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Sramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra

Vol. IV

NIHNAVA-VĀDA

Muni Ratna-prabha Vijaya.

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His most grateful and obedient

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RATNA-PRABHA VIJAYA.

PREFACE

The Text of Nihnavavāda.

Sources.

It is now a wellknown fact that *Riṣabhadēva Swāmī*, the first *Tīrthāṅkara* of the present series, was the founder of the *Jaina* Canon. It was during his regime that the Sacred Works of the Jainas came into existence. After him, the Sacred Works increased in number and quality when the religion was exalted to high rank, but they were reduced considerably in times of disorder and anarchy. Generally speaking, preachings of all the *Tīrthāṅkaras* happened to be of the same kind, and their lives were almost similar to each other in principal characteristics.

Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, the elder contemporary of *Gautama Buddha*, was the last, but Supreme *Tīrthāṅkara* in their whole dynasty. Like His predecessors, He too had got his preachings composed in books. His *Gaṇadharas* or principal disciples arranged those preachings in twelve *Aṅgas*, the last one being divided into fourteen *Parvas*. The Absolute Knowledge of these *Parvas* began to fade gradually till at last it was totally extinct. *Ārya Jambū Swāmī* was the last *Kēvalin*. After him there were half a dozen *Paṭṭadharas* designated as *Śruta-Kēvalins*. Then there were ten *Daśaparvins*, possessing the knowledge of ten *Parvas* only. *Ārya Vajra Swāmī* was the last *Daśaparvīn*, after whom the knowledge of *Parvas* began to fade quickly. *Dēvarddhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa* was the last of the type which possessed the knowledge of one *Parva* only.

Thus, when the knowledge of the original preaching of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra* was fast disappearing, it was rightly felt by some of his successors to commit those preachings to writings. As a result of such efforts, forty-five Sacred Works

came into existence: 11 *Āṅgas*, 12 *Upāṅgas*, 10 *Prakīrṇas*, 6 *Chēda-Sūtras*, 2 *Sūtras*, and 4 *Mūla-Sūtras*.^x Of these, the four *Mūla-Sūtras* are considered as the Original *Sūtras* or Commandments, because they are primarily needed to guide the Jaina Monks in their religious practices. *Āvaśyaka*, *Daśavaikālika*, *Uttarādhyayana* and *Piṇḍa Nirvyūkti* (or *Ogha Nirvyūkti*) are the four *Mūla Sūtras*. According to Weber, the order or composition of these *Sūtras* is this:—(1) *Uttarādhyayana* (2) *Āvaśyaka*. (3) *Daśavaikālika* and (4) *Piṇḍa Nirvyūkti*.

Though *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* is not the oldest of the four *Mūla Sūtras*, it is the most important of all, as its name suggests. *Sāmāyika* (*Sāmāiya*), *Caturviṃśati Stava* (*Cauvisattho*), *Vandanaka* (*Vandanayam*), *Pratikramaṇa* (*Paḍikkamaṇa*), *Kāyotsarga* (*Kāussagga*) and *Pratyākhyāna* (*Paccakkhāṇa*) are the six divisions of the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra*. It should be noted that though all these *Sūtras* were dedacted into books by *Gaṇadharas* they were originally preached by *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra*.*

Bhadrabāhu Swāmī had already written a *Nirvyūkti* on the *Āvaśyaka Sūtras* and a number of *Cūrṇis* were also composed by several authors as detailed commentaries on the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra*. Still, however, *Jinabhadra-gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa* felt the need of elucidating the Original *Nirvyūkti*; hence he wrote a *Bhāṣya* or Commentary in *gāthās* or verse on the *Nirvyūkti*. Since this was an additional *Bhāṣya* to the *Nirvyūkti*, which itself was a Commentary on the *Āvaśyaka Sūtra*, it was known as *Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya*. The whole work runs into 3603 *gāthās* or verses. It could further be divided into several sub-sections such as *Piṭhikā*,

^x In addition to these, some enumerate 20 more *Prakīrṇas*, 12 *Nirvyūktis*, and several more arriving at the total number of 84. Again in order to supplement the information supplied by those 84 *āgamas*, there are several other works known as *Nigamas* or *Upaniṣads* which, in turn, are 36 in all and bring the total number to 120.

* Vide क्रेण कया ति य ववहारओ जिणिदेण गणहरेहि च ।

तस्सामिणा उ निच्छयनयस्स तत्तो जओऽणण्णं ॥३३८२॥

(श्री विशेषावश्यक भाष्य)

Varavarikā, Upasargas, Sāmācārī (of ten varieties), *Gaṇadhara-vāda, Gaṇadharas, Nihnavas, Nihnavā-vāda, Śeṣa Upodghata, Niryukti* and *a-svādhyāya Niryukti*. Of these, *Gaṇadhara-vāda* and *Nihnavavāda* are the most important of all, because they discuss, both positively and negatively, several philosophical topics that are vitally connected with the Jainā āgamas.

Gaṇadharavāda and Nihnavavāda.

Although both the *Vādas* ultimately point to the common goal of the realisation of truth there is a great contrast between *Gaṇadhara-vāda* and *Nihnavavāda* in so far as their subject, method of discussion, debaters, and the consequences of debate are concerned. These points of contrast could be explained briefly as follows :—

Gaṇadharavāda deals with positive type of discussion while *Nihnavavāda* deals with negative type of discussion. Because *Gaṇadharavāda* strengthens the hands of *Jaina Āgamas* by asserting certain cardinal virtues of the *Jaina Religion*, while *Nihnavavāda* tries to repudiate the principle of Jainism in one way or the other weakening thereby its influence amongst the people. Discussions in G. V. are based on the interpretations of certain *Vedavacanas*, while those in N. V. are based on the interpretations of the *Jaina Āgamas*. *Gaṇadharas* enjoy the proud privilege of entering into debate with *Śramaṇa Bhagavan Mahāvīra* Himself, while *Nihnavas* enter into controversy with the Preceptor or of one *Gaccha* or the other. *Gaṇadharas* entertain honest doubts in their minds from the beginning and hence accept the principles of *Tīrthaṅkara* as soon as they are convinced; while *Nihnavas*, in most cases, do not leave their rigid beliefs in spite of any number of solid arguments advanced by their opponents. Debates of *Gaṇadharas*, therefore, seem to have generated for the realisation of truth, while those of *Nihnavas* are caused out of jealousy, anger, vanity or infatuation in many cases. Thus, love of truth is at the root of G. V., while insinuation of truth seems to be the root of N. V. It will, therefore, be seen that all the *Gaṇadharas* argue with their Celebrated Preceptor frankly

with true desire for knowledge, and hence they do not hesitate in accepting the Dikṣā ultimately when all their doubts are dispelled; while *Nihnavas* deliberately try to hide the truth in order to refute the theory of the *Tīrthaṅkara*, as they want to establish their own theory amongst the monks and create disruption in the *Gaccha*.

Faith in Āgamas is the guiding spirit of *Gaṇadharas*, while scepticism is the main characteristic of *Nihnavas*. In G. V., the debators are non-Jaina persons who are initiated into Jainism at the end, while in N. V. the debators are not only *Jainas* but the learned *Jaina* monks themselves who abandon the *Jaina* church and try to establish their own School. Logic, pure and simple, brings the debators to the right path in G. V., while physical punishment brings the debators to the right path in many cases in N. V.

In G. V., the discussions are held on a very high level as they treat philosophical subjects from beginning to end; while in N. V., the discussions sometimes fall to the level of mere logical tricks employed for refuting a small argument related to a certain statement of āgama. *Gaṇadharas* never went against the *Jaina* canon; on the contrary they sponsored the movement of establishing its influence over the masses by dedacting the principles of preachings of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra* into books. It was not so with *Nihnavas*. Since they were prominent monks holding strong influence over the public, the *Nihnavas* actually propagated their wrongly-based theories amongst the dull-witted monks and defiled certain portions of the *Gaccha* by dragging some of its members on their sides. *Rohagupta* and *Śivabhāti* are the glaring instances of this type. In short, the tendency of being at perfect agreement with the preachings of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra* signifies the character of *Gaṇadharas*; while that of being at disagreement with the same, either in part or in toto, reflects the character of *Nihnavas*.

Utility of Nihnavavāda—

It will appear from the points of contrast stated above that

Nihnavavāda has proved detrimental to the cause of Jainism. Although there is very little sympathy for *Nihnavas* amongst *Jainas*, it should be remembered that these intellectual outlaws have indirectly helped to strengthen the ground of Jainism by their apparent harsh activities. *Nihnavavāda* is not a mere quarrel. But it is an intellectual debate in which the real essence of the religious precepts are to test. After having passed through the hard test of the fire of *Nihnavavāda*, lustre of the precepts of the Jaina Canon has become brighter instead of becoming faint. Secondly, *Nihnavas* and their thoughts have done good turn to the followers of Jainism by holding a torch-light in the form of their plight as *Nihnavas* and warning them thereby of the disastrous consequences of running the risk that they had undertaken. Thirdly, *Nihnavavāda* draws our attention to one intrinsic weakness that is more or less inherent in every human being that of not putting into practice that we actually believe. Eventually such instances remind us of our own hypocrisy which is but another form of *Nihnavavāda* and make us introvert for a while to think if we could ever overcome the inconsistency of behaviour. Fourthly, the study of *Nihnavavāda* helps to cultivate intellectual robustness. Like *Nihnavas* one should learn to accept nothing without being convinced of it. Leaving aside their prejudicial temperament, *Nihnavas* possessed a remarkable quality of not accepting truth as it comes but only after intellectual test and direct experience. Their defeats teach us that there is one universal standard of testing truth and that is *anekāntavāda*, or all-embracing point of view. Fifthly, the story of each one of the *Nihnavas* is very interesting and provides literary flavour in between philosophical discussions. Being more realistic, it appeals to the common reader much more than mere enumeration or elucidation of religious precepts. Thus the study of *Nihnavavāda* bears importance from various sides.

Summary of the text—

A brief summary of the life-events and thoughts of different *Nihnavas* could be drawn as follows :—

Jamālī was the first *Nihnava*. He was the son-in-law of *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra* on the one hand and his nephew on the other. He was conversant with eleven *Āṅgas*. He was the head of a retinue of 500 monks while his wife was the chief of 1000 nuns. Once, after having separated from *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra* without his consent, as he was laid down with high fever, he ordered his followers to prepare a bed for him. While the monks were spreading the bed for him, he questioned them as to whether the bed was ready. The monks said 'yes'. But, in the heat of fever, *Jamālī* asserted that what was being spread could not be said to have been actually spread. Eventually he refused to accept the wellknown doctrine of 'Kriyamāṇam Kritam', 'caliyamāṇam calitam etc. found in the *Bhagavati Sūtra*. According to him, actual production of an object is achieved after *dirghakāla* or long time. The *sthaviras* tried to refute his theory of 'bahurata' which advanced the faults of *nityakritatva*, *mithyākriyā* etc. by putting forth various sound counter-arguments. But *Jamālī* did not listen to them. Consequently, some of the *sthaviras* left his side and returned to *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra*, while a few stuck to him and followed the theory of 'Bahuratas'. *Jamālī* boasted about his *Kēvalitva* even before the *Tīrthaṅkara*. *Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra* explained to him the transitoriness of *Jīva* like *loka* and asked him to renounce his theory. But *Jamālī* did not even put faith in him. Thereafter he led the life of a *stanuch śramaṇa* and met death without repenting for his misbelief. His wife, however, renounced the *Bahurata* theory after having grasped the truth on experiencing the burn of a charcoal thrown on her by a potter named *Dhaṅka*.

Tiśyagupta was the second *Nihnava*. He happened to be the student of *Ācārya Vasu* who was a *Śruta-Kēvalin*. In course of his study of *Purvas*, *Tiśyagupta* came across a conversation between the *Tīrthaṅkara* and his pupil discussing the definition of *Jīva*, where-in the *Tīrthaṅkara* asserts that not a portion or two but all the portions combined together, form *Jīva*. *Tiśyagupta* misinterpretes this *ālāpaka* and propounds a new theory that the last portion of a living being by which it becomes complete in.

form can alone be called Jīva. The preceptor tries to remove his misbelief by repeated assertions that it is not the last portion that brings about the completion of a living being, but each and every constituent of it, helps to do so, as each part of an object can never be taken as different from the object according to Evambhata Naya. Tisyagupta does not feel convinced and hence is expelled from the Gaccha. Thereafter he begins to wander here and there propagating his theory of 'Antya-pradeśatva' and finally arrives at the city of Āmalakalpā, where he is invited for dinner by a śrāvaka called Mitraśrī, who, by offering him the last portions of various articles of food, drink etc. opens his eyes and compels him to come to the right path.

Ārya Āśādhācārya was the pioneer of a third type of Nihnavas known as Avyaktas. He happened to be a preceptor in the Paulāśāḍha church of the city of Śvetavikā. While teaching the practice of āgāḍha yoga to his pupils, Āśādhācārya died on account of acute pain in heart and attained divyine form in the Nalinigulma region of Saudharma deva-loka. But when he knew by means of Avadhi jñāna that his pupils were engrossed in the study of yoga, he condescended to return to his original human form and proceeded with his work. So, the god in disguise of a preceptor taught the aims, explanations, and commandments of the Holy Writ. Ultimately, at the time of departure he informed the sādhus of his asaṃyata-dēvatva and begged their apology.

The young sādhus became sceptical at this instance. They began to doubt their own fellow brothers on the plea that one could never ascertain whether one was saṃyata or asaṃyata. They decided, therefore, not to respect anyone. The sthaviras tried to persuade these young sceptics in several ways but it was all in vain. Consequently the Ayaktavādins had to be expelled from the gaccha. Thereafter, on their arrival at Rājagriha, King Balabhadra sent for these Nihnavas and ordered them to be killed under the feet of elephants. For, the king argued, it could not be ascertained as to whether they were sādhus or

thieves. The Nihnavas then pleaded that they were real sādhus. The king replied that if they were real sādhus they ought to have respected their own sthaviras as real sādhus. This made the Avyaktas leave their false belief and join the gaccha after tendering due apology.

Ārya Aśvāmītra was the fourth Nihnava. He was the pupil of Ācārya Mahāgiri of the yakṣa temple in the city of Mithilā. While studying the Naipuṇika chapter of the Āṇupravāda Parva, Aśvāmītra came across a statement dealing with the discussion of *Chinna* and *chēdanaka*, which asserted that "all the Nārakas of the present convention will perish and so will all the deities." On reading this, Aśvāmītra conjectured that if all the Nārakas were to perish, all other living beings would as well meet destruction as soon as they were born. Consequently, he thought, they would not be able to attain the rewards of good and evil deeds. In this way, he began to draw several conclusions on false conjectures. The preceptor proved the absurdity of his theory by pointing out various in-consistencies in accepting the entire destruction of an object at the end of a particular condition of time, asserted by the Kṣaṇikakṣaya vāda of Aśvāmītra from the point of view of Rijustūtra Naya. Aśvāmītra, however, did not give up his false notion, and was subsequently expelled from the Gaccha. Thereafter, in the city of Rājagriha, the watchmen caught hold of Aśvāmītra and hit him and his retinue alleging them to be burglars. Aśvāmītra pleaded that they were none but śrāvakas belonging to a particular gaccha. But the watchmen refused to believe on the strength of their own theory and retorted that those śramaṇas and the gaccha had already perished there and then only. This brought Aśvāmītra to senses and he joined the original church by tendering due apology.

Ārya Gaṅgācārya was the fifth Nihnava. He propounded the theory of Dvaikriyās viz. that of two processes taking place simultaneously. In a village on the bank of river Ullūka, there lived a monk named Dhanagiri who had a pupil called Gaṅgācārya. Once, while crossing the river, Gaṅgācārya, bald-headed as he was, felt the heat of sunshine on his head, and the cold of

river-water on his feet. At this time, he formed a wrong notion that both the experiences took place simultaneously, and contradicted thereby the precept of Āgamas which had laid down that two processes of feeling could never take place simultaneously. He reported the theory to his preceptor and quoted his personal experience in support of it. The preceptor replied that the processes of undergoing two different feelings seem to work simultaneously on account of one's own inability to mark the subtle gap of time between the two as well as the quickness of mind. He established the validity of Āgamas and refuted the mis-belief of Dvaikriyā by proving an important principle of perception that there can never be more than one *upayoga* or application of mind, at one time, explaining the difference between general and definite types, of knowledge. Eventually, he was compelled by Mañināga to give up his false notion, and Gaṅgācārya had to do so out of fear. Ultimately, he resorted to his original school after tendering the apology.

Rohagupta, the pioneer of Vaiśeṣika System, was known as the Sixth Nihlava. He entered into controversy with a mendicant ascetic in the court of king Balaśrī of the city of Antarañjikā and defeated him by establishing the theory of three categories successfully. The defeated mendicant was expelled from the city, while victorious Rohagupta went to his preceptor and narrated the whole incident before him. Ācārya Śrīgupta inquired about the theory of Trairāśikas. So, Rohagupta explained that he had established the existence of three categories of Jīva viz. Jīva, Ajīva and Nojīva, by means of various tricks and examples. The Ācārya congratulated him on the success, but at the same time he advised Rohagupta to declare before the people that although he had proved the validity of the Trairāśika theory, they should not follow the same, as it went against the Jaina Āgamas. Rohagupta declined to do so. Consequently, Ācārya had to enter into controversy with him in the Royal court. They discussed the principle of Trairāśikas at length for six months. Ultimately, it was agreed by both the parties to approach the *kuṭrikāpaṇa* (Universal Shop) where all the objects existing in

three lokas were available. Accordingly, the Ācārya asked for nojīva at the Kutrikāpaṇa but it was not available. Consequently, Rohagupta was declared as Nihṇava and was expelled from the gaccha in a humiliating condition. He attracted a number of followers by propagating the Trairāśika theory and started a separate school of Vaiśeṣikas which, unlike Jaina Āgamas, established the principle of six entities viz. Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa and Samavāya.

Goṣṭhā-Māhila was the Seventh Nihṇava. He belonged to the Ikṣugriha Gaccha of Daśapura Nagara. He was angry with the preceptor Rakṣitasari for having appointed Durbalikā Puṣpamitra as the head of the Gaccha after him. So, when Puṣpamitra gave sermons on the eighth and ninth Parvas, Goṣṭhā-Māhila did not even care to listen to him. He heard the same from Vindhya who had carefully attended and understood the sermons. In course of discussion of the Karmaṇyāśāstra parva, when he heard from Vindhya that Karman is tied, attached and infused with all the regions of Jīva, he contradicted that principle of āgama and tried to assert that Karman was attached to Jīva only on the surface like the skin of a snake. He did not accept the relation of Jīva and Karman as that of milk and water or that of fire and iron. Further, he objected to the predicament which laid down that the practice of pratyākhyāna is to be followed by all the monks in mind, speech, and action till the end of their life, and asserted that the sanctity of the vow could be preserved only if it were to be practised without a time-limit. Vindhya tried to explain the purport of the āgama, but Goṣṭhā-Māhila did not listen to him. The matter was then reported to Ācārya Durbalikā Puṣpamitra. The Ācārya repudiated the view-point of Goṣṭhā Māhila by means of various pramāṇas and propounded the commandment of Scriptures that pratyākhyāna could never continue after death on the ground that Mukatātmā is free from duty of observing vow after leaving the mundane world. But Goṣṭhā Māhila arrogantly rejected the Ācārya's view-point and quoted the authority of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra in support of his own. Eventually it was decided in the assembly.

of sthaviras to refer the matter to Tirthaṅkara Sīmandara Swāmi. And it was done so through a goddess, who brought the verdict of the Tirthaṅkara in favour of the Ācārya. Goṣṭhā Māhila, who refused to accept even the authority of Tirthaṅkara Bhagavān, was then declared as Seventh Nihlava, and was immediately expelled from the Gaccha. He remained as a Nihlava till the end of his life.

Boṭika is a peculiar type of Nihnavas which gave rise to the sect of Digambaras. Śivabhūti was the pioneer of that sect. Originally, he happened to be a Royal attendant in the city of Rathavīrapura. He was very irregular in his habits. He used to come home after midnight. So, his wife was very much unhappy. Once when he came home late at night his mother rebuked him and did not allow him to enter the house. Śivabhūti left the home in pride and anger. He came near an Upāśraya where he found the Jaina Sādhus engrossed in their study at that late hour. Ācārya Kṛṣṇasūri was the head of the gaccha. Śivabhūti approached the ascetics and requested them to initiate him into asceticism. The ascetics refused to give him dīkṣā at the first instance, but subsequently Śivabhūti got himself initiated into gaccha.

Once, when all the Sādhus were on Vihāra, Śivabhūti received a blanket as present from a king. Śivabhūti was so much fascinated towards the new blanket that he kept it with him in spite of the preceptor forbidding him to do so. Once, when Śivabhūti was away, the preceptor took out his blanket, cut it into pieces and distributed the same amongst the sādhus. Śivabhūti's mind was greatly perturbed at this. He then heard the discourse of preceptor on Jinakalpika, and the apparel of a sādhu. Śivabhūti boasted to become Jinakalpika by complete renunciation. Accordingly, he gave up all his clothes and stayed in the garden without clothes. The Ācārya and several other sthaviras tried to dissuade him from giving up clothes by explaining the true spirit of niṣparigraha in various ways. But out of vanity and passion, Śivabhūti did not listen to him. His sister also followed

the brother in this respect but she was subsequently asked to put on garments. Thus Śivabhūti sponsored the sect of Digambaras. He had initiated two pupils viz. Kauṇḍinya and Koṭṭavīra, who prolonged the sect by tradition.

Commentaries—

Three commentaries are said to have been written on the text of Śrī Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. The author himself is said to have written a commentary on his own work, but unfortunately, his commentary is not available at present. The second commentary has been written by Koṭyācārya (or Śīlāṅkācārya) the manuscript of which dated 1136 V. S. is preserved in the Bhāndārkar Research Institute, Poona, in a tattered condition. This commentary has not been published as yet. The only commentary that has been published and popularly accepted at present is that of Maladhāri Hēmacandrācārya.

Maladhāri Hēmacandrācārya is different from Kali-kālasarvajña Hēmacandrācārya, the wellknown author of Dvyāśraya. Originally, he was known as Śvetāmbarācārya Bhaṭṭāraka. His worldly name was Pradyumna and in the prime of his youth, it is said, he was a minister. By the advice of Śrī Ambayādēva sūri he renounced the worldly life and having left his four wives, he entered the ascetic life. Siddharāja Jayasīmha, the great monarch of Gujarat, of the twelfth century V. S., was highly impressed by his great personality and wide-spread well-versedness.

The Author—His Life, Works, and Date.

Life—

Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa is the author of this splendid work. Very little is known about his life. Yet, there is no doubt that the author was a highly-esteemed scholar of his age †

† Here are the tributes paid to him by several commentators:—

(i) जिनभद्रगणिं स्तौमि क्षमाश्रमणमुत्तमम् ।

यः श्रुताज्जीतमुद्भवे शौरिः सिन्धोः सुधामिव ॥ १ ॥

—*Tilakācārya* in his *Āvaśayaka Vṛitti*.

He was the first Jaina writer and preacher who had consistently attempted to interpret and explain the principles of the Jaina Canon in such a manner as to appeal to the intellect of the people. That is to say, he did not instruct his pupils or followers only in a traditional way without caring for the inner motive or spirit of the preachings. Though he preached the same old traditional principles of the Jaina Canon, he interpreted and explained them in a logical way so as to appeal to their intellect. He was, therefore, accepted by the people as an unparalleled preacher and scholar of the age, and hence was awarded the title of “yugapradhāna”.§

His knowledge was not confined to the religious lore, but he was well-versed in the sciences of mathematics, etymology, prosody, and phonology also.‡

Still, however, Ācārya Jinabhadragāṇi was the staunch and orthodox upholder of the traditional Jaina Canon. Though he knew many sciences, his extensive knowledge and intelligence were taken advantage of only for establishing the authenticity

(ii) वाक्यैर्विशेषातिशयैर्विश्वसन्देहहारिभिः ।

जिनमुदं जिनभद्रं किं क्षमाश्रमणं स्तुवे ॥

—Muni-Candra Sūri in Amara Caritra.

(iii) जिनवचननतं विषमं भावार्थं यो विविच्य शिष्येभ्यः ।

इत्थमुपादिशदमलं परोपकारैककृतचेताः ॥

तं नमत बोधजलधिं गुणमंदिरमखिलवाग्मिनां श्रेष्ठम् ।

चरणश्रियोपगूढं जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणम् ॥

—Malayagiri Sūri in his Commentary on Brihat Kṣetra Samāsa.

§ Vide नमह य अणुओग-धरं जुगप्पहाणं पहाणनाणायमयं ।

सव्व-सुइ-सत्थ-कुसलं दंसण-नाणोवओगमग्गम्मिठियं ॥

—Siddhasena Sari in his Carṇi on Jitakalpasatṛa.

‡ Vide स-समय पर-समयागम-लिवि-गणिय-छन्द-सहनिम्माओ ।

दससु वि दिसासु जस्स य अणुओगो (अणुवमो) भणइ जसपडहो ॥

(Ibid)

and validity of the Jaina Āgamas. He is therefore, taken as one of the pioneer āgama-pradhāna or orthodox Ācāryas*

He used to take the support of logical illustrations and inferences only partially in the sense that such illustrations or inferences were quoted only if they strengthened the view-point of the traditional Jaina Āgamas, and were rejected if they went against the traditional preachings. The example of his predecessor Siddhasēna Divākara is wellknown. Siddhasēna was a free-minded but logical interpreter. His works are full of original thoughts and independent ideas irrespective of their being different from or similar to the traditional Jaina Āgamas. The theory that Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Perception do not take place simultaneously but one after the other, has been proved by him by the help of logical inferences and concrete illustrations. Siddhasēna thus went against the traditional view of the Jaina Āgamas according to which the Kēvala-Jñāna and the Kēvala-Darśana took place simultaneously. Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa repudiates the theory of Siddhasēna Divākara in his Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya and re-establishes the original theory of the Jaina Āgamas that Kēvala Darśana and Kēvala Jñāna take place simultaneously. § Jinabhadragaṇi is, thus, well-renowned as the up-holder of the Jaina traditions.

That Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa was an orator of established reputation is known from several sources. The commentator Hēmacandrācārya Maladhāri refers to Jinabhadragaṇi as “Upa Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇāḥ Vyākhyātāraḥ”. Another commentator named Koṭyācārya, who has written a commentary on the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, pays him a tribute to the same effect in the last verse of his commentary. He says.†

* Vide परसमयागम-निउणं सुसमिय-सुसमण-समाहिमग्गमयं ।

जिणभइखमासमणं खमासमणाणं निहाणमिव एकं ॥

(Ibid)

Also vide Jītakalpasūtra Editor's Preface, p. 7.

§ Vide वंसण-नाणोवओग (मग्गम्मि) ठियं ।

† Vide “Short History of Jaina Literature” Ed. by M. D. Desai, p. 152, foot-note.

भाष्यं सामायिकस्य स्फुटविकटपदार्थोपगूढं बृहद्य-
 छ्रीमत्पूज्यैरकारि क्षतकलुषधियां भूरिसंस्कारधारि ।
 तस्य व्याख्यानमात्रं किमपि विदधता यन्मया पुण्यमाप्तं-
 प्रेत्याहं द्राग् लभेयं परमपरिमितां प्रान्तिमत्रैव तेन ॥

No more information is available about the life of this great Acārya.

Works—

Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamaśramaṇa is said to have composed the following works:—

(i) Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya : This wellknown work has been ranked as one of the most important and highly esteemed works of Jainism. The author himself wrote a commentary on this Bhāṣya in Sanskrit. Jinabhadragaṇi has earned the reputation as a commentator mainly from this work. For, wherever he has been referred to as Bhāṣyakāra, the references have been quoted from Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. But as has been suggested in the Preface to the Jīta Kalpa Sūtra* it is not improbable if Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamaśramaṇa had composed other bhāṣyas as well. Take, for example, the following verse from the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya—

पोग्गल-मोदय-दन्ते फरुसगवडसालभञ्जने चैव ।
 श्रीणाद्वियस्स प प दिट्ठंता होंति नायव्वा ॥ २३५ ॥

In this verse, the examples of poggala (flesh) modaya (sweet-balls) danta (teeth) pharusaga (a potter) and vaḍasāla (the branch of a tree) have not been explained in details by the commentators. Ācārya Hēmacandra Maladhāri suggestively remarks that “ एतान्युदाहरणानि विशेषतो निशीथादवसेयानि ” (These examples should be understood in details from Nīśeetha).

Koṭyācārya† also leaves the remark unexplained merely by saying “ निशीथे वक्ष्यामः ” (We shall explain this in Nīśeetha).

* Vide Jīta Kalpa Sūtra, Preface, Page 9.

† Whose commentary has not been published, but is preserved in the Bhāndārkar Research Institute, Poona.

The question arises as to who is the author of Nīseeth. The tradition does not give the credit of authorship either to Hēma-candrācārya Maladhāri or to Koṭyācārya. So, it is probable that the commentary must have been written by Jinabhadragaṇi and the sentence “निशीथे वक्ष्यामः” found in the commentary of Koṭyācārya, might have originally belonged to the commentary written by Śrī Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa himself.

(ii) Brihat Saṃgrahaṇi—This work runs in almost 500 verses. Ācārya Malayagiri Śrī has written a commentary on this work in Sanskrit. The work along with the Commentary has already been published.

(iii) Brihat Kṣētra-Samāsa—This is also a similar work. Ācārya Śrī Malayagiri Śrī and others have written commentaries and the work along with the commentaries is published.

(iv) Jīta Kalpa Sutra—This work lays down various religious practices to be followed by the Jaina monks. The work is also dealing with the ten types of remonstrations. The subject of remonstrations has already been treated in the Chēda-sutra and other works. Jinabhadragaṇi seems to have composed this work with a view to treat the subject in a precise and comprehensive manner.

The oldest commentary available on this work at present is the cārṇi of Siddhasēna in Prākṛit. In his Cārṇi, Siddhasēna remarks at one place that there existed some other cārṇi also, before he composed his one, but that is not available at present. On this Cārṇi of Siddhasēna, Śrī Candra Śrī has written explanatory notes in Sanskrit.

Besides the cārṇi of Siddhasēna, there is one more cūrṇi available in Prākṛit verses. It is difficult to say whether it is the same cūrṇi that he refers to or it is different from his own. Nothing is known about the author and the date of composition

§ अहवा वितियचुन्निकरा-मिप्पाएण चत्वारि वि सुत्तेण व गहिया ।

either from the portion in the beginning or one at the end.*

(v) *Viśeṣaṇāvah*:—This book is a miscellaneous work comprised into nearly 400 Prākṛit verses and is not published as yet.

In addition to the above-mentioned five works, some people consider *Dhyāna-śataka* which has been incorporated by Ācārya Mahārāja Haribhadra Śrī in his commentary on the *Āvaśyaka Sūtras*, also to be the composition of Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamā-śramaṇa. But there are not sufficient evidences to convince us of his authorship of *Dhyāna-Śataka*.

Date—

There are no definite means that help us to fix the exact date of Jinabhadragaṇi kṣamā-śramaṇa. Still, however, the tradition of various Paṭṭāvalis throws considerable light on the problem. The tradition of the Paṭṭāvalis written after the sixteenth century (V. S.) tells us that Jinabhabragaṇi kṣamāśramaṇa flourished 1115 years after the Nirvāṇa of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra. This fixes the date somewhere about 645 V. S.

There is another theory which assigns to Jinabhadragaṇi 500 years earlier than his commentator Maladhāri Hēmacandrācārya who is said to have flourished in 1175 V. S. according to this theory also, Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamā-śramaṇa must have flourished somewhere about 650-675 V. S.

The author of *Tapāgaccha Paṭṭāvali* places Jinabhadragaṇi kṣamā-śramaṇa as the contemporary of Ācārya Śrīmaṇ Hari bhadra Śrī who is said to have written a commentary on *Dhyāna Śataka*. According to this view, Jinabhadra Gaṇi had lived a long life of 104 years and though Ācārya Haribhadra Śrī was senior to him by 60 or 65 years, both of them

* At the end of this bhāṣya the only reference is this:—

सं. १७२० वर्षे मार्गशीर्ष शुद्धि १ शुक्रवासरे अद्यहे श्रीपक्षजे लि. श्री मोद ज्ञातिना काशीदासात्मेजन अंबादत्तेन। शुभं भवतु। शिवमस्तु।

(Jīta Kalpa Sūtra, Preface P. 17)

happened to be contemporaries on account of the long life of Jinabhadragaṇi.* This view is not sound because Haribhadra Sūri did not, in fact, flourish in 530 V. S. or 580 V. S. but he flourished between 757 and 875 V. S. as has been suggested. Secondly, Śrīmān Haribhadra Sūri has frequently quoted Jinabhadragaṇi's sūtras in his Āvaśyaka Vritti. It is, therefore, clear that Jinabhadragaṇi did not in any case flourish after Haribhadra Sūri.

According to other Paṭṭāvalis, all of Jinabhadragaṇi, Haribhadra Sūri, Dēvarddhigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, Śīlaṅkācārya and Kālakācārya happened to be contemporaries. But the history of the development of Jainism shows that the theory is wrongly based. The date of Śrīmān Haribhadra Sūri has been fixed as the latter half of the eighth and the first half of the 9th century V. S. Jinabhadragaṇi has been placed in the latter half of the 7th and the first half of the 8th century V. S. Dēvarddhigaṇi kṣamā śramaṇa and Kālakācārya are said to have flourished in the beginning of the 6th century V. S.

Leaving others aside, let us consider if Jinabhadragaṇi and Śīlaṅkācārya happened to flourish at the same time. The tradition says that Śīlaṅkācārya was the priest of Vanarāja, the king of Anahillapura Paṭaṇa. If this is true, the date of Śīlaṅkācārya falls somewhere near 800 V. S. This places Śīlaṅkācārya undoubtedly as the contemporary of Ācārya Śree Haribhadra Sūriḥ. Now some of the Paṭṭāvalis refer to Śīlaṅkācārya as the pupil of Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa. If this Śīlaṅkācārya is the same as the commentator Koṭyācārya, several references about Jinabhadragaṇi found in his commentary on the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya, do not in any way lead us to believe that Śīlaṅkācārya was the pupil of Jinabhadragaṇi. Unfortunately, the first and last portions of this commentary are torn out,† but in course of his commentary the commentator refers to Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa at several places. e. g.

* Vide Śrī Tapāgachchha Paṭṭāvali, Vol I. page 98.

† Vide Jītakalpa Sūtra, Preface, pp. 14-15.

- (i) जिनभद्रगणिक्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादैस्तु नोक्तम् ।
- (ii) अत एव पूज्यपादैः स्वटीकायां प्रायोपग्रहणं कृतम् ।
- (iii) क्षमाश्रमणटीका त्वीयम् ।
- (iv) क्षमाश्रमणटीकापीयम् ।
- (v) श्रीमत्क्षमाश्रमणपूज्यपादानामभिप्रायो लक्षणीयः

Although these references show how much respect the commentator had for Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa, they do not in any way lead us to believe that Jinabhadragaṇi was his preceptor. On the contrary, we find a reference which shows a considerable gulf of time between the dates of Jinabhadragaṇi and Śīlaṅkācārya. The reference is this:—

भाष्याननुयायि पाठान्तरमिदं अग्रतः,
एवमनेनैव वृद्धिक्रमेणेत्यादेरर्वाक्,
न चेदं भूयसीषु प्रतिषु दृश्यते ॥ ‡

This reference shows that there were various readings of Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya in the time of Śīlaṅkācārya, which means that a considerable period of time must have elapsed after the composition of the Viśeṣāvaśyaka Bhāṣya. This, therefore, prevents us from accepting the view that Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa was the preceptor and hence the contemporary of Śīlaṅkācārya.

Thus there are many difficulties in accepting Jinabhadragaṇi as the contemporary of Śīlaṅkācārya or even that of Haribhadra sūriji and others.

It is, therefore, proper to believe that unless and until there is no evidence against the belief of the tradition, there is no objection in accepting the date of Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa as roughly about the second half of the seventh century V. S.

It is hoped that transliteration, translation, and the digest of Sanskrit commentary attached to each verse will prove useful to the students of Jaina Philosophy.

Gujarat College,
AHMEDABAD.
27th October 1947.

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D. P. Thaker

‡ Ibid p. 15.


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क्षमाश्रमण श्रीजिनभद्रगणिसन्द्भः :

॥ निहववादः ॥

श्रीमलधारिहेमचन्द्रसूरिकृतटीकासमलङ्कृतः ।



Kṣamāśramaṇa Jinabhadra Gaṇi's


NIHNAVA-VĀDA

Along with

Maladhārin Hemchandra Sūri's Commentary

Chapter I.

Introductory



Before proceeding with the actual निहववाद Nihnava-vāda (i. e. the discussions of the Nihnavas) it is incumbent to note in short, the life-history of each of the different types of Nihnavas and also to lay down the contest to which those discussions have been related.

एवं विहियपुहत्तेहिं रक्खियज्जेहिं पसमित्तेहिं ।

ठविए गणिम्मि किर गोढमाहिलो पडिनिवेसेणं ॥१॥२२९६॥

सो मिच्छत्तोदयओ सत्तमओ निण्हवो समुप्पण्णो ।

के अत्ते छंभणिए पसंगओ निण्हउप्पत्ती ॥२॥२२९७॥

1. Evam vihiya puhattehim Rakkhijajjehim Pasamittehim ।
Tihvie gaṇimmi kira Goṭṭhamāhito padiniveseṇam 2296,

2. So micchattodayao sattamao Niṇhavo samuppaṇṇo ।

Ke anne cha bbhaṇie pasanigato niṇha-uppatti. 2297.

[एवं विहितपृथक्त्वे रक्षितार्यैः पुष्पमित्रे ।

स्थापिते गणिनि किल गोष्ठामाहिलः प्रतिनिवेशेन ॥१॥२२९६॥

स मिथ्यात्वोदयतः सप्तमको निहवः समुत्पन्नः ।

केऽन्ये षड् भणिताः प्रसङ्गतो निहवोत्पत्तिः ॥२॥२२९७॥

1. Evam vihitaprithaktve Rakṣittaryaiḥ Puṣpamitre ।

Sthāpīte gaṇini kila Goṣṭhāmāhilaḥ pratiniveśena, 2296.

2. Sa mithyā-tvodayataḥ sapṭamako nihnavāḥ samutppannaḥ.

Ke'anye ṣaḍ bhaṇittāḥ prasangto nihnavotpattih 2, 2297]

Trans 1-2. Thus, indeed, when (Durbalikā) Puṣpamitra was appointed to the post of a preceptor by Arya-Rakṣita sūri who had instructed his pupils in the use of the different Anuyogas. Goṣṭhāmāhila through a wrong impression became the seventh Nihnava on account of the pre-eminence of Mithyātva (Wrong Belief). (The pupil asks):—"Who are the other six?" Incidentally the origins of the Nihnavas are described. 2296-2297.

टीका १ २ एवमुक्तप्रकारेण विहितानुयोगपृथक्त्वरार्यरक्षित
भिर्देवं यियासुभिर्नृत-तैल-बलघटादिप्ररूपणां सकलगच्छसमक्षं विधाय दुर्ब-
लिकापुष्पमित्रे गणिन्याचार्ये स्थापिते यो मथुरानगर्यामून्यतीर्थकेन सह
“वचस्वी” इति कृत्वा वाददानार्थं सुरिभिर्निजमातुलको गोष्ठामाहिलः
प्रेषित आसीत्, स यशः शेषेषु स्वरिषु प्रति वादिनं जित्वा समागतः सन्
“मामेवंभूतं वचस्विनं परितज्यान्योऽयमृषिमूककल्पः स्वरिभिराचार्य उप-
वेशितः, तत्पश्य कीदृशं तैः कृतम्” इत्यभिप्रायतः, तथा ततंरच घृतघटा-
दिप्ररूपणां श्रुत्वा प्रतिनिवेशेन गाढानुशयेन यो मिथ्यात्वादयो जातस्तस्मात्
स गोष्ठामाहिलः सप्तमो निहवः समुत्पन्नः । ननु यद्ययं सप्तमः, तर्हि केऽन्ये
षड्? इत्याशङ्क्य प्रसङ्गतो निहवोत्पत्तिर्भण्यते । इत्येका प्रस्तावना ॥

२२९६ + २२९७.

Digest of Commentary-

The Context in short, runs as follows:—

Having explained to his pupil Durbalikā Puṣpamitra (दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र) the various नयस Nayas (or philosophical systems through which the objects are perceived) and Anuyogas अनुयोग-the different methods of exposition of various subjects in details, Ācārya Ārya-Rakṣitasūri आचार्य आर्यरक्षितसूरि appointed him as his successor to the post of preceptorship at Mathurā (Muttrā) मथुरा.

At this time, Goṣṭhāmāhila गोष्ठामाहिल, the seventh Nihnava-who, in his wordly life happened to be the maternal uncle of Ācārya Mahārāja Arya Rakṣitasūriji and who was one of the most learned pupils of the Ācārya,-comes to him after having defeated a non-Jain adversary in a controversial discussion to which he was sent by the Ācārya, and remarks with vanity “Why should the preceptor appoint a shy and weak person like Durbalikā Puṣpamitra, as an Ācārya, leaving aside a smart and eloquent person like me?” Being incidentally impelled by personal hatred and vanity, he further tries to hide and refute the Truth propagated by all the Tīrthaṅkaras and the Preceptor, and as a result of that, he turns out to be a Nihnava. For, one who tries to deny and disbelieve the truthful theories merely by hiding the truth out of sheer vanity is called a निह्नव Nihnava.

Goṣṭhāmāhila was the seventh Nihnava. In connection with the story of this Nihnava, the author describes in details, the life-history as well as the discussions of each of the other six types of Nihnavas, in regular order. 1-2 (2296-2297.)

अहवा चोएइ नयाणुओगनिणहवणओ कहं गुरवो ।
 न हि निणहवति, भण्णइ जओ न जंपंति नत्थित्ति ॥३॥२२९८॥
 न य मिच्छभावणाए वयंति जो पुण पयंपि निणहवइ ।
 मिच्छाभिनिवेसाओ स निणहवो बहुरयाइ व्व ॥४॥२२९९॥

3. Ahavā cōei Nayāṇuoganinhavaṇao kaham guravo ।

Na hi niṇhavati, bhaṇṇai jao na jampanti natthi tti 2298

4. Nā-ya micchabhāvaṇāe vayan̄ti jo puṇa payam pi niṇhavai ।

Micchābhinivesāo sa nihhavo Bahurayāi vva । 2299

[अथवा चौदयति नयानुयोगनिहवतः कथं गुरवः ।

न हि निहवा इति, भण्यते यतो न जल्पन्ति न सन्तीति

॥३॥२२९८॥

न च मिथ्याभावनया वदन्ति य पुनः पदमपि निहनुते ।

मिथ्याभिनिवेशात् स निहवो बहुरतादिरिव ॥४॥२२९९॥

3. Athavā codayati nayanuyoganihnavataḥ, katham guravaḥ ।

Na hi nihnavā:iti, bhanyate yato na jalpanti na santīti 3 (2298)

4. Na ca mithyābhāvanayā vadanti ya punaḥ padampi nihnute ।

Mithyābhiniवेशात् sa nihnavo Bahuratādiriva 4 (2299)].

Trans. 3-4. Or, (if one asks) “Why are not the gurus nihnavas, on account of their hiding the nayas and anuyogas? (The reply is) —“They do not say that the nayas and anuyogas are not (existing). They do not also say so, on account of feelings of Mithyāṭva. He, who hides even a syllable by obstinately insisting on through Mithyāṭva, is a Nihnavas like Bahuratas etc.

टीका ३-४ अथवेति प्रस्तावनान्तरसूचकः । परः प्रेरयति—ननु नयानुयोगनिहवात् कथमार्यरक्षितगुरवो न निहवा भण्यन्ते ? । अत्रोत्तरम्—यतो “न सन्ति नयानुयोगाः” इति ते न जल्पन्ति; नापि मिथ्यात्वभावनया मिथ्याभिनिवेदेन ते किञ्चिद् वदन्ति । किन्तु प्रवचनहितार्थमेव नयानुयोग-गोपनं तैर्विहितम् । यः पुनर्मिथ्याभिनिवेशादेकमपि जिनोक्तं पदं निहनुते स बहुरतादिवज्जमलयादिवद् निहव एवेति ॥ २२९८ ॥ २२९९ ॥

The author, then, enumerates the various types of nihnavas as follows:—

बहुरय एस अव्वत्त सामुच्छा दुग तिग अबद्धिआ चैव ।

एएसिं निग्गमणं वोच्छामि अहाणुपुव्वीए ॥५॥ ॥२३००॥

Bahuraya paesa avvata sāmucchā duga tiga abaddhiā cēva ।

Eṣim niggaṃaṇaṃ vocchāmi ahāṇupuvvīē 5. (2300).

बहुरता प्रदेशा अव्यक्ता सामुच्छेदा द्वैक्रियास्त्रैराशिका अबद्धिकाश्चैव ।

एतेषां निर्गमनं वक्ष्येऽथानुपुर्व्या ॥ ५ ॥ २३०० ॥

Bahuratā pradeśā avyaktā sāmucchedā dvaikriyā strairāśika
abaddhikaścaiva ।

Eteṣām nirgamanam vaksye' athānupurvyā 5 (2300)].

Trans. 5 *Bahuratas* (or those who uphold the theory of the Long Range of time); *Pradeśās* (or those who attribute consciousness to the last pradeśa only); *Avyaktās* (or those having dubious and unfirm opinions); *Sāmucchedās* (or those who believe in the utter im-permanence of everything); *Dvaikriyās* (or those who attribute two actions to one object at the same time); *Strairāśikās* or those who uphold the theory of three categories viz—*Jīva* is free from the bondage of Karma). Now, I shall describe the production (of each one) of them in serial order (2300).

टीका ५ 'बहुरय ति' एकस्मिन् क्रियासमये वस्तु नोत्पद्यते, किन्तु बहुभिः क्रियासमयैः, इत्यभ्युपगमाद् बहुषु समयेषु रताः स न बहुरता दीर्घ-कालवस्तुप्रभवप्ररूपका इत्यर्थः । "पएस ति" पूर्वपदलोपाजीवप्रदेशा इति द्रष्टव्यम्, यथा वीरो महावीर इति । एक एव चरमप्रदेशो जीव इत्यभ्युपग-माजीवः प्रदेशो येषां ते जीवप्रदेशा निह्नुवाश्चरमप्रदेशजीवप्ररूपिण इति हृदयम् । "अव्यक्त ति" उत्तरपदलोपादव्यक्तमता यथा भीमो भीमसेन इति । न ज्ञायतेऽत्र कोऽपि संयतः, कोऽप्यसंयत इत्यव्यक्तस्यैव सर्वस्याभ्युपगमाद् न व्यक्तमव्यक्तमस्फुटम्, अव्यक्तं मतं येषां तेऽव्यक्तमताः संयतः संयताद्यवगमे संदिग्धबुद्धय इत्यर्थः । "समुच्छ ति" एकदेशेन समुदायस्य गम्यमानत्वादु-त्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव सामस्त्येन प्रकर्षतश्छेदः समुच्छदो वस्तुविनाशः, समुच्छेदम-धीयते, तद्वेदिनो वा, इत्यण्प्रत्यये सामुच्छेदाः क्षणक्षयिभावप्ररूपका इत्यर्थः । 'दुग ति' उत्तरपदलोपादेकस्मिन्नपि समये क्रियाद्वयानुभवाभ्युपगमाद् द्विक्रियाः, एकसमये द्वे क्रिये समुदिते द्विक्रियम्, तदधीयते तद्वेदिनो वा द्वौक्रियाः कालभेदेन क्रियाद्वयानुभवप्ररूपिण इति भावः । "तिग ति" त्रैराशिकाः, जीवाऽजीवनोजीवभेदात् त्रयोराशयः समाहृतास्त्रिराशि तत्प्रयोजन मेषां ते त्रैराशिका जीवाऽजीवनोजीवराशित्रयख्यापका इति तात्पर्यम् । "अव-द्विअ ति" स्पृष्टं जीवेन कर्म न स्कन्धवद् बद्धमवद्धमेव येषामस्ति वदन्ति वेत्यवद्विकाः स्पृष्टकर्मविपाकप्ररूपका इत्यर्थ इति । एते सप्त निह्नुवाः । एतेषां निर्गमनमुत्पत्तिमानुपूर्व्या यथाक्रमं वक्ष्ये ॥ ५ ॥ २३०० ॥

The author now gives the names of persons with whom theories originated.

बहुरय जमालिप्रभवा जीवपएसा य तीसगुत्ताओ ।
अव्वत्ताऽऽसाढाओ सामुच्छेआ असमिच्चाओ ॥ ६ ॥ २३०१ ॥
गंगाओ दोकिरिया छलुगा तेरासिआण उप्पत्ती ।
थेरा य गोद्धमाहिल पुट्टमबद्धं परुविति ॥ ७ ॥ २३०२ ॥

6. Bahuraya Jamāli pabhavā, Jivapaesā ya Tisaguttāo ।
Avvattā" sādhaō samuccheā Asamittāo 2301.
7. Gaṅgāo dokiriyā Ghhalugā Terāsīaṇa uppatti ।
Therā ya Goṭṭhamāhila puṭṭha-mabaddham parūvinti 2302.

बहुरता जमालिप्रभवा जीवप्रदेशाश्च तिष्यगुप्तात् ।
अव्यक्ता आषाढात् सामुच्छेदा अश्वमित्रात् ॥ ६ ॥ २३०१ ॥
गङ्गाद् द्वैक्रियाः षडुलूकात् त्रैराशिकानामुत्पत्तिः ।
स्थविराश्च गोष्ठामाहिलाः स्पृष्टमबद्धं च प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ ७ ॥ २३०२ ॥

6. Bahuratā Jamāliprabhavā Jivapradeśāśca Tisyaguptāt.
Āvyaktā aṣāḍhat Sāmuccedā Āśvāmītrāt (2301).
Gaṅgād dvaikriyāh Ṣaḍulūkāt trairāśikānāmūtpattiḥ.
7. Sthavirāśca Goṣṭhāmāhila sprṣṭhamabaddham ca prarūpa-
yanti 7 (2302)]

Trans 6-7. Bahuratās had been led by Jamāli and Jivapradeśās by Tisyagupta. Avyaktās (originated) from. Āṣāḍha. Sāmuccedās from Āśvāmītra, Dvaikriyās from Gaṅga and Trairāsikās from Ṣaḍulūka. While the *Sthaviras* who describe the *Jīva* to be free from (the boundages of) Karma happen to be the followers of Goṣṭhāhila. (2301-2302.)

टीका. ६-७ बहुरता जमालिप्रभवाः, जमालेराचार्यतः प्रभव उत्पत्तिर्येषां
ते जमालिप्रभवाः । जीवप्रदेशाः पुनस्तिष्यगुप्तादुत्पन्नाः । अव्यक्ता आषाढात् ।
सामुच्छेदा अश्वमित्रादिति । गङ्गाद् द्वैक्रियाः । षडुलूकात् त्रैराशिकानामुत्पत्तिः ।
स्थविराश्च गोष्ठामाहिलाः स्पृष्टमबद्धं प्ररूपयन्ति 'कर्म' इति गम्यते । परुर्विसु

वा इति पाठान्तरं वा । ततो गोष्ठामाहिलादाबद्धका जाता इति सामर्थ्याद् गम्यत
इति ॥ २३०१-२३०२ ॥

Place and time as regards their coming into existence are now described.

सावत्थी उसभपुरं सेअम्बिआ मिहिल उल्लुगातीरं ।

पुरमंतरंजि दसउर रहवीरपुरं च नयराइं ॥ ८ ॥ २३०३ ॥

चोदस सोलस वासा चोद्दा-वीसुत्तरा य दुण्णि सया ।

अद्दठावीसा य दुवे पंचेव सयाय चोआला ॥ ९ ॥ २३०४ ॥

पंचसया चुलसीओ छेव सया नवुत्तरा हुंति ।

नाणुप्पत्तीए दुवे उप्पन्ना निव्वुए सेसा ॥ १० ॥ २३०५ ॥

8. Sāvatti Usabhapuram Seambā Mihila Ullugātīram ।

Puramantaranji Dasaura Rahavīrapuram ca nayarāim 2303.

9. Coddasa solalsa vāsā coddā-vīsuttara ya duṇṇi sayā ।

Aṭṭhāvīsā ya duvè panceva sayāa ya coā 2304.

10. Pancasayā eulasā eehaceva sayā navuttarā hunti ।

Nāṇupattie duve uppannā nivvue šesā 2305.

श्रावस्ती ऋषभपुरं श्वेतविका मिथिलोल्लुकातीरम् ।

पुरमन्तरञ्जिका दशपुरं रथवीरपुरं च नगराणि ॥ ८ ॥ २३०३ ॥

चतुर्दश षोडश वर्षाणि चतुर्दश-विंशत्युत्तरे च द्वे शते ।

अष्टाविंशत्या चद्वे पञ्चैव शतानि च तुश्वत्वारशतिं ॥ ९ ॥ २३०४ ॥

पञ्चशतानि चतुरशीत्या षडेव शतानि नवोत्तराणि भवन्ति ।

ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ द्वावुत्पन्नौ निवृत्ते शेषाः ॥ १० ॥ २३०५ ॥

8. Śrāvastī Rīṣabhapuram Svetavikā Mithilollu'Rātīram.

Puramantaranjikā Daśapuram Rathavīrapuram ca nagarāṇi 8. (2303)

9. Caturdaśa ṣoḍaśa varṣāṇi caturdaśa-vinśatyuttare ca dve śate ।

Aṣṭāvinśatyā ca dve pāñcāiva śatāni ca catuṣcatvārīnśapā

9 (2304).

10. Pañca śatāni caturaśītyā śaḥva śatāni navottrāni bhavanti ।

Jñānotpattau dvāvutpannau nirvṛite śeṣāḥ. 10 (2305)]

Trans-8-9-10. Śrāvastī, Rishabhāpura, Śvetavikā, Mithilā, Ullukātira Antarañjika, Daśapura, and Rāthavīrapura (are) the (respective) places (where they came into existence as Nihnavas Fourteen, sixteen, two hundred and fourteen, two hundred and twenty, two hundred and twenty eight, five hundred and forty four, five hundred and eighty four, and six hundred and Nine (are respectively) the numbers of years (after Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira obtained Kevala Jñāna. So, two of the Nihnavas came into existence during (the period of) Kevala Jnana of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira and the rest appeared after his Nirvāna (2303-2305).

टीका-८ श्रावस्ती, ऋषभपुरम्, श्वेतविका, मिथिला, उल्लुकातीरम्, पुर-मन्तरञ्जिका, दशपुरम्, रथवीरपुरं चेति । एतान्यष्टौ नगराणि निह्वानां यथा-योगमुत्पत्तिस्थानानि बोद्धव्यानि । अष्टमं नगरं द्रव्यालेङ्गमात्रेणापि भिन्नानां सर्वापलापिनां महामिथ्यादशां वक्ष्यमाणानां बोद्धेकनिह्वानां लाघवार्थमुत्पत्ति-स्थानमुक्तमिति ॥ ८ ॥ २३०३ ॥

टीका ९-१० चतुर्दश वर्षाणि । तथा षोडश वर्षाणि । तथा “ चोद्वा वीसु-त्तरा य दुष्णि सय ति ” चतुर्दशाधिके द्वे शते, किंशत्युत्तरे च द्वे शते वर्षाणाम् इति गम्यते । तथा, अष्टाविंशत्याधिके च द्वे शते, तथा पञ्चैव शतानि चतुश्चत्वारिंशदधिकानि, पञ्च शतानि चतुरशीत्याधिकानि, षट् चैव शतानि नवोत्तराणि-भवन्ति । एतावता व्यवधान-कालेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरारभ्याद्यो द्वौ निह्वौ समुत्पन्नौ । शेषास्तु षड् भवन्ति श्रीमन्महावीर निर्धृते निर्वाणकालादारभ्य उक्तशेषेण यथो-क्तेन व्यवधानकालेनोत्पन्ना । इदमुक्तं भवति-श्री मन्महावीरस्य केवलोत्पत्तेश्चतु-र्दशभिर्वर्षैरतिक्रान्तैर्बहुरता : समुत्पन्नाः, षोडशभिर्वर्षैर्व्यतिक्रान्तैर्जीवप्रदेशाः समुत्पन्नाः, भगवत एव निर्वाणकालात् शेषेण चतुर्दशाधिक वर्षशतद्वयादिना काले-नातिक्रान्तेन शेषा अव्यक्तादयो निह्ववाः समुत्पन्ना इति ॥ २३०४-२३०५ ॥

Foot-note 1. It should be noted that while enumerating the types and the names of the leaders, the author has considered seven types only. These seven types of Nihnavas are called

देशविसंवादी Deśavisamvādī, because they have disagreement in certain minor portions of the Siddhāntas. But here he has given the place and time as regards Botikas, also. The Botikas are called सर्वविसंवादी Sarvavisamvādī as they have entire total disagreement with the Siddhāntas.

D. C. The following Table shows the above-mentioned details about Nihnavas in a precise way:—

TABLE

	Name of the Nihnavatype	Pioneer's name	Place	Time
Deśavisamvādī (देश विसंवादी)				
1	Bahurata	Jamāli	Śrāvastī	14 years after the attainment of Kevala Jñāna by Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra
2	Jivapradeśa	Tisya Gupta	Riṣabha pura	16 years Do
3	Avyakta	Āśādhācārya	Svetavikā	24 years after the Nirvāṇa of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra
4	Sāmucchedikā	Aśvamiṭṭhācārya	Mithilā	220 years Do
5	Dvaikriyā	Gaṅgācārya	Ullukātīra	228 „ Do
6	Trairāśika	Śadulūkācārya	Antaranjikā	544 „ Do
7	Abaddhika	Goṣṭhā māhila	Daśapura	584 „ Do
Sarvavisamvādī (सर्वविसंवादी)				
	Botika		Rathavīrapura	609 years Do

The life-history of each of the above-mentioned Nihnavas will be described in the following chapters just before the commencement of their respective discussions.

Chapter II

प्रथम निहव वक्तव्यता



Discussion with the First Nihnava

चोद्दस वासाणि तया जिणेण उप्पाडियस्स नाणस्स ।
तो बहुरयाण दिट्ठी सावत्थीए समुप्पन्ना ॥११॥२३०६॥

11. Coddasa vāsāṇi tayā Jiṇeṇa uppādiyassa nāṇassa ।
To Bāhurayāṇa diṭṭhī Sāvattthīe samuppannā ॥ (2306)

[चतुर्दश वर्षाणि तदा जिनेनोत्पादितस्य ज्ञानस्य ।
ततो बहुरतानां दृष्टिः श्रावस्त्यामुत्पन्ना ॥११॥२३०६॥

11. Caturdaśa varṣāṇi tadā Jine-not-pāditasya jñāṇasya ।
Tato Bahuratānām dṛiṣṭi Śrāvastyāmutpannā ॥ (2306).]

Trans. 11. Then, after fourteen years (had passed) since the Tīrthāṅkara (Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra) had attained Absolute Knowledge, the theory of Bahuratas came into existence in Śrāvastī 2306.

टीका ११ चतुर्दश वर्षाणि तदा जिनेन श्रीमन्महावीरेणोत्पादितस्य केवल-
ज्ञानस्य ततोऽत्रान्तरे बहुरतनिह्वानां दर्शनं दृष्टिः श्रावस्त्यां नगर्यां समुत्पन्नेति
॥२३०६॥

The origin of the theory :—

जिह्ठा सुदंसण जमालिणोज्ज सावत्थीतिंदुगुज्जाणे ।
पंच सया य सहस्सं ढंकेण जमालि मोत्तूणं ॥१२॥२३०७॥

12 Jitṭhā Sudamsaṇa Jamālīṇojja Sāvattthītindugujjāṇe ।
Pancasayā ya sahaṣsam Dhaṅkeṇa Jamālī mottūṇam 2307

[ज्येष्ठा सुदर्शना जमालिरनवद्या श्रावस्तीतैन्दुकोद्याने ।

पञ्चशतानि च सहस्रं ढङ्केन जमालिं मुक्त्वा ॥१२॥२३०७॥

12. Jyeṣṭhā Sudarśanā Jamaliranavadyā Śrāvastī-Taindukodyāne ।
Pancasatāni ca sahasram Dhaṅkena Jamālim muktvā (2307)]

TRANS. 12. Jyeṣṭhā (alias) Sudarśanā (alias) Anavadyā and Jamāli (developed the theory of Bahuratas) in the Tainduka garden of Śrāvastī. Five hundred (monks) and one thousand (nuns) excepting Jamāli (were advised) by Dhaṅika (2307)

टीका १२ व्याख्या—अत्र भावार्थस्तावत् कथानकेनोच्यते—इहैव भरतक्षेत्रे कुण्डपुरं नाम नगरम् । तत्र भगवतः श्रीमन्महावीरस्य भागिनेयो जमालिर्नाम राजपुत्र आसीत् । तस्य च भार्या श्रीमन्महावीरस्य दुहिता । तस्याश्च ज्येष्ठेति वा, सुदर्शनेति वा, अनवद्याङ्गीति वा नामेति । तत्र पञ्चशतपुरुषपरिवारो जमालिर्भगवतो महावीरस्यान्तिके प्रव्रज्यां जग्राह । सुदर्शनापि सहस्रस्त्रीपरिवारा तदनु प्रव्रजिता । ततश्चैकादशस्वङ्गेष्वधीतेषु जमालिना भगवान् विहारार्थमुत्कलापितः । ततो भगवता तूष्णीमास्थाय न किञ्चित् प्रत्युत्तरमदायि । तत एवममुत्कलितोऽपि पञ्चशतसाधुपरिवृतो निर्गतः श्रीमन्महावीरान्तिकात् । ग्रामानुग्रामं च पर्यटन् गतः श्रावस्तीनगर्याम् । तत्र च तैन्दुकाभिधानोद्याने कोष्टकनाम्नि चैत्ये स्थितः । ततश्च तत्र तस्यान्त-प्रान्ताहारैस्तीव्रो रोगातङ्कः समुत्पन्नः । तेन च न शक्नोत्युपविष्टः स्थातुम् । ततो बभ्राण श्रमणान्—“मन्निमित्तं शीघ्रमेव संस्तारकमास्तृणीत येन तत्र तिष्ठामि” । ततस्तैः कर्तुमारब्धोऽसौ । बाढं च दाहज्वराभिभूतेना जमालिना पृष्टम् “संस्तृतः संस्तारको न वा ?” इति । साधुभिश्च संस्तृतप्रायत्वादर्थसंस्तृतेऽपि प्रोक्तम् “संस्तृतः” इति । ततोऽसौ वेदनाविह्वलितचेता उत्थाय तत्र तिष्ठासुरर्धसंस्तृतं तद् दृष्ट्वा क्रुद्धः “क्रियमाणं कृतम्” इत्यादि सिद्धान्तवचनं स्मृत्वा मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयो दयतो वक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिविविधमिति चिन्तयामास । ततः स्थविरैर्वक्ष्यमाणाभिरेव युक्तिभिः प्रतिबोधितो यदा कथमपि न प्रतिबुध्यते तदा गतास्तं परित्यज्य भगवत्समीपे । अन्ये तु तत्समीप एव स्थिताः । सुदर्शनापि तदा तत्रैव श्रावक ढङ्ककुम्भकारगृह आसीत् । जमाल्यनुरागेण च तन्मतमेव प्रपन्ना ढङ्कमपि तद् ग्राहयितु प्रवृत्ता । ततो ढङ्केन ‘मिथ्यात्वमुपगतेयम्’ इति ज्ञात्वा प्रोक्तम्—“नेदृशं किमपि वयं

जानीमः' । अन्यदा चापाकाग्रिमध्ये मृद्धाजनोद्वर्तन-परावर्तने कुर्वताऽङ्गार-
कमेकं प्रक्षिप्य तत्रैव प्रदेशे स्वाध्यायं कुर्वत्याः सुदर्शनायाः संघाट्यञ्चलो दग्धः ।
ततस्तया प्रोक्तम्—“श्रावक ! किं त्वया मदीयसंघाटी दग्धा ?” । तेनोऽम्—ननु
दह्यमानमदग्धम् ‘इति भवतां सिद्धान्तः, ततः क्व केन त्वदीया संघाटी दग्धा ?’
इत्यादि तदुक्तं परिभाष्य संबुद्धाऽसौ “सम्यक् प्रेरिताऽस्मि” इत्यभिधाय
मिथ्यादुष्कृतं ददाति । जमालिं च गत्वा प्रज्ञापयति । यदा चासौ कथमपि न
प्रज्ञाप्यते तदासौ सपरिवारा, शेषसाधवश्चैकाकिनं जमालिं मुक्त्वा भगवत्समीपं
जग्मुः । जमालिस्तु बहुजनं व्युद्ग्राह्यानालोचितप्रतिक्रान्तः कालं कृत्वा
किंल्वषिकदेवेषूपपन्नः । व्याख्याप्रज्ञप्त्यागमा चैतच्चरितं विस्तरतोऽवसेय-
मिति । एष संग्रहगाथाभावार्थः । अक्षरार्थस्त्वयम्—“जेष्ठा सुदर्शना जमालिणो-
ज्जति” ज्येष्ठा, सुदर्शना, अनवद्योङ्गीति जमालिगृहिणीनामानि । अन्ये तु
व्याचक्षते—‘ज्येष्ठा महती सुदर्शना नाम भगवतः श्रीमन्महावीरस्य भगिनी
तस्याः पुत्रो जमालिः, अनवद्याङ्गी नाम भगवतो दुहिता जमालिगृहिणी’ इति ।
श्रावस्त्यां नगर्यां तैन्दुकोद्याने ‘जमालिनिहवदृष्टिरुत्पन्ना’ इति वाक्यशेषः ।
तत्र पञ्चशतानि साधूनां, सहस्रं चार्थिकाणाम्, एतेषां मध्ये यः स्वयं न प्रतिबु-
द्धस्तं जमालिं मुक्त्वा ढङ्गेन प्रतिबोधितः । इति निर्युक्तिगाथासप्तकार्थः ॥२३०७॥

1 Or, it may be interpreted thus :—The elder (sister) Sudar-
śanā. Jamāli and (his wife) Anavadyā (developed) the theory of
Bahuratas (vide Ācāraṅga Sūtra 1005)

Digest of Commentary. The following story illustrates the
full details of this verse:—

In this Bharata-kṣetra there was a city named Kuṇḍapura.
Jamāli, the nephew (i. e. sister's son) of Śramaṇa Bhagavān
Māhāvīra was a prince of that city. His wife happened to be
the daughter of Sramaṇa Bhagavān Māhāvīra. She had three
different names viz- Jyesthā, Sudarśanā and Anavadyāṅgī.

Jamāli accompanied by five hundred males and Sudarśanā
along-with one thousand females accepted Dīksā at the hands of
Śramaṇa Bhagavān Māhāvīra. After finishing the study of eleven
Aṅgas, Jamāli requested the Tīrthaṅkara to grant him permission
to go on vihāra (alone), Bhagavān remained silent and did not

respond to it. In spite of that, Jamāli left the (company of) Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra and went out for Vihāra alone with his five hundred *sthaviras*. Wandering from place to place Jamāli Muni at last, came to the city of Śrāvastī, where in the garden of Tainduka, he stayed in a Caitya named Koṣṭhaka.

There, on account of dry and stale food that he was taking, Jamāli Ācārya, was laid down with high fever. He, being unable to sit, asked his followers to prepare a bed for him immediately.

The bed was being prepared by the monks. In the meanwhile, due to excessive heat of fever, Jamāli Ācārya, repeatedly questioned the monks “Is the bed prepared or not?” The monks, who had already prepared half the bed, and were busy preparing the whole of it, replied “Yes, it is prepared.”

But Jamāli, whose mind was not steady, on account of excessive pain, was enraged at the sight of the half-spread bed that was being spread fully. At that very moment, he denied the truth of the theory of “Kriyamāṇam kritam²” which was already preached by great Tirthaṅkaras and asserted that Kriyamāṇa or that which is being produced is not krita or actually produced.

Some of the old *sthaviras* tried to persuade him not to do so, but it was of no avail. Consequently, some of them, went back to Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, while others stuck to Jamāli's theory and stayed with him. Sudarśanā, too, stayed with him, in the house of the potter Dhaṅka who also happened to be a Śrāvaka. She being attached to Jamāli, followed Jamāli's theory, and further attempted to persuade Dhaṅka to follow Jamāli. But Dhaṅka was shrewd enough to know that Sudarśanā was under the influence of *mithyatva* of vanity like Jamāli. So, he cleverly escaped by saying, “We cannot comprehend such things.”

२ प्रश्नः—से गुणं भंते ! चलमाणे चलिण ? उदीरिजमाणे उदीरिण ? वेइजमाणे वेइण ? पहीजमाणे पहीणे ? छिजमाणे छिजे ? मिजमाणे मिजे ? डज्जमाणे दड्डे ? मिजमाणे मडे ? निज्जरिजमाणे निज्जिण्णे ?

उत्तरः—हंता, गोयमा ! चलमाणे चलिण, जाव निज्जरिजमाणे निज्जिण्णे ।
(भगवतीसूत्र (पञ्चम अङ्ग] प्रथम खण्डं प्रथम शतक, प्रथमोद्देशक.)

One day while arranging the earthen pots in the kiln (āpāka) Dhaṅka threw a piece of burning coal on Sudarśanā, who was sitting nearly engrossed in her studies. As a result of that, a border of Sudarśanā's garment was burnt. Immediately she remarked "O, Śrāvaka! why did you burn my garment?" Dhaṅka replied "That which is burning, is not actually burnt according to you. So, who burnt your garment and when?" When told like this, by Dhaṅka, Sudarśanā realised the truth and said apologetically "Really, Śrāvaka! you have led me to the Right Path. I was under a disillusion." Repenting, thus, she went to Jamāli and expressed her realisation to him and tried her best to bring him to the right path. But Jamāli did not listen to her. Consequently, Sudarśanā had to leave Jamāli alone and join Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra along with her retinue of nuns. Gradually, all the monks returned to Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, and Jamāli was left out alone at the end. Finally, without repenting for the sins that he had committed by leading a number of persons astray, Jamāli passed away from this world (died) and assumed the form of Tejamāli Kilbiṣika, a low type of god thereafter³.

3. The Kilbiṣika gods are of three types: (1) Those enjoying duration of three palyopamas; (2) Those of the category of three Sāgaropams; and (3) Those of the category of thirteen Sāgaropamas.

Those of the First type would stay above the luminary gods and below the regions of *Saudharma* and *Iśāna deva-lokas*.

Those of the Second type reside above the regions of *Saudharma* and *Iśāna deva-lokas* and below the regions of *Sanat Kumāra* and *Māhendra deva-lokas*.

Those of the Third Type reside above the regions of *Brahma* and below the region of *Lāntaka deva-loka*. Jīvas, who oppose or defame a preceptor, teacher, family or a group of persons and those who preach a lot of falsehood out of sheer vanity, deceiving themselves as well as others by leading the life of a saint, but do not repent of their misdeeds till death,

This story has been described in details in the Vyākhyā-prajñapti. The reader may refer to it for more details⁴.

The reference of the story of Jamāli is also found in other works such as Āvaśyaka Sūtra with the commentaries of Kotyā-cārya, Haribhadra Sūriji, and Malayagiri Sūriji also. But there is no vital difference between the various descriptions given in those works except a few details here and there. The standard story related by the Vyākhyāprajñapti almost covers up all the accounts of Jamāli's life and theory. It is therefore, essential to give a brief summary of the story related therein. It runs as follows :—

Jamāli was a Kṣatriya by caste. He was born in Kṣatriya Kuṇḍagrāma. He was rich, and had an impressive personality. He had eight wives, all of whom were of equal charm. When he came to know one day that Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra had come to the Brāhmaṇa Kuṇḍagrāma and was preaching the truthful principles of Jainism and that many people had been there to listen to him and to pay their respects. Jamāli also went to listen to the preachings of the great Tīrthaṅkara, and was immediately induced to accept the Dīkṣā. His parents though distressed by his decision, could not prevent him. Then the ceremony of the acceptance of Dīkṣā was performed with proper care and dignity. After taking Dīkṣā, Jamāli Muni studied eleven Aṅgas under Bhagvān Mahāvīra Swāmiji.

assume the form of one of the three type of Kilbiṣika (or low) category of gods.

Kilbiṣika gods have to take four or five more turns in the categories of Nārakas, Tiryaṅcas Manusyaṣ and Devas before attaining Siddhatva or Buddhatva. But, at the same time, several of them have to wander in this beginningless and endless mundane world also. Vide Bhagavati Sutra, Fifth Aṅga, Third Khaṇḍa, Ninth Śataka, Uddeśaka 33 Sutras 38-43.]

4. Vide Bhagavati Sutra Aṅga 5. Khanda III Śataka IX. Uddeśaka XXXIII.; Sa. 8-46.

Then, on one day, Jamāli requested Śramaṇa Bhagavāu Mahāvīra to grant him permission to go on *vihāra* also. But Śramaṇa Bhagavan Mahāvīra remained silent and did not speak a single word of assent or refusal. As a result of that, Jamāli goes out for *vihāra* with a number of *sthaviras*, and comes to the city of Śrāvastī, where living in a caitya named Koṣṭhaka in the Tainduka garden, he falls ill on account of taking dry and stale food. Being unable to sit, he orders for a bed, to be prepared for him. When he asked the *sthaviras* as to whether the bed was ready or not; the *sthaviras* who had already spread half the bed and were actually spreading the whole of it, replied that the bed was prepared. Jamāli seeing that the whole bed was not prepared, gets angry, and refuses the theory of "Kriyamāṇam kṛitam" which was already preached by Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra.

He starts his own theory of Bahuratas and argues that since a thing which is being done (Kriyamāṇa) has to pass through the process of production until it is completely done (Kṛita). So, he says, it is not proper to assert that Kriyamāṇa is kṛita.

Some of the old *sthaviras* tried to dissuade him from this wrong path but Jamāli did not yield. Consequently some of them left him, while others including his wife Sudarśanā stuck to him for some time and ultimately, they too, went back to Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, leaving Jamāli alone.

Then, after recovery, Jamāli goes to the city of Campā where Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra was staying in a caitya called Pūraṇabhadra. Coming to Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, Jamāli says, "I do not move in cognito like many of your Śramṇas. But I move like a Kevalin with my own knowledge and perception. The Tīrthaṅkara replies. If you are a real Kevalin, answer these questions :—

Ques. I. Is the Loka eternal or not ?

Ques. II. Is Jīva eternal or not ?

Jamāli was confused at these questions and he could not utter a single word.

Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, then, remarked :- ‘I have a number of pupils, who are incognito, and who can easily answer these questions. But none of them boasts like you, that he is a Sarvajna, or a Jina or a Kevalin.’ Explaining the questions Bhagavān says :- ‘Loka is eternal because it is not possible to say that there was no loka in the past, there is no loka at present and will be no loka in future. On the other hand, since loka suffers destruction and creation in turn, it is अशाश्वत a-śāśvata or im-permanent also.

The same is the case with Jīva.” Jamāli does not put faith in the explanation offered by the Tirthaṅkara and goes away from him. Leading the life, however, of a strict śramaṇa for a long time and preaching his own doctrine, wherever he went Jamāli at last met with death, without repenting for his misdeeds and attained the life of the third type of Kilbiṣika-deva in the Lāntaka region. He will be able to attain Siddhatva after passing through four or five *bhavas* of *tiryancas*, *manusyas* and *devas*.

Jyeṣṭhā, Sudarśanā and Anavadyāṅgī are the three names of Jamāli’s wife. Others interpret that Sudarśanā was the Jeṣṭha or elder sister of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra and she happened to be the mother of Jamāli. Anavadyāṅgī, the daughter of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra was Jamāli’s wife⁵.

५. समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरस्स पित्तियए सुपासे कासवगोत्तेण । समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरजेद्वे भाया णंदिवद्वणे कासवगोत्तेण । समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरस्सजेद्वे भाइणी सुदंसणा कासवगोत्तेण ।.....समणस्स णं भगवओ महावीरस्स धूया कासवगोत्तेण, तीसे णं दो णामधेज्जा एवमाहिज्जंति तां जहा-अणोज्जा ति वा पियदंसणा ति वा । समणस्स णं भगवओ णत्तुई-कोसिय गोत्तेण, तीसे णं दो णामधेज्जा एवमाहिज्जंति, तं जहा सेसवइ ति वा, जसवती ति वा ॥१००५॥

श्री आचाराङ्गसूत्र

Now Jamāli explains his Bahurata theory :—

सकखं चिय संथारो न कज्जमाणो कउ त्ति मे जम्हा ।

बेइ ज्जमालि सव्वं न कज्जमाणं कयं तम्हा ॥१३॥२३०८॥

13. Sakkham ciya santhāro na kajjamāṇs kan tti me jamhā ।

Bei Jjamāli sarvam na kajjamāṇam kayam tamhā 2308

[साक्ष देव संस्तरो न क्रियमाणः कृत इति मम यस्मात् ।

ब्रवीति जमालिः सर्वं न क्रियमाणं कृतं तस्मात् ॥१३॥२३०८॥

13. Sākṣādeva samstaro na kriyamāṇah kṛita iti mama yasmāt ।

Braviti Jamāliḥ sarvam na kriyamāṇam kṛitam tasmāt 13 ॥ 2308]

Trans 13. Jamāli says that ‘Since the bed which is being prepared, does not (actually) happen to have been prepared in my presence, everything that is being prepared cannot be said to have been (actually) prepared’ (2308)

[Thus, according to Acārāṅga Sūtra, Sudarśanā was the name of Bhagavān's elder sister and Bhagavān's daughter (who was married to Jamāli) had two names viz Anavadyā and Priyadarśanā. In other words, Sudarśanā was the name of Jamāli's mother and Anavadyā and Priyadarśanā were the two names of his wife according to the second story.

The first theory asserts, as mentioned before, that Jyestha, Sudarśanā and Anavadyā are the three names of Jamāli's wife, who also happened to be Bhagavān's daughter.

The commentators of the Avaśyaka Sutra viz Śrīmān Hari-
bhadra Suri, Malayagiriji, and Maladharin Hemacandra Suri interpret the verse in the light of this theory and merely quote the second interpretation as the theory of others. But they do not discuss the validity of them. Bhagavati Sūtra is completely silent on this point. Hence it is very difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion about the names of Jamāli's wife and mother.

However, we think it better to take ‘Jyesthā’ as an adjective than take it as a proper noun and thus follow the view of Acārāṅga Sūtra. It is not improbable, if the author of Avaśyaka Sūtra had confounded Sudarśanā with Priyadarśanā -Tr.]

टीका:-१३ 'मे जम्ह ति' यस्माद् मम साक्षात् प्रत्यक्षमेवेदं वृत्तं यदुत-
कम्बलास्तरणरूपः संस्तारकः क्रियमाणं कृतं न भवति, किन्तु कृतमेव कृतमुच्यते ।
ततो भगवत्यादिषु यदुक्तम्-चलमाणे चलिए, उईरिजमाणे उईरिए, वेइजमाणे
वेइए (चलयमाने चलितम्, उदीर्यमाणे उदीरितम्, वेद्यमाने वेदितम्) भगवत्यां
प्रथमशतके प्रथमोद्देशे । इत्यादि, तत् सर्वं मिथ्येत्यभिप्राय इति ॥२३०८॥

D. C.

Jamāli:—It is clearly evident that the bed (of blankets etc.) which is being spread at present, has not actually been spread. We can, therefore, easily remark that all objects that are being prepared or that are under the process of preparation, cannot be said to have been actually prepared, but those that have been already prepared *could alone* be said to have been prepared.

The doctrine of Caliyamāṇe calitam, Udīryamāṇe udīritam etc." explained in the Bhagavatī Sūtra⁶ will therefore prove invalid. 13 (2308)

There are other faults, also, in accepting "Kriyamāṇam kritam"—

जस्सेह कज्जमाणं कयं ति तेणेह विज्जमाणस्स ।

करणकिरिया पवन्ना तहा य बहुदोसपडिवत्ती ॥१४॥२३०९॥

14 Jasseha kajjamāṇam kayam ti teṇeha vijjamāṇassa ।

Karaṇa kiriya pavannā tahā ya bahudosapadivattī 2309.

[यस्येह क्रियमाणं कृतमिति तेनेह विद्यमानस्य ।

करणक्रिया प्रपन्ना तथा च बहुदोषप्रतिपत्तिः ॥१४॥२३०९॥

14. Yasyeh kriyamāṇam kritamiti teneha vidyamānasya.

Karaṇakriyā prapannā tathā ca bahudoṣa pratipattiḥ 14 (2309)]

Trans. 14 (He who accepts) that which is being done (kriyamāṇa) has already been done (krita) (shall accept) the process of accomplishment (in case) of an object (which) already exists, and thus (will give rise to) numerous faults. 2309.

6. Vide Bhagavati Sūtra Aṅga V Khanda I Śataka I Sūtra I.

टीका-१४ इह यस्य वादिनः “क्रियमाणं वस्तु कृतम्” इत्यभ्युपगमः, तेनेह विद्यमानस्य सतः करणरूपाः । क्रियाः करणक्रियाः प्रतिपन्ना अङ्गीकृता । तथा च सति वक्ष्यमाणानां बहूनां दोषाणां प्रतिपत्तिरभ्युपगमरूपा कृता भवतीति ॥२३०९॥

D. C. One who accepts the principle of 'kriyamāṇam kṛitam' will accept *Karaṇa kriyā* or the process of preparation in case of a *vidyamāna* object as well. And this will involve a number of difficulties 14 (2309)

Because,

कयमिह न कज्जमाणं सब्भावाओ चिरंतनघडोव्व ।

अहवा कयं पि कीरइ कीरउ निच्चं न य समत्ती ॥१५॥२३१०॥

15. Kayamiha na kajjamāṇam sabbhāvāo cirantana ghaḍo vva ।
Ahavā kayam pi kīrai kīrau nīccam ya samattī 2310.

[कृतमिह न क्रियमाणं सद्भावाच्चिरन्तन घट इव ।

अथवा कृतमपि क्रियते क्रियतां नित्यं न च समाप्तिः ॥१५॥२३१०॥

Kṛitamiha na kriyamāṇam sadbhāvāccirantana ghata iva ।

Athavā kṛitamapi kriyate kriyatām nityam na ca samāptih

15. (2310)]

Trans. 15. That which has (already) been prepared (kṛita) could not be said as being prepared (kriyamāṇa) on account of its being existent like a ghata (which is) prepared since long. Or (if it is said that) What has already been prepared (kṛita) is also prepared, let it be prepared (for ever) and there would be no end (of it) 2310.

टीका-१५ इह क्रियमाणं कृतं न भवतीति प्रतिज्ञा । सद्भावात्-कृतस्य विद्यमानत्वादिति हेतुः । चिरन्तनघटवदिति दृष्टान्तः । विपर्यये बाधकमाह-अथ कृतमपि क्रियत इत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि नित्यमनवरतमेव क्रियतां, कृतत्वाविशेषात् । एवं च सति न कदाचिदपि कार्यक्रियापरिसमाप्तिरिति ॥२३१०॥

D. C. What is *kṛita* cannot be said as *kriyamāṇa*. For, an object which is *kṛita* is always *vidyamāna* like a *ghata* prepar-

ed since long. In spite of that, an object which is already *kṛita* is also accomplished; it ought to be accomplished for ever and the process of accomplishment will never cease to operate 15 (2310).

And,

किरियावेफलं ति य पुव्वमभूयं च दीसए होंतं ।

दीसइ दीहो य जओ किरियाकालो घडाईणं ॥१६॥२३११॥

16. Kiriyaṇvèphallam ti ya puṇvamaḇhūyam ca dīsaē hontam |
Dīsaī dīho ya jaō kīriyā kālo ghaḍaīṇam 2311 ॥

[क्रियावैफल्यमिति च पूर्वमभूतं च दृश्यते भवत् ।

दृश्यते दीर्घश्च यतः क्रियाकालो घटादीनाम् ॥१६॥२३११॥

16. Kriyāvaiphalyamiti ca pūrvamaḇhūtam dṛśyate bhavati |
Dṛśyate dīrghasca yataḥ kriyākālo ghaḍaīṇam 16 (2311)]

Trans. 16. If *kriyamāṇa* is taken as *kṛita*, the process (of accomplishment) will be useless. And that which did not exist before, will appear as coming into existence. Besides, on the other hand, the time of production of (the objects like) *ghaṭa* etc. will appear long. 2311.

टीका-१६-यदि च क्रियमाणं कृतमिष्यते, तर्हि घटादि कार्यार्थं या मृन्मर्दन-चक्रभ्रमणादिका क्रिया तस्या वैफल्यं प्राप्नोति, तत्काले कार्यस्य कृतत्वाभ्युपगमात् । प्रयोगः-इह यत् कृतम्, तत्क्रिया विफलैव, यथा चिरनिष्पन्नघटे, कृतं चाभ्युपगम्यते क्रियाकाले कार्यम्, ततो विफला तत्र क्रियेति । किञ्च, क्रियमाण-कृतवादिना कृतस्य विद्यमानस्य क्रियेति प्रतिपादितं भवति । एवं च प्रत्यक्ष-विरोधः, यस्मादुत्पत्तिकालात् पूर्वमभूतमविद्यमानमेव कार्यं भवज्जायमानं दृश्यत उत्पत्तिकाले, तस्मात् क्रियमाणमकृतमेवेति । किञ्च, आरम्भक्रियासमय एव कार्यमुत्पद्यत इति तवाभ्युपगमः । एतच्चायुक्तम् । कुतः ? । यस्माद् घटादिकार्याणामुत्पद्यमानानां दीर्घ एव निर्वर्तनक्रियाकालो दृश्यत इति ॥२३११॥

D. C. If *Kriyamāṇa* is taken as *kṛita*, there would be no utility of processes like grinding of clay, the rotating of wheel etc. for the production of *ghaṭa* etc. Because, even at the time

when the process of production is going on, it is already taken for granted that *ghaṭa* has been produced.

Secondly, the followers of the theory of “*Kriyamāṇam kṛitam*” accept the *Kārya* (which is *a-vidyamāna*) as existing as it thus gives rise to selfcontradiction. For, in such a case, a *kārya* which was *a-vidyamāna* before the time of production, appears as being produced. And hence, the theory of *Kriyamāṇa kṛitam* is not correct.

Thirdly, those who believe in ‘*Kriyamāṇam kṛitam*’ believe that the *Kārya* is produced at the very beginning of the process of production. But it is not correct to believe like that. Because, the period of production of the objects like *ghaṭa* etc. appears very long, 16. (2311)

And,

नारंभे चिय दीसइ न सिवादद्धाए दीसइ तदंते ।
तो नहि किरियाकाले जुत्तं कज्जं तदंतम्मि ॥१७॥२३१२॥

17. Nāraṃbhe cciya disai na sīvādaddhāe disai tadantè ।
To nahi kiriyākālè juttam kajjam tadantammi. 2312.

[नारम्भ एव दृश्यते न शिवाद्यद्धायां दृश्यते तदन्ते ।
ततो नहि क्रियाकाले युक्तं कार्यं तदन्ते ॥१७॥२३१२॥

17. Nāraṃbha eva dṛśyate na śivādyaddhāyām dṛśyate tadante ।
Tato nahi kriyākāle yuktam kāryam tadante. 17 (2312)]

Trans. 17. An object like *ghaṭa* is not seen just in the beginning, nor is it seen at the time of (production of forms such as) ‘*śivaka*’ etc; (but) is seen only at the end of that. It is, therefore, not proper to accept the (existence of) *Kārya* during the period of its production, but only at the end (2312) .

टीका—१७ नारम्भक्रियासमय एव घटादि कार्यं भवद् दृश्यते, नापि शिवाद्यद्धायां-शिवक-स्थास-कोश-कुशलादि समयेष्वपि न दृश्यत इत्यर्थः । क्व तर्हि दृश्यते ? इत्याह-“तदंते” दीर्घकालस्यान्ते घटादिकार्यं भवद् दृश्यते ।

तस्माद् न क्रियाकाले कार्यं युक्तम्, तस्य तदानीमदर्शनात् । तदन्ते तु दीर्घक्रियाकालस्यान्ते युक्तम् कार्यम्, तदानीमेव तस्य दर्शनादिति सकलजनस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेवेदम् । इति जमालिपूर्वपक्षाः ॥२३१२॥

D. C. An object like *ghaṭa* is not seen as existing just in the beginning of the process of its production nor does it appear at the time of production of its intermediate forms such as *sivaka-sthāra kośa* and *kuśula*-prior to the final form of *ghaṭa*. It is seen only at the end of that long period of time which it takes during its process of production.

It is therefore, not proper to accept the existence of an object either in the beginning of the process of its production or in the intermediate stages of production. A *Kārya* is existent only at the end of the *dirghakāla* or the long period of production.

This is the end of the arguments of Jamāli. 17 (2312).

The old monks refute these arguments as follows:—

थेराण मयं नाकयमभावओ कीरए खपुप्फं व ।

अहं व अकयं पि कीरइ कीरउ तो खरविसाणं पि ॥१८॥२३१३॥

18. Therāṇa mayam nākayamabhāvaṃ kīrae khapuppham va ।

Aha va akayam pi kīrai kīrau to kharavisāṇam pi (2313)

[स्थविराणां मतं नाकृतमभावतः क्रियते खपुष्पमिव ।

अथवाऽकृतमपि क्रियते क्रियतां ततः खरविषाणमपि ॥१८॥२३१३॥

18. Sthavirāṇām matam nākṛtāmabhavataḥ kriyate khapuṣpamiva ।

Athavā 'kritamapi kriyate kriyatām tataḥ kharaviśāṇamapi

18 (2313)]

Trans. 18. It is the belief of sthaviras that what is not be produced on account of its being non-existent like a *khapuspā*. Or, (if) an *a-Kṛita* (unaccomplished) object is even made, let the horn of an ass, also, be made 2313.

टीकाः—१८ स्थविराः श्रुतवृद्धा गीतार्थाः साधवस्तेषां मतंकुप्ररूपणां

कुर्वन्तं जमालिं त एवं प्रज्ञापयन्तीत्यर्थः—नाकृतमविद्यमानं वशादिकार्यं क्रियते, असत्त्वात्, आकाशकुसुमवत् । अथाकृतमविद्यमानमपि क्रियते, क्रियतां तर्हि खरविषाणमपि, अकृतत्वाविशेषादिति ॥२३१३॥

D. C. Sthaviras:—An a-*kṛita kārya* like that of a *ghaṭa* is never done because it is a-*vidyamāna* like *khapūspa*. Still, however if an a-*vidyamāna* object is also produced, a non-existent object like *kharaviśāṇa* should also be made on account of its having the common element of a-*kṛitatva*. 18 (2323)

Refuting the possibility of the fault of “nitya kṛitatva” advanced by Jamāli, the sthaviras continue:—

निचकिरियाइदोसा नणु तुल्ला असइ कट्ठतरगा वा ।

पुव्वमभूयं च न ते दीसइ किं खरविसाणं पि ? ॥१९॥२३१४॥

19. Niccakiriyaī dosā naṇu tullā asai kaṭṭhataragā vā ।

Puvvamaḥbhūyam ca na te dīśai kim kharaviśāṇam pi ? 2314

[नित्यक्रियादिदोषा ननु तुल्या असति कष्टतरका वा ।

पूर्वमभूतं च न तव दृश्यते किं खरविषाणमपि ? ॥१९॥२३१४॥

19. Nitya kriyādi doṣā nanu tulyā asati kaṣṭatarakā vā ।

Parvamaḥbhūtam ca na tava druśyate kim kharaviśāṇamapi ?

19 (2314)]

Trans. 19. The faults of nitya-kriyā, etc. are in fact, equally possible in (case of) a non-existent object also. Or say, they are more obstructive. And, (when) an object which is not produced at all, is seen by you, why should not the horn of an ass also be seen by you ? (2314)

टीका:—१९ नन्वसत्यविद्यमाने वस्तुनि कारणाक्रियाभ्युपगमे नित्यक्रियादिदोषाः, आदिशब्दात् क्रियाऽपरिसमाप्ति-क्रियावैकल्यपरिग्रहः, आवयोस्तुल्याः समाः, यथा कृतपक्षे त्वया दत्तास्तथाऽकृतपक्षोऽप्यापतन्तीत्यर्थः । किं तुल्या एव ? । नेत्याह—कष्टतरका वा । विद्यमाने हि वस्तुनि पर्याय विशेषाधानद्वारेण कथञ्चित् करणक्रियाद्युप पद्यत एव, यथा “आकाशं कुरु, पादौ कुरु,

पृष्ठं कुरु” इत्यादि । अविद्यमाने तु सर्वथा नायं न्यायः संभवति, सर्वथाऽसत्त्वात्, खरविषाणवादिति । यदि च पूर्वं कारणावस्थायामभूतमसत् कार्यं जायते, तर्हि मृत्पिण्डाद् घटवत् खरविषाणमपि जायमानं किं न दृश्यते, असत्त्वाविशेषात् ? । अथ खरविषाणं भवद् न दृश्यते, तर्हि घटोऽपि तथैवास्तु, विपर्ययो वेति ॥२३१४॥

D. C. Sthaviras :—Possibility of the faults such as *nitya kriyatra* (Continuous process of doing) *Kriyā-aparisaṃāpti* (Imperfection of the process of production) and *kriyā-raiphalayam* (Futility of the process of production), shown by you^e are not only equally possible, but all the more possible if you believe in the production of a non-existent object. In case of an existent object, it is possible that the *Kriyā* or process of production may decrease comparatively owing to its taking another form. For example— when we say “Do the sky (i. e. keep the space), “Do the legs” “Do the back” etc. the *Kriyā* seems to slow down owing to its taking another form. This does not happen in case of an *a-vidyamāna* object owing to its being non-existent like a *khara-viśāṇa*.

Moreover, if an *a-vidyamāna Kārya* is produced during the condition of *Kāraṇa* etc. in the beginning, then, instead of *ghaṭa* why should *khara-viśāṇa* be not seen as being produced from the lump of earth ? For, the quality of being non-existent is common with the *khara-viśāṇa* also. But this does not happen in reality. Your theory is not valid. (2314).

In reply to the argument that the period of production of the objects like *ghaṭa* etc. is long⁹, the sthaviras explain that:—

पइसमयउप्पन्नाणं परोप्परविलक्खाण सुबहूणं ;

दीहो किरियाकालो जइ दीसइ किं त्थ कुंभस्स ? ॥२०॥२३१५॥

20. Paisamayauppannāṇam paropparavilakkhāṇa subahūṇam ;

Diho kiriyākālo jai disai kim ttha kumbhassa ? 2315.

[प्रतिसमयोत्पन्नानां परस्परविलक्षणानां सुबहूनाम् ।

दीर्घः क्रियाकालो यदि दृश्यते किमत्र कुम्भस्य ? ॥२०॥२३१५॥

8. Vide verse 2310. 9. Vide verse 2311.

20. Pratisamayotpannānām parasparavilakṣaṇānām subahūnām ।
Dīrghaḥ kriyākālo yadi driśyate kimatra kumbhasya?

(2315)].

Trans. 20. If the period of the process of production of the numerous (*kāryas*) that possess mutually distinct characteristics (and) that are (being) produced at every moment, appears to be long, how is *ghaṭa* affected (by that)? 2315.

टीका:—२० यदि नाम प्रतिसमयोत्पन्नानां परस्परविलक्षणस्वरूपाणां सुबह्वानां शिवक-स्थास-कोश-कुशूलादिकार्यकोटीनां क्रियाकाल-निष्ठा-काल-योरेकत्वेन प्रतिप्रारम्भसमयनिष्ठाप्राप्तानां दीर्घक्रियाकालो दृश्यते, तर्हि कुम्भस्य घटस्य किमत्रायातम् ? । इदमुक्तं भवति-मृदानयन-मर्दन-पिण्डविधानादिकालः सर्वोऽपि घटनिर्वर्तनक्रियाकाल इति तवाभिप्रायः । अयं चायुक्त एव । यतस्तत्र प्रतिसमयमन्यान्येव कार्याण्यारभ्यन्ते, निष्पाद्यन्ते च, कार्यस्य कारणकाल-निष्ठाकालयोरेकत्वात् । घटस्तु पर्यन्तसमय एवारभ्यते, तत्रैव च निष्पद्यते, इति कोऽस्य दीर्घो निर्वर्तनक्रियाकालः इति ॥२०॥२३१५॥

D. C. Sthaviras:—If the period of production of the numerous *Kāryas* such as *śivaka*, *sthāsa*, *kośa* and *kuśula*¹⁰ etc. that are being prepared from time to time, is to be long, how is the period of production of *ghaṭa* taken as long? According to you, the period of processes such as that of collecting earth, pounding it, and forming a lump etc. is the same. But it is not so. For, the production of *ghaṭa* starts only at the last moment. It is, therefore, not proper to believe that the *kriyā-kāla* of *ghaṭa* is *dīrgha* or long.

Jamāli:—Why is *ghaṭa* not seen at the production of other *Kāryas*, which are produced just prior to that? (2315)

The answer is :—

अन्नारंभे अन्नं किह दीसउ जह घडो पडारंभे ।

सिकादओ न कुंभो किह दीसए सो तदद्वाए ? ॥२१॥२३१६॥

10. Various forms of earth before the actual form of *ghaṭa* is produced.

21. Annārambhe annam kiha dīsau jaha ghaḍo padārambhe ।
Sivakādaḥ na kumbho kiha dīsaḥ so tadaddhāe ? (2316)

[अन्यारम्भेऽन्यत् कथं दृश्यतां यथा घटःपटारम्भे ।

शिवकादयो न कुम्भः कथं दृश्यते स तदद्धायाम् ? ॥२१॥२३१६॥

21. Anyārambhe'nyat katham dṛśyatām yathā ghaṭaḥ
paṭārambhe ।

Śivakādayo na kumbhaḥ katham dṛśyate sa tadaddhāyām ?
21 (2316)]

Trans. 21. Just as *ghaṭa* (is not seen) in the beginning of (the production of) *paṭa* how could a different *Kārya* be found at the time of the production of a (totally) different *Kārya* ? Śivaka etc. are not *ghaṭa*. Hence how could *ghaṭa* be found at (the time of) their production ? 2316.

टीका:—२१ अन्यस्य शिवकादेरारम्भेऽन्यद् घटलक्षणं कार्यं कथं दृश्यते ? । न हि पटारम्भे घटः कदाचिदपि दृश्यते । अतः किमुच्यते—‘नारंभे चिय दीसइ त्ति’ । शिवकादयोऽपि कुम्भरूपा न भवन्ति, किन्तु ततोऽन्य एवेति कथं तदद्धायामप्यसौ कुम्भो दृश्यते ? । अत एव तदप्यज्ञतया प्रोच्यते “न सिवादद्धाए” इति ॥२३१६॥

D. C. Just as a *Kārya* like *ghaṭa* is not seen at the time of the production of a *Kārya* like *paṭa*, so also, a *Kārya* like *ghaṭa* etc. is not seen at the time of production of the *Kāryas* like śivaka, etc. which are totally different from them 21 (2316).

With regard to Jamālī's contention that a *Kārya* is seen only at the end of the long range of “*Kriyā-Kāla*”¹¹, the sthāviras' explanation is this—

अंते चिय आरद्धो जइ दीसइ तम्मि चेव को दोसो ? ।

अकयं व संपइ गए कह कीरउ कह व एस्समि ? ॥२२॥२३१७॥

22. Ante cēiya āraddho jai dīsaī tammi ceva ko doṣo ? ।

Akayam va sampai gae kaha kīrau kaha va essammi 2317.

[अन्त एवारद्धो यदि दृश्यते तस्मिन्नेव को दोषः ? ।

अकृतं वा संप्रति गते कथं क्रियतां कथं वैष्यति ? ॥२२॥२३१७॥

11. Vide v 2312.

22. Anta evārabdho yadi dṛiṣyate tasminneva ko doṣaḥ ?

Akritam vā samprati gate katham kriyatām katham vaiṣ-
yati ? 22 (2317)]

Trans. 22. If a *kārya* started at the end, appears at that time only what objection (is there)? (For) otherwise (vā) how could (that which) is not produced at the present time, possibly have been produced in the past or in future ? 2317

टीका-२२. अन्त एव क्रियाक्षणे प्रारब्धो घटो यदि तत्रैव दृश्यते तर्हि को दोषः ?-न कश्चिदित्यर्थः । यदुक्तम्-तो न हि किस्विकाले “इत्यादि । तत्राह-‘अकथं वेत्यादि’ । यदि च सम्प्रति वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणे न कृतं कार्यमिती-
ष्यते तदा गतेऽतिक्रान्ते एष्यति-अनागते च क्रियाक्षणे कथं नाम तत् कार्यं क्रियताम् ? ।-न कश्चिदित्यर्थः । तथाहि-नातीत-भविष्यत्क्रियाक्षणौ कार्य-
कारकौ, विनष्टानुत्पन्नत्वेनासत्त्वात्, खरविषाणवत् । अतः कथं क्रियान्ते कार्यं स्यात् ? । तस्मात् क्रियमाणेव कृतमिति । यदि च क्रियमाणमपि न कृतम्, क तर्हि कृतमिति वक्तव्यम् ? । क्रियाविगम इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, तदानीं क्रियाया असत्त्वात् । तदसत्त्वेऽपि च कार्योत्पत्ताविष्यमाणायां क्रियारम्भात् प्रागपि कार्योत्पत्तिः स्यात्, क्रियासत्त्वाविशेषात् । अथ सम्प्रतिसमयः क्रियमाण-
कालः, तदनन्तरस्तु कृतकालः, न च क्रियमाणकाले कार्यमस्ति, इत्यतः खल्व-
कृतं क्रियते न तु कृतमित्यभिधत्से । नन्वेतदिह प्रष्टव्योऽसि किं भवतः कार्यं क्रियया क्रियते उत तामन्तरेणापि भवति ? । यदि क्रियया, तर्हि कथं सोऽन्यत्र समये अन्यत्र तु कार्यम् ? । न हि खदिरे च्छेदनक्रियायां पलाशे च्छेदः समुप-
जायते । किञ्च, “क्रियोपरमे कार्यं भवति, न तु क्रियासद्भावे” इति वदता प्रत्युतकार्योत्पत्तेर्विघ्नेतुः क्रियेति प्रतिपादितं भवति । ततश्च कारणमप्यकारण-
मिति प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधः । अथ क्रियामन्तरेण कार्यमुपजायत इत्यभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि घटादिकार्यार्थेना निरर्थकः सर्वोऽपि मृन्मर्दन-पिण्डविधान-चक्रारोपण-
भ्रमणादिक्रियारम्भः । अतो न कर्तव्यं मुमुक्षुभिरपि तपः-संयमादिक्रियानुष्ठानम्, तदन्तरेणापि मुक्तिमुखसिद्धेः । न चैवम् । तस्मात् क्रियाकाल एव कार्यम्, न पुनस्तदुपरम इति ॥२३१७॥

D. G. There is no harm if a *ghaṭa* which is being produced at the final moment, is believed to have appeared only at

that time. Here if it is believed that a Kārya is not produced during the process of its production at the present time, it could neither have been produced at any time in the past nor at any time in future. For, the *kriyā-kāla* of the past or future is either perished or unproduced as the case may be. It is therefore, *a-vidyamāna* like the horn of an ass. This shows that what is being done (*Kriyamāṇa*) has alone been done (*kṛita*). For if *Kriyamāṇa* is not *kṛita*, where is it done?

Again, it is not proper to assert that Kārya is produced after the *Kriyā* is over. In spite of the absence of *Kriyā*, if the production of a Kārya is accepted, the Kārya should have as well been produced before the beginning of *Kriyā*, since there is *Kriyābhāva* at that time also.

The present tense is known as *Kriyamāṇa-Kāla* and the period following it, is *Kṛita-Kāla* or say *Kārya-Kāla*. If you say here that a Kārya which was undone (till now) has been done but that which has already been done is not done, we ask you this question:— Is the Kārya produced with or without the help of *kriyā*? If it is produced with the help of *kriyā*, how could *Kriyā* and Kārya take place at different times? By putting a cut into the *Khdīra tree*, a *palāsa* tree is never cut off.

It is also not true to say that Kārya takes place after the *Kriyā* is over, and is not actually produced in presence of *Kriyā*. For, by saying so, *Kriyā* will prove to be an obstruction rather than an instrument in the accomplishment of Kārya and this will give rise to a number of self-contradictions.

Lastly, if it is held that Kārya is produced without the help of *Kriyā*, the trouble undergone by a potter desirous of *ghaṭa*, by way of bringing earth, pounding it, moulding it into a lump, placing the lump on the wheel and moving the wheel in a circle, would entirely turn futile. Following your ideology, one can say that those desirous of Final Emancipation, should not perform penances or observe self-control etc¹².

12. The sentences of Vēda such as अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गं कर्मः,

Because, according to you, the attainment of Mokṣa should follow without any Kriyā. But it does not happen so. So, Kārya comes into being during the process of production, and not after the process is over.

Jamāli:—Right from the time of collecting earth to the time of its transformation into the form of ghaṭa, the whole period is the time of production of ghaṭa. The kriyā-kāla of ghaṭa is therefore dīrgha, according to me. It is not correct to say that a Kārya is produced just from the time when the process of production has been started.

The sthaviras reply as follows:—

पइसमयकज्जकोडीनिरवेक्खो घडगयाहिलासो सि ।

पइसमयकज्जकालं थूलमई घडम्मि लाएसि ॥२३॥२३१८॥

23. Paisamaya kajja kodī niravekkho ghaḍagayāhilāso si ।
Pai samaya kajja kālam thūlamaī! ghaḍammi lāesi 2318.

[प्रतिसमयकार्यकोटीनिरपेक्षो घटगताभिलाषोऽसि ।

प्रतिसमयकार्यकालं स्थूलमते ! घटे लगयसि ॥२३॥२३१८॥

23. Prati samaya kārya kotī nirapekṣo ghaṭa gatābhilāṣo' si ।
Prati samaya kārya kālam sthulamate! ghaṭe lagayasi
23 (2318)].

Trans. 23. Ignoring the numerous Kāryas (which are being) produced from time to time, you have been desirous of ghaṭa. (And hence) O dull-witted (Jamāli)! You are confusing the period (of production) of the Kāryas (produced) from time to time with (that of) ghaṭa 2318.

टीका—२३ हन्त ! यद्यपि प्रतिसमयमन्यान्यरूपाः कार्यकोट्यस्तत्रोत्पद्यन्ते, तथापि तन्निरपेक्षस्त्वं—निष्प्रयोजनत्वेनाविवक्षितत्वादुत्पद्यमाना अपि तास्त्वं न गणयसीत्यर्थः । कुतः । यस्माद् घटगताभिलाषोऽसि, सप्रयोजनत्वेन तस्यैव प्रधानतया विवक्षितत्वात् । “घट इहोत्पत्स्यते” इत्येवं तत्रैव तवाभिलाषः, अतः

एकया पूर्णयाहृत्या सर्वान् कामानवाप्नोति and पुण्यः पुण्येन कर्मणा, पापः पापेन कर्मणा etc.

प्रतिसमयकार्यकोटीनामदर्शकत्वेन स्थूलमते ! प्रतिसमयकार्यसंबन्धिनमपि कालं सर्वमपि घटे लगयसि—“सर्वोऽप्ययं घटोत्पत्तिकालः” इत्येवमध्यवस्यासि त्वमित्यर्थः, अतो मिथ्यानुभवोऽयं तवेत्यभिप्रायः, एकसामयिक एव घटोत्पत्तिकाले बहुसामयिकत्वग्रहणेन प्रवृत्तेः । अत्राह—ननु प्रतिसमयं कार्यकोट्य उत्पद्यमानास्तत्र न काश्चन संवेद्यन्ते, किंत्वपान्तराले शिवक—स्थास—कोशादीनि कानिचिदेव कार्याणि संवेद्यन्ते । सत्यम्, किन्तु स्थूलान्येव शिवकादिकार्याणि, यानि तु प्रतिसमयभावीनि सूक्ष्मकार्याणि तानि च्छन्नस्थो व्यक्त्या नावधारयितुं शक्नोति, परं प्रतिसमयकार्याणां ग्राहकाण्यनन्तसिद्धकेवलानां ज्ञानान्युत्पद्यन्ते तान्यपि तत्रापान्तराले कार्याण्येव, इति घटन्त एव प्रतिसमयं कार्यकोट्य इति ॥२३१८॥

D. C.

Sthaviras :—A series of different Kāryas are produced from time to time during the process of production. But, you being desirous of ghaṭa alone, do not look to these Kāryas and give importance to ghaṭa only. All the while during the process of production, you think that “ghaṭa will be produced here.”

Since, O dull-witted Jamāli, you do not apprehend the time during which the intermediate forms of ghaṭa are prepared, you are confusing the full length of time (during which different Kāryas are produced) with the period of production of ghaṭa and therefore, you assert that “This whole period of time is the period of production of ghaṭa alone.” But your assertion is totally false, as the period of production of ghaṭa is only a part of the whole period of the process of production. Jamāli :—The whole series of Kāryas produced from time to time is not seen but the Kāryas like śivaka and sthāsa alone are seen.

Sthaviras :—Kāryas like śivaka etc. are sthala but those that are produced from time to time are sukṣma which could not be apprehended by a sthūlamati (dull-witted) like you. The cognizance of ananta Siddha Kevali (who has attained Absolute Perception) alone can recognize these sukṣma Kāryas.

It should also be noted that the various Jnānas that apprehend these Kāryas are themselves produced at various times

and therefore they are also *Kāryas*. Hence, the theory that a series of *Kāryas* is produced from time to time, is valid and proper. 23 (2318).

Jamāli says :—

को चरमसमयनियमो पढमे चिय तो न कीरए कज्जं ? ।

नाकारणं ति कज्जं तं चेवं तम्मि से समए ॥२४॥२३१९॥

24. Ko caramasamayaniamo paḍhame ceiya to na kīrae kajjam ? ।

Nākāraṇam ti kajjam tam cevam tammi se samaye 2319.

[कश्चरमसमयनियमः प्रथम एव ततो न क्रियते कार्यम् ? ।

नाकारणमिति कार्यं तदेव तस्मिंस्तस्य समये ॥२४॥२३१९॥

24. Kaścaramasamayaniamah prathama eva tato na kriyate Kāryam ?

Nākāraṇamiti kāryam tadeva tasminstasya samaye 24 (2319)]

Trans. 24. If “the *Kriyā Kāla* is not taken as long” what is the utility of the rule of the final instant? (In that case) why is *Kārya* not done in the first instant (only)? (The answer is) :—“ Since *Kārya* (cannot exist) without *Kāraṇa*, that (i. e. the final moment) itself is its (*ghaṭasya*) *Kāraṇa* at that time.” 2319.

टीका—२४ ननु यदि कार्यस्य दीर्घः क्रियाकालो नेष्यते, किन्त्वेक-सामयिक एव, तर्हि कोऽयं चरमसमयनियमो येन तत्रैवोत्पद्यते घटादिकार्यम्-न घटत एवायं नियम इत्यर्थः । तत एतन्नियमाभावात् किं प्रथमसमय एव कार्यं न क्रियते ?—अपि तु क्रियत एवेति का का नीयते । अत्रोत्तरमाह—अकारणं कार्यं न भवति, तच्चान्त्य समय एव ‘से’ तस्य घटस्य कारणमस्ति न तत्प्रथम-समये, अतः कथं तत्रोत्पद्यते ? । अन्वय—व्यतिरेकसमधिगम्यो हि कार्य--कारण भावः, अन्वय—व्यतिरेकाभ्यां चान्त्यसमय एव घटादेः कारणं लक्ष्यत इति तत्रैव तदुत्पद्यत इति युक्त एव चरमसमयनियम इति ॥२३१९॥

D. C.

Jamāli :—If you do not believe that the *Kriyā-Kāla* of *ghaṭa*

is *dīrgha*, why, should you make the rule that *ghaṭa* is produced only at the last moment and not at the first?

Sthaviras:—*Kārya* cannot exist without *Kāraṇa*. Wherever there is no *kāraṇa* there is no *kārya* also. The *kāraṇa* in case of *kāryas* like *ghaṭa* etc. is always found in the final instant and not in the first one. The *kārya*, therefore, does not come into being in the first moment. The proposition that the production of *kārya* takes place at the end is justified in this way. 24 (2319)

Summarising the arguments,

तेणेह कज्जमाणं नियमेण कयं कयं तु भयणिज्जं ।

किञ्चिदिह कज्जमाणं उवरयकिरियं च हुज्जा हि ॥२५॥२३२०॥

25. Tenēha kajjamāṇam niyameṇa kayam kayam tu bhayanijjam.।

Kimcidiha kajjamāṇam uvarayakiriyam ca hujjā hi (2320)

[तेनेह क्रियमाणं नियमेन कृतं कृतं तु भजनीयम् ।

किञ्चिदिह क्रियमाणमुपरतक्रियं च भवेत् ॥२५॥२३२०॥

25. Tenēha kriyamāṇam niyamena kṛitam kṛitam tu bhajanīyam ।

Kimcidiha kriyamāṇamuparatakriyam ca bhavet 25 (2320)]

Trans. 25. That is why *Kriyamāṇa* is (said to be) *kṛita* as a rule; while *kṛita* is alternately (so). Here some of it may be (described) as being done, while some would have the process stopped. 2320.

टीका—२५ तेनोक्तप्रकारेण क्रियमाणं वर्तमानक्रियाक्षणभावि कार्यं नियमेन कृतमेवोच्यते, यत्तु कृतं तद् भजनीयं विकल्पनीयम् । कथम् ? इत्याह—किञ्चिदिह कृतं क्रियाप्रवृत्तकालभावि क्रियमाणमुच्यते, अन्यत् तूपरतक्रियं चक्रापाकाद्युत्तीर्णं कृतं घटादिकार्यं न क्रियमाणमुच्यते, उपरतक्रियत्वादिति

॥२३२०॥

D. C. On account of the reasons stated above, the *Kārya* which is being done at present, should certainly be called as *kṛita*. But that which has already been done, should be taken so only alternately. For, in that case, some of the work which

is done, could be said to have been done at the time of its process of being done, while the rest of the work as in the case of ghaṭa which is taken down from the cakra etc. could not be taken as Kriyamāṇa on account of its process of production being already ceased. 25 (2320).

Now, applying all the views of Sthaviras to the case of bed, Jamāli argues:—

जं जत्थ नभोदेसे अत्थुव्वइ जत्थ जत्थ समयम्मि ।
तं तत्थ तत्थमत्थुयमत्थुव्वंतं पि तं चेव ॥२६॥२३२१॥

26. Jam jattha nabhodese atthuvvai jattha jattha samayammi ।
Tam tattha tatthamtt Huyamatthuvvantam pi tam ceva (2321)

[यद् यत्र नभोदेश आस्तीर्यते यत्र यत्र समये ।
तत् तत्र तत्रास्तीर्णमास्तीर्यमाणमपि तदेव ॥२६॥२३२१॥

26. Yad yatra nabhodesa āstīryate yatra yatra samaye ।
Tat tatra tatrāstīrṇamāstīryamāṇamapi tadeva 26 (2321)]

Trans. 26. That which is spread in whatever space at whatever time, is (said to have been) spread and is also (said to be under the process of) being spread at that time and in that space. 2321.

टीका—२६ आस्तीर्यमाणसंस्तारकस्य यद् यावन्मात्रं नभोदेशे यत्र यत्र समये “अत्थुव्वइ” आस्तीर्यते तत् तावन्मात्रं तस्मिन् नभोदेशे तत्र तत्र समय आस्तीर्णमेव भवति, आस्तीर्यमाणमपि च तदेवोच्यते । इदमुक्तं भवति—सर्वोऽपि संस्तारक आस्तीर्यमाणो नास्तीर्ण इति “क्रियमाणं कृतम्” इत्यादि महावीर-वचनं व्यलीकमेव जमालिर्मन्यते । एतच्चायुक्तम्, भगवद्वचनाभिप्रायापरिज्ञानात् । सर्वनयात्मकं हि भगवद्वचनम् । ततश्च “क्रियमाणमकृतम्” इत्यपि भगवान् कथञ्चिद् व्यवहारनयमतेन मन्यत एव, परं “चलमाणे चलिष, उईरिज्जमाणे उईरिष” इत्यादिस्मृतिषु निश्चयनयमतेनैव प्रवृत्तानि । तन्मतेन च क्रियमाणं संस्तृतम्, इत्यादि सर्वमुपपद्यत एव । निश्चयो हि मन्यते—प्रथमसमयादेव घटः कर्तुं नारब्धः, किन्तु मृदानयनमर्दनादीनि प्रतिसमयं परापरकार्याण्यारभ्यन्ते, तेषां च मध्ये यद् यत्र समये प्रारभ्यते तत् तत्रैव निष्पद्यते, कार्यकाल—निष्ठा

कालयोरेकत्वात्, अन्यथा पूर्वोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गात् । ततःक्रियमाणं कृतमेव भवति । एवं प्रस्तुतः संस्तारकोऽपि नाद्यसमयात् सर्वोऽपि संस्तरितुमारभ्यते, किन्त्वपरापे तदवयवाः प्रतिसमयमास्तीर्यन्ते, तेषां च मध्ये यो यत्र समयेऽवयवः संस्तरितुमारभ्यते, तत्रैव च निष्पद्यत इति संस्तीर्यमाणं संस्तीर्णमेव भवतीति ॥२३२१॥

D. C. When a particular bed is spread on a particular place at a particular time, it is said to have been spread at that time and place to a particular extent, and is also said to be under the process of being spread. That is to say, while some part of the bed has already been spread, another part is being spread. So, it is pointless to say that the whole bed has been spread. And, the theory of “Kriyamāṇam kritam” preached by Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra seems wrong to me.

Sthaviras :—O Jamālī ! You have not been able to grasp the real purport, of the Bhagavān’s doctrines and that is why it seems wrong to you. The words of Bhagavān are सर्वनयात्मक *sarvanayātma*¹³ and hence it is possible to believe from the point of view of *vyavahāra*¹⁴ that *kriyamāṇa* is not *krita*. But according to *niścaya naya*,¹⁵ sūtras like “*calamāṇe calite*” are preached and from this point of view, axioms like *kriyamāṇam kritam*” and “*saṁstīryamāṇam saṁstīrṇam*” are justified.

It should be carefully noted that the production of *ghaṭa* does not start from the very first moment, but since *Kriyā-kāla* (period of production) and *niṣṭhā-kāla* (period of completion) are the same, different *kāryas* are produced at different times and each one of them is completed at the same time when it has started being produced. Otherwise, the faults mentioned before; would certainly arise. Taking the case of bed, we can say that the bed itself is not being spread in the beginning, but its different parts are spread one after the other. Each one of those parts is being spread at one moment as has also been spread at the same moment according to our theory “*Kriyamāṇam kritam*.” The bed, as a whole, is said to

13. Containing all the points of view. 14. Practical point of view. 15. Definite view-point.

have been spread only at the final moment, for, then and then only, the work of spreading is completely finished. So, it is perfectly true to assert that "What is being spread is already spread." 26 (2321)

Moreover,

बहुवत्तत्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियाइकज्जकोडीणं ।

मण्णसि दीहं कालं जइ, संथारस्स किं तस्स ? ॥२७॥२३२२॥

27. Bahuvatthattaraṇa vibhinṇadesakiriyaīkajjakodīṇam ।

Maṇṇasi diham kālam jai, saṁthārassa kim tassa ? (2322)

[बहुवत्त्रास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियादिकार्यकोटीनाम् ।

मन्यसे दीर्घं कालं यदि, संस्तारस्य किं तस्य ? ॥२७॥२३२२॥

27. Bahuvastrāstarāṇa vibhinna deśa kriyādi kāryakoṭīnām ।

Manyase dīrgham kālam yadi, saṁstārasya kim tasya ?

27. (2322)]

Trans. 27. If you think that the period (of production) of the series of Kāryas such as that of spreading many cloth-coverings at various places etc. is long, how is the bed (as a whole) concerned by that ? 2223.

टीका—२७ यदि नाम बहुवत्त्रास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियादिकार्यकोटीनां संबन्धिनं दीर्घकालं मन्यसे जानासि त्वम्, ततः संस्तारकस्य तस्य किमायातम् ? इत्यक्षरघटना । विभिन्नो देशो यासां ता विभिन्नदेशास्ताश्च ताः क्रियाश्च विभिन्नदेशक्रियाः, वस्त्रस्योपलक्षणत्वात् कम्बलानां चास्तरणं वस्त्र-कम्बलास्तरणं तस्य विभिन्नदेशक्रिया वस्त्रकम्बलास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियाः, तदादयश्च ताः कार्यकोट्यश्च बहुवत्त्रकम्बलास्तरणविभिन्नदेशक्रियादिकार्यकोट्य इति समासस्तासामिति । आदिशब्दः स्वगतानेकमेदख्यापकः । कार्याणां च कोटिसंख्यत्वमिहापि पूर्ववद् भावनीयमिति ॥२३२२॥

D. C.

Sthaviras :—If you take the period of production of the Kāryas such as that of spreading a number of blankets, cloth-coverings etc. to be long, it does not follow at all that the period of production of the bed, as a whole, should also be long.

Jamālī:—According to you, various *kāryas* take place in the beginning, while the actual bed is begun being spread only at the last moment and it is finished also at that moment according to you. Now, if the *kārya-kāla* and *niṣṭhā-kāla* are the same, what makes me apprehend the *kriyā-kāla* of the bed as *dirgha*? 27 (2322).

Sthaviras reply—

पइसमयकज्जकोडीविमुहो संथारयाहिकयकज्जो ।

पइसमयकज्जकालं कथं संथारम्मि लाएसि ? ॥२८॥२३२३॥

28. Pai samaya kajja kodī vimuho saṁthārayāhikayakajjo ।

Pai samaya kajja kālam katham saṁthārammi lāesi ? (2313)

[प्रतिसमयकार्यकोटिविमुखः संस्तारकाधिकृतकार्यः ।

प्रतिसमयकार्यकालं कथं संस्तारके लगयसि ? ॥२८॥२३२३॥

28. Prati samaya kārya koṭi vimukhah saṁstārakādhikrita kāryah ।

Pratisamaya kāryakālam katham saṁstārake lagayasi ?
(2323)]

Trans. 28. Being mainly careful of (the preparation of) bed and indifferent to (the production of) numerous *Kāryas* (that are produced) from time to time, why do you confuse the period (of production) of the *Kāryas* produced from time to time, with that of the bed? 2323.

टीका—२८ गतार्था, नवरं संस्तारकेणाधिकृतं प्रस्तुतं कार्यं यस्यासौ संस्तारकाधिकृतकार्यं इति समासः ॥२३२३॥

What happened when Jamālī was thus addressed with arguments?

सो उज्जुसुयनयमयं अमुणंतो न पडिवज्जए जाहे ।

ताहे समणा केइ उवसंपण्णा जिणं चेव ॥२९॥२३२४॥

पियदंसणा वि पइणोऽणुरागओ तम्मयं चिय पवण्णा ।

ढंकोवहियागणिदड्ढवत्थदेसा तयं भणइ ॥३०॥२३२५॥

सावय ! संघाडी मे तुमए दड्ढ ति सो वि य तमाह ।

नणु तुज्झ डज्झमाणं दड्ढं ति मओ न सिद्धंतो ॥३१॥२३२६॥

दङ्ढं न दृष्ट्वामाणं जइ विगएऽणागए व का संका ।
काले तयभावाओ संघाटी कम्मि ते दङ्ढा ? ॥३२॥२३२७॥

29. So Ujjusuyanayamayam amuṇanto na padivajjāe jāhe ।
Tāhe samaṇā kei uvasampanṇā Jīṇam ceva (2324)
30. Piyadamsaṇā vi paiṇo'ṇurāgaṇo tammayam ciya pavaṇṇā ।
Dhaṇkovahiyāgaṇidaddhavadatthadesā tayam bhaṇai (2325)
31. Sāvaya saṃghādī me tumae daḍḍha tti so vi ya tamāha ।
Nanu tujjha dajjhamāṇam daḍḍham ti mao na siddhanto (2326)
32. Daḍḍham na dajjhamāṇam jai vigae' ṇāgae va kā saṅkā ।
Kāle tayabhāvāo saṃghādī kammi te daḍḍhā ? (2327)

[स ऋजुसूत्रनयमतमजानन् न प्रतिपद्यते यावत् ।
तावत् श्रमणाः केऽप्युपसंपन्ना जिनमेव ॥२९॥२३२४॥
प्रियदर्शनापि पत्युरनुरागतस्तन्मतेव प्रपन्ना ।
दङ्गोपहिताग्निदग्धवस्त्रदेशा तं भणति ॥३०॥२३२५॥
श्रावक ! संघाटी मे त्वया दग्धेति सोऽपि च तामाह ।
ननु तव दह्यमानं दग्धमिति मतो न सिद्धान्तः ॥३१॥२३२६॥
दग्धं न दह्यमानं यदि विगतेऽनागते वा का शङ्का ।
काले तदभावात् संघाटी कस्मिंस्ते दग्धा ? ॥३२॥२३२७॥

29. Sa Rījusūtranayamatamajānan na pratipadyate yāvat ।
Tāvat śramaṇāḥ ke'pyupasampannā Jīnameva (2324)
30. Priyadarśanāpi patyuranurāgatastanmateva prapannā ।
Dhaṅkopahitāgni dagdha vastra deśā tam bhaṇati (2325)
31. Śrāvaka ! saṃghātī me tvayā dagdheti so'pi ca tāmāha ।
Nanu tava dahyamānam dagdhamiti mato na siddhāntaḥ (2326)
32. Dagdham na dahyamānam yadi vigate' nāgate vā kā śaṅkā ।
Kāle tadabhāvāt saṃghātī kasminste dagdhā ? (2327)]

Trans. 29-30-31-32. Being ignorant of the Rījusūtra¹⁶ point of view, when he does not accept (the principle of

16. According to the Naya theories of the Jainas, there are seven points of view for the comprehension of an object. Rījusū-

kriyamāṇam kritam) several of the monks returned to the Tīrthaṅkara.

Priyadarśanā¹⁷ along with others follows his doctrine on account of her love for him.

When she gets a border of her garment burnt by (a spark of) fire thrown by Dhauka, she says "O śrāvaka! you have burnt my garment." He replies "You do not believe in (the principle of) *dahyamāna dagdha*."

Thus, when a burning (object) is not (said to have) burnt, how could you suspect that your garment is burnt in past or future on account of its being absent (then)? (2324-2327).

टीका—२९-३०-३१-३२ चतस्रोऽपि गाथा गतार्थाः नवरमृजुसूत्रो निश्चयनयविशेषः । “पियदंसणा वि त्ति” आह-ननु पूर्वे “सुदर्शना” इति

tra Naya is one of them. The seven nayas could be briefly explained as follows :—

- (1) Naigama Naya-enables the combined comprehension of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.
- (2) Saṅgraha Naya offers only a *sāmānya* or general outlook.
- (3) Vyavahāra Naya gives only a *viśeṣa* or practical point of view.
- (4) Rijusūtra Naya means a direct or straight-forward outlook of an object in its present condition. From this view-point, an object is directly perceived in its present condition.
- (5) Śabda Naya recognizes an object only on etymological strength.
- (6) Samabhirūḍha Naya explains numerous interpretations of the same word by virtue of different paryāyas.
- (7) Evambhūta Naya explains the meaning of a word by means of vyutpatti or derivation.

It should be noted that the first four nayas are *padārtha-grāhi*, while the remaining are *Śabdārtthagrāhi*.

17. According to Bhaṣyakāra, Priyadarśanā, Jyeṣṭhā, Sudarśanā and Anavadyāṅgi are the different names of Jamālī's wife.

(For more details Vide Foot Note 4.)

तस्या नाम प्रोक्तम्, कथमिदानीं “प्रियदर्शना” इत्युच्यते ? । सत्यम्, किन्त्व-
दमपि तस्या नाम द्रष्टव्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—“तेयसिरिं च सुरुवं जणइ य
पियदंसणं धूयं” इति । “ढंकोवहियेत्यादि”—स्वाध्यायपौरुषीं कुर्वत्यास्तस्या
आपाकाद् गृहीत्वा ढंङ्केनोपहितः क्षिप्तो योऽग्निस्तेन दग्धो वस्त्रदेशो यस्याः सा
ढङ्कोपहिताग्निदग्धवस्त्रदेशा सती तं ढङ्कं भणति । सोऽपि तां प्रियदर्शनामाह-दड्ढ-
मित्यादिचतुर्थगाथाया अयं भावार्थः—ननु यदि दह्यमानं दाहक्रियाक्षणे वर्तमाने
वस्त्रं न दग्धमिति भवद्भिरुच्यते, ततो विगत उपरते, अनागते वा भविष्यति
दाहक्रियाकाले का शङ्का वस्त्रदाहविषया, तदभावात् दाहक्रियाया विनष्टानुत्पन्न-
त्वेन सर्वथाऽभावादित्यर्थः । अतो वर्तमानाऽतीताऽनागतलक्षणे कालत्रयेऽप्युक्ति-
तोऽदग्धत्वात् कस्मिन् काले आर्ये ! ते तव संघाटी मया दग्धेत्युच्यताम् ?
इति ॥२३२४॥२३२५॥

D. C. Rijusūtra Naya is characterised by niscaya naya and it helps us to comprehend an object clearly as it happens to be at present.

Priyadarśanā is also the name of Jamālī's wife in addition to Sudarśanā which has already been referred to above.

In reply to her query, as to why Dhaṅka burnt her garment, Dhaṅka asserts that “*daḥyamāna* is not *dagdha*” according to the Bahurata school of thought.

So, according to your theory, your garment which is *daḥyamāna* or burning at present, could not be said to have been burnt. Nor should you take it to have been burnt in past or future. For, in the past as well as in future, the process of burning would be absent. Then, at what time did I burn your garment, O respectable lady ? (2324–2327).

अहवा न डज्झमाणं दड्ढं दाहकिरियासमत्तीए ।

किरियाऽभावे दड्ढं जइ दड्ढं किं न तेलुक्कं ? ॥२३॥२३२८॥

33. Ahavā na ḍajjhamānam daḍḍham dāhakiriyāsamattīe ।

Kiriya'bhāve daḍḍham jai daḍḍham kim na telukkam ? (2328)

[अथवा न दह्यमानं दग्धं दाहक्रियासमाप्तौ ॥

क्रियाऽभावे दग्धं यदि दग्धं किं न त्रैलोक्यम् ॥३३॥२३२८॥

33. Athavā na dahyamānam dagdham dāhakriyasamāptau ।

Kriyā'bhāve dagdham yadi dagdham kim na trailokyam.

(2328)]

Trans. 33. Or, (if you say that) a burning object is burnt at the end of the process of burning. If it is burnt in absence of the process (of burning), why is the Universe not burnt ? 2328.

टीका-३३ अथैवं ब्रूये-दह्यमानं न दग्धम्, किन्तु दाहक्रियासमाप्तौ दग्धम् । नन्वेवं सति दाहक्रियाऽभावे दग्धमित्युक्तं भवति । एतच्चायुक्तम्, यतो यदि दाहक्रियाऽभावे दग्धम्, तर्हि त्रैलोक्यमपि किं न “दग्धम्” इत्यत्रापि संबध्यते, यथा वस्त्रे तथा त्रैलोक्येऽपि दाहक्रियाऽभावस्य तुल्यत्वादिति ॥२३२८॥

D. C. If you argue that “an object which is being burnt, is not burnt now, but it is burnt only when the process of burning has ceased, that is not proper. For, if it burns in absence of *dāha-Kriyā*, why should not the whole Universe be taken as burnt on account of the absence of *dāha-kriyā* common therein ? 33 (2328)

उज्जुसुयनयमयाओ वीरजिणिंदवयणावलंबीणं ।

जुज्जेज्ज डज्झमाणं दड्ढं वोत्तुं न तुज्झ त्ति ॥३४॥२३२९॥

34. Ujjusuyanañāyāyāo Vira-jinindavayaṇāvalambīṇam ।

Jujjēja dajjhamāṇam daddham vōttum na tujjha tti. (2329)

[ऋजुसूत्रनयमताद् वीरजिनेन्द्रवचनावलम्बिनाम् ।

युज्यते दह्यमानं दग्धं वक्तुं न तवेति ॥३४॥२३२९॥

34. Rījusūtranayamātād Vira-jinēndravacanāvalambinām ।

Yujyate dahyamānam dagdham vaktum na tavēti. (2329)]

Trans. 34. The followers of the great Tīrthāṅkārā Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira, are fit to say, that *dahyamāna* is *dagdha* from the point of view of Rījusūtra system. But you cannot say so. 2329.

टीका—उत्तानार्था ॥२३२९॥

Because,

समए. समए जो जो देसोऽग्निभावमेइ डज्झमाणस्स ।
तं तम्मि डज्झमाणं दड्ढं पि तमेव तत्थेव ॥३५॥२३३०॥

35. Samae samae jojo jojo deso'gñibhāvamei dajjhamāṇassa ।
Tam tammi dajjhamāṇam daḍḍham pi tameva tattheva (2330)

[समये समये यो यो देशोऽग्निभावमेति दह्यमानस्य ।
तत् तस्मिन् दह्यमानं दग्धमपि तदेव तत्रैव ॥३५॥२३३०॥

35. Samaye samaye yo yo deśo'gñibhāvameti dahyamānasya ।
Tat tasmin dahyamānam dagdhamapi tadeva tatraiva (2330)]

Trans. 35. According to Rijusūtra naya, whatever part of the burning (object) is being burnt at whatever time, is said to have been burnt. Hence that which is burnt in it, is said to have been burnt there and at that moment only. 2330.

टीका—३५ यो यो दाहस्य पटादेर्देशस्तन्त्वादिः समये समयेऽग्निभावमेति—
दह्यत इत्यर्थः, तत्तद्देशरूपं वस्तु तस्मिन् समये दह्यमानं भण्यते तथा दग्धमपि
तदेव वस्तु तस्मिन्नेव समये भण्यते । अतो दह्यमानमेव दग्धम् । यत्तु देशमात्रेऽपि
दग्धे संघाटी मे “दग्धा” इति त्वं वदसि, तत् संघात्येकदेशेऽपि संघाटी शब्दो-
पचारादिति मन्तव्यमिति ॥२३३०॥

D. C. From the point of view of the Rijusūtra system, an object is comprehended only in its present condition. So, when a particular part, say, thread of the garment is burning at a particular time, it is said to have burnt actually. *Dahymāna* is said as *dagdha* in this sense. When only a part of your garment is burnt, you say that your garment is burnt, and thus you take the part of the garment as the (whole) garment itself.

We can therefore, say that—

नियमेण डज्झमाणं दड्ढं दड्ढं तु होइ भयणिज्जं ।
किंचिदिह डज्झमाणं उवरयदाहं च हुज्जा हि ॥३६॥२३३१॥

36. Niyameṇa dajjhamāṇam daḍḍham daḍḍham tu hoi bhaya-
nījjam ।

Kimcidiha dajjhamāṇamuvarayaḍāham ca hujjā hi (2331)

[नियमेन दह्यमानं दग्धं दग्धं तु भवति भजनीयम् ।

किञ्चिदिह दह्यमानमुपरतदाहं च भवेत् ॥३६॥२३३१॥

36. Niyameṇa dahyamāṇam dagdham dagdham tu bhavati
bhajanīyam ।

Kimcidiha dahyamāṇamuparataḍāham ca bhavet (2331)]

Trans. 36. As a rule, *dahyamāṇa* is *dagdha*. But a *dagdha* is said to have been burnt (only) alternately. (Because) here, some (part) is (actually) burning while some is (actually) void of (the process of) burning. 2331.

टीका—व्याख्या प्रागुक्तानुसारेण कार्येति ॥२३३१॥

This has already been explained before¹⁸.

Thus explained by Dhaṅka—

इच्छामो संबोहणमज्जो ! पियदंसणादओ ढंक् ।

वोत्तुं जमालिमेक्कं मोत्तूण गया जिणसगांसं ॥३७॥२३३२॥

37. Iccāmo sambohaṇamajjo ! Piyadaṇṣaṇādao Dhaṅkam ।

Vottum Jamālimekkam mottaṇa gayā Jīṇasagāsam 2332.

[इच्छामःसंबोधनमार्य ! प्रियदर्शनादयो ढङ्कम् ।

उत्त्वा जमालिमेकं मुक्त्वा गता जिनसकाशम् ॥३७॥२३३२॥

37. Iccāmaṇ sambodhanamārya ! Priyadarśanādayo Dhaṅkam ।

Uktvā Jamālimekkam muktvā gatā Jīna-sakāśam (2332)]

Trans 37. Priyadarśanā and others said (apologetically) ‘O Revered Sir, we follow your advice’ and leaving Jamāli alone, (they) went to the Tīrthaṅkara. 2332.

End of the Discussion with the First Nihnava.

18. Vide verse 2320.

Chapter III



द्वितीय निहव वक्तव्यता

Discussion with the Second Nihava.

सोलसवासाणि तया जिणेण उप्पाडियस्स नाणस्स ।
जीवपएसियदिट्ठी तो उसभपुरे समुप्पण्णा ॥३८॥२३३३॥
रायगिहे गुणसिलए वसु चउदसपुव्वि तीसभुत्ते य ।
आमलकप्पा नयरी मित्तसिरी कूर-पिउडाई ॥३९॥२३३४॥

38. Solasavāsāṇi tayā Jiṇena uppādiyassa nāṇassa ।
Jīvapaesiyaditṭhī to Usabhapurē samuppanṇā (2333).
39. Rāyagihe Guṇasīlāe Vasu caudasapuvvi Tisagutte ya ।
Āmalakappā nayarī Mittasirī kūra-piudāi (2334)

[षोडशवर्षाणि तदा जिनेनोत्पादितस्य ज्ञानस्य ।
जीवप्रदेशिकदृष्टिस्तत ऋषभपुरे समुत्पन्ना ॥३८॥२३३३॥
राजगृहे गुणशिलके वसुश्चतुर्दशपूर्वी तिष्यगुप्तश्च ।
आमलकल्पा नगरी मित्रश्रीः कूर-सिक्थादिना ॥३९॥२३३४॥

38. Ṣoḍaśavarṣāṇi tadā Jinenotpāditasya jñānasya ।
Jīvapradeśikadr̥ṣṭistata R̥ṣabhapurē samutpannā (2333).
39. Rājagrihe Guṇaśilake Vasuścaturdaśapūrvī Tiṣyaguptaśca ।
Āmalakalpā nagarī Mitraśrīḥ kūra-sikthādinā (2334)]

Trans. 38-39. When sixteen years (had passed) since the Tīrthaṅkara had attained the Absolute Perception, the theory of Jīvapradeśikas came into existence in R̥ṣabhapura.

Tiṣyagupta (the pupil of) caturdaśaparvī Vasu of the Guṇaśilaka cāitya in (the city of) Rājagriha (was convinced) by Mitraśrī in the city of Āmalakalpa by (offering him) lumps of boiled rice etc. (2333-2334).

टीका-३८-३९ व्याख्या-श्रीमन्महावीरजिनेन तदा षोडशवर्षाणि केवल-
ज्ञानस्योत्पादितस्याभूवन् । ततश्च राजगृहापरनाम्नि ऋषभपुरे नगरे जीवप्रदेशिक-
दृष्टिःसमुत्पन्नेति । कथमुत्पन्ना ? । इत्याह-राजगृहे नगरे गुणशिलके चैत्ये
चतुर्दशपूर्विणो वसुनामान आचार्याः समागताः, तेषां च तिष्यगुप्तो नाम शिष्यः ।
स च तत्र पूर्वगतमालापकं वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपमधीयानो वक्ष्यमाणयुः भिविप्रति-
पन्नोऽसंबुद्धः परिहृतो सुखभिविहरन्नामलकल्पायां नगर्यां गतः । तत्र मित्रश्रीनाम्ना
श्रावकेण कूर-पिण्डादिना कूर-सिक्थ्यादिदानेन प्रतिबोधित इत्यर्थः ॥२३३३
-२३३४॥

D. C. Sixteen years had passed since the Tīrthaṅkara (Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra) had attained Kevala Jñāna.

1. Like his predecessors, Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra also had got his preachings composed in books. His Gaṇadharas or principal pupils arranged his preachings in twelve Āṅgas. Of these twelve Āṅgas, the twelfth Āṅga was divided into fourteen Purvas. Both the sects of the Jainas-the Śvetambaras as well as Digambaras-accept these Purvas as the oldest Sacred Works of the Jaina Canon.

The tradition of the Śvetambaras about these Pūrvas is this :—The fourteen Pūrvas had been incorporated in the Twelfth Āṅga (the Dṛṣṭivāda) which was lost before 1000 A. V. But a detailed Table of its contents and consequently of the Purvas has survived in the Fourth Āṅga-the Samavāyāṅga and in the Nandi Sūtra. (Vide Weber. Indisch Studien XVI p. 341).

We are further told by the tradition that Sthavira Ārya Jambū Swāmī was the last Kevali and Sthavira Sthūlabhadraji was the last śruta-kevali who knew all the twelve Āṅgas along with the fourteen Purvas with their meanings and explanations of intricate subjects in his memory.

There was a preceptor named Vasusūri in the Guṇaśilaka caitya of Rājagriha. He was well-versed in all the fourteen Pārvas. He had a pupil named Tiṣyagupta. During the course of his study of the Pārvas, Tiṣyagupta was once overcome by vanity, as a result of which, he left the caitya and came to the city of Āmalakalpā. There, he was convinced (of the validity of the Ācārya's view) by a Śrāvaka named Mitraśrī who offered him lumps of boiled rice etc. 38-39 (2333-2334).

The whole story is told in details as follows :—

**आयप्पवायपुव्वं अहिज्जमाणस्स तीसगुत्तस्स ।
नयमयमयाणमाणस्स दिट्ठिमोहो समुप्पण्णो ॥४०॥२३३५॥**

40. Āyappavāyapuvvam ahijjamāṇassa Tīsaguttassa ।
Nayamayamayāṇamāṇassa diṭṭhimoho samuppaṇṇo (2335)

**[आत्मप्रवादपूर्वमधीयानस्य तिष्यगुप्तस्य ।
नयमतमजानतो दृष्टिमोहः समुत्पन्नः ॥४०॥२३३५॥**

40. Ātmapravādaparvamadhīyānasya Tiṣyaguptasya ।
Nayamatamajānato dṛṣṭimohaḥ samutpannaḥ (2335)]

Trans. 40. While studying a Parva named Ātma-pravāda (Āyappavāya)² Tiṣyagupta not knowing the (real purport of) a particular school of thought, was disillusioned. 2335.

2. Ātma-pravāda (Āyappavāya) is one of fourteen Pārvas incorporated in the Pūrvagata section of Dṛṣṭivāda.

Parikrama, Sūtra, Anuyoga, Pūrvagata and Calikā are the five sections of Dṛṣṭivāda.

Pūrvagata forms the most important part of Dṛṣṭivāda, on account of its containing the following fourteen Pārvas viz :—

1. Utpāda pārva (Uppāya-pārva).
2. Agrāyaṇīya-pārva (Aggeanatha-puvva)
3. Vīryapravāda-pārva (Viriyaappavāya puva)
4. Atthinastippavāyapuvva (Astināstipravāda pārva)

टीका-४० आत्मप्रवादनामकं पूर्वमधीयानस्य तिष्यगुप्तस्यायं सूत्रालापकः सामायातस्तद्यथा-“एगे भंते ! जीवपएसे जीवे त्ति वत्तव्वं सिया ? । नो इणट्ठे समट्ठे । एवं दो, तिन्नि जाव दस, संखेज्जा असंखेज्जा भंते ! जीवपएसा जीव त्ति वत्तव्वं सिया ? । नो इणट्ठे समट्ठे, एगपएसूणे वि णं जीवे नो जीवे त्ति वत्तव्वं सिया, से केणं अट्ठेणं ? । जम्हा णं कसिणे पडिपुत्ते लोगांगासपएसतुल्ले जीवे जीवे त्ति वत्तव्वं सिया, से तेणं अट्ठेणं” इति । (एको भगवन् ? जीवप्रदेशो जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् ? । नो अयमर्थः समर्थः । एवं द्वौ, त्रयो यावद् दश, संख्येयाः, असंख्येया भगवन् ? जीवप्रदेशा जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् ? । नो अयमर्थः समर्थः, एकप्रदेशोऽपि जीवो नो जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् । अथ केनार्थेन ? । यस्मात् कृत्स्नः परिपूर्णो लोकाकाशप्रदेशतुल्यो जीवो जीव इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् तेनार्थेन) । अमुं चालापकमधीयानस्य “कस्यपि नयस्येदमपि मतम्, न तु सर्वनयानाम्” इत्येवमजानतस्तिष्यगुप्तस्य मिथ्यात्वोदयाद् दृष्टेर्दर्शनस्य मोक्षो विपर्यासः संजात इति ॥२३३५॥

D. C. During his study of a Pūrva, named Āyappavāya, Tisyagupta came across the following conversation:-

“ O Lord, could one portion of a living being be called Jiva ?

“ No, that is not the correct view ”

“ Then, O Lord ! could the two, three, ten or many portions of a living being be called Jiva ?

-
5. Jñānapravāda pūrva (Nāṇappavāya puvva)
 6. Satya prayāda pūrva (Saccappavāya puvva)
 7. Ātmāpravāda pūrva (Āyappavāya puvva)
 8. Karmāpravāda pūrva (Kammappavāya puvva)
 9. Pratyākhyāna pradāda pūrva (Paccakkhāṇappavāya puvva)
 10. Vidyāpravādapūrva (Vijjāppavaya puvva)
 11. Avandhya pūrva (Avanjjha puvva)
 12. Prāṇavāda pūrva (Pāṇavāya puvva)
 13. Kriyā viśāla pūrva (Kiriya viśāla puvva)
 14. Lokabindu sāra (Logabindu sara)

“No, that is not the correct view. A living being even one portion less, cannot be said to be *Jīva*. It could be called *Jīva* only if it is complete (in form) like *Loka* and *Ākāśa*.”

Tisya Gupta did not know that this statement was true only from one point of view, and not from all points of view. He, therefore, misinterpreted the above-mentioned *alāpaka* and formed a wrongly-based theory as a result of that. 40 (2335)

His theory is explained thus:--

एगादओ. पएसा नो जीवो नो पएसहीणो वि ।
जं तो स जेण पुण्णो स एव जीवो पएसो त्ति ॥४१॥२३३६॥

41. Egādao paesā no Jīvo no pāsahīṇo vi ।
Jam to sa jeṇa puṇṇo sa eva Jīvo paeso tti (2336)

[एकादयः प्रदेशा नो जीवो नो प्रदेशहीनोऽपि ।
यत्तः ततः स येन पूर्णः स एव जीवः प्रदेश इति ॥४१॥२३३६॥

41. Ekādayaḥ pradeśā no Jīvo no pradeśahīno'pi ।
Yat tataḥ sa yena pūrṇaḥ sa eva Jīvaḥ pradeśa iti (2336)

Trans. 41. One or more parts (of a living being) cannot be said as *Jīva*. That which lacks (some) part, is also not (*Jīva*). So, that (part) by which it becomes complete (in form), is alone called *Jīva* 2336

टीका-४१ यद् यस्मादेकादयः प्रदेशास्तावज्जीवो न भवति, एगे भन्ते ! जीवपएसे इत्याद्यालापके निषिद्धत्वात्; एवं यावदेकेनापि प्रदेशेन हीनो जीवो न भवति, अत्रैवालापके निवारितत्वात् । ततस्तस्माद् येन केनापि चरमप्रदेशेन स जीवः परिपूर्णः क्रियते स एव प्रदेशो जीवो न शेष प्रदेशाः एतत्संवालापक प्रामाण्यादिति । एवं विप्रतिपन्नोऽसाविति ॥२३३६॥

D. C, Since the above-mentioned *alāpaka* does not admit of one or more *pradesas* of a living being to be *jīva* and since it does not allow a living being lacking in some part or the other, to be called as *Jīva*, we are led to believe that the last

pradeśa should alone be called *Jīva*, because it makes the whole being complete in form.

Tisyagupta misinterprets the *ālāpaka* in this way and gets himself confused. 41 (2336).

Then,

गुरुणाऽभिहिओ जइ ते पढमपएसो न संमओ जीवो ।
तो तत्परिणामो चिय जीवो कहमंतिमपएसो ? ॥४२॥२३३७॥

42. Guruṇā'bhihiō jai te paḍhamapaeso na sammaō Jivo ।
To tappariṇāmo cciya Jivo kahamantimapaeso ? 2337

[गुरुणाऽभिहितो यदि तव प्रथमप्रदेशो न संमतो जीवः ।
ततस्तत्परिणाम एव जीवः कथमन्तिमप्रदेशः ? ॥४२॥२३३७॥

42. Guruṇā'bhihito yadi tava prathamapradeśo na sammtō Jivāḥ ।
Tatastatpariṇāma eva Jivāḥ kathamantimapradeśaḥ ? (2337)]

Trans. 42. He was told by the preceptor that "If you do not take the first part (of a living being) to be *Jīva*, how could the last portion which happens to be of the same consequence as that of the first one, be called *Jīva* ? 2337.

टीका-४२ “एकोन्त्यप्रदेशो जीवः तद्भावभावित्वाज्जीवत्वस्य ” इत्यादि ब्रुवाणस्तिष्यगुप्तो गुरुणा वसुसुरिणाऽभिहितः—हन्त ! यदि ते तव प्रथमो जीव-प्रदेशो जीवो न संमतः, ततस्तर्ह्यन्तिमो जीवप्रदेशः कथं केन प्रकारेण जीवः ?—न घटत एव सोऽपि जीव इत्यर्थः । कुतः ? तत्परिणाम इति कृत्वा । इदमुक्तं भवति—भवदभिमतोऽन्त्यप्रदेशोऽपि न जीवः, अन्यप्रदेशैस्तुल्यपरिणामत्वात्, प्रथमाद्यन्यप्रदेशवदिति ॥२३३७॥

D. C. In reply to the belief of Tisyagupta that the last portion—and not the other portions—alone should be taken as *Jīva*, Ācārya Vasusūri explains :—

“O Tisyagupta, if you do not take the first part (of a living being) as *Jīva*, it is not worthy of you to take the last part also as *Jīva*. Because, the last portion is of the same *pari-*

pāma as that of the first one, and hence, is in no way different from the first one. 12 (2337)

अहव स जीवो कह नाइमो त्ति को वा विसेसहेऊ ते ? ।

अह पूरणो त्ति बुद्धी एकेको पूरणो तस्स ॥४३॥२३३८॥

43. Ahava sa jīvaḥ kaha nāimo tti ko vā viśesaheṭ te ?
Aha pāraṇo tti buddhī ekkekko pāraṇo tassa (2338)

[अथवा स जीवः कथं नादिम इति वा विशेषहेतुस्तव ? ।

अथ पूरण इति बुद्धिरेकैकः पूरणस्तस्य ॥४३॥२३३८॥

43. Athavā sa jīvaḥ katham nādima iti vā viśeṣaheṭustava ? ।
Atha pāraṇa iti buddhirekaikaḥ pāraṇastasya (2338).]

Trans. 43. "Or, if that (portion) is Jīva, why not the first (one) also ? Or, what is the distinctive purpose for holding such a view ? Here, if the contention (is) that it is complete (in form) due to the last portion, (The reply is that) "It is complete (in form) by each and every portion "

2338.

टीका-४३ अथवा, सोऽन्तिमप्रदेशः कथं जीवस्त्वयाऽभ्युपगम्यते, कथं च न-
नैकादिमः प्रथमस्तद्रूपतयेष्यते ? । नन्वाद्योऽपि प्रदेशो जीव एवेष्यताम्, शेष-
प्रदेशतुल्यपरिणामत्वात्, अन्त्यप्रदेशवदिति । को वाऽत्र विशेषहेतुस्तव येन
प्रदेशत्वे तुल्येऽप्यन्तिमो जीवो न प्रथमः ? इति । अथ विवक्षितासंख्येयप्रदेश-
राशेरन्त्यः प्रदेशः पूरण इति विशेषसद्भावात् स जीवो न प्रथम इति तव बुद्धिः ।
तदयुक्तम्, यतो यथाऽन्त्यः प्रदेशः पूरणस्तथैकैकप्रथमादिप्रदेशस्तस्य विवक्षित-
जीवप्रदेशराशेः पूरण एव, एकमपि प्रदेशमन्तरेण तस्यापरिपूर्तिरिति ॥२३३८॥

D C.

The Ācārya:—According to you, the last portion is jīva in spite of its being similar, on what particular ground do you hold this belief?

Tisyagupta:—Since the last portion completes the range of innumerable portions of which a living being is composed, and the first portion does not do that, I hold the last *pradeśa* to have *jīvatva*.

The Ācārya :—You are labouring under a great disillusion by doing so. For, it is not the last *pradeśa* alone, but each and every *pradeśa* of which a living being is composed, that helps to compose and complete the perfect form of a living being. So, either each and every portion of the living being, shall have to be taken as Jīva, if we accept your views; or there would be nothing like *jīvatva* in the last portion like other portions resulting in the absolute negation of *jīvatva* 43 (2338)

If we accept Jīvatva in every single portion of a living being, there are other difficulties also -

एवं जीवबहुत्तं पइजीवं सव्वहा व तदभावो ।
इच्छाविवज्जओ वा विसमत्तं सव्वसिद्धी वा ॥४४॥

44. Evam jīvabahuttam pajīvam savvaha va tadabhāvo ।
Icchāvivajjaō vā visamattam savvasiddhī vā. (2339)

[एवं जीवबहुत्वं प्रतिजीवं सर्वथा वा तदभावः ।
इच्छाविपर्ययो वा विषमत्वं सर्वसिद्धिर्वा ॥४४॥२३३९॥

44. Evam jīvabahutvam pratijīvam sarvathā vā tadabhāvaḥ ।
Icchaviparyayo vā viṣamattvam sarvasiddhirvā (2339)]

Trans. 44. In that case, every jīva will have to be taken as composed of numerous jīvas. Or, there would be absolute negation of it. If it is left to your free will, there would be reverse or ambiguous (statements) as well. Or, all the alternatives (will be proved) 2339.

टीका—४४ एवं सर्वजीवप्रदेशानां विवक्षितप्रदेशमानपूरणत्वेऽन्त्यप्रदेशवत् प्रत्येकं जीवत्वात् प्रतिजीवं जीवबहुत्वमसंख्येयजीवात्मकं प्राप्नोति । अथवा प्रथमादिप्रदेशवदन्त्यप्रदेशस्याप्यजीवत्वे सर्वथा तदभावो जीवाभावः प्रसजति । अथ पूरणत्वे समानेऽप्यन्त्यप्रदेश एव जीवः, शेषास्तु प्रदेशा अजीवा इत्याग्रहो न मुच्यते, तर्हि राजादेरिवेच्छा भवतः, यत् प्रतिभासते तदेव हि जल्प्यत इति । तथा च सति विपर्ययोऽपि कस्माद् न भवति, आद्यो जीवः अन्त्यस्तु प्रदेशोऽजीव

इति ? । विषमत्वं वा कुतो न भवति—केचनापि प्रदेशा जीवाः, केचित्तु अजीवा इति ? अनियमेन सर्वविकल्पसिद्धिर्वा कस्माद् न भवति, स्वेच्छया सर्वपक्षानामपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वात् इति ॥२३३९॥

D. C. If you take all the *pradeśas* as having *jīvatva* along with the last *pradeśa*, every *jīva* will have to be taken as composed of a number of other *jīvas*. If you do not take them as *jīvas*, there would be absolute negation of *jīvatva*. Still, however, ignoring the fact that the last *pradeśa* is, in no way, different from other *pradeśas*, so far as *pārṇatva* is concerned, if you insist with your own sweet will that the last portion is *jīva*, and the rest are *a-jīvas*, then, like the free will of kings etc. you could, as well, insist upon the reverse statement viz—that the first etc. are *jīvas* and the last is *a-jīva*. Or, why not say vaguely that some of them are *jīvas* and some are *a-jīvas*? Or, you could prove the validity of all the possible alternatives. For, being dependent upon your free will, you can opine on all sides, 44 (2339)

जं सव्वहा न वीसुं सव्वेसु वि तं न रेणुतेल्लं व ।
सेसेसु असव्वभूओ जीवो कहमन्तिमपासे ? ॥४५॥२३४०॥

45. Jam savvahā na vīsum savvesu vi tam na reṇutellam va ।
Sesesu asabbhūo jīvo khamantimapaese ? (2340)

[यत् सर्वथा न विष्वक् सर्वेष्वपि तद् न रेणुतैलमिव ।
शेषेष्वसद्भूतो जीवः कथमन्तिमप्रदेशे ? ॥४५॥२३४०॥

45. Yat sarvathā na viṣvak sarveṣvapi tad na reṇutailamiva ।
Śeṣeṣvasadbhūto jīvaḥ kathamantimapradeśe ? (2340)]

Trans. 45. That which does not entirely exist separately, does not even exist in all parts (combined together) like the (drop of) oil in sands. Similarly, when *jīva* is not present in other parts, how could it exist in the last portion ? 2340.

टीका-४५ यद् विष्वगेकैकस्मिन्नवयवे नास्ति तद् सर्वेष्ववयवेषु समुदि-

तेषु न भवति, यथा रेणुकणेषु प्रत्येकमसत् तत्समुदाये तैलम्, नास्ति च प्रथमादिक एकैकस्मिन् प्रदेशे जीवत्वम्, ततःशेषेषु प्रथमादिप्रदेशेष्वसज्जीवत्वं परिणामादिना तुल्ये कथमकस्मादेवास्मिन्नेवान्त्यप्रदेशे समायातम् ? इति ॥२३४०॥

D. C. Like the drop of oil in the particles of sand, that which is not present in each of the portions separately, does not even exist in all the portions combined together.

Since you do not admit the existence of *jīvatva* in portions such as the first one etc., how could *jīvatva* be present in the last portion accidentally in spite of its being similar to other portions in respect of *pariṇāma* etc. ? 45 (2340).

अहं देसओऽवसेसेसु तो वि किह सव्वहंतिमे जुत्तो ।

अहं तस्मिं व जो हेऊ स एव सेसेसु वि समानो ॥४६॥२३४१॥

46. Aha 'desa'vasesesu to vi kiha savvahantime jutto ।

Aha tammi va jo hea sa eva sesesu vi samāṇo 2341.

[अथ देशतोऽवशेषेषु ततोऽपि कथं सर्वथान्तिमे युक्तः ।

अथ तस्मिन् वा यो हेतुः स एव शेषेष्वपि समानः ॥४६॥२३४१॥

46. Atha deśato'vaśeṣeṣu tato'pi katham sarvathāntime yuktaḥ ।

Atha tasmiṇ vā yo hetuḥ sa eva śeṣeṣvapi samānaḥ (2341)]

Trans. 46. If it is said that in the remaining portions *jīvatva* exists partially, then also, how could it be wholly present in the last portion ? The same reason for *jīvatva* as it is present in it (the last portion), is present in other particles as well. 2341.

टीका-४६ अथान्त्यादवशेषेषु प्रथमादिप्रदेशेषु देशतो जीवः समस्त्येव, अन्त्यप्रदेशे तु सर्वात्मनाऽसौ समस्तीति विशेषः । ततो “जं सव्वहा न वीसुं” इत्येतदसिद्धमिति भावः । अत्रोत्तरमाह-तथापि कथमन्त्यप्रदेशे सर्वात्मना जीवो युक्तः ? । ननु तत्रापि देशत एवासौ युज्यते, तस्यापि प्रदेशत्वात्, प्रथमादिप्रदेशवत् । अथान्त्यप्रदेशे संपूर्णो जीव इष्यते, तर्हि तत्र तद्भावे यो हेतुः स

शेषेष्वपि प्रथमादिप्रदेशेषु समान एव, तुल्यधर्मकत्वात् । अतस्तेष्वपि प्रतिप्रदेशं संपूर्णजीवत्वमन्त्यप्रदेशवत् किं नेष्यते ? इति ॥२३४१॥

D. C.

Tisyagupta :—In all the portions except the last one of the living being, jīvatva exists partially, while in the last portion it exists wholly.

The Ācārya :—That is not possible on grounds mentioned above³. How could jīva exist in the last portion wholly, and in the rest of them partially ? There also, it is proper to admit its existence partially as in the case of other portions. Hence, if the whole of jīva is taken as existing in the last portion, it should also be taken as existing wholly in other portions as well. 46. (2341).

नेह पएसत्तणओ अन्तो जीवो जहाइमपएसो ।

आह सुयम्मि निसिद्धा सैसा न उ अन्तिमपएसो ॥४७॥२३४२॥

47. Neha paesattanaŕ anto jīvo jahāimapaeso ।

Āha suyammi nisiddhā sesā na u antimapaeso. (2342)

[नेह प्रदेशत्वतोऽन्त्यो जीवो यथादिमप्रदेशः ।

आह श्रुते निषिद्धाः शैषा न त्वन्तिमप्रदेशः ॥४७॥२३४२॥

47. Neha pradeśatvato'ntyo jīvo yathādīmapradeśaḥ ।

Āha śrute niṣiddhāḥ śeṣā na tvantimapradeśaḥ 47 (2342)]

नणु एगो त्ति निसिद्धो सो वि सुए जइ सुयं पमाणं ते ।

सुत्ते सव्वपएसो भणिया जीवो न चरिमो त्ति ॥४८॥२३४३॥

48. Naṇu ego tti nisiddho so vi sue jai suyam pamāṇam te ।

Sutte savvapaesā bhaṇiyā jīvo na carimo tti. (2343)

[नन्वेक इति निषिद्धः सौऽपि श्रुते यदि श्रुतं प्रमाणं तव ॥

सूत्रे सर्वप्रदेशा भणिता जीवो न चरम इति ॥४८॥२३४३॥

48. Nanveka iti niṣiddhaḥ so'pi śrute yadi śrutam pramāṇam tava |
Sūtre sarvapradeśā bhaṇitā jīvo na carama iti (2343)]

Trans. 47-48. Just as the first portion is not *jīva* on account of its (quality of) being *pradeśa*, the last portion is also not *jīva* (for the same reason). If it is said that the remaining portions are excluded from the (said) commandment, but the last portion is not excluded, (The answer is this)— If the commandment is accepted as an authority (by you), that (the last portion) is, also, in fact, excluded from the commandment by virtue of its being one. In the (said) commandment all the *pradeśas* (combined together) have been stated as having *jīva*. *Jīva* does not, therefore, exist in the last portion alone. (2342-2343).

टीका-४७ इहान्त्यप्रदेशोऽपि न जीवः, प्रदेशत्वात्, यथा प्रथमादिप्रदेश इति । अह-नन्वाममबाधितेयं प्रतिज्ञा, यतःपूर्वोक्तालापकरूपे श्रुते शेषाः प्रथमादिप्रदेशा जीवत्वेन निषिद्धाः, न पुनरन्त्यप्रदेशः, तस्य तत्र जीवत्वानुज्ञानात् । अतःकथं प्रथमादिप्रदेशवदन्त्यस्य जीवत्वनिषेधं मन्यामहे ? इति ॥२३४२

टीका-४८ ननु सोऽप्यन्त्यप्रदेशःश्रुते जीवत्वेन निषिद्धः । कुतः ? । इत्याह-एक इति कृत्वा । तथाहि-तत्रेवेत्थमुक्तम्-“ एगे भन्ते ! जीवपएसे जीवे त्ति वत्तव्यं सिया ? । नो इण्ठे समठ्ठे ” इति । ततो यदि श्रुतं तव प्रमाणम्, ततोऽन्त्यप्रदेशस्यापि जीवत्वं नेष्टव्यम्, एकत्वात्, प्रथमाद्यन्यतर प्रदेशवत् । किञ्च, यदि श्रुतं हन्त ! प्रमाणीकरोषि, तदा सर्वेऽपि जीवप्रदेशाः परिपूर्णा जीवत्वेन श्रुते भणिताः, न त्वेक एव चरमप्रदेशः । तथा च तत्रैवाभिहितम्-“ जम्हाणं कसिणे पडिपुन्ने लोगागासपएसतुल्ले जीवे त्ति वत्तव्यं सिया ” । अतः श्रुतप्रामाण्यमिच्छता भवता नैक एवान्त्यप्रदेशो जीवत्वेनैष्टव्य इति ॥२३४३

D. C. Ācārya :—Like the first portion, the last portion also has no *jīvatva* on account of its quality of being a *pradeśa*.

Tisyagupta :—But that does not go against the main *śrūta* or commandment. Because, the *śrūta* excludes *pradeśas* such as the first one etc. from having *jīvatva*, where as the last *pradeśa*

is not excluded like that. So, why should we not take the last pradeśa as having jīvatva ?

The Ācārya :—The last portion is also excluded from the *śruta* on account of its being a single pradeśa. I would also like to draw your attention to the statement therein, that all the pradeśas combined together would form *jīva*, while one single last pradeśa cannot do so. It has been stated, therefore, that “Jambhāṇam kasiṇe padipanne logāgāsapaesa-tulle jive tti vattavyam siyā.”

Since you take this *śruta* as an authority, you cannot take the last portion alone as *jīva*. 47-48 (2342-2343).

The same idea is then illustrated as follows :—

तंतू पडोवयारी न समत्तपडो य समुदिया ते उ ।
सव्वे समत्तपडओ सव्वपएसा तहा जीवो ॥४९॥२३४४॥

49. Tanta paḍovayārī na samattapaḍo ya samudiyā te u ॥
Savve samattapaḍaō savvapaesā tahā jīvo (2344).

[तन्तुः पटोपकारी न समस्तपटश्च समुदितास्ते तु ।
सर्वे समस्तपटकः सर्वप्रदेशास्तथा जीवः ॥४९॥२३४४॥

49. Tantuḥ paṭopakārī na samastapaṭaśca samuditāste tu ।
Sarve samastapaṭakah sarvapradeśāstathā jīvaḥ (2344)]

Trans, 49. Thread is a (helping) constituent of paṭa, but it is not the whole paṭa itself. They are said to be paṭa (only) when they (i. e. all the threads) are combined together. The same is the case with jīva and (its) constituents. 2344.

टीका—४९ एकस्तन्तुर्भवति समस्तपटोपकारी, तमप्यन्तरेण समस्तपटस्या-
भावात् । परं स सकस्तन्तुः समस्तपटो न भवति किन्तु ते तन्तवः सर्वेऽपि
समुदिताः समस्तपटव्यपदेशं लभन्त इति प्रतीतमेव । तथा जीवप्रदेशोऽप्येको

जीवो न भवति, किन्तु सर्वेऽपि जीवप्रदेशाः समुदिता जीव इति ॥२३४४॥

D. C. A thread of a paṭa is only a constituent of the *paṭa* as a whole. It cannot be said to be the whole *paṭa*. All the threads combined together form the *paṭa*. Similarly, one single pradeśa cannot be taken as *jīva*, but all the pradeśas combined together form *jīva*. 49 (2344)

एवंभूयनयमयं देस-पएसा न वत्थुणो भिन्ना ।

तेणावत्थु त्ति मया कसिणं चिय वत्थुमिट्ठं से ॥५०॥२३४५॥

जइ तं पमाणमेवं कसिणो जीवो अहोवयाराओ ।

देसे वि सव्वबुद्धी पवज्ज सेसे वि तो जीवं ॥५१॥२३४६॥

50. Evambhūyanayamayam desa-paesā na vatthuṇo bhinnā ।
Teṇāvatthu tti mayā kaṣiṇam ciya vatthumiṭṭham se (2345)

51. Jai tam pamāṇamevam kaṣiṇo jīvo ahovayārāō ।
Dese vi savvabuddhī pavajja sese vi to jīvaṃ (2346)

[एवंभूतनयमतं देश-प्रदेशौ न वस्तुनो भिन्नौ ।

तेनावस्तिवति मतौ कृत्स्नमेव वस्तिवष्टं तस्य ॥५०॥२३४५॥

यदि तत् प्रमाणमेवं कृत्स्नो जीवोऽथोपचारात् ।

देशेऽपि सर्वबुद्धिः प्रपद्यस्व शेषानपि ततो जीवम् ॥५१॥२३४६॥

50. Evambhūtanayamatam deśa-pradeśau na vastuno bhinnau ।
Teṇāvastviti matau kritsnameva vastviṣṭam tasya (2345)

51. Yadi tat pramāṇamevam kritsno jīvo'thopacārāt ।
Deśe'pi sarvabuddhiḥ prapadyasva śeṣānapi tato jīvaṃ (2346) ।

Trans. 50-51. According to the *Evambhūta naya*, various portions (of an object) are not different from the object. Hence, they are known as *a-vastu* (or non-objects). The whole (of an object) is alone accepted as *vastu* according to that (point of view). If that is accepted by you, *jīva* too,

is a whole (being). Still however, if the part is metaphorically understood as a whole, then, the remaining parts should also be taken as jīva. 2345-2346.

टीका-५०-५१ एवंभूतनयस्येदं मतं यदुत-देश-प्रदेशा न वस्तुनो भिन्नाः, तेन ताववस्तुरूपौ मतौ । अतो देश-प्रदेशकल्पनारहितं कृत्स्नं परिपूर्णमेव वस्तु “से” तस्यैवंभूतनयस्येष्टम् । ततो यदि तदेवंभूतनयमतं प्रमाणं जानासि त्वम् एवं तर्हि कृत्स्नः परिपूर्णो जीवो, न त्वन्त्यप्रदेशमात्रमिति प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथ “ग्रामो दग्धः,” “पटो दग्धः,” इत्यादिन्यायादेकदेशेऽपि समस्तवस्तुपचारादन्त्यप्रदेशलक्षणे देशेऽपि समस्तजीवबुद्धिस्तत्र प्रवर्तते, तर्हि शेषे प्रथमादिप्रदेश उपचारतो जीवं प्रतिपद्यस्व, न्यायस्य समानत्वादिति ॥२३४५-२३४६॥

D. C. According to the Evambhata point of view, various parts of an object are not taken as different from the object. But a part is not taken as a whole by it. *Deśa-pradeśas* are, therefore, *a-vastus* according to this naya. The whole of an object without the consideration of *deśapradeśas* is alone taken as *vastu*. From this point of view, therefore, you should take jīva, existing in a whole and not in a part like the last pradeśa. If, at this point, you take the point as a whole metaphorically, as in the case of an expression such as “A village is burnt” “A cloth is burnt” etc, you shall have to take jīva as existing in other pradeśas also in the metaphorical sense. 50-51 (2345-2346).

जत्तो व तदुवयारो देसूणे न उ पएसमेत्तम्मि ।

जहं तंतूणम्मि पडे पडोवयारो न तंतुम्मि ॥५२॥२३४७॥

52. Jatto va taduvayāro desūṇe na u paesamettammi ।

Jaha tantūṇammi paḍe paḍovayāro na tantummi (2347)

4. Evambhūta naya is a sabdārtha-grāhī naya and explains the meaning of a word from the point of view of *vyutpatti* or derivation. In other words, this naya interprets an object in the light of its strict etymological derivation.

[यतो वा तदुपचारो देशोने न तु प्रदेशमात्रे ।
यथा तन्तू न पटे पटोपचारो न तन्तौ ॥५२॥२३४७॥

52. Yato vā tadupacāro deśone na tu pradeśamātre ।
Yathā tantu na paṭe paṭopacāro na tantau (2347)]

Trans. 52. Or, that (sort of) metaphorical interpretation is applicable (to an object) having less parts and not to a single part, just as a metaphorical interpretation is applicable to a paṭa having less threads but not to the thread itself 2347.

टीका-५२ अथवा, उपचारादप्येक एवान्त्यप्रदेशो जीवो न भवति, किन्तु देशेन एव जीवे जीवोपचारो युज्यते, यथा तन्तुभिः कतिपयैरुने पटे पटोपचारो दृश्यते, न त्वेकस्मिन्तन्तुमात्र इति ॥२३४७॥

D. C. Even by means of a metaphorical interpretation, the last portion does not become jīva, because the metaphorical interpretation is applicable to a jīva lacking in some parts, and not to one single portion. Take the example of *tantu* and *paṭa*. The metaphorical sense of *paṭa* could only be transposed to a *paṭa* having less parts, but it could not in any case be applied to a *tantu*. 52 (2347).

The Ācārya explained Tisya Gupta in this way, but,

इय पण्णविओ जाहे न पवज्जइ सो कओ तओ बज्जो ।
ततो आमलकप्पाए मित्तसिरिणा सुहोवायं ॥५३॥२३४८॥

भकखण-पाण-बंजण-वत्थंतावयवलाभिओ भणइ ।
सावय ! विधम्मिया म्हे कीस त्ति तओ भणइ सइढो ॥५४॥२३४९॥

नणु तुज्झं सिद्धंतो पज्जंतावयवमित्तओऽवयवी ।
जइ सच्चमिणं तो का विहम्मणा मिच्छमिहरा भे ॥५५॥२३५०॥

53. Iya paṇṇaviö jāhe na pavajjai so kaö taö bajjho ।
Tato Āmalakappāe Mittasiriṇā suhovāyam (2348)

54. Bhakkhaṇa-pāṇa-vañjaṇa-vatthantāvayavalābhiḥ bhaṇai ।
Sāvaya ! vidhammiyā mhe kīsa tti tao bhaṇai saḍḍho (2349)
55. Naṇu tujjham siddhanto pajjantāvayavamittao'vayavi ।
Jai saccamiṇam to kā vihammaṇā micchamiharā bhe (2350).

[इति प्रज्ञापितो यावद् न प्रपद्यते स कृतस्ततो बाह्यः ।
तत आमलकल्पायां मित्रश्रिया सुखोपायम् ॥५३॥२३४८॥

भक्षण-पान-व्यञ्जन-वस्त्रान्तावयवलाभितो भणति ।
श्रावक ! विधर्मिता वयं कस्मादिति ततो भणति श्राद्धः ॥५४॥२३४९

ननु तव सिद्धान्तःपर्यन्तावयवमात्रतोऽवयवी ।
यदि सत्यमिदं ततःका विधर्मता मिथ्यात्वमितरथा भवताम्
॥५५॥२३५०॥

53. Iti prajñāpito yāvad na prapadyate sa kritastato bāhyah ।
Tata Āmala-kalpāyām Mitraśriyā sukhopāyam (2348)
54. Bhakṣaṇa-pāṇa-vyañjana-vastrāntāvayavalābhiḥ bhaṇati ।
Śrāvaka ! vidharmitā vāyam kasmāditi taṭo bhaṇati śrāddhaḥ
54 (2349)
55. Nanu tava siddhāntaḥ paryantāvayavamātrato'vayavi ।
Yadi satyamidam tataḥ kā vidharmatā mithyātvamitarathā
bhavatām 55 (2350)]

Trans. 53-54-55. In spite of his being, thus, instructed by (his) preceptor, when he was not convinced, he was excluded (from the Order of Monks). Then, in (the city of) Āmalakalpā, (he was invited) by Mīśraśrī for dinner etc. When offered the last portions of food, drinks, condiments and clothes, he said "O Śrāvaka ! why did you insult us by doing so ? The host replied "According to your theory, the last portion is the whole object. If it is true, how is the insult (made) ? Otherwise, your theory is false."

टीका ५३-५४-५५ गतार्था एव । नवरमिति पूर्वोक्तप्रकारेण गुरुभिः प्रज्ञापितस्तिष्यगुप्तो यावद् न किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यते तत उद्धाटय बाह्यः कृतो विहरन्नामलकल्पां नगरीं गत्वाऽऽम्रसालवने स्थितः । तत्र मित्रश्रीश्रावकेण “निह्वोऽयम्” इति ज्ञात्वा तत्प्रतिबोधनार्थं गत्वा निमन्त्रितः—“यद् मदीयगृहे प्रकरणमद्य तत्र भवद्भिःस्वयमागन्तव्यम् ।” ततो गतास्ते तद्गृहे । तेन च तत्र तिष्यगुप्तमुपवेश्य महान्तं संभ्रममुपदर्शयता तत्पुरतो भक्ष्य-भोज्याऽन्न-पान-व्यञ्जन-वस्त्रादिवस्तुनिचया विस्तारिताः । ततस्तेषां मध्ये सर्वत्रान्त्यावयवान् गृहीत्वा प्रतिलाभितोऽसौ कूर-सिक्थादिना प्रतिलाभित इत्यर्थः । ततो भणत्यभिधत्ते—“हे श्रावक ! विधर्मिताः किमिति त्वया वयमित्थम् ?” । ततःश्रावो भणति—“नय तुज्झमित्यादि” । “मिच्छमिहरा मे चि” अन्यथा यदि नेदं सत्यम्, तदा सर्वमपि मिथ्या भवतां भाषितमिति ॥२३४८॥२३४९॥२३५०॥

D. C. When Tisyagupta did not accept the explanation offered by the Ācārya, as mentioned above, he was turned out of the *gaccha*. Then, while wandering here and there, Tisyagupta came to the city of Āmāla-Kalpā where he lodged himself in the forest named Āmrasāla. There Mitraśrī, a śrāvaka, apprehending that he was a *nihnava*, invited him to his place, for dinner etc. in order to make him conscious of his error.

After Tisyagupta entered his house, he placed a pile of objects for food, drinks, condiments and clothes, in front of him. Then, from the midst of all those objects, the host took out the last portions of all the items and offered them to Tisyagupta. Being enraged at this act of the host, Tisyagupta said “O śrāvaka! what do you mean by insulting me like this? The host replied “It is, in fact, your theory that the last portion of an object means the object as a whole, how are you offended in that case? For, otherwise, your theory would be false.” 53-54-55. (2348-2349-2350)

And,

अंतोऽवयवो न कुण्ड समस्तकज्जं ति जइ न सोऽभिमओ ।
संववहारार्हो तो तस्मि कओऽवयविगाहो ? ॥५६॥२३५१॥

56. Anto'vayavo na kurai samattakajjam ti jai na so'bhimāo |
Samvavahāraie to tammi kao'vayavigāho ? (2351)

[अन्त्योऽवयवो न करोति समस्तकार्यमिति यदि न सोऽभिमतः ।
संव्यवहारातीते ततस्तस्मिन् कुतोऽवयविग्रहः ? ॥५६॥२३५१॥]

56. Antyo'vayavo na karoti samastakāryamiti yadi na so'bhi-
matah |
Samvyavahārātīte tatastasmin kuto'vayavigrahaḥ ? (2351)]

Trans. 56. The last portion does not do the work of the whole. And, therefore, if it is not acceptable to you, how did you apprehend the object as a whole in that part in absence of dealing together ? (2351).

टीका—५६ यदि नामान्त्यावयवः समस्तस्याप्यवयविनो यत् साध्यं कार्यं तद् न करोति, इत्यतोऽसौ नाभिमतो भवताम्—कूर-पक्वान्न-वस्त्रादीनां सिक्थ-सुकुमारिकादिस्वल्पखण्डतन्त्रादिरूपोऽन्त्यावयवो यदि न परितोषकरो भवतामित्यर्थः, तर्हि संव्यवहारातीते तस्मिन्नन्त्यावयवे कुतः किल समस्तावयविग्रहो भवताम् ? इति ॥२३५१॥

D. C. On the ground that the last portion does not do the work of the whole, if the last portions of food, drink, clothes etc. do not satisfy you, (then), how is it that you apprehend the whole body of all the *avayavas* combined together into one *avayava* only ? 56 (2351).

अन्तिमतंतू न पडो तक्कज्जाकरणओ जहा कुंभो ।

अह तयभावे वि पडो सो किं न घडो खपुप्फं व ॥५७॥२३५२॥

57. Antimatantū na paḍo takkajjākaraṇaḥ jahā kumbho |
Aha tayabhāve vi paḍo so kim na ghaḍo khapuppham va
(2352).

[अन्तिमतन्तुर्न पटस्तत्कार्यकरणतो यथा कुम्भः ।

अथ तदभावेऽपि पटः किं न घटः खपुष्पं वा ? ॥५७॥२३५२॥]

57. Antimatanturna paṭastatkāryākaraṇato yathā kumbhaḥ ।
Atha tadabhāve'pi paṭaḥ sa kim na ghaṭaḥ khapuṣpaṃ vā ?
(2352)]

Trans. 57. Like ghaṭa, the last thread also could not be called paṭa in absence of its doing the work of paṭa. And in spite of that, if it is (taken as) paṭa, why should that not be taken as ghaṭa or khapuṣpa ? 2352

टीका-५७ अन्त्यतन्तुमात्रं न पटः, तस्य पटस्य कार्यं शीतत्राणादिकं तत्कार्यं तस्याकरणं तत्कार्याकरणं तस्मादिति । यथा कुम्भो घटः । अयं तदभावेऽपि पटकार्याभावेऽपि तन्तुः पट इष्यते, तर्हि किमित्यसौ पटो घटः खपुष्पं वा न भवति, पटकार्याकृतत्वस्याविशेषादिति ॥२३५२॥

D. C. Just as a *ghaṭa* could not be called a paṭa, the last thread of a paṭa also could never be called paṭa on account of its inability to do the work of paṭa. Now, even in spite of its inability to do the kārya of paṭa, if the last thread is taken as paṭa, why should Khapuṣpa not be taken as paṭa on the same ground ? 57 (2352).

And,

उवलंभववहाराभावाओ नत्थि ते खपुष्पं व ।
अंतावयवेऽवयवी दिट्ठन्ताभावओ वावि ॥५८॥२३५३॥

58. Uvalambhavyavahārābhāvāo natthi te khapuppham va ।
Antāvayave'vayavī diṭṭhantābhāvāo vāvi (2353)

[उपलम्भव्यवहाराभावाद् नास्ति तव खपुष्पमिव ।
अन्त्यावयवेऽवयवी दृष्टान्ताभावतो वापि ॥५८॥२३५३॥

58. Upalambhavyavahārābhāvād nāsti tava khapuspanmiva ।
Antyāvayave'vayavī dṛiṣṭāntābhāvato vāpi (2353)]

Trans. 58. Like khapuṣpa, the whole is not (present) in the last portion, in absence of perception, practical utility, and (apt) illustration. 2353.

टीका-५८ तत्राभिमतोऽवयवी अन्त्यावयवे नास्ति, उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलब्धेः, व्यवहाराभावाच्च, खपुष्पवदिति । अथवा, “ अन्त्यावयवमात्र अवयवी, अवयविसंपूर्णहेतुत्वात् ” इत्यत्र तावद् दृष्टान्ताभावाद् न साध्यसिद्धिरिति ॥२३५३॥

D, C. Since the whole of an object is neither perceived, nor utilized in the last *avayava*, it cannot be taken as existing in the last portion. And, there is no illustration to prove your theory. 58 (2353)

For,

पच्चक्खओऽणुमाणादागमओ वा पसिद्धी अत्थाणं ।
सव्वप्पमाणविसयाईयं मिच्छत्तमेवं भे ॥५९॥२३५४॥

59. Paccakkhao'numāṇādāgamaō vā pasiddhī atthāṇam ।
Savvappamāṇavisayāīyam micchattamevam bhe (2354)

[प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुमानादागमतो वा प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम् ।
सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतं मिथ्यात्वमेवं भवताम् ॥५९॥२३५४॥

59. Pratykṣato'numāṇādāgamato vā prasiddhirarthānām ।
Sarvapramāṇaviṣayātītam mithyātvamevam bhavatām
(2354)]

Trans. 59. Establishment of (various) interpretations is (possible) either by means of direct proof or inference or by means of āgamas. Your theory is thus worthless in absence of all (such) authenticities 2354.

टीका-५९ प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरर्थानां सिद्धिः, तानि च त्वत्पक्षसाधकेन न प्रवर्तन्ते ।
अतः सर्वप्रमाणविषयातीतं “ भे ” भवतामभिमतं मिथ्यात्वमेवेति ॥२३५४॥

D. C. Various interpretations are established on the strength of *pratyakṣa* pramāṇas or āgamas. Your theory being devoid of all such pramāṇas becomes utterly baseless.

इय चोइय संबुद्धो खामियपडिलाभिओ पुणो विहिणा ।
गंतुं गुरुपायमूलं ससीसपरिसो पडिक्कंतो ॥५९॥२३५५॥

60. Iya coiya sambuddho khāmiya padilābhiṃ puṇo vihiṇā ।
Gantum gurupāyamalam sa-sisapariso paḍikkanto (2355)

[इति चोदितः संबुद्ध क्षामितप्रतिलाभितः पुनर्विधिना ।
गत्वा गुरुपादमूलं सशिष्यपरिषत् प्रतिक्रान्तः ॥६०॥२३५५॥]

60. Iti coditaḥ sambuddhaḥ ksāmitapratilābhitaḥ punarvidhinā ।
Gatvā gurupādamalam sa-śiṣyapariṣat pratikrāntaḥ (2355)]

Trans. 60. Being thus inspired and instructed, he was pardoned (for his errors), and awarded presents by Mitraśrī according to regular custom; (then), having gone near the soles of the preceptor's feet (and having) saluted, he returned along with his retinue of pupils. 2355.

टीका—६० इति प्रेरितः संबुद्धोऽसौ विहितक्षमितक्षामितेन मित्रश्रीश्रावकेण संपूर्णान्नप्रदानादिविधिना पुनरपि प्रतिलाभितो गुरुपादमूलं गत्वा शिष्यपरिषत्समेतो विधिना प्रतिक्रान्तः सम्यग् मार्गं प्रपन्नो गुर्वन्तिके विजहार ॥२३५५॥

D. C. When Tisyagupta was thus inspired and instructed by the Śrāvaka Mitraśrī he was forgiven and awarded the full lumps of *bhojana* etc. by Mitraśrī. Tisyagupta, then, saluted the preceptor, and returned with his pupils.

End of the Discussion with the Second Nihnava.



Chapter IV



॥ तृतीयनिहववक्तव्यता ॥

Discussion with the Third Nibnava.

अथ तृतीयनिहववक्तव्यतामाह—

चउदस दो वासमया तइआ सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स ।

तो अब्वत्तयदिट्ठी सेयविआए समुप्पण्णा ॥६१॥२३५६॥

61. Caudasa do vāsasayā taiā siddhim gayassa Virassa ।

To Arvattayadiṭṭhī Seyaviāe samuppaṇṇā. (2356).

[चतुर्दश द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य ।

ततोऽव्यक्तकदृष्टिः श्वेतविकायां समुत्पन्ना ॥६१॥२३५६॥

61. Caturdaśa dve varṣaśate tadā siddhim gatasya Virasya ।

Tato'vyaktakadriṣṭiḥ Śvetavikāyām samutpannā (2356)]

Trans. 61. When two hundred and fourteen years (had passed) since the Nirvāṇa of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra, the theory of Avyaktas came into existence in (the city of) Śvetavikā. 2356.

टीका-६१ चतुर्दशाधिकवर्षशतद्वयं तदा श्रीमन्महावीरस्य सिद्धिगतस्यासीत् ।
ततोऽव्यक्ताभिधाननिह्वानां दृष्टिर्दशनरूपा श्वेतविकायां नगर्यां समुत्पन्नेति
॥२३५६॥

Here is the story of the production of this theory.—

सेयविपोलासाढे जोगे तद्विवसहिययसूले य ।

सोहम्मनलिणिगुम्मे रायगिहे मूरियबलभहे ॥६२॥२३५७॥

62. Seyavipolāsāḍhe joge taddivasahiyayasūle ya ।
Sohamma Nalinigumme Rāyagihe Mariyabalabhadde (2357)

[श्वेतविकापौलाषाढे योगे तदिवसहृदयशूले च ।
सौधर्मनलिनीगुल्मे राजगृहे मौर्वयलभद्रः ॥६२॥२३५७॥

62. Śvetavikāpaulāsāḍhe yoge taddivasahridayaśule ca ।
Sandharma Nalinīgulme Rājagrihe MauryaBalabhadraḥ (2357)]

Trans. 62. While teaching (the practice of) yogas in the Paulāsāḍha (church) of (the city of) Śvetavikā, when the preceptor passed away to the Nalinīgulma (region) of the Saudharmās¹ (as a result of) acute pains in his heart on the same day, Maurya Balabhadra brought them to the right path) in (the city of) Rājagriha. 2357.

टीका-६२ श्वेतविकाया नगर्याः पौलाषाढचैत्य आर्यापाठनामान आचार्याः स्थिताः । तेषां च बहवः शिष्या आगाढयोगान् प्रपन्नाः । अपरवाचनाचार्यासत्त्वे च त एवार्यापाठसूरयस्तेषां वाचनाचार्यत्वं प्रतिपन्नाः । तथाविधकर्मविपाकतश्च ते तत्रैव दिवसे रजन्यां हृदयशूलेन कालं कृत्वा सौधर्मदेवलोके नलिनीगुल्मविमाने देवत्वेनोत्पन्नाः । न च विज्ञाताः केनापि गच्छमध्ये । ततोऽयधिना प्राक्तनव्यतिकरं विज्ञाय साध्वनुकम्पया समागत्य तदेव शरीरमधिष्ठाप्योत्थाप्य च प्रोक्तास्तेन साधवः-यथा-वैरात्रिककालं गृहणीत । ततः कृतं साधुभिस्तथैव । श्रुतस्योद्देश-समुद्देशा-ऽनुज्ञाश्च तदग्रतः कृताः । एवं दिव्यप्रभावतस्तेन देवेन तेषां साधूनां कालभङ्गादिविघ्नं रक्षता शीघ्रमेव निस्तारिता योगाः । ततोऽनेन तच्छरीरं मुक्त्वा दिवं गच्छता प्रोक्ता साधवो; यथा-क्षमणीयं भदन्तैयदसंयतेन सता मयाऽऽत्मनो वन्दनादिकारिताश्चारित्रिणो यूयम् । अहं ह्यमुकदिने कालं कृत्वा दिवं गतो युष्मदनुकम्पयाऽत्रागतः, निस्तारिताश्च भवतामागाढयोगाः । इत्याद्युक्त्वा क्षमयित्वा च स्वस्थानं गतः । ततस्ते साधवस्तच्छरीरकं परिष्ठाप्य चिन्तयन्ति अहो ! असंयतो बहुकालं वन्दितः । तदित्थमन्यत्रापि शङ्का, को

1. Region of the highest types of deities known as Saudharmas (For more details vide foot-note 3, verse 2307 Chapter II).

जानाति—“कोऽपि संयतः, कोऽप्यसंयतो देवः ? इति” । सर्वस्याप्यवन्दनमेव श्रेयः, अन्यथा ह्यसंयतवन्दनं मृषावादश्चस्यात् । इत्थं तथाविधगुरुकर्मोदयात् तेऽपरिणतमतयः साधवोऽव्यक्तमतं प्रतिपन्नाः परस्परं न वन्दन्ते । ततःस्थविरैस्तेऽभिहिताः, यदि परस्मिन् सर्वत्र भवतां संदेहः, तर्हि येनोक्तम्—“देवोऽहम्” इति तत्रापि भवतां कथं न संदेहः ? ।—किं स देवोऽदेवो वा ? इति । यदि तेन स्वयमेव कथितं—“अहं देवः” तथा, देवरूपं च प्रत्यक्षत एव दृष्टम्, इति न तत्र संदेहः । हन्त ? यद्येवम्, तर्हि य एवं कथयन्ति “वयं साधवः” तथा, साधुरूपं प्रत्यक्षत एव दृश्यते, तेषु कः साधुत्वसंदेहः, येन परस्परं यूयं न वन्दध्वे ? । न च साधुवचनात् देववचनं सत्यमिति शक्यते वक्तुम् । देववचनं हि क्रीडाद्यर्थमन्यथापि संभाव्यते, न तु साधुवचनम्, तद्विरतत्वात् तेषामिति । एवं च युक्तिभिर्यावद् न प्रज्ञायन्ते तावदुद्घाटय बाह्याः कृताः । पर्यटन्तश्च राजगृहनगरं गताः । तत्र च मौर्यवंशसंभूतो बलभद्रो नाम राजा । स च श्राद्धः । ततस्तेन ते विज्ञाता यथाऽव्यक्तवादिनो निह्नुवा इह समायाता गुलशिलकूचैत्ये तिष्ठन्ति । ततःस्वपुरुषान् प्रेष्य राजकूल आनायितास्तेन ते कटकमर्देन मारणार्थं चानुज्ञाताः । ततो हस्तिनि कटकेषु च तन्मर्दनार्थमानीतेषु तैः प्रोक्तम्—“राजन् ? वयं जानीमः श्रावकस्त्वम्” तत् कथमस्मान् श्रमणानित्थं मारयसि ? । ततो राज्ञा प्रोक्तम्—“युष्मत्सिद्धान्तैर्नैव को जानाति किं श्रावकोऽहं न वा ।” भवन्तोऽपि किं चौराः, चारिकाः, अभिमरा वा ? इत्यपि को वेत्ति ? ।” तैः प्रोक्तम्—“साधवो वयम् ।” यद्येवम्, अव्यक्तवादितया किमिति परस्परमपि यथाज्येष्ठं वन्दनादिकं न कुरुथ ? । इत्यादिनिष्ठुरैर्मृदुभिश्च वचनैः प्रोक्तास्ते नरपतिना । ततः संबुद्धा लज्जिताश्च निःशङ्किताः सन्मार्गं प्रतिपन्नाः । ततो राज्ञा प्रोक्तम्—“भवतां संबोधनार्थमिदं मया सर्वमपि विहितम्” इति क्षमणीयमिति ॥२३५७॥

D. C. Ārya Āṣādhācārya was the preceptor of the Paulāṣādhā church in the city of Śvetavikā. Many of his pupils learnt the practice of Āgāḍha yogas² under him. Āṣādhācārya was

2. In order to attain a highly-esteemed position of a perfect ascetic, the Jaina sādhus practise a peculiar type of penances known as “Yogodvahana.” Āgāḍha yoga is one of the various processes of “Yogodvahana”.

thus their preceptor. On account of excessive strain taken by him in reading and teaching the practice of Āgāḍha yoga, Ārya Āṣāḍhācārya suffered from acute pain in his heart and he died on the same night. Consequently, he attained divine form in the Nalinīgulma vimān (region) of Saudharma deva-loka.

This was not known to any one in the temple. Then having known the past incident by Avadhi Jñāna³, Ārya Āṣāḍhācārya took compassion on the sādhus who were practising yogas and entered the same body. Immediately after that, he got up and asked the sādhus to proceed with their lessons of the second half of the night. Thus, the god in disguise of a preceptor taught the *Uddeśa* (aims) *Samuddheśa* (explanations) and *Anujñā*. (Commandment) of the Holy writ. Practices of all the stages

According to Patanjali, yoga is defined to be “the preventing of the modifications of *Citta* or the thinking principle (which modifications arise through the three *Pramāṇas*—Perception, Inference, and Verbal testimony—as well as through incorrect ascertainment, fancy, sleep, and recollection) by *abhyāsa* or the constant practice of keeping the mind in its unmodified state (clear as crystal when uncoloured by contact with other substances) and by *vairāgya* or dispassion.” This dispassion being obtained by *praṇidhāna* or devotedness to the Supreme Being, who is defined as a particular *puruṣa* or spirit unaffected by afflictions, works etc. The eight means or stages of Yoga or Mental Concentration are: 1. *Yama* (forbearance) 2. *Niyama* (religious observances) 3. *Āsana* (postures) 4. *Prāṇāyama* (regulation of the breath) 5. *Pratyāhāra* (restraint of the senses) 6. *Dhāraṇā* (steadying of the mind) 7. *Dhyāna* (contemplation) 8. *Samādhi* (profound meditation, which according to the Bhagwad Gitā VI B. is to be practised by fixing the eyes on the tip of the nose. True Liberation is the cessation of matter and spirit or *Kaivalya* (isolation) the self-mortification and asceticism connects it closely with Buddhism and Jainism (Vide pp. 821–822 Sanskrit-English Dictionary by Sir Monier Williams).

3. Perception attained by means of concentration of attention,

of yogas were completely taught in that way, saving thereby all the sādhus from the interruptions of time etc. by virtue of divine power. Finally, while going to heaven, after leaving the human body, he said to the sādhus “*A-samyata* (unrestrained) as I happen to be, I made you, who happen to be of high moral character, bow to me. Please pardon me for that act of mine. On the other day, I happened to meet with death and pass away to the heavenly regions, from where I condescended to come here out of sympathy for you and taught you all the practices of yoga.” Having said so, he returned to his heavenly abode after being pardoned.

After his departure, sitting around his body, the sādhus began to think like this:— “Oh! an *a-samyata* (unrestrained) deity has been respected for a long time. The same could be doubted in the case of others as well. For, who knows whether one is *samyata* or *a-samyata*? It is better, therefore, not to respect any body. By respecting an unrestrained deity, we would become liars.” Consequently, short-witted as they were, all the sādhus resorted to indiscretion and did not even bow to each other as sādhus.

Then, some of the old and wise sthaviras tried to explain them the right thing. The following conversation took place between them and the Nihnavas.

STHAVIRAS:—If you entertain such a doubt with regard to each and every one in this world, then, why not doubt the asceticism of the deity himself, when he introduced himself as a deity to you?

Nihnavas:—There is no doubt about his being a deva, firstly because, he himself said that “I am a deity” and secondly because he was directly perceived as a *deva*.

Sthaviras:—The same will be the case with sādhus also. Those who say that, “We are sādhus” and those who are recognized as sādhus directly from their appearance, should also

be taken as *sādhus* and so, you should not refrain from respecting each other as *sādhus*.

And, you cannot assert that the word of a *deva* is more trust-worthy than that of a *sādhu*. A *deva* might tell a lie even for the sake of fun etc., but a *sādhu* being completely averted from falsehood, would never tell a falsehood.

Sthaviras tried to persuade them in many other ways, but they were not convinced. Those *Avyakta-vāḍins* were, therefore, expelled from the *Gaccha*. Then, wandering here and there, they came to *Rājagriha Nagara* in course of time and stayed there in the *Guṇaśīla caitya* (temple of an *yakṣa*). King *Balabhadra* of the *Maurya Dynasty* was a devotee of *Jaina Dharma*. So, as soon as he came to know of the arrival of the *Nihnavas* of the *Sceptical Type*, he called them with a view to bring them to the right path. When they were brought to his palace, the king ordered them to be killed by crushing them under the feet of elephants. When the retinue of elephants was brought there, in order to crush them, the king was thus told by the *nihnavas* "O king! you are a devotee of *Jaina Dharma*. We are also *Jaina Śramaṇas*. Then, why do you kill us?" The king replied: "According to your principle, who knows whether I am a *śrāvaka* or not? And who knows if you are not thieves, spies or burglars?" The *Nihnavas* said "We are certainly *Sādhus* and none else." The king replied:—If you are real *Sādhus* why do'n't you respect the elderly *sādhus* in your group?"

On hearing such harsh and tender words of the king, the *Nihnavas* were roused and brought to the right path with all their doubts removed.

Finally, the king said apologetically that he had to do all that for the benevolent purpose of rousing them from ignorance and hence he craved their pardon, which was duly awarded. 62. (2357).

The same story is now described by the author in details:—

गुरुणा देवीभूएण समणरूवेण वाइया सीसा ।
सब्भावे परिकहिए अव्वत्तयदिट्ठिणो जाया ॥६३॥२३५८॥

63. Gurunā devibhūeṇa samaṇarūveṇa vāiyā sīsā.
Sabbhāve parikahie Avvattayadiṭṭhiṇo jāyā. 2358.

[गुरुणा देवीभूतेन श्रमणरूपेण वादिताः शिष्याः ।
सद्भावे परिकथितेऽव्यक्तकदृष्टयो जाताः ॥६३॥२३५८॥]

63. Gurunā devibhutena śramaṇarūpeṇa vālitāḥ śiṣyāḥ ।
Sadbhāve parikathite'vyaktaka drṣṭayo jātāḥ 63 (2358)]

Trans. 63. The pupils were taught by the preceptor in disguise of a monk after he had attained divinity. When the fact was told (by him), they became sceptical. 2358.

They began to raise doubts in this way :—

को जाणइ किं साहू देवो वा तो न वंदणिज्जो त्ति ।
होज्जाऽसंजयनमणं होज्ज मुसावायममुगो त्ति ॥६४॥२३५९॥

64. Ko jāṇai kim sāhū devo vā to na vandaṇijjo tti ।
Hojja'saṇjayanamaṇam hojja musāvāyamamugo tti (2359).

[को जानाति किं साधुर्देवो वा ततो न वन्दनीय इति ।
भवेदसंयतनमनं भवेद् मृषावादोऽमुक इति ॥६४॥२३५९॥]

64. Ko jānāti kim śādhurdevo vā tato na vandaniya iti ।
Bhavedasaṇyatanamanam bhaved mriṣāvādo'muka iti (2359)]

Trans. 64. Who knows whether a (particular) person is a śādhu or a deity ? He is, therefore, not worthy of bowings. (Because otherwise) either there would be bowing to an unrestrained (person) or there would be false presumption. (2359).

टीका-६४ को जानाति-किमयं साधुवेषधारी साधुदेवो वा ? नास्त्येवात्र निश्चय इत्यर्थः । न च वक्तव्यम्-साधुरेवायम्, तद्वेष-समाचारदर्शनात्, भवानिव । आर्याषाढदेवेऽपि साधुवेष-समाचारदर्शनेनानैकान्तिकत्वात् । तस्माद् न

कोऽपि वन्दनीयः, संशयविषयत्वात् । यदि पुनर्बन्ध्यते, तदाऽऽर्याषाढदेववन्दनं स्यात् । तदमुको ब्रवीति—भाषणे च मृषावादः स्यादिति ॥२३५९॥

D. C. On seeing a person bearing the attire of a *sādhū*, one cannot decide whether he is a real monk or a deity in disguise of *sādhū*. It is, therefore, not proper to bow to any one on account of his being the object of doubt. For, if he is respected, it would turn out to be a bowing to an *a-saymata* (unrestrained) person like *Aṣāḍha-deva*; otherwise, while saying that “he is an ascetic, we would resort to falsehood 64 (2359).

The *sthaviras* reply to the arguments of the *Avyakta Nihnavas* as follows:—

थेरवयणं जइ परे संदेहो किं सुरो त्ति साहु त्ति ? ।

देवे कहं न संका किं सो देवो न देवो त्ति ? ॥६५॥२३६०॥

तेण कहियं ति व मई देवोऽहं रूवदरिसणाओ य ।

साहु त्ति अहं कहिए समानरूवम्मि का संका ? ॥६६॥२३६१॥

देवस्स व किं वयणं सच्चं ति न साहुरूवधारिस्स ।

न परोप्परं पि वन्दहं जं जाणन्ता वि जयउ त्ति ॥६७॥२३६२॥

65. Thēravayaṇam jai pare sandeho kim suro tti sāhu tti ? ।

Deve kaham na saṅkā kim so devo na devo tti (2360)

66. Teṇa kahiyaṃ ti va mai devo'ham rūvadarisaṇāo ya ।

Sāhu tti aham kahie samāṇarūvammi kā saṅkā ? (2361)

67. Devassa va kim vayaṇam saccam ti na sāhurūvadhārissa ।

Na paropparam pi vandaha jam jāṇantā vi jayau tti (2362)

[स्थविरवचनं यदि परे सन्देहः किं सुर इति साधुरिति ? ।

देवे कथं न शङ्का किं स देवो न देव इति ? ॥६५॥२३६०॥

तेन कथितमिति वा मतिर्देवोऽहं रूपदर्शनाच्च ।

साधुरिति कथं कथिते समानरूपे का शङ्का ? ॥६६॥२३६१॥

देवस्य वा किं वचनं सत्यमिति न साधुरूपधारिणः ।

न परस्परमपीह वन्दध्वे यज्ज्ञानन्तोऽपि यतय इति ॥६७॥२३६२॥

65. Sthavira vacanam yadi pare sandehaḥ kim sura iti sādhuriti ?
Deve katham na śaṅkā kim sa devo na deva iti ? (2360)
66. Tena kathitamiti vā matirdevo'ham rūpadarśanācca ।
Sādhuriti katham kathite samānarūpe kā śaṅkā ? (2361)
67. Devasya vā kim vacanam satyamiti na sādhurāpadhāriṇaḥ ।
Na paraspāramapīha vandaḥve yajjānanto'pi yataya iti.
(2362)]

Trans. 65-66-67. Sthaviras say that (if you entertain doubt about another (person) as to whether he is a deity or a sādhu, why not question the genuinity of a deity (also) as to whether he is a genuine deity or not? If it is your belief that since he himself says that "I am a deity" and since we saw the form of a deity, we did not doubt its validity; why should you raise the doubt when it is said that "I am a sādhu" and when the same body is (directly) perceived? Or, is it, because, the word of a deity is true and that of an ascetic not so, that you do not salute each other in spite of your knowing that "this is an ascetic." 2360-2361-2362.

If you entertain doubts even about ascetics, who are *pratya-kṣa*, then, there is all the more reason for your doubt about *jīva* etc. that are *parokṣa* :—

जीवाइपयत्थेसु य सुहुम-व्ववहिय-विगिट्ठरूवेसु ।

अच्चंतपरोक्खेसु य किह न जिणाइसु भे संका ? ॥६८॥२३६३॥

68. Jivāipayatthesu ya suhuma-vvavahiya-vigittṭharūvesu ।
Accantaparokkhesu ya kiha na Jiṇāisu bhe saṅkā ? (2363)

[जीवादिपदार्थेषु च सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विकृष्टरूपेषु ।

अत्यन्तपरोक्षेषु च कथं न जिनादिषु भवतां शङ्का ? ॥६८॥२३६३॥

68. Jivādipadārtheṣu ca suksma-vyavahita-vikṛṣṭarapeṣu ।
Atyantaparokṣeṣu ca katham na Jinādiṣu bhavatām śaṅkā ?
(2363)]

Trans. 68. And, why should there be no doubt about objects such as jīva etc. whose bodies are subtle, obscure and drawn asunder, as well as, about Tīrthaṅkaras etc. that are extremely remote (from the physical sight)? 68 (2363)

Here if it is argued that there cannot be any doubt about Jīva etc. on the authority of the words of Jinas, the same will be the case with ascetics also—

तव्वयणाओ व मई नणु तव्वयणे सुसाहुवित्तो त्ति ।
आलय-विहार-समिओ समणोऽयं वंदणिज्जो त्ति ॥६९॥२३६४॥

69. Tāvvaṇṇāo va maī naṇu tāvvaṇṇe susāhuvitto tti ।
Ālaya-vihāra-samio samaṇo'yam vandaṇijjo tti (2364)

[तद्वचनाद् वा मतिर्ननु तद्वचने सुसाधुवृत्त इति ।
आलय-विहारसमेतः श्रमणोऽयं वन्दनीय इति ॥६९॥२३६४॥

69. Tadvacanād vā matirnanu tadvacane susādhuvritta iti ।
Ālaya-vihārasametaḥ śramaṇo'yam vandanīya iti (2364)]

Trans. 69. Or, if this belief is held (on the authority of) His words⁴, then according to his words, a devotee having (proper) dwelling and monastic establishment, and possessing right conduct of a (real) saint, is definitely worthy of bowings. 2364.

टीका-६९ अथ तद्वचनाज्जनवचनाद् न जीवाद्यर्थेषु शङ्का । ननु यद्येवम्, तद्वचन इदमप्यस्ति यदुत-शोभनं साधुवृत्तं श्रमणशीलं यस्यासौ सुसाधुवृत्त इति हेतोः “श्रमणोऽयम्” इति निश्चयाद् वन्दनीयः । सुसाधुवृत्तोऽपि स कथं ज्ञायते ? इत्याह-“आलय-विहार-समिओ” इति कृत्वा । उक्तं च-

आलयेणं विहारेणं ठाणा चंक्रमणेण य ।
सक्का सुविहियं नाउं भासावेणइएण य ॥१॥

इति ॥ २३६४ ॥

D. O. If you say that you do not entertain doubt about the validity of jīva etc. on the authority of the words of Jinas, then, according to the Tīrthaṅkaras, one who possesses right conduct of an ascetic, is a real sādhu worthy of respect. Here, if it is asked "How is a person of right conduct of a saint, recognized? The answer is- "By means of proper dwelling and monastic establishments, a real śramaṇa is at once recognized.

It is said—

“Ālayeṇam vihāreṇam ṭhāṇā caṅkamaṇeṇa ya ।

Sakkā suvihiyam nāum bhāsāveṇaieṇa ya⁵ ॥ 1 ॥

A real śramaṇa (saint) is known from his ālaya (dwelling) vihāra (monastic establishments) movements from one place to another and courteous language]. 69 (2364)

जह वा जिणिंदपडिमं जिणगुणरहियं ति जाणमाणा वि ।
परिणामविशुद्धत्थं वंदह तह किं न साधुं पि ? ॥७०॥२३६५॥

हुज्ज न वा साहुत्तं जइरूवे नत्थि चेव पडिमाए ।
सा कीस वंदणिज्जा जइरूवे कीस पडिसेहो ? ॥७१॥२३६६॥

70. Jaha vā Jīṇindapaḍimam Jīṇagūṇarahiyam ti jāṇamāṇā vi ।
Pariṇāmavisuddhattham vandaha taha kim na sādhum pi ?
(2365)

71. Hujja na vā sāhuttam jairūve natthi ceva paḍimāc ।
Sā kīsa vandanijjī jairave kīsa paḍiseho ? (2366)

[यथा वा जिनेन्द्रप्रतिमां जिनगुणरहितामिति जानन्तोऽपि ।
परिणामविशुद्धयर्थं वन्दध्वे तथा किं न साधुमपि ? ॥७०॥२३६५॥

भवेद् न वा साधुत्वं यतिरूपे नास्त्येव प्रतिमायाम् ।
सा कस्माद् वन्दनीया यतिरूपे कस्मात् प्रतिषेधः ॥७१॥२३६६॥

5. This verse is taken from the Āvaśyaka-niryukti Vide Verse 80. Vandanaka Niryukti in the Āvaśyaka-Niryukti. Also vide p. 529 v. 1148. Āvaśyaka sūtra with the commentary of Haribhadra Sūri Part II. Āgamodaya Samiti Edition)

70. Yathā vā Jinendrapratimām Jinaguṇarahitāmiti jānanto'pi ।
Pariṇāmaviśuddhyartham vandadhve tathā kim na sādhu-
mapi ? (2365)
71. Bhaved na vā sādhutvam yatirūpe nāstyeva pratimāyām ।
Sā kasmān vandanīyā, yatirūpe kasmāt pratiśedhaḥ (2366)]

Trans. 70-71. Or, just as you worship the image of a Tīrthaṅkara for the sake of blissful result in spite of your knowing that the image of Tīrthaṅkara has no qualities of the Tīrthaṅkara, in the same way, why (should you) not respect a sādhu also? In the form of an ascetic, (real) qualities of a sādhu may or may not be (found). But that⁶ is altogether absent in the image. Why is the image, then, taken as worthy of worship, and what makes the form of an ascetic unworthy of respects? 2365-2366.

टीका-७०-७१ सुगमे, नवरं प्रथमगाथायां प्रतिमायाः साधुरूपेण सह वन्दनीयत्वे साम्यमुक्तम् । द्वितीयगाथायां तु साधुरूपे विशेषं दर्शयति-यतिरूपे प्राणिनि साधुत्वं भवेद् न वा ? इति संदिग्धमेव । प्रतिमायां तु जिनत्वं नास्त्येवेति निश्चयः । ततः किमिति सा वन्दनीया ?, यतिरूपे च किमिति वन्दन प्रतिषेधः ? ॥२३६५-२३६६॥

The opponent's answer is—

असंजयजइरूवे पावाणुमई मई न पडिमाए ।
नणु देवाणुगयाए पडिमाए वि हुज्ज सो दोसो ॥७२॥२३६७॥

72. Asañjayajairave pāvāṇumaī maī na paḍimāe ।
Naṇu devāṇugayāe paḍimāe vi hujja so doso (2367)

[असंजययतिरूपे पापानुमतिर्मतिर्न प्रतिमायाम् ।
ननु देवानुगतायां प्रतिमायामपि भवेत् स दोषः ॥७२॥२३६७॥

72. Asañyatayatirūpe pāpānumatirmatirna pratimāyām ।
Nanu devānugatāyām pratimāyāmapi bhavet sa doṣaḥ (2367)]

6. Quality of a Tīrthaṅkara.

टीका-७२-अथैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेत्-असंयतदेवाधिष्ठिते यतिरूपे वन्द्यमाने तद्गतासंयमरूपपापानुमतिर्भवति, न त्वसौ प्रतिमायाम् । अत्रोच्यते-ननु देवताधिष्ठितप्रतिमायामप्ययमनुमतिलक्षणो दोषो भवेदैवेति ॥२३६७॥

D. C.

Nihnavas.—While bowing to an *a-samyata* (unrestrained) deity in disguise of an ascetic, the fault of assenting to the sin of unrestraint would be committed. But that does not happen in case of worshipping an image of a Tirthaṅkara.

Sthaviras:—Even in case of an image inspired by a god or a Tirthaṅkara, the same fault of assenting to the sin would certainly be committed. 72 (2367)

अहं पडिमाए न दोसो जिणबुद्धीए नमओ विसुद्धस्स ।
तो जइरूवं नमओ जइबुद्धीए कहं दोसो ? ॥७३॥२३६८॥

73. Aha paḍimāe na doso Jiṇabuddhīe namao visuddhassa ।
To jairūvaṃ namao jaibuddhīe kahaṃ doso ? (2368)

[अथ प्रतिमायां न दोषो जिनबुद्ध्या नमतो विशुद्धस्य ।
ततो यतिरूपं नमतो यतिबुद्ध्या कथं दोषः ॥७३॥२३६८॥

73. Atha pratimāyāṃ na doṣo Jinabuddhyā namato viśuddhasya ।
Tato yatirūpaṃ namato yatibuddhyā katham doṣaḥ (2368)]

Trans. 73. If there is no fault in case of one who bows to an image taking it sincerely as a Tirthaṅkara, then, how would a fault arise in case of one who bows to an ascetic taking him sincerely as an ascetic ? 2368.

टीका-७३ अथ प्रतिमायां नायमनुमतिलक्षणो दोषः । किं कुर्वनः ? । नमस्यतः । कया ? । जिनबुद्ध्या । कथंभूतस्य ? । विशुद्धस्य-विशुद्धाध्यवसायस्य । यद्येवम्, ततो यतिबुद्ध्या यतिरूपं विशुद्धस्य नमस्यतः को दोषः, येन भवन्तः परस्परं न वन्दन्ते ? । अत्रापरः कश्चिदाह-यद्येवम्, लिङ्गमात्रधारिणं पार्श्वस्थादिकमपि यतिबुद्ध्या विशुद्धस्य नमस्यतो न दोषः । तदयुक्तम्-पार्श्वस्थादीनां सम्यग्यतिरूपस्याप्यभावात् । तदभावश्च “ आलम्बणं विहारेण ”

इत्यादियतिलिङ्गस्यानुपलम्भात् । ततः प्रत्यक्षदोषवतः पार्श्वस्थादीन् वन्दमानस्य
तत् सावद्यानुज्ञालक्षणो दोष एव । उक्तं च—

जइचेलं बगलिङ्गं जाणंतस्स नमओ हवइ दोसो ।

निद्धंघसं य नाऊण वंदमाणे धुवो दोसो ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि । प्रतिमायास्तु दोषाचरणाभावात् तद्वन्दने सावद्यानुज्ञाऽभावतो न
दोष इति ॥२३६८॥

D. C.

Nihnavas :—The fault of assenting to the evil quality will not arise in case of bowing to an image of a Tīrthaṅkara with sincere apprehension of a Tīrthaṅkara in the image.

Sthaviras :—If it is so, what harm is there in case of one bowing to an ascetic with the sincere apprehension of a sādhu in him, that you do not even respect each other as ascetics ?

Nihnavas :—If it is so, there would be no harm even in bowing to his own companion etc. with the sincere apprehension of an ascetic in him.

Sthaviras :—That is not proper, companions etc. do not actually bear even a proper appearance of an ascetic. Nor are the actual symbols such as ālaya, vihāra etc. appropended in him. Hence, one who bows to companions etc. that are clearly unworthy, commits the fault of assenting to the sāvadya⁷ (censurable) resolution of an ascetic in them. It is said—

Jaicelam bagaliṅgam jāṇantassa namao havai doso ।

Niddhamdhasam ya nāṇa vandamāṇe dhuvo doso ॥१॥⁸

7. Sāvadya (censurable) Niravadya (blameless)

8. This verse is also quoted from Āvaśyaka Niryukti vide verse 65, Vandāṅka-niryukti in the Āvaśyaka Niryukti. Also vide page 526 verse 1137, Āvaśyaka Sūtra with the commentary of Śrīmad Haribhadra Sūri Part II.

There seems to be a slight alteration in the text of this

And,

अह पडिमं पि न वंदह देवासंकाइ तो न घेत्तव्वा ।

आहारो-वहि-सज्जा मा देवकया भवेज्ज ण्हु ॥७४॥२३६९॥

74. Aha paḍimam pi na vandaha devāsankāi to na ghattavvā
Āhāro-vahi-sajjā mā devakayā bhavejja ṇhu (2369)

[अथ प्रतिमामपि न वन्दध्वे देवाशङ्कया ततो न ग्रहीतव्याः ।

आहारो-पधि-शय्या मा देवकृता भवेयुर्नु ॥७४॥२३६९॥

74. Atha pratimāmapī na vandadhve devāśāṅkayā tato na grahi-
tavyāḥ ।

Ābāro-padhi-śayyā mā devakritā bhaveyurnu (2369).

Trans. 74. If you do not respect an image (also) thinking it to be (that of) a deva, then, thinking that food, accessory articles, bed etc. might have been created by gods, they should not be taken (at all). 2369.

टीका-७४ अथ प्रतिमामपि न वन्दध्वे यूयम्, हन्त ! यद्येवं शङ्काचारी भवान्, तर्हि मा देवकृता भवेयुरित्याहारो-पधि-शय्यादयोऽपि न ग्राह्या इति ॥२३६९॥

D. C. If you become sceptical to the extent of not bowing even to an image, you should not take food, accessory articles, bed etc. as they, too, might have been created by gods. 74 (2369)

verse. Original reading of the verse found in the niryukti is this—

Jaha velambagalingam jānantassa namao havai doso

Niddhamdhasam iya nāna vandamāne dhuvo doso—

a, Instead of “Jaicelam bagalingam b, Instead of “ya.”

[One who bows to a wicked and hypocrite ascetic, in spite of his knowing him to be such, would commit a fault. Having once known the breach of trust, if one bows to him, he is definitely at fault.]

But in case of worshipping an image, no such fault would arise in absence of sāvadyānujñā. 73 (2368)

And too much of sceptical attitude will result in the negation of the whole *vyavahāra* in this way—

को जाणइ किं भत्तं किमओ किं पाणयं जलं मद्यम् ।

किमलावु माणिक्कं किं सप्पो चीवरं हारो ? ॥७५॥२३७०॥

को जाणइ किं सुद्धं किमसुद्धं किं सजीवं निज्जीवं ।

किं भक्खं किमभक्खं पत्तमभक्खं तओ सव्वं ॥७६॥२३७१॥

75. Ko jānai kim bhattam kimaṇo kim pāṇayam jalam madhyam ।
Kimalābu māṇikkam kim sappo cīvaram hāro ? (2370)

76. Ko jānai kim suddham kimasuddham kim sajjīvam nijjīvam ।
Kim bhakkham kimabhakkham pattamabhakkham tao
savvam (2371)

[को जानाति किं भक्तं कृमयः किं पानकं जलं मद्यम् ।

किमलावु माणिक्यं किं सर्पश्चीवरं हारः ? ॥७५॥२३७०॥

को जानाति किं शुद्धं किमशुद्धं किं सजीवं निर्जीवम् ।

किं भक्ष्यं किमभक्ष्यं प्राप्तमभक्ष्यं ततःसर्वम् ॥७६॥२३७१॥

75. Ko jānāti kim bhaktam krimayaḥ kim pānakam jalam madhyam ।
Kimalābu māṇikyam kim sarpaścīvaram hāraḥ ? (2370)

76. Ko jānāti kim suddham kimasuddham kim sajjīvam nirjīvam ।
Kim bhakṣyam kimabhakṣyam prāptamabhakṣyam tataḥ
sarvam (2371)

Trans 75-76. Who knows whether a particular thing is food or a worm? Whether a drinking substance is water or wine? Whether one thing is a bottlegourd or a jewel? Whether (one thing is a serpent, a (piece of) garment or a necklace?

Who knows what is pure (and) what is impure, what is animate and what is inanimate, what is eatable and what is uneatable? Everything turns out to be uneatable in that respect. 2370-2371.

टीका-७५-७६ को जानाति किमिदं भक्तं कृमयो वा ? इत्याद्याशङ्कायां भक्तादावपि कृम्यादिभ्रान्त्यनिवृत्तेः सर्वमभक्ष्यमेव प्राप्तं भवतः । तथा, अलाबु-चीवरादौ मणि-माणिक्य-सर्पादिभ्रान्त्य-निवृत्तेः सर्वमभोग्यं च प्राप्तमिति ॥२३७०-२३७१॥

D. C. Since you are not able to remove illusions of worms jewels, serpents etc in an article of food, bottle-gourd, garments etc. everything would become forbidden to you 75-76 (2370-71)

And,

जइणा वि न संवासो सेओ पमया-कुसीलसंकाए ।
 होज्ज गिही वि जइ त्ति य तस्सासीसा न दायव्वा ॥७७॥२३७२॥
 न य सो दिक्खेयव्वो भव्वोऽभव्वो त्ति जेण को मुणइ ? ।
 चोरु त्ति चारिउ त्ति य होइ जओ परदारगामि त्ति ? ॥७८॥२३७३॥
 को जाणइ को सीसो को व गुरु तो न तव्विसेसो वि ।
 गज्झो न चोवएसो को जाणइ सच्चमलियं ति ? ॥७९॥२३७४॥
 किं बहुणा सव्वं चिय संदिद्धं जिणमयं जिणिंदा य ।
 परलोय-सग्ग-मोक्खा दिक्खाए किमत्थमारंभो ? ॥८०॥२३७५॥
 अह संति जिणवरिंदा तव्वयणाओ य सव्वपडिवत्ती ।
 तो तव्वयणाउ चिय जइवंदणयं कहं न मयं ? ॥८१॥२३७६॥

77. Jainā vi na saṃvāso seo pamayā-kusīlasaṅkāe ।
 Hojja gihī vi jai tti ya tassāsīsā na dāyavvā. (2372)
78. Na ya so dikkheyavvo bhavvo'bhavvo tti jeṇa ko muṇai ? ।
 Coru tti cāriu tti ya hoi jao parādāragāmi tti ? (2373)
79. Ko jaṇai ko sīso ko va gurū to na tavviseso vi ।
 Gajjho na covaeso ko jāṇai saccamaliyam ti ? (2374)
80. Kim bahuṇā savvam ciya sandiddham Jīṇamayam Jīṇindā ya ।
 Paraloya-sagga-mokkhā dikkhāe kimatthamārambho ? (2375)
81. Aha santi Jīṇavarindā tavvayaṇāo ya savvapaḍivattī ।
 To tavvayaṇāu cciya jaivandaṇayam kaham na mayam ? (2376)

[यतिनापि न संवासःश्रेयः प्रमदा-कुशीलशङ्कया ।
 भवेद् गृह्यपि यतिरिति च तस्माआशीर्न दातव्या ॥७७॥२३७२॥
 न च स दीक्षितव्यो भव्योऽभव्य इति येन को जानाति ? ।
 चौर इति चारिक इति च भवति यको परदारगामीति ? ॥७८॥२३७३॥
 को जानाति कःशिष्यःको वा गुरुस्ततो न तद्विशेषोऽपि ।
 ग्राह्यो न चोपदेशःको जानाति सत्यमलीकमिति ? ॥७९॥२३७४॥
 किं बहुना सर्वमेव संदिग्धं जिनमतं जिनेन्द्राश्च ।
 परलोक-स्वर्ग-मोक्षा दीक्षायाः किमर्थमारम्भः ? ॥८०॥२३७५॥
 अथ सन्ति जिनवरेन्द्रास्तद्वचनाच्च सर्वप्रतिपत्तिः ।
 ततस्तद्वचनादेव यतिवन्दनकं कथं न मतम् ? ॥८१॥२३७६॥

77. Yatināpi na saṁvāsaḥ śreyaḥ pramadākuśīlaśaṅkayā ।
 Bhaved grihyapi yatiriti ca tasmā āśirna dātavyā (2372)
78. Na ca sa dīkṣatavyo bhavyo'bhavya iti yena ko jānāti ? ।
 Caura iti cārika iti ca bhavati yako paradāragāmīti ? (2373)
79. Ko jānāti kaḥ śiṣyaḥ ko vā gurustato na tadviśeṣo'pi ।
 Grāhyo na copadeśaḥ ko jānāti satyamalīkamiti ? (2374)
80. Kim bahunā sarvameva sandigdham jinamatam jinendrāśca ।
 Paraloka-Svarga-Mokṣā dīkṣāyāḥ kim arthamārambhaḥ ? (2375)
81. Atha santi jinavarendrāstadvacanācca sarvapratipattiḥ ।
 Tatastad vacanādeva yati vandanakam katham na matam ?
 (2376)

Trans. 77-78-79-80-81. Doubting the misconduct of woman, it is not advisable even for an ascetic to associate (with them). Presuming that a householder may even happen to be an ascetic, blessing should not be conferred (upon him). Nobody should be (allowed to be) initiated as a pupil. For, who knows whether one is meritorious or wicked, a thief, a spy or a burgler ? (And) who knows as to who is a pupil

and who is the preceptor ? So, there is no distinction between them also. His sermon is also not acceptable, because, who knows whether it is true or false ? What more (should be said) ? Tīrthaṅkaras, their principles, the other (future) world, heaven, Final Emancipation—all this is uncertain according to you. Then, what is the use of accepting dīkṣā (at all) ? If you believe in the Tīrthaṅkara and if you take everything as existing on the authority of His words, why should bowing to an ascetic be not accepted on the same authority ?

(2372-2376)

टीका-७७-७८-७९-८०-८१ सर्वा अपिप्रकटार्थाः । नवरं “जइणा वि न संवासो” इत्यादिनाऽभ्युपगमविरोधो दर्शितः । अथ सन्ति जिनवरेन्द्राः, तद्वचनसिद्धत्वात् तेषां, तद्वचनादेव च सर्वस्यापि परलोक-स्वर्ग-मोक्षादेः प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति; एवं तर्हि तद्वचनादेव यतिवन्दनमपि कस्माद् न संमतम् ? इति ॥२३७२॥२३७३॥२३७४॥२३७५॥२३७६॥

D. C. If according to you, Tīrthaṅkara exists, and if you believe that the existence of all objects including, paraloka (future world), Svarga (heaven) Mokṣa (Final Emancipation) etc. is approved by him, there is no reason why the act of bowing to ascetics be not approved by him. 77-81 (2372-2376).

Moreover,

जइ जिणमयं पमाणं मुणि त्ति तो बज्झकरणपरिसुद्धं ।
देवं पि वन्दमाणो विमुद्धभावो विमुद्धो त्ति ॥८२॥२३७७॥

82. Jai Jiṇamayam pamāṇam muṇi to bajjhakaraṇa-parisuddham ।
Devam pi vandamāṇo visuddhabhāvo visuddho tti (2377)

[यदि जिनमतं प्रमाणं मुनिरिति ततो बाह्यकरणपरिशुद्धम् ।
देवमपि वन्दमानो विशुद्धभावो विशुद्ध इति ॥८२॥२३७७॥

82. Yadi jinamatam pramāṇam muniriti tato bahyakaraṇa parisuddham ।
Devamapi vandamāṇo visuddhabhāvo visuddha iti (2377)]

Trans. 82. If you take the principles of the Tīrthaṅkaras as authentic, then even, he who bows to a god (appearing as) purified by external means apprehending him sincerely as a sage, will be guiltless (2377).

टीका-८२ यदि जिनमतं भवतां प्रमाणम्, तर्हि “मुनिः” इत्यनया बुद्ध्या आलय-विहारादि बाह्यकरणपरिशुद्धं देवमपि-अमरमपि वन्दमानो विशुद्ध-भावो भवेद् दोषरहितो विशुद्ध एव । उक्तं चागमे-

परमरहस्समिसीणं समत्तगणिपिडगभवियसाराणं ।

परिणामियं पमाणं निच्छयमवलंबमाणं ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि ॥२३७७॥

D. C. If you really follow the principles of the Tīrthaṅkaras, you shall have to accept even those who bow to a god who appears purified only externally on account of *ālaya. vihāra* etc. taking him to be a sage with a sincere heart, as guiltless.

For, it is said in the Āgamas—

“Parama rahassamisiṇam samatta gaṇipīdaga bhaviya sārāṇam Pariṇāmiyam pamaṇam nicchayamavalambamāṇaṇam ”

[It is a great secret of sages who (look upon) the (gem-like) treasure-box of the preceptor (the entire (collection) of the twelve Āngas as auspicious wealth, and a trust worthy authority for ascetics who depend on Nīscaya] 82 (2377)

Or,

जह वा सो जइरू वो दिट्ठो तह कित्तिया सुरा अन्ने ? ।

तुब्भेहिं दिट्ठपुब्बा सव्वत्थापच्चओ जं भे ॥८३॥२३७८॥

83. Jaha vā so jairūvo diṭṭho taha kittiyā surā anne ? ।

Tubbhehim diṭṭhapuvvā savvatthāpaccāo jam bhe (2378)

[यदि वा स यतिरूपो दृष्टस्तथा कियन्तः सुरा अन्ये ? ।

युष्माभिर्दृष्टपूर्वाः सर्वत्राप्रत्ययो यद् भवताम् ॥८३॥२३७८॥

83. Yadi vā sa yatirūpo dṛiṣṭastathā kiyantaḥ surā anye ?

Yuṣmābhirdṛiṣṭapārvāḥ sarvatrapratyayo yad bhavatāṃ (2374)

Trans. 83. Like that (god) in the form of an ascetic seen by you, how many more gods were seen by you in the past, that you did not put trust in anything ? (2378)

टीका—८३ 'वा' इत्यथवा, यथाऽऽर्याषाढदेवो यतिरूपधरोऽत्र दृष्टस्तथा कियन्तःसुरास्ततोऽन्ये भवद्विर्दृष्टपूर्वाः, यदेतावन्मात्रेणापि सर्वत्राप्रत्ययो " भे " भवताम् ? । न हि कदाचित् कथञ्चित् कचिदाश्चर्यकल्पे कस्मिंश्चित् तथाविधे दृष्टे सर्वत्र तथा भावाशङ्का युज्यत इति भावः । तस्माद् व्यवहारनयमाश्रित्य युक्तं भवतामन्योन्यवन्दनादिकम् । उक्तं च—

निच्छयओ दुन्नेयं को भावे कम्मि वट्ठए समणो ।

संववहारो य जुज्जइ जो पुव्वट्ठिओ चरितम्मि ॥ १ ॥

इत्यादि ॥२३७८॥

D. C. In addition to the preceptor Āṣāḍha-deva seen by you, in disguise of an ascetic, how many more gods did you see in the past that you entertain doubt about everything ?

It is not really worthy of you to entertain doubt like that when some one is seen like that at some time, in some way. Even from practical point of view, it is worthy of you to respect each other.

For, it is said—

Nicchayao dunneyam ko bhāve kammi vaṭṭae samaṇo ।

Samvavahāro ya jujjai jo puvvaṭṭhio carittammi ॥

[It is difficult to know definitely as to which ascetic lives in which भाव Bhāva (inclination of mind). But, one who is pre-eminent in character, is fit from practical point of view.] 83 (2378)

In support of the same argument, the author continues—

छउमत्थसमयचज्जा ववहारनयाणुसारिणी सव्वा ।

तं तह समायरंतो सुज्झइ सव्वो विसुद्धमणो ॥८४॥२३७९॥

संव्यवहारो वि बली जमसुद्धं पि गहियं सुयविहीए ।
कोवेइ न सव्वणू वंदइ य कयाइ छउमत्थं ॥८५॥२३८०॥

निच्छयव्यवहारनओवणीयमिहं सासनं जिणिंदाणं ।
एगयपरिचाओ मिच्छं संकादओ जे य ॥८६॥२३८१॥

जह जिणमयं पवज्जहं तो मा व्यवहारनयमयं सुयह ।
व्यवहारपरिचाए तित्थुच्छेओ जओस्वस्सं ॥८७॥२३८२॥

84. Chaumattha samaya cājja vavahāranayānusāriṇī savvā ।
Tam taha samāyaranto sujghai savvo visuddhamano (2379)
85. Samvavahāro vi balī jamasuddham pi gahiyaṃ suyavihiē ।
Kovei na savvaṇṇa vandaī ya kayāi chaumattham (2380)
86. Nicchaya vavahāra naovaṇṇiyamiha sāsanaṃ Jīṇindāṇam ।
Egayapariccāo miccham saṅkaḍao je ya (2381)
87. Jaha Jīṇamayam pavajjaha to mā vavahāra naya mayam
muyaha ।
Vavahārapariccāe tittluēccheo jao' vassam. (2382)

[छद्मस्थसमयचर्या व्यवहारनयानुसारिणी सर्वा ।
तां तथा समाचरन् शुध्यति सर्वो विशुद्धमनाः ॥८४॥२३७९॥

संव्यवहारोऽपि बली यदशुद्धमपि गृहीतं श्रुतविधिना ।
कोपयति न सर्वज्ञो वन्दते च कदाचिच्छद्मस्थम् ॥८५॥२३८०॥

निश्चयव्यवहारनयोपनीतमिह सासनं जिनेन्द्राणाम् ।
एकतरपरित्यागो मिथ्यात्वं शङ्कादयो ये च ॥८६॥२३८१॥

यदि जिनमतं प्रपद्यध्वं ततो मा व्यवहारनयमतं मुञ्चत ।
व्यवहारपरित्यागे तीर्थोच्छेदो यतोऽवश्यम् ॥८७॥२३८२॥

84. Chalmasthasamaya caryā vyavahāranayānusāriṇī sarvā ।
Tām tathā samācaran śudhyati sarvo viśuddhamanāḥ (2379)

85. Saṃvyavahāro'pi bali yadaśuddhamapi grihītam śrutavidhinā ।
Kepayati na sarvagno vandate ca kadācicchaḍmastham (2380)
86. Niścayavyavahāra nayopanītanīha sāsanaṃ Jinendranām ।
Ekataṛa parityāgo mithyātvam śaṅkādayo ye ca (2381)
87. Yadi Jinamatam prapadyadhvam tato mā vyavahāramaya
matam muncata ।
Vyavahāra parityāge Tīrthocchedo yato'vaśyam (2382)]

Trans 84-85-86-87. The whole routine of the engagements of an ascetic incognito is based upon practical point of view. One who follows it sincerely becomes entirely pure-minded. Mutual intercourse (of respecting each other) is also practicable. For, in case an impure (object) is apprehended by the commandment of holy writ, or in case if one bows to an ascetic incognito, the Omniscient does not disallow it. The commandment of Tīrthaṅkaras is based upon both the positive and practical view-points. It is useless to leave either of them and entertain doubts etc. (So), if you accept the commandment of Tīrthaṅkaras, then do not abandon the theory based upon practical point of view. Because, in abandoning the practical point of view, the authority of the Tīrtha (Śrī Saṅgha) itself will be exterminated (2379-2382)

टीका-८४-८५-८६-८७-चतस्रोऽपि सुगमाः । नवरं “कोवेईत्यादि”
न कोपयति नाप्रमाणीकरोति न परिहरति भुङ्क्त इत्यर्थः । “संक्रादउ इत्यादि”
येऽपि शङ्का-काङ्क्षादयस्ते हि मिथ्यात्वमिति संबन्धः ॥२३७९॥२३८०॥
२३८१॥२३८२॥

Then,

इय ते नासग्गाहं सुयंति जाहे बहुं पि भणंता ।
ता संधपरिचत्ता रायणिहे निवतिणा नाउं ॥८८॥२३८३॥
बलभदेणग्घाया भणंति सावय वं तवस्सि त्ति ।
मा कुरु संकमसंकारुहेसु भणिण भणइ राया ॥८९॥२३८४॥

को जाणइ के तुब्भे किं चोरा चारिआ अभिमर त्ति ।
 संजयरूवच्छण्णा अज्जमहं भे विवाएमि ॥९०॥२३८५॥
 नाण-चरियाहिं नज्जइ समणोऽसमणो व कीस जाणंतो ।
 तं सावय ! संदेहं करेसि भणिए निवो भणइ ॥९१॥२३८६॥
 तुब्भं चिय न परुप्परं वीसंभो साहवो त्ति कह मज्झं ।
 नाण-चरियाहिं जायइ चोराण वि किं न ता संति ? ॥९२॥२३८७॥
 उवउत्तिओ भयाच्च य पव्वण्णा संव्वमयमसग्गाहे ।
 निवखामियाभिगंतुं गुरुमूलं ते पडिक्कंता ॥९३॥२३८८॥

88. Iya te nāsaggāham muiyanti jāhe bahum pi bhaṇantaḥ ।
 Tā saṅghaparicattā Rāyagihe nīvatiṇā nāum (2383)
89. Balabhaḍḍaṇagghāyā bhaṇanti sāvaya vaṁ tavassi tti ।
 Mā kuru saṅkamasāṅkāruhesu bhaṇie bhaṇai rāyā (2384)
90. Ko jāṇai ke tubbhe kim corā cāriā abhimara tti ।
 Sanjayaṛavacchaṇṇā ajjamaham bhe vivāemi (2385)
91. Nāṇa-cariyāhim najjai samaṇo'samaṇo va kīsa jāṇanto ।
 Tam sāvaya ! sandeham karesi bhaṇie nivo bhaṇai (2386)
92. Tubbham ciya na parupparam viṣambho sāhavo tti kaha
 majjham ।
 Nāṇa-cariyāhim jāyai corāṇa vi kim na tā santi (2387)
93. Uvautti bhayācca ya pavvaṇṇā savvamayamasaggāhe ।
 Nivakhāmiyābhigantum gurumūlam te paḍikkantā (2388)

[इति ते नासद्ग्रहं मुञ्चन्ति यावद् बह्वपि भण्यमानाः ।
 तावत् संघपरित्यक्ता राजगृहे नृपतिना ज्ञात्वा ॥८८॥२३८३॥
 बलभद्रेणाघ्राता भणन्ति श्रावक ! वयं तपस्विन इति ।
 मा कुरु शङ्कामशङ्कारूपेषु भणिते भणति राजा ॥८९॥२३८४॥
 को जानाति के यूयं किं चौराश्चारिका अभिमरा इति ।
 संयमरूपच्छन्ना अद्याहं भवतो व्यापादयामि ॥९०॥२३८५॥

ज्ञान-चर्याभ्यां ज्ञायते श्रमणोऽश्रमणो वा कस्माज्ज्ञानम् ।
 त्वं श्रवक ! संदेहं करोषि भणिते नृपो भणति ॥९१॥२३८६॥
 युष्माकमेव न परस्परं विस्त्रम्भः साधव इति कथं मम ।
 ज्ञान-चर्याभ्यां जायते चौराणामपि किं न ते स्तः ? ॥९२॥२३८७॥
 उपपत्तितो भयाच्च प्रपन्नाः सर्वमतमसद्ग्राहे ।
 नृपक्षामिता अभिगत्य गुरुमूलं ते प्रतिक्रान्ताः ॥९३॥२३८८॥

88. Iti te nāsadgraham muncanti yāvad bahvapi bhaṇyamānāḥ ।
 Tāvāt saṅghaparityaktā Rājagrihe nripatinā jnatvā (2383)
89. Balabhadreṇāghrātā bhaṇanti śravaka ! vayam tapasvina iti ।
 Mā kuru śaṅkāmaśaṅkāruheṣu bhaṇite bhaṇati rājā (2384)
90. Ko jānāti ke yāyam kim caurāścārikā abhimarā iti ।
 Saṃyamaraṇapacchannā adyāham bhavato vyāpādayāmi (2385)
91. Jnāna-caryābhyām jñāyate śramaṇo'śramaṇo vā kasmajjānan ।
 Tvam Śrāvaka ! sandeham karoṣi bhaṇite nripo bhaṇati (2386)
92. Yuṣmākameva na, parasparam visrambhah sādhaḥva iti
 katham mama ।
 Jnāna-caryābhyām jñāyate caurāṇāmapi kim na te stah ?
 (2387)
93. Upapattito bhayācca prapannāḥ sarvamatamasadgrāhe ।
 Nripakṣāmitā abhigatya gurumūlam te pratikrāntāḥ (2388)]

Trans. 88-89-90-91-92-93. When they did not give up their mischievous belief in spite of their being persuaded in many ways, as stated above, they were expelled from the Saṅgha (Congregation). When called by king Balabhadra, who had come to know (of their arrival) at Rājagriha, they said " O Śravaka ! We are ascetics. Please do not suspect things that are beyond suspicion." The king replied—" Who knows as to who you are ? Who knows whether you are thieves, spies or burglars, in disguise of ascetics ? I shall kill you to-day." " In spite of your knowing that an ascetic or otherwise, is known by (his) knowledge and character, O śrāvaka ! why

do you suspect us ? ” When thus told, the king replied :—
 “ When you yourselves do not rely upon each other that you are (ascetics), how can I trust you merely from knowledge and character ? Could they not be (found) in thieves also ? (Thus persuaded) by means of trick and fear, (at last) they resorted to the right belief. Having abandoned their wrong belief, and having forgiven the king (for his apparently harsh act), all of them returned to the original (school) of their preceptor (2383-2388).

टीका-८८-८९-९०-९१-९२-९३ सर्वा अप्युक्तार्थाः, सुगमाश्च । नवरं नृपतिना बलमद्रेण “ ते आगताः ” इति ज्ञात्वाऽऽघ्राता आहूताः “ के यूयम् ? ” इति पृष्टाश्च भणन्ति-हे श्रावक ! इत्यादि । “ नाण-चरियाहिं ति ” ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां यो भवतामपि “ साधवः ” इति विश्वम्भः परस्परं नास्ति स ताभ्यां कथं मम जायते ? । अपि च, किं ते कृत्रिमे ज्ञान-क्रिये चौराणामपि न स्तो-न भवतः ? । इति ॥२३८३॥२३८४॥२३८५॥२३८६॥२३८७॥२३८८॥

D. C. When king Balabhadra came to know that the Nihnavas had come to Rājagriha, he called them, and asked them—
 “ Who are you ? ” “ O Śrāvaka ! We are ascetics etc.” was the reply. With the threatening of killing them by crushing under the feet of elephants, the king said “ Since you do not trust each other as ascetics on the standards of jñāna and kriyā, how can I take you to be ascetics on those standards ? Outward jñāna and kriyā could be found in thieves as well.”

On hearing such words, they came to know their mistake and resorted to their original school of thought, abandoning their wrong theories for ever.

End of the Discussion with the Third (type of) Nihnava.



Chapter V

चतुर्थ निहव वक्तव्यता



Discussion with the Fourth Nihava.

वीसा दो वाससया तइया सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स ।
सामुच्छेइयदिट्ठी मिहिलपुरीए समुप्पन्ना ॥९४॥२३८९॥

94. Visā do vāsasaya taiyā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa ।
Sāmuccheiyadiṭṭhī Mihilapurīe samuppannā (2389)

[विंशत्या द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य ।
सामुच्छेदिकदृष्टिर्मिथिलापुर्यां समुत्पन्ना ॥९४॥२३८९॥

94. Viṃśatyā dve varṣaśate tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya ।
SāmucchedikadṛṣṭirMithilāpuryām samutpannā (2389)]

Trans. 94. Theory of Samucchedikas came into existence in (the city of) Mithilā, two hundred and twenty years after Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra had attained Nirvāṇa 2389.

टीका-९४ विंशत्युत्तरं वर्षशतद्वयं तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्यासीत् । ततोऽ-
त्रान्तरे सामुच्छेदिकदृष्टिर्मिथिलापुर्यां समुत्पन्नेति ॥२३८९॥

Here is the story of the production of this theory—

मिहिलाए लच्छिघरे महगिरि कोडिन्न आसमित्ते य ।
नेउणियाणुप्पवाए रायगिहे खंडरक्खा य ॥९५॥२३९०॥

95. Mihilāe Lacchighare Mahagiri Koḍinna Āsamitte ya ।
Neṇṇiyāṇupavāe Rāyagihe khaṇḍarakkhā ya (2390)

[मिथिलायां लक्ष्मीगृहे महागिरिः कौण्डिन्य अश्वमित्रश्च ।
नैपुणिकमनुप्रवादे राजगृहे खण्डरक्षाश्च ॥९५॥२३९०॥

95. Mithilāyām Lakṣmīgrihe Mahāgiriḥ Kauṇḍinya Aśvamitraśca ।
Naipuṇikamanupravāde Rājagrihe khaṇḍarakṣāśca (2390)]

Trans. 95. There was (an Ācārya named) Mahāgiri in (the caitya-temple of an Yakṣa-named) Laxmīgriha in (the city of) Mithilā. There were Kauṇḍinya, and Aśvamitra also. (While studying) the Naipuṇika (portion) of Anupravāda¹ they resorted to the principle of Samucchēdas. And, Khaṇḍarakṣās brought them to the right path in (the city of) Rājagriha. 2390.

टीका-९५ मिथिलानगर्यां लक्ष्मीगृहे चैत्ये महागिरिस्त्रीणां कौण्डिन्यो नाम शिष्यः स्थितः । तस्याप्यश्वमित्रो नाम शिष्योऽनुप्रवादाभिधानपूर्वे नैपुणिकं^२ नाम वस्तु पठति स्म । तत्र च्छिन्नच्छेदनकनयवक्तव्यतायामालापकाः समायाताः, तद्यथा-“पदुप्पन्नसमयनेरइया सव्वे वोच्छिज्जिस्संति, एवं जाव वेमाणिय त्ति, एवं बीयाइसमएसु वि वत्तव्वं” । अत्र तस्य चिकित्सा जाता, तद्यथा-प्रत्युत्पन्न-समयनारकाः सर्वेऽपि तावद् व्यवच्छेदं प्राप्स्यन्ति, ततश्च कुतः सुकृत-दुष्कृत कर्मफलवेदनाम्, उत्पादानन्तरं सर्वजीवानां नाशात् ? इति । एवमादिस्वमतिकल्पितं प्ररूपयन् वक्ष्यमाणभाष्ययुक्तिभिर्गुरुणा प्रज्ञाप्यमानोऽपि यावत् कथमपि न प्रज्ञाप्यते तत् उद्वाह्य संववाह्यः कृतः समुच्छेदवादं प्ररूपयन् काम्पिल्यपुर-नगरं राजगृहापरनामकं गतः । तत्र च खण्डरक्षाभिधानाः श्रावकाः आसन्, ते शुलकपालाः । तैश्च ते निह्नुवाः समागता विज्ञाता मारयितुं चारब्धाः । ततो भीतैरश्वमित्रादिभिस्ते प्रोक्ताः-“वयं न जानीमः-श्रावका यूयम् तत्किमस्मान् श्रमणान् सतो मारयथ ?” । ततस्तैरुक्तम्-“ये श्रमणास्ते युष्मत्सिद्धान्तेन

1. Like purvas, such as Virya-pravāda, Asti-Nāsti pravāda, Jnāna-pravāda, Satya-pravāda, Ātma-pravāda etc., Anu-pravāda seems to belong to one of them. It is an independent purva, treating of Kriyā, Jnāna etc.

2. Neupiya or Naipuṇika is the name of a chapter in the said Anu-pravāda pūrva.

समुच्छिन्नाः, यूयं तु चोराद्यन्यतराः केचिदिति मारयामः” । ततस्तैर्भीतैर्मुक्तो निजाग्रहः, संबुद्धाश्च दत्तमिथ्यादुष्कृता गता गुरुपादमूल इति ॥२३९०॥

D. C. Mahāgiri-sari the preceptor of the Lakṣmīgriha caitya in Mithilā, had a pupil named Kauṇḍinya, who, in turn had a pupil named Aśvamiṭra. While studying the Naipuṇika chapter of the Anu-pravāda pūrva, Aśvamiṭra came across the following statement in course of a discussion of the principles of *chinna* and *chedanaka* (Destroyed and destroyer):—

“Paḍuppanna samayaneraiyā savve vocchijjissanti ।

Evam jāva Vemāṇiya tti, evam bīyāisamayesu vi vattavvam.”

[All the Nārakas (inhabitants of hell) of the present convention will perish, and so will all the deities. The same should be understood of those of other conventions as well.]

On reading this, Aśvamiṭra conjectured that if all the Nārakas of the present convention were to perish, all other living beings would also meet destruction, as soon as they were born. Consequently, they would not be able to attain the rewards of good and evil deeds. In this way, Aśvamiṭra began to draw conclusions on false conjectures. His preceptor (Kauṇḍinya) tried to persuade him by means of various tricks (which will be told hereafter), but Aśvamiṭra was not convinced at all. He was, then, expelled from the Saṅgha (Congregation). He, then, came to the city of Rājagriha (or Kāmpilyapuri). There the śrāvakas khaṇḍarakṣas, who were posted as customs watchmen, began to beat Aśvamiṭra and his fellow-Nihnavas all of a sudden. “Do you not know us? Why do you beat us even though you are śrāvakas” said the Nihnavas. “Those that are śramaṇas have already perished according to your theory. You may be some other people like thieves etc. and hence, we are beating you,” was the reply. Being afraid of this, they gave up their false notion, came to the right path and returned to the original school of their preceptor, after having excused the khaṇḍarakṣas for the apparently harsh act. 95 (2390).

Now, the author explains the above-mentioned account of Niryukti in details —

नेउणमणुप्पवाए अहिज्जओ वत्थुमासमित्तस्स ।
एगसमयाइवोच्चेयसुत्तओ नासपडिवत्ती ॥९६॥२३९१॥
उप्पायाणंतरओ सच्चं चिय सच्चहा विणासि त्ति ।
गुरुवयणमेगनयमयमेयं मिच्छं न सच्चमयं ॥९७॥२३९२॥

96. Neṇṇamaṇupparavāe ahijjao vatthumāsamittassa ।
Egasamayāi-voccheyasuttao nāsapadivattī (2391)
97. Uppāyāṇantarao savvam ciya savvaha viṇāsi tti ।
Guruvayaṇameganayamayameyam miccham na savvamayam
(2392)

[नैपुणमनुप्रवादेऽधीयानस्य वस्त्वश्वमित्रस्य ।
एकसमयादिव्यवच्छेदसूत्रतो नाशप्रतिपत्तिः ॥९६॥२३९१॥
उत्पादानन्तरतः सर्वमेव सर्वथा विनाशीति ॥
गुरुवचनमेकनयमतमेतद् मिथ्या न सर्वमतम् ॥९७॥२३९२॥

96. Naipuṇamanupravāde'dhiyānasya vastvaśvāmitrasya ।
Ekasamayādi-vyavacchedasatrato nāśapratipattiḥ (2391)
97. Utpādānantarataḥ sarvameva sarvathā vināśīti ।
Guruvacanamekanayamatametad mithyā na sarvamataṁ (2392)

Trans. 96-97. While studying the Naipuṇika chapter in the Anupravāda (parva). Aśvāmitra derived the theory of (entire) destruction viz—that everything is entirely perishable after its production from the rule (laying down) the destruction (of an object) at one time etc. It is the opinion of the preceptor that it is false, because it is approved only by one point of view but not by all. (2391-2392).

टीका-९६-९७ अनुप्रवादपूर्वमध्यगतं नैपुणं वस्त्वधीयानस्याश्वमित्रस्य
पूर्वोक्तादेकसमयादिव्यवच्छेदसूत्राद् नाशप्रतिपत्तिरुत्पन्ना । कोऽर्थः ? । इत्याह—
“उत्पादानन्तरमेव सर्वं वस्तु सर्वथा विनश्वररूपम्” इत्येवंभूतो बोधः समुत्पन्नः ।

अत्र प्रति-विधानार्थं गुरुवचनम्- ननु प्रतिसमयविनाशित्वं वस्तूनाम् इत्येतदेक-
स्यैव क्षणक्षयवादिन् ऋजुसूत्रनयस्य मतम्, न तु सर्वनयमतम्, ततो मिथ्यात्व-
मेवेति ॥२३९१॥२३९२॥

D. C. While studying the Naipūṇika portion of the Anu-
pravāda parva, Aśvameṭra derived a theory from the rule laying
down the theory of destruction of objects of one convention that
all objects of one convention vanish entirely-in all respects-as
soon as they are produced. The preceptor persuaded him not to
form such a wrong notion, and said "The theory of destructibi-
lity of objects at every moment, is laid down by the kṣaṇa-
kṣaya-vādins only from one point of view viz-Rijusūtra naya³,
but it is not true from all points of view. So, it is false.

Why is it Mithatva?

न हि सव्वहा विणासोऽद्धापज्जायमेत्तनासम्मि ।

स-पर-पज्जायाणंतधम्मणो वत्थुणो जुत्तो ॥९८॥२३९३॥

98. Na hi savvahā viṇāso'ddhāpajjāyamettanāsammi ।

Sa-para-pajjāyāṇantadhammaṇo vatthuṇo jutto (2393)

[न हि सर्वथा विनाशोऽद्धापयायमात्रनाशे ।

स्व-पर-पर्यायानन्तधर्मणो वस्तुनो युक्तः ॥९८॥२३९३॥

98. Na hi sarvathā vināśo'ddhāparyāyamātranāśe ।

Sva-para-paryāyāṇantadharmaṇo vastuno yuktaḥ (2393)]

Trans. 98. Merely at the end of a (particular) condition
of time, it is not proper to admit entire destruction of an
object that has innumerable qualities on account of its own,
as well as, of other's *paryāya* (form) 2393.

टीका-९८ न हि सर्वथैव वस्तुनो विनाशो युक्तः । क सति ? । इत्याह-
अद्धापयायमात्रनाशे । तत्रेहाद्धा नारकादीनामुत्पत्ति-प्रथमादिसमयः, स एव

3. According to this system of philosophy an object is per-
ceived in its present condition only.

पर्यायमात्रं तस्य नाशोऽपगमस्तस्मिन् सति । कथंभूतस्य वस्तुनः ? इत्याह—
स्व-पर-पर्यायानन्तधर्मकस्य । इदमुक्तं भवति—यस्मिन्नेव समये तदनारकवस्तु
प्रथमसमयनारकत्वेन समुच्छिद्यते तस्मिन्नेव समये द्वितीयसमयनारकत्वेनोत्पद्यते,
जीवद्रव्यतया त्ववतिष्ठते । अतो यदि नामाद्वापर्यायमात्रमुच्छिन्नम्, ततःसर्व-
स्यापि वस्तुनः समुच्छेदे किमायातम्, अनन्तपर्यायात्मकस्य वस्तुन एकपर्याय-
मात्रोच्छेदे सर्वोच्छेदस्य दूरविरुद्धत्वात् ? इति ॥२३९३॥

D. C. It is not at all proper to accept the entire destruction of an object merely because a particular condition (say, bhūta paryāya or past condition) of time⁴ is over. Every object is possessed of innumerable qualities, say for example, whenever the Nārakas perish as Nārakas of the first condition (paryāya) of time, they do not perish entirely but they are produced immediately as Nārakas of the second condition of time, and thus continue to stay on as living matter.

It is not proper, therefore, to believe that an object which has innumerable paryāyas or forms at different conditions of time, vanishes entirely as soon as a particular paryāya or condition of time is over. 98 (2393)

अह सुत्ताउ त्ति मई सुत्ते नणु सासयं पि निदिट्ठं ।

वत्थुं दव्वट्ठाए असासयं पज्जयट्ठाए ॥९९॥२३९४॥

99. Aha suttāu tti māi sutte naṇu sāsayaṃ pi nidiṭṭhaṃ ।
Vatthum davvaṭṭhāc a-sāsayaṃ pajjayatṭhāc (2394)

[अथ सूत्रादिति मतिः सूत्रे ननु शाश्वतमपि निर्दिष्टम् ।

वस्तु द्रव्यार्थतयाऽशाश्वतं पर्यायार्थतया ॥९९॥२३९४॥

99. Atha sūtrāditi matiḥ sūtre naṇu śāśvatamapi nirdiṣṭaṃ ।
Vastu dravyārthatayāśśāsvatam paryāyārthatayā (2394)].

4. According to Jaina Terminology, the word 'Addhā' signifies Time. Addhāparyāya signifies the paryāya or condition of time. e. g. Vartamāna paryāya (Present condition) Bhūta paryāya (Past condition) and Bhaviṣya paryāya (Future condition).

Trans. 99. If your belief is based upon (the afore-said) rule, it is also laid down in the rule that an object is imperishable by (virtue of its) form 2394.

टीका-९९ अर्थ पूर्वोक्तालापकरूपात् सूत्रात् सूत्रप्रामाण्यात् प्रतिसमयं सर्वथा वस्तुच्छेदः प्रतिपाद्यत इति तव मतिः । ननु यदि सूत्रं तव प्रमाणम्, तर्हि सूत्रे द्रव्यार्थतया शाश्वतमपि वस्त्वन्यत्रोक्तमेव, पर्यायार्थतयैव चाशाश्वतम्, तथा च सूत्रम्-“नेरइयाणं भंते ! किं सासया, असासया ? । गोयमा ! सिय सासया, सिय असासया । से केणट्ठेणं ? । गोयमा ! दब्बट्ठयाए सांसया, भावट्ठयाए असासया ” इति ॥२३९४॥

D. C. According to you, an, object should be taken as entirely perished at every moment on the authority of the rule referred to before⁵.

Now, if you take the sūtra as an authority on this point there is another sūtra also which describes an object as *śāśvata* or imperishable by virtue of its being matter, and *vinaśvara* or perishable by virtue of its form—

The sūtra runs as follows :—

Q. “Neraiyāṇam bhante ! kim sāsaya a-sāsaya ?

A. Goyamā ! siya sāsaya, siya a-sāsaya⁶.

5. Vide verse 2390.

6. The following *ālāpaka* is from Bhagvatī Sūtra :—

Q. “Neraiyā ṇam bhante ! kim sāsaya a-sāsaya ?

A. Goyamā ! siya sāsaya siya a-sāsaya.

Q. Se keṇaṭṭheṇam bhante ! jāvaevam vuccai “Neraiyā siya sāsaya, siya a-sāsaya ?

A. Goyamā ! Avvocchitti nayaṭṭhāyāe sāsaya, vocchittinayaṭṭhayaē asāsaya. Se teṇa-aṭṭheṇam jāva siya sāsaya siya a-sāsaya.

Q. Se kenatṭhenam ?

A. Goyamā ! Davvaṭṭhāe sāsaya, Bhāvaṭṭhāe a-sāsaya.

[Q. O Lord ! are the Nārakas perishable or imperishable ?

A. O Gautama ! they might be perishable, as well as, imperishable also.

Q. How could that be ?

A. O Gautama ! they are imperishable on account of their matter, and perishable so far as their form is concerned.]

And,

इत्थ वि न सव्वनासो समयाइविसेसणं जओऽभिहिंयं ।

इहरा न सव्वनासे समयाइविसेसणं जुत्तं ॥१००॥२३९५॥

को पढमसमयनारगनासे बितिसमयनारगो नाम ।

न सुरो घडो अभावो व होइ जइ सव्वहा नासो ? ॥१०१॥२३९६॥

100. Ittha vi na savvanāso samayāivisesaṇam jao'bhiiyam ।
Iharā na savvanāse samayāivisesaṇam juttam (2395)

101. Ko paḍhamasamayanāraganāse bitisamayanārago nāma ।
Na suro ghaḍo abhāvo va hoi jai savvahā nāso ? (2396)

[अत्रापि न सर्वनाशः समयादिविशेषणं यतोऽभिहितम् ।

इतरथा न सर्वनाशे समयादिविशेषणं युक्तम् ॥१००॥२३९५॥

कःप्रथमसमयनारकनाशे द्वितीयसमयनारको नाम ।

न सुरो घटोऽभावो वा भवति यदि सर्वथा नाशः ? ॥१०१॥२३९६॥

[Bhagavati Sutra Śataka 7 Udeśaka 3, last portion] Gujarāṭi
Translation page 15 Part III.]

It will be noted on comparison that though both the ālāpakas differ slightly in readings, there is not the slightest difference between the two, so far as the meanings of both the ālāpakas are concerned.]

100. Atrāpi na sarvanāśaḥ samayādiviśeṣaṇam yato'bhihitam ।
Itarathā na sarvanāśe samayādiviśeṣaṇam yuktam (2395)
101. Kaḥ prathamasaṁmayanārakanāśe dvitīyasamayanārako nāma ।
Na suro ghaṭo'bhāvo vā bhavati yaḥ sarvathā nāśaḥ ?
(2396)]

Trans. 100-101. Here also, since adjectives like *samaya* etc. are told, entire destruction could not (fit in). (For) otherwise, the adjectives like *samaya* etc. would be useless in (case of) entire destruction. How could a *nāraka* of the second moment come into existence when the *nāraka* of the first moment has (entirely) perished? If there were entire destruction, there would be nothing like god, *ghaṭa* or *a-bhāva* (non-existence) 2395-2396.

टीका-१००-१०१ अत्रापि “प्रथमसमयनारका व्यवच्छेदं यास्यन्ति” इति सूत्रे न सर्वनाशः सर्वात्मना नाशो गम्यते । कुतः ? इत्याह यतो यस्मात् समयादिविशेषणमिहितम्, ततो न सर्वथा नाशोऽत्र गम्यते, किन्तु प्रथमसमयनारका व्यवच्छेत्स्यन्ति । कोऽर्थः । प्रथमसमयनारकत्वेन विनङ्क्ष्यन्ति । एवं द्वितीयादिसमयनारका अपि द्वितीयादिसमयनारकत्वेनैव विनङ्क्ष्यन्ति न तु सर्वथा, द्रव्यार्थतया शाश्वतत्वात् । इतरथा सर्वनाशोऽभिभेदे प्रथमसमयादिविशेषणं न युक्तं स्यादिति । कथमयुक्तम् ? इत्याह-“को पढमेत्यादि” प्रथमसमयोत्पन्नानां हि नारकाणां सर्वथा विनाशे को नाम द्वितीय-तृतीयादिसमयनारकः ? ! अवस्थितस्यैव हि कस्यचित् प्रथम-द्वितीय-तृतीयादिसमयोत्पन्नविशेषणं युज्यते । यदि तु सर्वथा नाशः तर्हि प्रथमसमयोत्पन्ननारकस्य निरन्वयनाशेन नष्टत्वाद् द्वितीयसमयोत्पन्नो नारक इति व्यपदेष्टुं कथं युज्यते, यन्नारकात् सर्वथा विलक्षत्वादसौ सुरो घटोऽभावो वा नोच्यते ? । सुरादिव्यपदेशे च न द्वितीयादिसमयनारकाः । तस्मात् प्रथम-द्वितीय-तृतीयादिसमयोत्पन्ना इति विशेषणं कथञ्चिदवस्थितस्यैव नारकादेर्युज्यत इत्यस्मिन्नपि सूत्रे न नारकादेः सर्वोच्छेदः प्रतिपाद्यते । इति निर्मूल एव निजाशुभकर्मविपाकजनितस्तवैष व्यामोह इति ॥२३९॥२३९६॥

D. C. In the sūtra laying down that the *nārakas* of the first moment will meet destruction, entire destruction is not, at

all, implied. Adjectives viz first moment, second moment' etc. mentioned therein are significant." By the expression that "Nārakas of the first moment will meet destruction," entire destruction of the *nārakas* is not meant but it only means that the *nārakas* of the first moment lose the property of being *nārakas* at that time. Similarly those of the second moment lose the property of being *nārakas* at the second moment and so on.

But *nārakas* would never perish entirely on account of their matter being indestructible, Thus; if the theory of entire destruction is admitted, adjectives such as *prathama samaya*, *dvitīya-samaya* etc. would not be justified. If the *nārakas* that were produced at previous moments had perished entirely along with those moments, how could *nārakas* of the second moment, and those of the third moment etc. come into existence? So, the adjectives viz *prathama samayotpanna* (produced in the first moment) *dvitīya samayotpanna* (produced in the second moment) etc. would be justified only if the *nārakas* were taken as the existent beings.

In spite of all this, if you hold the theory of entire destruction, a *nāraka* produced at the first moment, would perish entirely, and it would not leave any scope for the production of a *nāraka* of the second moment. And if a *nāraka* perishes entirely with the first moment, that which is produced at the second moment would be definitely different from the *nāraka* (itself), and hence it would never be possible to recognize, a *sura*, a *ghaṭa* or a *bhāva* from it. This proves that adjectives such as *prathama samayotpanna*, *dvitīya samayotpanna* etc. could be attributed only to an existing being and to none else.

Thus, the sūtra mentioned before, does not, in any way, imply entire destruction of *nārakas*, at the end of a particular period of time. It is only due to futile embarrassment produced in you, on account of your (past) misdeeds, that you are led to hold such wrong notions, 100-101 (2395-2396).

अहव समाणुप्पत्ती समाणसंताणओ मई होज्जा ।
को सव्वहा विणासे संताणो किं व सामण्णं ? ॥१०२॥२३९७॥

102. Ahava samāṇuppati samāṇasantāṇao mai hojjā ।
Ko savvaha viṇāse santāṇo kim vā sāmaṇṇam ? (2397).

[अथवा समानोत्पत्तिः समानसंतानतो मतिर्भवेत् ।
कः सर्वथा विनाशे संतानः किं वा सामान्यम् ? ॥१०२॥२३९७॥]

102. Athavā samānotpattiḥ samāṇasantānato matirbhavet ।
Kaḥ sārvaṭhā vināśe santānaḥ kim vā sāmānyam ? (2397)]

Trans. 102. Or, the belief may be that (there is) production of similar (nārakas) on account of similar offsprings. (But) in (case of) absolute destruction, what is the utility of (even) an offspring or similarity ? (2397).

टीका—१०२ अथवैवंभूता मतिः परस्य भवेद्, यदुत—नारकादीनां प्रति-
समयमपरापरसमानक्षणोत्पत्तिर्भवति । ततस्तया समानक्षणोत्पत्त्या यः समान-
क्षणसंततिरूपः संतानस्तस्मात् संतानात् संतानमाश्रित्य नारकादेः कथञ्चिद्
धौव्यमन्तरेणापि प्रथमद्वितीयादिसमयोत्पन्नविशेषणमुपपद्यत एव । अत्रोत्तरमाह
“को सव्वहेत्यादि” । ननु सर्वथा विनाशे समुच्छेदेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे कः कस्य
संतानः, किं वा कस्य समानम् ? इति निर्निबन्धनमेवेदमुच्यते । न हि निरन्वय-
विनाशेऽवस्थिताः केचनापि नारकादिक्षणाः सन्ति, यानाश्रित्येदमुच्यते—“अय-
मेषां संतानः, इदं चास्य समानम्” इति ॥२३९७॥

D. C.

Aśvameśvara :—Since *nārakas* etc. are created at similar mo-
ments one after the other, their *santānas* are also created in the
form of productions of similar moments, and by virtue of those
santānas, adjectives such as *prathama samayotpanna* etc. would
be justified even without any object being taken as existent.

Acārya :—When you accept the theory of entire destruction,
who would be taken as whose offspring ? And what would be

similar to what ? For, in case of entire destruction, there would not exist any moment of production of nārakas etc. by virtue of which, we can say that "This is their offspring or that is similar to this." 102 (2397)

Because,

संताणिणो न भिण्णो जइ संताणो न नाम संताणो ।

अह भिण्णो न कखणिओ खणिओ वा जइ न संताणो ॥

१०३॥२३९८॥

103. Santāṇiṇo na bhiṇṇo jai santāṇo na nāma santāṇo ।

Aha bhiṇṇo na kkhaniṇo kkhaniṇo vā jai na santāṇo. (2398)

[संतानिनो न भिन्नो यदि संतानो न नाम संतानः ।

अथ भिन्नो न क्षणिकः क्षणिको वा यदि न संतानः ॥१०३॥२३९८॥

103. Santānino na bhinno yadi santāno na nāma santānaḥ ।

Atha bhinno na kṣaṇikaḥ kṣaṇiko vā yadi na santānaḥ

(2398)]

Trans. 103. If an offspring is not different from (its) generator, it is not an offspring. And, if (it is) different, it would not be momentary; (for) if it is momentary, it would not be an offspring. 2398,

टीका-१०३ यदि संतानिभ्यो न भिन्नः किन्त्वभिन्नः संतानः, तर्हि न नामासौ संतानः, संतानिभ्योऽनर्थान्तरभूतत्वात्, तत्स्वरूपवत् । अथ संतानिभ्यो भिन्नः संतानः, तर्हि क्षणिकोऽसौ नेष्टव्यः, अवस्थितत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अथ क्षणिकोऽसाविष्यते तर्हि नासौ संतानः, संतानिवत् । ततस्त एव संतानाभावपक्षोक्ता दोषा इति । तदेव सर्वथोच्छेदेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने संतान उत्पद्यत इति भावितम् ॥२३९८॥

D. C. If a *santāna* is not different from a *santānin* (generator) it would not be called a *santāna*, as it would not possess a form independent of *santānin*. And if it is different from *santā-*

nin, it would not be taken as *kṣaṇika* or transitory, because by accepting it as *kṣaṇika*, its state of retention would be accepted.

On the other hand, if a *santāna* is taken as *kṣaṇika*, it will no longer be existent like *santānin* and difficulties arising from the state of non-existence of *santāna* would crop up. So, there is no scope for the *santāna* to exist in the midst of absolute destruction. 103 (2398)

Continuing the same argument, the author states :—

पुव्वाणुगमे समया हुज्ज न सा सव्वहा विणासम्मि ।

अह सा न सव्वनासो तेण समं वा नणु खपुप्फं ॥१०४॥२३९९॥

104. Puvvāṇugame samaya hujja na sā savvahā viṇāsammi ।

Aha sā na savvanāso teṇa samam vā naṇu khapuppham
(2399)

[पूर्वानुगमे समता भवेद् न सा सर्वथा विनाशे ।

अथ सा न सर्वनाशस्तेन समं वा ननु खपुष्पम् ॥१०४॥२३९९॥

104. Parvānugame samatābhaved na sā sarvathā vināśe ।

Atha sā na sarvanāśastena samam vā nanu khaṇuṣṣam
(2399)]

Trans. 104. Similarity is (possible) only in (case of) its connection with the former (moment), but not in (the midst of) all-pervading destruction. And if it exists, there would be nothing like all-pervading destruction. Or else, even *khaṇuṣṣa* would become similar to it. 2399.

टीका—१०४ यदि पूर्वक्षणस्योत्तरक्षणे केनापि रूपेणानुगमोऽन्वयो भवेत् तदा तत्रानुगमे पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोः समता समानरूपता भवेत् । सर्वथा तु सर्वात्मना पूर्वक्षणस्य निरन्वयविनाशे न सा समतोत्तरक्षणस्य युज्यते । सा समता तयोरभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि तद्रूपस्य कथञ्चिदवस्थितत्वाद् न पूर्वक्षणस्य सर्वथा विनाशः । अथ सर्वथा विनाशेऽपि तस्या समताऽभ्युपगम्यते, हन्त ! तर्हि तेन सर्वथाऽभावीभूतेन पूर्वक्षणेन समं तुल्यं युज्यते यदि, परं खपुष्पम्, सर्वथाभावरूपतया द्वयोरपि तुल्यत्वादिति ॥२३९९॥

D. C. If the former moment is connected in any way with the later moment, there would be some sort of similarity between the former and later moments. But when there is absolute negation of the former moment, its similarity with the later moment has no place. And, if there is any similarity between the two, the former moment will have to be taken as existing, and hence, there would be no possibility of absolute negation.

Still however, if this sort of similarity is accepted by you, in spite of there being absolute destruction, why should a non-existent object like *khapussa*, also, be not taken as similar to it as the property of being non-existent is common to both ? 104 (2399).

For,

अण्णविणासे अण्णं जइ सरिसं होइ होउ तेलुक्कं ।
तदसंबद्धं व मई सो वि कओ सव्वनासम्मि ? ॥१०५॥२४००॥

105. Aṇṇavināse aṇṇam jai sarisam hoi hou telukkam ।
Tadasambaddham va mai so vi kao savvanāsammi ? (2400)

[अन्यविनाशेऽन्यद् यदि सदृशं भवति भवतु त्रैलोक्यम् ।
तदसंबद्धं वा मतिः सोऽपि कुतः सर्वनाशे ? ॥१०५॥२४००॥

105. Anyavināśe'nyad yadi sadṛśam bhavati bhavatu trailokyam ।
Tadasambaddham vā matih s'opi kutah sarvanāśe ? 105
(2400)]

Trans. 105. If at the destruction of one thing, something else becomes similar (to it), even (the group of) three worlds would become similar to it. Or, if it is (accepted) on account of its being unconnected-how is that even possible in the midst of all-pervading negation. 2400.

टीका-१०५ सर्वथा निरन्वयविनाशे घटात् पट इवोत्तरक्षणात् । सर्वथाऽन्य एव पूर्वक्षणस्तस्माच्चान्य एवोत्तरक्षणः । ततः सर्वथाऽन्यस्य पूर्वक्षणस्य विनाशे तस्मात् सर्वथान्यदुत्तरक्षणरूपं यदि सदृशं भवतीत्यभ्युपेयते, तर्हि भवतु त्रैलोक्य-

मपि ततस्तत्सदृशम्, अनन्वयित्वेऽन्यत्वस्य सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वात् । अथ तत् त्रैलोक्यं प्रस्तुतपूर्वक्षणेन सह देशादिव्यवहितत्वादसंबद्धमिति न तत्सदृशम्, उत्तरक्षणस्तु तेन सह संबद्ध इति तत्सदृश इति परस्य मतिः स्यात् । ननु सोऽपि पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोः संबन्धः पूर्वस्य सर्वथा विनाशे कुतः ?—न कुतश्चिदित्यर्थः, तत्संबन्धाभ्युपगमेऽन्यसंबन्धायोगेनानन्वयाभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गादिति भावः ॥२४००॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—Just as a paṭa is totally different from a ghaṭa, the former moment is different from later moment and vice versa. Now, even when the former moment is taken to have perished entirely, if it is held that the later moment which is absolutely different from it, is similar to the former moment, the group of the Three Worlds should also be taken as similar to it, because the property of being absolutely different (from the later moment) is common there also.

Aśvamitra:—The group of the Three Worlds, could not be taken as similar to the former moment in question, because that is not connected with it by means of time, place etc., while later moment is taken as similar to the former moment, because it is connected with the former moment by means of time.

Ācārya:—But how can the relation between former and later moments exist in spite of the former moment having entirely perished? Such a relation can never exist without accepting the context, and hence, the state of retention or existence of the former moment in question. 105 (2400)

Besides,

किह वा सव्वं खणियं विण्णायं जइ मई सुयाउ ति ।

तदसंखसमयसुत्तत्थगहणपरिणामओ जुत्तं ॥१०६॥२४०१॥

न उ पइसमयविणासे जेणिक्किक्खवरं चिय पयस्स ।

संखाईयसामइयं संखिज्जाइं पयं ताइं ॥१०७॥२४०२॥

संखिज्जपयं वक्कं तदत्थगहणपरिणामओ हुज्जा ।

सव्वक्खणभंगनाणं तदजुत्तं समयनट्ठस्स ॥१०८॥२४०३॥

106. Kiha vā savvam khaṇiyam viṇṇāyam jai maī suyāu ti ।
Tadasaṅkhasamayassuttatthagahaṇapariṇāmao juttam (2401)
107. Na u paisamayaviṇāse jeṇikkikkakākharam eīya payassa ।
Saṅkhāiyasāmayam saṅkhijjāmi payam tāim (2402)
108. Saṅkhijjapayam vakkam tadatthagahaṇapariṇāmao bujjā. ।
Savvakhaṇabhāṅganāṇam tadajuttam samayanaṭṭhassa.
(2403)

[कथं वा सर्वं क्षणिकं विज्ञातं यदि मतिः श्रुतादिति ।

तदसंख्यसमयसूत्रार्थग्रहणपरिणामतो युक्तम् ॥१०६॥२४०१॥

न तु प्रतिसमयविनाशे येनैकैकाक्षरमेव पदस्य ।

संख्यातीतसामयिकं संख्यातानि पदं तानि ॥१०७॥२४०२॥

संख्यातपदं वाक्यं तदर्थग्रहणपरिणामतो भवेत् ।

सर्वक्षणभङ्गज्ञानं तदयुक्तं समयनष्टस्य ॥१०८॥२४०३॥

106. Katham vā sarvam kṣaṇikam vijnātam yadi matiḥ śrutā
diti ।
Tadasaṅkhasamayassūtrārthagrahaṇapariṇāmato yuktam
106 (2401)
107. Na tu pratisamayavināse yenaikaikākṣaram eva padasya ।
Saṅkhyāṭitasāmayikam saṅkhyātāni padam tāni 107 (2402)
108. Saṅkhyātapadam vākyam tadarthagrahaṇapariṇāmato bhavet ।
Sarvakṣaṇabhāṅgajnānam tadayuktam samayanaṣṭasya
108 (2403)].

Trans. 106-107-108. Or, if it is asked "How is every-thing recognized as momentary?" (The answer is) "From the Holy writ." It is proper (to take it) as a result of the comprehension of the meanings of innumerable sūtras, but not (as a result of) the destruction (taking place) at every moment. Each syllable of a word (is produced) at an incalculable portion of time. A word consists of a definite number of those (syllables), and a sentence is composed of certain

number of words. At the comprehension of its meaning, knowledge of all-pervading transitoriness (is attained). (But) that is misfitted to one (whose mind) perishes (soon after) the time of production 2401-2402-2403.

टीका-१०६-१०७-१०८ “वा” इत्यथवा, पर्यन्तयुज्यते भवान् । ननु “सर्वं वस्तु क्षणिकम्” इत्येतत् कथं भवता विज्ञातमिति वक्तव्यम् ? श्रुतादिति चेत् । ननु तत् श्रुतादर्थविज्ञानमसंख्येयसमयैर्निष्पन्नो यः सूत्रार्थग्रहणपरिणामस्तस्मादेव युक्तम्, न तु प्रतिसमयविनाशे । इदमुक्तं भवति-असंख्येयानेव समयान् यावच्चित्तस्यावस्थाने “सर्वं क्षणिकम्” इति विज्ञानोपयोगो युज्यते, न तु प्रतिसमयोच्छेदे । अत्र कारणमाह-येन यस्मात् कारणात् पदस्य सावयवत्वात् तत्संबन्धेकैकमप्यक्षरं संख्यातीतसामयिकमसंख्यातैः समयैर्निष्पद्यत इत्यर्थः, तानि चाक्षराणि संख्यातानि समुदितानि पदं भवति । संख्यातैश्च पदैर्वाक्यं निष्पद्यते, तदर्थग्रहणपरिणामाच्च वाक्यार्थग्रहणपरिणामादित्यर्थः, सर्वक्षणभङ्गज्ञानं भवेत् । तच्चोत्पत्तिसमयानन्तरमेव नष्टस्य समुच्छिन्नस्य मनसोऽयुक्तमेवेति ॥ २४०१॥२४०२॥२४०३॥

D. C.

Āśvamiṭra :—How could you apprehend that everything is kṣaṇika ?

Ācārya :—From the Holy writ. Apprehension of kṣaṇikatā from the Holy writings, is justifiable only as a result of the apprehension of the meanings of sūtras, but not as a result of destruction taking place at every moment. Every syllable of a word is produced at an incalculable moment. A word consists of a number of such syllables and a sentence is made up of a number of words. When the meaning of such sentences is comprehended, knowledge of all-pervading transitoriness is attained. But it should be noted that such a knowledge is not attainable to one whose mind perishes soon after the time of its production. 106 - 108. (2401-2403)

And,

तित्ती समो किलामो सारिक्ख-विवक्ख-पच्चयाईणि ।

अज्झयणं ज्ञाण भावणा य का सव्वनासम्मि ? ॥१०९॥२४०४॥

109. Tittī samo kilāmo sārīkka-vivakkha-paccayāiṇi ।

Ajjhayaṇaṃ jhāṇa bhāvaṇā ya kā savvanāsammi? (2404)

[तृप्तिः श्रमः क्लमः सादृश्य-विपक्ष-प्रत्ययादीनि ।

अध्ययनं-ध्यानं भावना च का सर्वनाशे ? ॥१०९॥२४०४॥

109. Triptih śramah klanah sādṛśya-vipakṣa-pratyayādīni ।

Adhyayanam dhyānam bhāvanā ca kā sarvanāśe? 109
(2404)].

Trans. 109. And, in (the midst of) absolute destruction, how could satiety, exertion, languor, similarity, distinction, etc; as well as, study, meditation, and imagination exist? (2404).

टीका-१०९ तृप्तिर्घ्राणिः, मार्गगमनादिप्रवृत्तस्य खेदः श्रमः, क्लमो ग्लानिः, सादृश्यं साधर्म्यम्, विपक्षो वैधर्म्यम्, प्रत्ययः प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिः आदि-शब्दात् स्वनिहितप्रत्यनुमार्गेण-स्मरणादिपरिग्रहः । अध्ययनं पुनः पुनर्ग्रन्थाभ्यासः, ध्यानमेकावलम्बने मनःस्थैर्यम्, भावना पौनः पुन्येनानित्यत्वादिप्रकारतो भवनैर्गुण्यपरिभावनरूपा । एतानि सर्वाण्यप्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव वस्तुनः सर्वनाशेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे कथमुपपद्यन्ते ? इति ॥२४०४॥

D. C. If the theory of entire destruction of an object (at every moment) is accepted, everything will be destroyed immediately after its production. Consequently, there will be no place for feelings like those of satiety, exertion or fatigue. There will be nothing like similarity, dissimilarity, belief or remembrance, and there will be no scope for study, meditation or imagination 109 (2404).

अण्णण्णो पइगासं भुत्ता अंते न सो वि का तित्ती ? ।

गंतादओ वि एवं इय संववहारवुच्छित्ती ॥११०॥२४०५॥

110. *Annaṇṇo paigāsam bhuttā ante na so vi kā titti ?*
Gantādao vi evam iya saṃvavahāravucchitti (2405)

[अन्योऽन्यः प्रतिग्रासं भोक्ताऽन्ते न सोऽपि का तृप्तिः ? ।

गन्त्रादयोऽप्येवमिति संव्यवहारव्युच्छित्तिः ॥११०॥२४०५॥

110. *Anyo'nyaḥ pratigrāsam bhoktā'nte na so'pi kā triptiḥ ?*
Gantrādayo'pyevamiti saṃvyavahāravucchittiḥ (2405)]

Trans. 110. (In case of entire destruction) an eater would be different at every mouthful; (and) at the end (he would exist) no more. (Hence) how could there be (the feeling of) satisfaction at all? The same will be the condition of those who move, ect. In this way, there would be violation of the (whole of) vyavahāra. 2405.

टीका—११० “ग्रसु ग्लसु अदने” ग्रसनं ग्रासः कवलक्षेपः, ग्रस्यत इति वा ग्रासः कवलः । ततश्च प्रतिग्रासं प्रतिकवलं भोक्ता देवदत्तः क्षणिकत्वादन्य-
 श्चान्यश्च भवति, भोजनक्रियायाश्चान्ते पर्यन्ते सोऽपि भोक्ता सर्वथा न भवति,
 भुजिक्रियाविशेषणस्याभावे तद्विशिष्टस्य देवदत्तस्यापि सर्वथोच्छेदात् । ततश्चैक-
 स्मिन्नन्यकवलप्रक्षेपे का तृप्तिः; भोक्तुश्चाभावात् कस्यासौ तृप्तिः । एवमुक्तानु-
 सारेण गन्त्रादीनामपि श्रमाद्यभावः स्वबुद्ध्या भावनीय इति । एवं समस्तलोक-
 व्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसक्तिरिति ॥२४०५॥

D. C. In case of there being entire destruction (at every moment), one who eats would be different at every mouthful of food on account of his being *kṣaṇika*. In absence of the process of eating, the eater will also perish at the end. Hence, how could there be a feeling of satisfaction at the last mouthful, and in absence of eater, who will experience the feeling of satisfaction?

In the same way, those who move would not feel exertion, and so on. Ultimately this would lead the entire *vyavahāra* to nothing.

Here the opponent would say—

जेणं चिय पइगासं भिन्ना तित्ती अओ चिय विणासो ।

तित्तीए तित्तस्स य एवं चिय सव्वसंसिद्धी ॥१११॥२४०६॥

111. Jeṇam ciya paigāsam bhinnā tittī aō ciya viṇāso ।
Tittī tittassa ya evam ciya savvasaṃsiddhī (2406)

येनैव प्रतिग्रासं भिन्ना तृप्तिरत एव विनाशः ।
तृप्तेस्तृप्तस्य-चैवमेव सर्वसंसिद्धिः ॥१११॥२४०६॥

111. Yenaiva pratigrāsam bhinnā triptirata eva vināśah ।
Triptestriptasya cāivameva sarvasaṃsiddhīh (2406)]

Trans. 111. On the ground on which (feeling of) satisfaction is different from each mouthful, (the feeling of) satisfaction and the one who is satisfied attain destruction. The same will be the condition of everything. 2406.

टीका-१११ येनैव यत एव प्रतिग्रासमन्योऽन्यश्च भोक्ता भवति, अपरापरा च तृप्तिमात्रा भवति, अत एव तृप्तेः, तृप्तस्य च प्रतिक्षणं विनाशोऽभ्युपगम्यतेऽस्माभिः, विशेषणभेदे विशेष्यस्याप्यवश्यं भेदात्, अन्यथा विशेषणभेदस्याप्ययोगात् । प्रतिक्षणविनाशित्वे तृप्त्याद्ययोगोऽभिहित एवेति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-“एवं चिय सव्वसंसिद्धि ति” एवमेव प्रतिक्षणविनाशित्व एव सर्वस्यापि तृप्ति-श्रम-कृमादेर्लोकव्यवहारस्यसंसिद्धिः । इदमुक्तं भवति-तृप्त्यादि-वासनावासितः पूर्वपूर्वक्षणादुत्तरोत्तरक्षणः समुत्पद्यते तावत् यावत् पर्यन्त उत्कर्ष-वन्तस्तृप्त्यादयो भवन्ति । एतच्च क्षणिकत्व एवोपपद्यते, न नित्यत्वे । नित्यस्या-प्रच्युता-ऽनुत्पन्न-स्थिरैकस्वभावत्वेन सर्वदैव तृप्त्यादिसद्भावात्, सर्वदैव तदभा-वादवेति ॥२४०६॥

D. C.

Āśvaṃitra :—Just as an eater of each mouthful differs from another, so also, every portion of the feeling of satisfaction differs from another. This makes both the satisfaction and the satisfier, *ksanika* (destructible) at every moment. If the *viśeṣaṇa* (adjective) is different, the *viśeṣya* (the object which is qualified by it) should also be different; otherwise there would be no justification of *viśeṣaṇa*.

Here it is not proper to advance the argument that feelings of satisfaction etc. could not exist in case of momentariness

taking place at every moment. Because, it is only in that condition (i. e. only in case of there being destructibility at every moment) that the worldly feelings of satisfaction, exertion, gloominess etc., would be established. The later moments that are filled with feelings of satisfaction etc. are produced from the corresponding former moments, one after the other, until feelings of satisfaction etc. become extremely powerful. All this is possible only, if the object is perishable, instead of its being imperishable or *nitya*. That which is *nitya* is never produced or destroyed but is always retained steadily, in one condition. In such a case, feelings of satisfaction etc. would either be wholly accepted or wholly rejected. 111 (2406)

The answer is—

पुर्विल्लसव्वनासे वुड्ढी तित्ती य किंनिमित्ता तो ? ।

अह सा वि तेऽणुवत्तइ सव्वविणासो कहं जुत्तो ? ॥११२॥२४०७॥

112. Puvvillasavvanāse vuḍḍhī titti ya kimmimittā to ? ।

Aha sā vi te'ṇuvattai savvaviṇāso kahaṃ jutto ? (2407)

[पूर्वसर्वनाशे वृद्धिस्तृप्तिश्च किंनिमित्ता ततः ? ।

अथ सापि तेऽनुवर्तते सर्वविनाशः कथं युक्तः ? ॥११२॥२४०७॥

112. Pūrvasarvanāśe vṛddhistṛptiśca kim-nimittā tataḥ ? ।

Atha sāpi te'nuvartate sarvavināśaḥ katham yuktaḥ ?

112 (2407)].

Trans 112 If there is entire destruction of the previous moments, how are the (gradual) rise, as well as, the (feeling of) satisfaction accounted for? And, if they, too, follow (the later moments) how will (the theory of) entire destruction be justified? 2407.

टीका—११२ “तो त्ति” यद्येवम्, ततः पूर्वक्षणस्य सर्वथा विनाश उत्तरोत्तरक्षणेषु तृप्त्यादीनां या क्रमेण वृद्धिस्तृप्तिर्वती पर्यन्ते तृप्तिः श्रमादिसंभूतिश्च सा किंनिमित्ता किंकारणा ? इति वक्तव्यम् ? । पूर्वपूर्वक्षणेनोत्तरोत्तरक्षणस्य या

तृप्त्यादिवासना जन्यते तन्निमित्तेति चेत् । न, तस्यास्तदनर्थान्तरत्वे पूर्वपूर्वक्षण-
नाशे नाशात् । अथोत्तरोत्तरक्षणेऽनुवर्तत एवेति ते तत्राभिप्रायः, तर्हि पूर्वपूर्व-
क्षणस्य सर्वविनाशः कथं युक्तो वक्तुम्, तदनर्थान्तरभूततृप्त्यादिवासनाया
समनुवर्तनात् ? इति ॥२४०७॥

D. C.

Acārya:—If it is so, how would the gradual development of the feelings of satisfaction etc. that are found during the respective later moments, and the production of the feelings of satisfaction etc. be accounted for?

Aśvamitra:—Feelings of satisfaction etc. are produced by the instincts of satiety etc. produced in the later moments by means of former ones.

Acārya:—That is not so. Since those instincts are similar to the corresponding former moments, they would perish along with those moments.

Aśvamitra:—Feelings of satisfaction etc., are produced in later moments, in as much as they are continued in the later moments after their production during the respective former moments.

Acārya:—In believing so, as you assume the continuation of the feelings of satisfaction etc., that are similar to the former moments, you will not be able to justify the theory of entire destruction of an object along with the former moments during which it is produced. 112 (2407)

Also,

दिक्खा व सव्वनासे किमत्थमहवा मई विमोक्खत्थं ।
सो जइ नासो सव्वस्स तो तओ किं व दिक्खाए ? ॥११३॥२४०८॥

113. Dikkhā va savvanāse kimatthamahavā maī vimokkhattham ।
So jai nāso savvassa to taō kim va dikkhāe ? (2408)

[दीक्षा वा सर्वनाशे किमर्थमथवा मतिर्विमोक्षार्थम् ।

स यदि नाशः सर्वस्य ततः सकः किं वा दीक्षया ? ॥११३॥२४०८॥

113. Dikṣā vā sarvanāśe kimarthamathavā matirvimokṣārtham ।

Sa yadi nāśaḥ sarvasya tataḥ sakaḥ kim vā dikṣayā ?

. 113 (2408)]

Trans. 113. Or, in (case of) entire destruction, what is the utility of dikṣā ? Or, (it may be) your belief that it is for the sake of Final Emancipation. If that (mokṣa) itself is (susceptible to) destruction, then, it would be (attainable) to all. And hence, what (would be) the purpose of dikṣā ? 2408

टीका-११३ दीक्षा वा क्षणानां सर्वनाशे किमर्थमिति वाच्यम् ? निरर्थक्यमिति भावः । अथ मोक्षार्थं दीक्षेति परस्य मतिः, तर्ह्यत्रापि वक्तव्यम्-स मोक्षो नाशरूपो वाऽभ्युपगम्यते, अनाशरूपो वा ? । तत्र “सो जइ नासो च्छि” स मोक्षो यदि नाशरूप इति पक्षः, “सव्वस्स तो त उ च्छि” ततस्तर्हि तकोऽसौ मोक्षः सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनः स्वरसतः प्रयत्नमन्तरेणापि त्वदभिप्रायेण सिद्ध एव, किं दीक्षाप्रयत्नेन इति ॥२४०८॥

D. C. According to your theory of entire destruction, dikṣā has no utility. If you argue that dikṣā is useful for the attainment of mokṣa, then, is that mokṣa perishable or imperishable ? If it is perishable, it would become accessible to all living beings without any effort on their part, and then, it would lose its importance. 113 (2408).

And,

अह निच्चो, न क्खणियं तो सव्वं अह मई ससंतानो ।

अहउ च्छि तओ दिक्खा निस्संतानस्स मुक्खो च्छि ॥११४॥२४०९॥

114. Aha nicco, na kkhāṇiyam to savvam aha maī sa-sāntāno ।

Ahau tti taō dikkhā nissāntāṇassa mukkho tti. (2409)

[अथ नित्यो, न क्षणिकं ततः सर्वमथ मतिः स्वसंतानः ।

अहत इति ततो दीक्षा निःसंतानस्य मोक्ष इति ॥११४॥२४०९॥

114. Atha nityo, na kṣaṇikam tataḥ sarvamatha matih svasantānaḥ ।

Ahata iti tato dikṣā niḥsantānasya mokṣa iti 114 (2409)]

Trans. 114. If it is imperishable, you cannot hold that everything is transitory. Here, it might be said that since one's own continuous range (santati) does not break off, dikṣā becomes necessary (for the purpose of breaking it off.) (For) Final Emancipation (mokṣa) is attainable (only) to a niḥsantāna being (i e. one who does not possess the continuous range of birth, death etc. any more.) 2409

टीका-११४ अथ नित्यो मोक्षः “तो चि” ततस्तर्हि “सर्ववस्तु क्षणिकम्” इत्येतद् न भवति, मोक्षेणैव व्यभिचारात् । अथ स्व आत्मीयो विज्ञान-वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कार-रूपात्मकस्कन्धस्य संतानो नाद्यापि हतः, निःसंतानस्यैव च मोक्षः, अतो निःसंतानार्थं दीक्षा विधीयत इति ॥२४०९॥

D. C.

Acārya :—If mokṣa is *nitya*, you cannot assert that everything is *kṣaṇika*.

Aśvamitra :—Since mokṣa is attainable only to one who is *niḥsantāna*, dikṣā is useful for one to become *niḥsantāna* (One is said to be *niḥsantāna* when the continuous range of the moments of cognition, sentiments, consciousness, and perfection etc. with regard to an object, is cut off)

The Acārya answers this argument as follows :—

छिण्णेणाछिण्णेण व किं संताणेण सव्वनट्ठस्स ।

किंचाभावीभूयस्स स-पर-संतानचिंताए ? ॥११५॥२४१०॥

115. Chiṇṇeṇāchiṇṇeṇa va kim santāṇeṇa savvanatṭhassa ।

Kiñcābhāvībhūyassa sa-para-santāṇacintāe ? (2410)

[छिन्नेनाच्छिन्नेन वा किं संतानेन सर्वनष्टस्य ।

किञ्चाऽभावीभूतस्य स्व-पर-संतानचिन्तया ? ॥११५॥२४१०॥

115. Cehinnenacchinnena vā kim santānena sarvanaṣṭasya ।
Kincā'bhāvibhatasya sva-para-santānacintayā ? 115 (2410)]

Trans. 115. What is the use of *santāna* being broken or unbroken to one who has perished entirely ? And, what is the good of worrying as to whether it is one's own *santāna* or some one else's, when one is entirely reduced to nothing ? 2410.

टीका-११५ सर्वनष्टस्य सर्वप्रकारैर्विनाशमापन्नस्य च्छिन्नेन, अच्छिन्नेन वा, संतानेन किं प्रयोजनम्, येन संतानहननार्थं दीक्षां गृहणीयात् ? । किञ्च, सर्वथाऽभावीभूतस्य क्षणभङ्गुरतया सर्वथा विनष्टस्य किमनया चिन्तया-अयं स्वसंतानः, अयं तु परसंतानः, अयं तु न हतः, येनोच्यते-“ससंतानो अह उ त्ति तओ दिक्खा” इति ? ॥२४१०॥

D. C.

Ācārya:--It is no use discussing as to whether *santāna* is broken or unbroken, when one has entirely perished. And hence, what is the good of *dīkṣā* also ? There is no sense in worrying that, “This is my *santāna*” “That is another's *santāna*” “This is broken” “That is not broken” etc. when there is entire negation of everything. So, the expression that “*Dīkṣā* is useful to one who is *niḥsantāna*,” also proves futile. 115 (2410)

सव्वं पयं व खणियं पज्जंते नासदरिसणाउ त्ति ।

नणु इत्तो च्चिय न खणियमंते नासोवलद्धीओ ॥११६॥२४११॥

116. Savvam payam va khaṇiyam pajjante nāsadarisaṇāu tti ।
Naṇu itto cciya na khaṇiyamante nāsovaladdhīō. (2411)

[सर्वं पय इव क्षणिकं पर्यन्ते नाशदर्शनादिति ।

नन्वित एव न क्षणिकमन्ते नाशोपलब्धेः ॥११६॥२४११॥

116. Sarvam paya iva kṣaṇikam paryante nāśadarśanāditi ।
Nanvita eva na kṣaṇikamante nāśopalabdheḥ 116 (2411)]

Trans. 116. Everything is momentary like milk on account of the apprehension of destruction at the end. On the same

ground, it is not momentary, because of the apprehension of destruction at the end." 2411.

टीका-११६ सर्वं वस्तु क्षणिकम्, पर्यन्ते नाशदर्शनात्, पयोवदिति । आह -ननु यदि वस्तूनां पर्यन्ते नाशो दृश्यते, तर्हि प्रतिक्षणविनाशित्वे किमायातम्, येन सर्वं क्षणिकमुच्यते ? । सत्यम्, किन्त्वयमिह तदभिप्रायः-पर्यन्तेऽपि घटादीनां विनाशस्तावद् निर्हेतुक एव भवति, मुद्रादेर्विनाशहेतोरयोगात्, तथाहि-मुद्रादिना किं घट एव क्रियते, कपालानि वा, तुच्छरूपोऽभावो वा ? इत्यादियुक्तितो विनाशस्य निर्हेतुकत्वं प्रागत्रैव दर्शितम् । ततो निर्हेतुकोऽसौ भवन्नादित एव भवतु, अन्यथा पर्यन्तेऽपि तदभवनप्रसङ्गादिति पर्यन्ते नाशदर्शनाद् हेतोः क्षणिकत्वसिद्धिः ।

अत्र सूरिः प्राह-नन्वेतस्मादेव पर्यन्ते नाशदर्शनलक्षणाद्वेतोरस्माभिरेतच्छक्यते वक्तुम् । किम् ? इत्याह-न क्षणिकं न प्रतिक्षणं वस्तु विनश्यतीत्यर्थः, पर्यन्त एव तन्नाशोऽलब्धेः, घटादिवत् । न च युक्तिवाधितत्वाद् भ्रान्तेयमुपलब्धिरिति शक्यते वक्तुम्, सर्वेषां सर्वत्रेत्थमेव प्रवर्तनात्, युक्तीनामेवानया बाधनात्, शून्यवादियुक्तिवदिति ॥२४११॥

D. C.

Āśvāmītra :—Everything is transitory, like milk, because of the apprehension of destruction at the end.

Ācārya :—If the destruction of an object is apprehended *at the end*, how could that, and hence everything, be said to be momentary ?

Āśvāmītra :—'The main purport of my argument is this. Destruction of objects like ghaṭa etc. apprehended at the end, is causeless in absence of destructive instruments like hammer etc. If the instruments like hammer etc. work as the causes, causelessness of destruction could easily be established by arguments like this :— When an object is destroyed by means of hammer etc. What is produced ? Ghaṭa, its fragments or the non-existence (itself) ? This being causeless, destruction takes place in the beginning and is apprehended at the end. Thus, momentariness

of an object is established, because of the apprehension of destruction at the end.

Ācārya :—We establish indestructibility of an object on the same ground on which you try to prove its transitariness. Since destruction of an object is apprehended at the end, it does not perish entirely at every moment like ghaṭa etc. It is, also, not possible for you to say that such an apprehension is nothing but an illusion, because it is bound by logical limits. Because, the condition of all objects is the same everywhere. 116 (2411)

And,

इहराइउ चिय तओ दीसेज्जंते व्व कीस व समानो ।

सव्वविणासे नासो दीसइ अंते न सोऽन्नत्थ ? ॥११७॥२४१२॥

117. Iharāiu cciya taō dīsejjante vva kīsa va samāṇo ।

Savvaviṇāse nāso dīsaī ante na so'nnattha ? (2412)

[इतरथादित एव सको दृश्येतान्ते इव कस्माद् वा समानः ।

सर्वविनाशे नाशो दृश्यतेऽन्ते न सोऽन्यत्र ? ॥११७॥२४१२॥

117. Itarathādita eva sako dṛīṣyetānte iva kasmād vā samānaḥ ।

Sarvavināśe nāśo, dṛīṣyate'nte na so'nyatra ? (2412)]

Trans. 117. Otherwise, it would be seen right from the beginning, just as^a (it would be seen) at the end. Or, why would destruction be not seen anywhere else, but at the end, when the entire destruction (of an object) applies equally everywhere ? 2412.

टीका—११७ इतरथा यदि प्रतिक्षणं नाशो भवेत् तदा यथा पर्यन्ते सर्वेणापि भवन्नसौ दृश्यते, तथा आदित एवादि-मध्येषु सर्वत्र तकोऽसौ नाशो दृश्येत । अथ पर्यन्तेऽसौ दृश्यते नादि-मध्येषु, किं कुर्मः ? । तर्हि प्रष्टव्योऽसि । किम् ? इत्याह—“कीस वेत्यादि” किमिति चासौ नाशो वस्त्वभावरूपतया सर्वत्र समानो निरवशेषस्वरूपोऽपि सन् सर्वविनाशे मुद्रादिना विहिते दृश्यत उपलक्ष्यतेऽन्ते पर्यन्ते, न पुनरन्यत्रादि-मध्येषु सर्वत्र भवताऽभ्युपगतोऽप्यसौ भवन्नपलक्ष्यत इत्यत्र कारणं वाच्यम् ?, न पुनः पादप्रसारिका श्रेयस्करीति भावः ॥२४१२॥

D. C.

Ācārya :—If the object is perishable at every moment, destruction ought to have been apprehended in the beginning, and in the middle, just as it is apprehended at the end.

Āsvamitra :—It is apprehended neither in the beginning, nor in the middle, but any how at the end.

Ācārya :—Though we believe that destruction (i. e. negation of an object) is equal in the beginning, as well as in the middle, how is it that it is apprehended only at the end, when beaten by hammer etc., and neither in the beginning nor at the middle ?
117 (2412)

Also,

अंते व सव्वनासो पडिवण्णो केण जदुवलद्धीओ ।
कप्पेसि क्खणविणासं नणु पज्जायंतरं तं पि ॥११८॥२४१३॥

118. Ante va savvanāso paḍivaṇṇo keṇa jaduvaladdhīo ।
Kappesi kkhaṇaviṇāsam naṇu pajjāyantaram tam pi (2413)

[अन्ते वा सर्वनाशः प्रतिपन्नः केन यदुपलब्धेः ।
कल्पयसि क्षणविनाशं ननु पर्यायान्तरं तदपि ॥११८॥२४१३॥

118. Ante vā sarvanāśah pratipannaḥ kena yadupalabdheḥ ।
Kalpayasi kṣaṇavināśam naṇu paryāyāntaram tadapi 118
(2413)]

Trans. 118. Or, who has established (the theory of) entire destruction that you believe in transitariness (of an object) by the apprehension (of destruction) at the end ? In fact, that is nothing but another form (of the object) 2413.

टीका-११८ यदि वा, भोः क्षणभङ्गवादिन् ! अन्ते पर्यन्तेऽपि मुद्गरादिसंनिधाने घटादिवस्तुनः सर्वनाशः सर्वथा विनाशः केन प्रतिवादिना जैनेनाभ्युपगतः ? यदुपलब्धेर्यद्दर्शनावष्टम्भेन त्वं क्षणभङ्गरूपं प्रतिक्षणविनाशं कल्पयसि घटादेः ? । यदि मुद्गरादिसंनिधाने सर्वविनाशस्तस्य जैनेनाभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि तदवस्थायां घटो न दृश्यते, कपालान्येव च दृश्यन्त इत्येतत् किमिष्यते ?

इत्याह—“नष्टित्यादि” नन्वहो ! मृद्रूपतयाऽवस्थितस्यैव घटद्रव्यस्य भूत-
भविष्यदनन्तपर्यायापेक्षया तदपि पर्यायान्तरं पर्यायविशेष एव कपालानि, न
पुनस्तदानीं घटस्य सर्वथा विनाशः, मृद्रूपतया अप्यभावप्रसङ्गात्, तथा च कपा-
लानाममृद्रूपतापत्तेरित्यसिद्धिः पर्यन्ते सर्वनाशस्येति ॥२४१३॥

D. C.

Acārya :—Who has admitted the theory of entire destruction of an object that you establish transitoriness (of an object) like ghaṭa by apprehending its destruction at the end when beaten by (an instrument like) hammer ?

Aśvamiṭra :—If you do not believe in entire destruction for an object like ghaṭa when beaten by an instrument like hammer, how is it that instead of ghaṭa, its fragments are seen ?

Acārya :—Fragments of ghaṭa are nothing but one of the various paryāyas (forms) of ghaṭa itself, existing primarily as earth. Ghaṭa, therefore, does not vanish entirely at that time. If it vanished entirely at the first moment, when struck by hammer, it ought to vanish as earth also. Fragments of the vessel will also cease to exist as a paryāya of earth as a result of that.

Thus, the theory that entire destruction is apprehended at the end, is proved to be logically false. 118 (2413)

Besides,

जेसिं व न पज्जंते विणासदरिसणमिहंभराईणं ।

तन्निच्चब्भुवगमओ सव्वक्खणविणासिमयहाणी ॥११९॥२४१४॥

119. Jesim va na pajjante viṇāsadarisaṇamihambharāīṇam ।

Tanniccabbhuvagamaō savvakkhanaṇaviṇāsimayahāṇī. (2414)

[येषां वा न पर्यन्ते विनाशदर्शनमिहाम्बरादीनाम् ।

तन्नित्याभ्युपगमतः सर्वक्षणविनाशिमतहानिः ॥११९॥२४१४॥

119: Yeṣāṃ vā na paryante vināśadarśanamihāmbarādīnām ।

Tannityābhyupagamataḥ sarvakṣaṇavināśimatahāṇiḥ 119

(2414)]

Trans. 119. Or, by apprehending sky etc., whose destruction is not apprehended at the end, as it is imperishable, (your) theory of entire destruction of everything would be refuted. 2414.

टीका-११९ घटादीनां तावत् पर्यन्ते सर्वनाशदर्शनात् प्रसङ्गेनादित एव प्रतिक्षणनश्वरतां साधयति भवान्, ततो येषामम्बरादीनां व्योम-काल-दिगादीनां पर्यन्ते विनाशदर्शनं कदाचिदपि नास्ति, तेष्वस्मात् प्रसङ्गसाधनात् प्रतिसमयनश्वरत्वं न सिध्यति । ततस्तेषां नित्यत्वमेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । तन्नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमे च “सर्वं क्षणिकम्” इति व्याप्तिपरं यद् मतं भवतस्तस्य हानिरघटमानतैव प्राप्नोतीति ॥२४१४॥

D. C. By the example of ghaṭa etc. you try to establish the theory that everything is *kṣaṇika*. But elements like sky, time, space etc., are never apprehended as perishing at the end. You cannot apply your theory of entire destruction to them. On the contrary, you shall have to accept them as *nitya* or imperishable, refuting your own theory of *sarva-kṣaṇikatā* (all-pervading transitoriness). 119 (2414)

Also,

पञ्जायनयमयमिणं जं सव्वं विगम-संभव-सहावं ।
दव्वट्ठियस्स निच्चं एगयरमयं च मिच्छत्तं ॥१२०॥२४१५॥

120. Pajjāyanayamayamiṇaṃ jaṃ savvaṃ vigama-sambhava saḥāvaṃ ।
Davvaṭṭhiyassa niccaṃ egayaramayaṃ ca micchattam (2415)

[पर्यायनयमतमिदं यत् सर्वं विगम-संभव-स्वभावम् ।
द्रव्यार्थिकस्य नित्यमेकतरमतं च मिथ्यात्वम् ॥१२०॥२४१५॥

120. Paryāyanayatamatamidaṃ yat sarvaṃ vigama-sambhava svabhāvaṃ ।
Dravyārthikasya nityamekataramatam ca Mithyātvaṃ
(2415)]

Trans. 120. That everything is susceptible to destruction and production, is the opinion of the (followers) of the Paryāya

naya (school)⁷. (But) according to a Dravyārthika⁸ it is imperishable. Either of the two view-points is wrong. 2415.

टीका-१२० पर्यायवादिन एव नयस्येदं मतं यत् त्वं ब्रूषेः-सर्वमेव त्रिभुवनान्तरगतं वस्तु विगम-संभव-स्वभावं प्रतिक्षणमुत्पद्यते विनश्यति चेत्यर्थः । द्रव्यमेवार्थो यस्य न पर्याया स द्रव्यार्थिकस्तस्य तु द्रव्यार्थिकनयस्य तदेव सर्वं वस्तु नित्यं मतम् । एवं च स्थिते यद् भवानेकतरस्यैव पर्यायनयस्य प्रतिक्षणविनश्वरत्वलक्षणं मतमभ्युपगच्छति तद् मिथ्यात्वमेवेति मुञ्चेदमिति भावः ॥२४१५॥

D. C. Your view-point is like that of a follower of the Paryāya-naya school, which takes every object in this Universe as susceptible to production and destruction at every moment by its very nature.

But according to the school of Dravyārthikas, dravya or the elementary substance, of which an object is made, (and not the paryāyas or forms which an object exhibits at different times), is given importance. So, according to them, everything is *nitya* or eternal.

7. According to the followers of the Paryāya naya school or the school of Rotation, various forms that an object holds at various times, are taken as the object itself, rendering the object thereby as susceptible to production and destruction.

8. Dravyārthika is one who takes *dravya* (matter) as the *artha* (object) itself, that is to say, *dravya* or the elementary substance, of which an object is actually composed (and not the paryāya or form), is the object itself according to this school rendering it imperishable.

In the Nyāya Philosophy, there are nine kinds of *dravya* viz Prithvī, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Kāla, Diś, Ātman, and Manaḥ. But according to the Jainas, there are only six types of *dravya* viz- Dharmāsti Kāya, 2. A-dharmāsti Kāya, 3. Ākāśāsti Kāya, 4. Pudgalāsti Kāya, 5. Jīvāsti Kāya, and 6. Kāla.

According to you, everything is kṣaṇika or destructible at every moment, as the paryāya vanishes soon after its production.

Now, both these view-points are extreme and exclusive so far as entire Truth is concerned. As you cling to one of them exclusively, your argument is not true wholly, but partially only. And hence, it cannot be accepted as a general principle. 120 (2415).

जमणंतपज्जयमयं वत्थुं भुवणं व चित्तपरिणामं ।

ठिइ-विभव-भंगरूपं निच्चानिच्चाइतोऽभिमयं ॥१२१॥२४१६॥

121. Jamaṇantapajjayamayam vatthum bhavaṇam va cittaparināmanam ।

Thii-vibhava-bhaṅgaravam niccāniccāito'bhimayam (2416)

[यदनन्तपर्यवमयं वस्तु भुवनमिव चित्रपरिणामम् ।

स्थिति-विभव-भङ्गरूपं नित्यानित्यादिततोऽभिमतम् ॥१२१॥२४१६॥

121. Yadanantaparyavamayam vastu bhuvanamiva citraparināmanam ।

Sthiti-vibhava-bhaṅgarapam nityānityāditato'bhimatam.

121 (2416)]

Trans. 121. Since (every) object is possessed of innumerable forms like the Universe, it should be taken as possessed of variegated forms, perishable and imperishable, susceptible to retention, production, and destruction. 2416.

टीका-१२१ यद् यस्माद् नैकान्ततः पर्यायमयं, नाप्येकान्तेन द्रव्यरूपम्, किन्त्वनन्तपर्यायं स्थित्युत्पाद-विनाशरूपत्वादभू-भवन-विमान-द्वीप-समुद्रादिरूपतया त्रिभुवनमिव समस्तमपि वस्तु नित्याऽनित्यादिरूपतया विचित्रपरिणाममनेकस्वरूपं भगवतामभिमतम् । अतोऽस्यैकान्तविनश्चरलक्षणैकरूपाभ्युपगमो मिथ्यात्वमेवेति ॥२४१६॥

D. C. Since an object is not exclusively *paryāya-maya* (or formed of external forms alone) nor is it exclusively *dravya-maya* (or formed of mere matter), but it possesses innumerable

forms that are *nitya*, as well as *a-nitya*, and that are susceptible to retention, production, and destruction like those such as earth, sea, and planets etc, of the Universe. Hence, your assumption of an object as being exclusively perishable is wrongly based. 121 (2416)

Moreover,

सुह-दुक्ख-बन्ध-मुक्खा उभयनयमयाणुवट्ठिणो जुत्ता ।
एगयरपरिच्चाए सव्वव्ववहारवोच्छित्ती ॥१२२॥२४१७॥

122. Suha-dukkha-bandha-mukkhā ubhayanayamayāṇuvattṭiṇo juttā ।
Egayarapariiccāe savvavvavahāravocchittī. (2417)

[सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षा उभयनयमतानुवर्तिनो युक्ताः ।
एकतरपरित्यागे सर्वव्यवहारव्युच्छित्तिः ॥१२२॥२४१७॥

122. Sukha-duḥkha-bandha-mokṣā ubhayanayamatānuvartino yuktāḥ ।
Ekataraparityāge sarva-vyāvahāravyuucchittī 122 (2417)]

Trans. 122. (Existence of) pleasure, pain, bondage, and Final Emancipation, is justifiable (only) to those who follow both the theories. By rejecting either of the two, there could be (absolute) destruction of all worldly affairs (vyavahāra) 2417.

टीका-१२२ भावितार्थैवेति ॥२४१७॥

Now, explaining the above proposition in details, the author states :—

न सुहाइ पज्जयमए नासाओ सव्वहा मयस्सेव ।
न य दव्वट्ठियपक्खे निच्चत्तणओ नभस्सेव ॥१२३॥२४१८॥

123. Na suhāi pajjayamae nāsāo savvahā mayasseva ।
Na ya davvatṭhiyapakkhe niccattṇaṇo nabhasseva (2418)

[न सुखादि पर्यवमते नाशात् सर्वथा मृतस्येव ।
न च द्रव्यार्थिकपक्षे नित्यत्वतो नभस इव ॥१२३॥२४१८॥

123. Na sukhādi paryavamate nāsāt sarvathā mritasyeva ।
Na ca dravyārthikapakṣe nityatvato nabhasa iva 123 (2418)]

Trans. 123. According to the theory of paryāyas, pleasure etc. do not (actually) exist on account of (their) entire destruction, like that of a dead being. And, that is not (acceptable) according to the theory of Dravyārthikas also, on account of their (their) being imperishable like sky. 2418.

टीका-१२३ एकस्मिन्नेव पर्यायनयमतेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे न सुखादि जगतो घटत इति प्रतिज्ञा, सुख-दुःख-बन्ध-मोक्षादयो न घटन्त इत्यर्थः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं सर्वथा नाशादिति हेतुः । मृतस्येवेति दृष्टान्तः । न च द्रव्यार्थिकनयपक्षे केवले समाश्रीयमाणे सुखादि घटते, एकान्तनित्यत्वेनाविचलितरूपत्वात् नभस इवेति । तस्माद् द्रव्य-पर्यायोभयपक्ष एव सर्वमिदमुपपद्यत इत्ययमेव ग्राह्यः, केवलैकनयपक्षस्तु दोषलक्षकक्षीकृतत्वात् त्याज्य एवेति ॥२४१८॥

D. C. The proposition is that, worldly pleasure, pain, bondage, Final Emancipation etc., could never exist if the theory of paryāya naya is exclusively accepted. For, according to that theory, everything perishes completely like a dead being, immediately after its production.

And pleasure etc., could not exist if the theory of Dravyārthikas is exclusively accepted. Because, according to that theory, everything would be imperishable like sky. All this is possible only if both the theories are accepted as supplementing each other. Resorting exclusively to either of the two, will result in a number of difficulties. 123 (2418)

Then, again, the Sthaviras tried to persuade him from another point of view :—

जइ जिणमयं पमाणं तो मा दव्वट्ठियं परिच्चयसु ।
सकस्स व होइ जओ तन्नासे सव्वनासो त्ति ॥१२४॥२४१९॥

124. Jai Jīṇamayam paṁāṇam to mā davvaṭṭhiyam pariccayasū ।
Sakkassa va hoī jaō tannāse savvanāso tti. (2419)

[यदि जिनमतं प्रमाणं ततो मा द्रव्यार्थिकं परित्याक्षीः ।
शाक्यस्येव भवति यतस्तन्नाशे सर्वनाश इति ॥१२४॥२४१९॥

124. Yadi Jinamatam pramāṇam tato mā dravyārthikam parityākṣīḥ ।

Śākyasyeva bhavati yatastannāśe sarvanāśa iti. (2419)]

Trans. 124. If the principle of the Tīrthaṅkaras is (taken as) authentic by you, then, do not reject the theory of Dravyārthikas. For, in case of your believing in its destruction, like a Bauddha, all-pervading* destruction will be attained 2419.

टीका-१२४ पूर्वदर्शितसूत्रालापकभावार्थमजानन्नपि विभ्रमितचित्ततया तत्प्रामाण्यं पूत्कुर्वाणः किल जिनवचनप्रामाण्यावलम्बिनमात्मानं मन्यते भवान् । तद् यदि हन्त ! सत्यमेव जिनमतं भवतः प्रमाणम्, ततः केवलपर्यायवादितया जिनमताभिमतमपि द्रव्यास्तिकनयं मा परित्याक्षीः । द्रव्यास्तित्वं मा प्रतिषेधयेत्यर्थः, यतो यस्मात् शाक्यस्य बौद्धस्येव तव तन्नाशे द्रव्यस्य सर्वथा विनाशे स्वीक्रियमाणे “सर्वनासो ति” सर्वस्यापि तृप्ति-श्रमादेर्बन्ध-मोक्षादेश्च व्यवहारस्य नाशो भवति विलोपः प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः ॥२४१९॥

D. C. In spite of your ignorance of the meaning of the statements of the aforesaid sūtra, if you really consider yourself as a follower of the Tīrthaṅkaras, and hence take the words of the Tīrthaṅkaras as authentic, then, by inclining yourself exclusively to the Paryāya-vāda, do not reject the theory of Dravyārthikas, which is approved by the Tīrthaṅkaras, and do not try to refute the existence of *dravya* in vain.

Because, like a Bauddha monk, if you take *dravya* as absolutely perishable, everything such as feelings of satisfaction, exertion etc., as well as, bondage, and Final Emancipation, will have no scope of existence.

What happened, when Aśvamiṭra was not convinced although he was persuaded with arguments--

इय पण्णविओ वि जओ न पवज्जइ कओ तओ भज्जो ।
विहरंतो रायगिहे नाउं तो खंडरक्खेहिं ॥१२५॥२४२०॥

गंहिओ सीसेहिं समं एण्हिमर त्ति जंपमाणेहि ।
संजयवेसच्छण्णा सज्झं सव्वे समाणेह ॥१२६॥२४२१॥

अम्हे सावय ! जयओ कत्थुप्पण्णा कहिं च पव्वइया ।
अमुगतथ बेन्ति सद्धा ते वोच्छण्णा तया चेव ॥१२७॥२४२२॥

तुब्भे तव्वेसधरा भणिण् भयओ सकारणं च त्ति ।
पडिक्कण्णा गुरुमूलं गंतूण तओ पडिक्कन्ता ॥१२८॥२४२३॥

125. Iya paṇṇaviö vi jaö na pavaṃjjai kaö taö bajjho ।
Viharanto Rāyagihe nāun to khaṇḍarakkhehim. (2420)
126. Gahiö sīsehim samam ec'himara tti jaṃpamaṇehim ।
Saṃjayavesacchaṇṇā sajjham sarve samāṇeha. (2421)
127. Amhe ! sāvaya ! jayaö katthuppaṇṇā kahim ca pavvaiyā ।
Amugattā benti saḍḍhā te vocchaṇṇā tayā ceva. (2422)
128. Tubbhe tavvesadharā bhaṇie bhayaö sakāraṇam ca tti ।
Paḍivaṇṇā guraṃmūlaṃ gaṇṭūṇa taö paḍikkantā (2423)

[इति प्रज्ञापितोऽपि यतो न प्रपद्यते स कृतस्ततो बाह्यः ।
विहरन् राजगृहे ज्ञात्वा ततःखण्डरक्षैः ॥१२५॥२४२०॥

गृहीतःशिष्यैःसममेतेऽभिमरा इति जलपद्भिः ।
संयतवेषच्छन्नाः, सद्यःसर्वान् समानयेह ॥१२६॥२४२१॥

वयं श्रावक ! यतयः कुत्रोत्पन्नाः कदा च प्रव्रजिताः ।
अमुत्रक ब्रुवन्ति श्राद्धास्ते व्युच्छिन्नास्तदैव ॥१२७॥२४२२॥

यूयं तद्वेषधरा भणिते भयतः सकारणं चेति ।
प्रतिपन्ना गुरुमूलं गत्वा ततः प्रतिक्रान्ताः ॥१२८॥२४२३॥

125. Iti prajñāpito'pi yato na prapadyate sa kritastato bāhyaḥ ।
Viharan Rājagrihe jñātvā tataḥ khaṇḍarakṣaiḥ. (2420)
126. Grihītaḥ śiṣyaiḥ samamete'bhimarā iti jalpadbhiḥ ।
Saṃyataveśacchannāḥ, sadyaḥ sarvān samānayeḥa (2421)
127. Vayam śrāvaka ! yatayaḥ kutrotpannāḥ kadā ca pravrajitāḥ ।
Amutraka bruvanti śrāddhāste vyuechinnāstadaiva. (2422)

128. Yūyam tadveśadharā bhaṇite bhayataḥ sakāraṇam ceti ।
Pratipannā gurumulam gatvā tataḥ pratikrāntāḥ. (2423)]

Trans. 125-126-127-128. Although persuaded in this way by the preceptor as well as by Sthaviras, when he was not convinced, Aśvamitra was expelled from the Saṅgha.^x Then having apprehended his arrival at the city of Rājagriha, the khaṇḍa-rakṣakas (watchmen) caught him along with his pupils, saying that "These are burglars, in disguise of ascetics." "They should be brought here immediately." "O śrāvaka ! we are ascetics" said Aśvamitra. 'Whom do you belong to?' and when were you initiated? We belong to such and such a place and we were initiated at such and such a time." was the reply. They, being dead, have perished there and then only. You seem to be imposters (and hence should be punished.)

When thus told, they resorted to their original (school of) preceptor and got themselves re-initiated. 2420-2423.

टीका:-१२५-१२६-१२७-१२८ उक्तार्था एव, नवरं "भणिष भयतो सकारणं च चि" तै खण्डरक्षश्रावकैरेवं पूर्वोक्ते भणिते सति भयतो भयात् सकारणं च सयुक्तिकं च समाकर्ण्यनुशास्तिरूपं तद्वचः प्रतिपन्नास्तेऽश्वमित्रप्रमुखा निह्वसाधवः ॥२४२३॥


End of the Discussion with the Fourth Nihlava.



^x Congregation.

Chapter VI

॥ पञ्चमनिहवचकव्यता ॥



Discussion with the Fifth Nihava.

अट्ठावीसा दो वाससया तइआ सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स ।
दो किरियाणं दिट्ठी उल्लुगतीरे समुप्पण्णा ॥१२९॥२४२४॥

129. Atṭhāvisā do vāsasayā taiā Siddhim gayasya Vīrassa ।
Do-kiriyāṇam diṭṭhī Ullugatīre samuppaṇṇā. (2424)

[अष्टाविंशत्या द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य ।
द्वैक्रियाणां दृष्टिरुल्लुकातीरे समुत्पन्ना ॥१२९॥२४२४॥

129. Aṣṭāvimśatyā dve varṣaśate tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya ।
Dvaikriyāṇām drṣṭirUllukātīre samutpannā. (2424)]

Trans. 129. Then, was originated the theory of Dvaikriyās¹, on the bank of the river Ullukā², two hundred and twenty-eight years after (the Tirthaṅkara) Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra had attained Nirvāṇa. 2424.

टीका-१२९ अष्टाविंशत्यधिके द्वे वर्षशते तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य श्रीमन्महा-
वीरस्यात्रान्तरे द्वैक्रियानिहवानां दृष्टिरुल्लुकातीरे समुत्पन्नेति ॥२४२४॥

नइखेडजणवउल्लुग महागिरि धणगुत्त अज्जगंगे य ।
किरिया दो रायगिहे महातवोतीर मणिनाए ॥१३०॥२४२५॥

1. Who hold that two processes of feeling, work simultaneously.

2. Or in the city of Ullukātīra according to another interpretation.

130. Nai kheda jaṇava Ulluga Mahāgiri Dhaṇagutta Ajjagaṅge ya
Kiriya do Rāyagihe Mahātavotira Maṇināe. (2425)

[नदीखेटजनपदोल्लुके महागिरिर्धनगुप्त आर्यगङ्गश्च ।

क्रिये दो राजगृहे महातपस्तीर मणिनागः ॥१३०॥२४२५॥

130. Nadikhetajanapadolluke MahāgiriDhanagupta Āryagaṅgaśca ।

Kriye do Rājagrihe Mahātapastira Maṇināgaḥ. (2425)]

Trans. 130. In the village named after (river) Ullukā, (there lived) Mahāgiri, Dhanagupta, and Ārya-gaṅga (who upheld the theory of) two processes (taking place at one time). Maṇi-nāga (brought him to the right path) in Rājagriha near the stream (of) Mahātapastira. 2425.

टीका-१३० उल्लुका नाम नदी तदुपलक्षितो जनपदोऽप्युल्लुका । उल्लुका-
नद्याश्चैकस्मिंस्तीरे धूलिप्राकारावृतनगरविशेषरूपं खेटस्थानमासीत्, द्वितीये
तल्लुकातीरं नाम नगरम् । अन्ये त्वाहुः एतदेवोल्लुकातीरं धूलिप्राकारवृतत्वात्
खेटमुच्यते । तत्र च महागिरिशिष्यो धनगुप्तो नाम । अस्यापि शिष्य आर्यगङ्गो
नामाचार्यः । अयं च नद्याः पूर्वतटे, तदाचार्यस्त्वपरतटे । ततोऽन्यदा सरत्समये
सूरिवन्दनार्थं गच्छन् गङ्गो नदीमुत्तरति । स च खल्वाटः । तत्स्तस्योपरिष्ठादुष्णेन
दह्यते खल्ली । अधस्तात्तु नद्याः शीतलजलेन शैत्यमुत्पद्यते । ततोऽत्रान्तरे कथ-
मपि मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयोदयादसौ चिन्तितवान्-अहो ! सिद्धान्ते युगपत्क्रियाद्वा-
नुभवः किल निषिद्धः, अहंत्वेकस्मिन्नेव समये शैत्यमौष्णं च वेदयामि, अतोऽनु-
भवविरुद्धत्वाद् नेदमागमोक्तं शोभनमाभाति । इति विचिन्त्य गुरुभ्यो निवेदया-
मास । ततस्तैर्वक्ष्यमाणयुक्तिभिः प्रज्ञापितोऽसौ । यदा च स्वाग्रहग्रस्तबुद्धित्वाद् न
किञ्चित् प्रतिपद्यते । तदोद्वाप्य बाह्य कृतो विहरन् राजगृहनगरमागतः तत्र च
महातपस्तीरप्रभवनाम्नि प्रश्रवणे मणिनागनाम्नो नागस्य चैत्यमस्ति । तत्समीपे
च स्थितो गङ्गः पर्षत्पुरस्सरं युगपत्क्रियाद्वयवेदनं प्ररूपयति स्म । तच्च श्रुत्वा
प्रकुपितो मणिनागस्तमवादीत्-अरे दुष्ट शिक्षक ! किमेवं प्रज्ञापयसि, यतोऽत्रैव
प्रदेशे समवसृतेन श्रीमद्वर्धमानस्वामिनैकस्मिन् समये एकस्या एव क्रियाया वेदनं

प्ररूपितम् । तच्चेह स्थितेन मयापि श्रुतम् । तत् किं ततोऽपि लष्टतरः प्ररूपको भवान्, येनैवं युगपत्क्रियाद्वयवेदनं प्ररूपयसि ? । तत्परित्यजैतां कूटप्ररूपणाम्, अन्यथा नाशयिष्यामि त्वाम् । इत्यादि—तदुदितभयवाक्यैर्युक्तिवचनैश्च प्रबुद्धोऽसौ मिथ्यादुष्कृतं दत्त्वा गुरुमूलं गत्वा प्रतिक्रान्त इति ॥२४२५॥

Digest of Commentary :—

D. C. 130. Ullukātira is interpreted in three ways :—

- (1) On one of the banks of the river Ullukā, there was a place surrounded by a fort of dust.
- (2) There was a city named Ullukātira.
- (3) Since Ullukātira was surrounded by heaps of dust, it was known as a Kheṭa³ also⁴.

There lived a sādhu named Dhanagiri in the above-mentioned city. He was the pupil of Ācārya Mahāgiri and he had a pupil named Gaṅgācārya.

Once upon a time, Ārya Gaṅgācārya was crossing the river Ullukā while going to pay his homage to his preceptor, who was staying on the opposite side of the river. Ārya Gaṅgācārya was bald-headed. It was autumn and the water of the river was cold. So, while crossing the river his bald head felt heat from sunshine, and his feet felt cold due to the river-water being cold.

At this time, under the influence of Mithyātva Mohanīya (wrong belief caused by delusion), Gaṅgācārya disbelieved the principle of Āgamas that two processes of sensation could never take place simultaneously and thought that he felt the sensations of heat and cold at the same time. He reported the view-point to his preceptor (and declared) that the principle of the Āgamas was false on the ground that it was contrary to the actual experience which he had undergone.

3. Kheṭa=Village.

4. Of the three interpretations mentioned here, the commentator seems to have chosen the first one.

The preceptor tried to convince him of the validity of the religious principle of the Āgamas, but he did not change his belief. Consequently, he was expelled from the Saṅgha.

Then, during the course of his wanderings from place to place, he went to the city of Rājagriha. There, in the midst of an assembly gathered near the temple of a serpent-god named Maṇināga situated on the bank of a spring named Mahātapastīra, he preached his theory of dvikriyā. Maṇināga was highly enraged at the arguments of Gaṅgācārya, and he said, "O wicked monk! Why do you try to preach such an ignoble principle here? Do you claim yourself to be even a greater preacher the Great Tīrthaṅkara Śrīman Vardhamāna Swāmi who laid down, in this city of Rājagriha, the principle that one and only one process of experience could take place at one time? What do you mean by preaching a false theory of two processes of experience working at one time? Give up holding such false notions or else you will ruin yourself."

Being afraid of Maṇināga, and becoming enlightened by sound reasoning, Ārya Gaṅgācārya gave up his false belief and at last resorted to the school of his old preceptor after having excused Maṇināga for his apparently harsh deed. 2425.

Now, the whole story is narrated in detail.

नइसुल्लुगमुत्तरतो सरए सीयजलमज्जगंगस्स ।

सूराभितत्तसिरसो सीउसिणवेयणोभयओ ॥१३१॥२४२६॥

लग्गोऽयमसग्गाहो जुगवं उभयकिरियोवओगो त्ति ।

जं दो वि समयमेव य सीउसिणवेयणाओ मे ॥१३२॥२४२७॥

131. Naimullugamuttarato sarae sīyajalamajjagaṅgassa ।
Sūrābhitattasiraso sī-usiṇaveyaṇobhayaō. (2426)

132. Laggo'yamasaggāho jugavam ubhayakiriyogavaōgo tti ।
Jam do vi samayameva ya sī-usiṇaveyaṇāō me. (2427)

[नदीमुल्लुकामुत्तरतः शरदि शीतजलमार्यगङ्गस्य ।
सूराभितप्तशिरसः शीतोष्णवेदनोभयतः ॥१३१॥२४२६॥

लग्नोऽयमसद्ग्रहो युगपदुभयक्रियोपयोग इति ।
यद् द्वे अपि समकमेव च शीतोष्णवेदने मे ॥१३२॥२४२७॥

131. Naḍimullukāmuttarataḥ śaraḍi śītajalamāryagaṅgasya ।
Sūrābhitaptaśīrasaḥ śītoṣṇavedanobhayataḥ. (2426)

132. Lagnō'yamasadgraho yugapadubhayakriyopayoga iti ।
Yad dve api samakamev ca śītoṣṇavedane me. (2427)]

Trans. 131-132. While crossing the cold waters of river Ullukā in Autumn, as he felt the sensations of cold as well as of heat, due to his head being heated by sunshine, Ārya Gaṅga drew a false conclusion that "Since I have felt both the sensations—that of cold as well as of heat—at one time, the two processes of experience work simultaneously." (2426-2427)

टीका—१३१-१३२ गतार्थे, नवरमार्यगङ्गस्य लग्नोऽयमसद्ग्रहो यदुत-
युगपत्क्रियाद्वयसंवेदनोपयोगोऽस्ति, यद् यस्माद् मे मम द्वे अपि शीतोष्णवेदने
समकालमेव स्तः । प्रयोगश्चात्र युगपदुभयक्रियासंवेदनमस्ति, अनुभवसिद्धत्वात्,
मम पादशिरोगतशीतोष्णक्रियासंवेदनवदिति ॥२४२६॥२४२७॥

D. C. In support of his theory, (which is really speaking nothing but misapprehension) Gaṅgācārya argues as follows :—
" Since my head felt hot due to sunshine, and my feet felt cold at the same time due to cold waters running beneath, I felt both the sensations simultaneously. It is clear, therefore, that the processes of undergoing both the feelings are working simultaneously. This is supported by my practical experience."

Then,

तरतमजोगेणायं गुरुणाऽभिहिओ तुमं न लक्खेसि ।
समयाइसुहुमयाओ मणोऽतिचलसुहुमयाओ य ॥१३३॥२४२८॥

133. Taratamajogenāyam guruṇā'bhihiō tumam na lakkhesi ।
Samayāisuhumayāō maṇo'ticalasuhumayāō ya. (2428)

[तरतमयोगेनायं गुरुणाऽभिहितस्त्वं न लक्षयसि ।

समयादिसूक्ष्मतातो मनोऽतिचलसूक्ष्मतातश्च ॥१३३॥२४२८॥

133. Taratamayogenāyam guruṇā'bhihitastvam na lakṣayasi ।
Samayādisūkṣmatāto mano'ticalasukṣmatātasca. (2428)]

Trans. 133. The Ācārya replied: "That takes place in (regular) turn. You are (not able) to mark (it) due to exquisite unstability and subtlety of mind, as well as, subtlety of time etc. 2428.

टीका-१३३ गुरुणाऽभिहितोऽसौ-हन्त ! योऽयं युगपत्क्रियाद्वयानुभवस्त्वया गीयते स तरतमयोगेन क्रमेणैव भवतः संपद्यते, न युगपत्, परं सदपि क्रमभवन-मस्य त्वं न लक्षयसि, समया-ऽऽवलिभादेः कालस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात्, तथा मनस-श्चातिचलत्वेनातिसूक्ष्मत्वेन चाशुसंचारित्वादिति । तस्मात् "अनुभवसिद्धत्वात्" इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति ॥२४२८॥

D. C.

Ācārya Dhanagupta.—Feeling of two sensations does not actually take place simultaneously as you represent, but both the sensations are felt one after the other. You are not able to mark such a process, because the period of interval between the two different experiences is extremely short, and the mind, which feels the two sensations one after the other, is fickle and subtle by its very nature. Your apprehension of the practical experience undergone by your own self, is therefore wrong and hence your theory is baseless. 133 (2428)

सुहुमासुचरं चित्तं इंदियदेसेण जेण जं कालं ।

संबज्झइ तं तम्मूत्तनाणहेउ त्ति नो तेण ॥१३४॥२४२९॥

उवलभए किरियाओ जुगवं दो दूरभिण्णदेसाओ ।

पाय-सिरोगय-सीउण्हवेयणाणुभवरूवाओ ॥१३५॥२४३०॥

134. Suhumasucaram cittam indiyadesēṇa jeṇa jam kālam ।
Sambajjhai tam tammattanāṇaheu tti no teṇa. (2429)

135. Uvalabhae kiriyāō jugavam do dārabhinṇadesāō ।
Pāya-sīrogaya-siṇḥaveyaṇṇubhavarūvāō. (2430)

[सूक्ष्माशुचरं चित्तमिन्द्रियदेशेन येन यस्मिन् काले ।
संबध्यते तत् तन्मात्रज्ञानहेतुरिति नो तेन ॥१३४॥२४२९॥

उपलभते क्रिये युगपद् द्वे दूर-भिन्नदेशात् ।
पाद-शिरोगतशीतोष्णवेदनानुभवरूपे ॥१३५॥२४३०॥

134. Saksmaśucaram cittamindriyadeśēṇa yena yasmin kāle ।
Sambadhyate tat tanmātrajñānāheturiti no tena. (2429)

135. Upalabhate kriye yugapad dve dūra-bhinnaśeśat ।
Pāda-sīrogataśīto-ṣṇavedanānubhavarūpe. (2430)

Trans. 134-135. Mind, subtle and quick (as it is), becomes the cause of perception, only with regard to those sense-organs with which it is connected and that (period of) time (only) during which (the perception takes place). So, two processes in the form of feeling heat and cold at head and feet (respectively), could not take place simultaneously, owing to the two places being extremely remote 2429-2430.

टीका-१३४-१३५ सूक्ष्माशुचरं च चित्तं मनः, तत्र सूक्ष्मं सूक्ष्मातीन्द्रियपुद्गलस्कन्धनिर्वृत्तत्वात्, आशुचरं च शीघ्रसंचरणशीलत्वात् । ततश्च तदेवंभूतं चित्तं येन येन कायाद्याकारस्पर्शनादिद्रव्येन्द्रियसंबन्धिना देशेन सह यस्मिन् काले संबध्यते संयुज्यते तस्मिन् काले तन्मात्रज्ञानहेतुर्भवति-येन स्पर्शनादिद्रव्येन्द्रियदेशेन संबध्यते तज्जन्यस्यैव शीतादिविषयस्योष्णादिविषयस्य वैकतरविज्ञानस्य हेतुर्जायते, न तु येनेन्द्रियदेशेन सह सत्काले स्वयं तद् न संबद्धं तज्जन्यज्ञानस्यापि हेतुरित्यर्थः । इति शब्दो वाक्यसमाप्त्यर्थः । येनैवम्, तेन कारणेन नो नैव दूरभिन्नदेशे द्वे क्रिये कोऽपि युगपदुपलभते संवेदयत इति संबन्धः । कथंभूते द्वे क्रिये ? इत्याह-पाद-शिरोगतशीतोष्णवेदनयोरनुभवनमनुभवस्तद्रूपे तदात्मिके । अत्र प्रयोगः-इह पाद-शिरोगतशीतोष्णवेदने युगपद् न कोऽपिसंवे-

दयते, भिन्नदेशत्वात्, विन्ध्य-हिमवच्छिन्नस्पर्शनक्रियाद्वयवदिति “अनुभव
सिद्धत्वात्” इत्यसिद्धोऽयं हेतुरिति ॥२४२९॥२४३०॥

D. C. Mind is subtle, because it is beyond the perception of senses, and quick, because it moves swiftly. Such a mind becomes the cause of feeling heat, cold etc, as a result of its contact with sense-organs, like that of touch etc; for a particular period of time during which the contact is maintained. When it is not connected with the proper sense-organ, it does not work as the cause of perception by means of that sense-organ. It is, therefore, utterly impossible for anyone to undergo sensations of heat and cold simultaneously, at two extremely remote sense-organs like head and feet. Your argument of personal experience is baseless from this view point also. 134-135 (2429-2430)

Moreover,

उवओगमओ जीवो उवउज्जइ जेण जम्मि जं कालं ।
सो तम्मओवओगो होइ जाहिंदोवओगम्मि ॥१३६॥२४३१॥

136. Uvaögamaö jīvo uvaujjai jeṇa jammi jam kālam ।
So tammaövaögo hōi jahindovaögammi. (2431)

[उपयोगमयो जीवं उपयुज्यते येन यस्मिन् यस्मिन् काले ।
स तन्मयोपयोगो भवति यथेन्द्रोपयोगेन ॥१३६॥२४३१॥

136. Upayogamayo jīva upayujyate yena yasmin yasmin kāle ।
Sa tanmayopayogo bhavati yathendropayogena (2431)]

Trans. 136. Whenever the soul which is *upayoga-maya*⁵, is engaged (with a particular sense-organ), it becomes applicable to that (sense-organ) only, as in the case of (one under the) employment of Indra. 2431.

टीका-१३६ उपयोगेनैव केवलेन निर्वृत्त उपयोगमयो जीवः । ततः स येन
केनापि स्पर्शनादीन्द्रियदेशेन करणभूतेन यस्मिन् शीतोष्णाद्यन्यतरविषये “जं

5. i. e. Complete by application to or engagement with a sense-organ.

कालं ति” यस्मिन् काल उपयुज्यते सावधानो भवति तन्मयोपयोगी भवति-
यत्र शीताद्यन्तरार्थउपयुक्तस्तन्मयोपयोग एव भवति नान्यथोपयुक्त इत्यर्थः ।
उदाहरणमाह-“जहिं दोवओगम्मि ति” यथेन्द्रोपयोगे वर्तमानो माणवकस्त-
न्मयोपयोग एव भवति, न पुनरर्थान्तरमयोपयोगः । इदमत्र तात्पर्यम्-एकस्मिन्
काल एकत्रैवार्थउपयुक्तो जीवः संभवति, न त्वर्थान्तरे, पूर्वोक्तसांकर्यादिदोष-
प्रसङ्गात् । ततश्च युगपत्क्रियाद्वयोपयोगानुभवोऽसिद्ध एवेति ॥२४३१॥

D. C. Jīva is *upayoga-maya* by nature. So, when it applies itself to a particular sense-organ, say, that of touch, and feels the sensation of, say, heat and cold, it is completely devoted to that sense-organ, and to those subjects of sensations at that time and is not utilized elsewhere.

As for example, when a person, say, Māṇavaka is employed in the service of Indra, he is entirely at the disposal of Indra, and does not work for anyone else. Similarly, when the Soul is employed for the perception of a particular object, it remains entirely at the disposal of that *indriya* and the object concerned, so long as it is connected with them.

In short, Jīva is applicable to one sense-organ at one time, and never to two at the same time. For, otherwise, faults like that of Sāṅkhyā etc. would arise.

Thus, the theory of two *kriyās* taking place at one time, is invalid.

सो तदुवओगमेत्तोवउत्तसत्ति त्ति तस्समं चेव ।

अत्थन्तरोवओगं जाउ कहं केण वंसेण ? ॥१३७॥२४३२॥

137. So taduvaōgamettovauttasatti tti tassamam ceva ।

Atthantarovaōgam jāu kaham keṇa vamsena ? (2432)

[स तदुपयोगमात्रोपयुक्तशक्तिरिति तत्सममेव ।

अर्थान्तरोपयोगं यातु कथं केन वंशेन ? ॥१३७॥२४३२॥

137. Sa tadupayogamātropayuktaśaktiriti tatsamameva ।

Arthāntaropayogam yātu katham kena vāṁsena ? (2432)]

Trans. 137. How could that (Soul) with all its energy utilized at the disposal of one object, be utilized for another (either) wholly or (even) partially exactly along with it ? 2432.

टीका-१३७ स जीवः “तदुपयोगमेतौवउवसत्ति ति” तस्य विवक्षितै-
कार्थस्योपयोगस्तदुपयोगः स एव तन्मात्रं तत्रोपयुक्ता व्यापृता निष्ठां गता शक्ति-
र्यस्य स तदुपयोगमात्रोपयुक्तशक्तिरिति कृत्वा कथं तत्समकालमेवार्थान्तरं
उपयोगं यातु ?-न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः, सांकर्यादिप्रसङ्गात् । किञ्च, सर्वैरपि स्वप्रदे-
शैकस्मिन्नर्थोपयुक्तो जीवः केनोद्वरितेनांशेनार्थान्तरोपयोगं व्रजतु ? । नास्त्येव
हि स कश्चिदुद्वरितांशो येन तत्समकमेवार्थान्तरोपयोगमसौ गच्छेदिति
भावः ॥२४३२॥

D. C.

Acārya :—When the Soul employs all its energy in the perception of one (object), it is not possible for it to work for the perception of another at the same time. And, since all the parts of Jivā are applied together at one place, it is not even possible to apply itself even partially at another place simultaneously.

Gaṇa :—If two processes of perception do not work simultaneously, as you say, what makes me feel like that ? 137 (2432)

The answer is—

समयाइसुहुमयाओ मन्नसि जुगवं च भिन्नकालं पि ।
उत्पलदलसयवेहं व जह व तदलायचक्रं ति ॥१३८॥२४३३॥

138. Samayāisuhumayāo mannasi jugavam ca bhinnakālam pi ।
Uppaladalaśayaveham va jaha va tadalāyacakkam ti (2433)

[समयादिसूक्ष्मततो मन्यसे युगपच्च भिन्नकालमपि ।
उत्पलदलशतवेधमिव यथा वा तदलायचक्रमिति ॥१३८॥२४३३॥

138. Samayādisūkṣmatāto manyase yugapacca bhinnakālamapi ।
Utpaladalaśatavedhamiva yathā vā tadalātacakramiti (2433)]

Trans. 138. On account of acute subtlety of time etc. you take an action taking place at different times as simultaneous as in the case of boring a hole into hundred petals of lotus or (rotating of) a circular series of (burning) coal. 2433.

टीका-१३८ समयावलिकादिकालकृतविभागस्य सूक्ष्मत्वाद् भिन्नकालमपि कालविभागेन प्रवृत्तमपि क्रियाद्वयसंवेदनमुत्पलपत्रशतवेधवद् युगपत् प्रवृत्तमिव मन्यसे त्वम् । न हि उत्पलपत्रशतमौत्तराधयेण व्यवस्थापितं सुतीक्ष्णयापि सूच्या छेकेन समर्थेनापि च वेधकर्ता समकालमेकं विध्यते, किन्तु कालभेदेन, उपर्युपरितनेऽविद्वेऽधोऽधोवर्तिनः पत्रस्य वेधायोगात्, अथ च वेधकर्ता युगपद् विहितमेव वेधं मन्यते, तद्वेधनकालभेदस्य सूक्ष्मत्वेन दुर्लक्षत्वात् । यथा वा तत् प्रसिद्धमलातचक्रं कालभेदेन दिक्षु भ्रमदपि भ्रमणकालभेदस्य सूक्ष्मत्वेन दुरवगमत्वाद् निरन्तरभ्रमणमेव लक्ष्यते । एवमिहापि शीतोष्णक्रियानुभवकालभेदस्य सूक्ष्मत्वेन दुरवसेयत्वाद् युगपदिव तदनुभवं मन्यते भवानिति ॥२४३३॥

D. C.

Ācārya :—When a strong person bores a hole into a hundred petals of lotus with a small needle after arranging the one over the other, he thinks that all the petals are pierced through simultaneously. But really speaking, that is not so. A petal beneath is not pierced unless and until the one above it is actually pierced through. Thus, really, every petal is pierced through one after the other, and hence, at different times. This difference in time is so minute that the person boring the hole, is not able to mark it.

So, also, when a circular series of burning coal is rotated, it does rotate in different directions at different times. But the time-gap between every two directions is so small due to its quick speed, that one apprehends it only as moving constantly in one direction. The same is the case here also.

Sensations of heat and cold are definitely felt at different times, but they are not so apprehended because of subtlety of time etc.

Thus, you are wrong in believing that the two processes of perception take place simultaneously. 135 (2433)

And,

चित्तं पि नेंदियाइं समेइ सममह य खिप्पचारि त्ति ।
 समयं व सुक्कसक्कुलिदसणे सव्वोवलद्धि त्ति ॥१३९॥२४३४॥
 सव्वेंदिओवलंभे जइ संचारो मणस्स दुल्लक्खो ।
 एगेंदिओवओगंतरम्मि किह होउ सुलक्खो ? ॥१४०॥२४३५॥

139. Cittam pi nendiyāim samei samamaha ya khippacāri tti |
 Samayam va sukkasakkulidasane savvovaladhi tti. (2434)

140. Savvendiövalambhe jai sañcāro maṇassa dullakkho |
 Egendiövaögantarammi kiha hōu sulakkho? (2435)

[चित्तमपि नेन्द्रियाणि समेति सममथ च क्षिप्रचारीति ।
 समकमिव शुष्कशङ्कुलीदशने सर्वोपलब्धिरिति ॥१३९॥२४३४॥
 सर्वेन्द्रियोपलम्भे यदि संचारो मनसो दुर्लक्षः ।
 एकेन्द्रियोपयोगान्तरे कथं भवतु सुलक्षः ॥१४०॥२४३५॥

139. Cittamapi nendriyāṇi sameti samamatha ca kṣipracārīti |
 Samakamiva śuṣkaśaṅkulīdaśane sarvopalabdhirīti (2434)

140. Sarvendriyopalammbhe yadi sañcāro manaso durlakṣaḥ |
 • Ekendriyopayogāntare katham bhavatu sulakṣaḥ. (2435)]

Trans. 139-140. Mind also does not combine itself with (all the) sense-organs at the same time; (but) since it is quick in movement, its connection with the sense-organs is apprehended as simultaneous, just as there is apprehension of (all) tastes at (the time of) eating dry sesamum cake. (And), if the movement of mind is difficult to be traced at the (time of) perception of all sense-organs, how could it be easily apprehended in (case of) engagement with one sense-organ ? (2434-2435)

टीका-१३९-१४० चित्तमपि च नैवेन्द्रियाणि सममेव समेति मनोऽपि नैवेन्द्रियैः सह युगपत् संबध्यत इत्यर्थः । उपलक्षणत्वाद् नापि शिरः-पादादिभिः

स्पर्शनेन्द्रियदेशैर्युगपत् संबध्यते, अथ च क्षिप्रचारि शीघ्रसंचरणशीलं तदिति कृत्वा समकमिव युगपदिव “सर्वत्र संबद्धं लक्ष्यते” इति शेषः । दृष्टान्तमाह— “समयं वेत्यादि” । “समयं वा” इत्येतदन्तरं योजितमप्यावृत्त्या पुनरपीह योज्यते । तत्र वाशब्दो यथार्थः । यथाशब्दश्च दृष्टान्तोपन्यासार्थः । यथा शुष्क शङ्कुलिकादशने सर्वेषामपि शङ्कुलिकागतरूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-शब्दानामुपलब्धिः सर्वोपलब्धिरसमकं प्रवृत्तापि समकं लक्ष्यते, तथाऽत्रापि मनः-शिरः-पादादिभिः स्पर्शनेन्द्रियदेशैरिन्द्रियान्तरैश्च क्रमेण संबध्यमानमपि युगपत् संबध्यमानं लक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः । इदमत्र हृदयम्-इह दीर्घां शुष्कां च शङ्कुलिकां कस्यचिद् भक्षयतस्तद्रूपं चक्षुषा वीक्षमाणस्य रूपज्ञानमुत्पद्यते, तद्रन्ध्रं च घ्राणेनाऽऽजिघ्रतो गन्धज्ञानम्, तद्रसं च रसनयाऽऽस्वादयतो रसज्ञानम्, तत्स्पर्शं च स्पर्शनेन वेदयतः स्पर्शज्ञानम्, चर्चणोत्थं तच्छब्दं च श्रृण्वतः शब्दज्ञानमुपजायते । एतानि च पञ्चापि ज्ञानानि क्रमेणैव जायन्ते, अन्यथा सांकर्यादिदोषप्रसङ्गात्, मत्यादिज्ञानोपयोगकाले चावध्याद्युपयोगस्यापि प्राप्तेः, एकं च घटादिकमर्थं विकल्पयतोऽनन्तानामपि घटाद्यर्थविकल्पानां प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च । न चैतदस्ति । ततः क्रमेण जायमानान्यप्येतानि ज्ञानानि प्रतिपत्ता “युगपदुत्पद्यन्ते” इति मन्यते, समयाऽऽवलिकादिकालविभागस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात् । एवमिहापि शिरः-पादादिभिः स्पर्शनेन्द्रियदेशैरिन्द्रियान्तरैश्च क्रमेण संबध्यमानमपि मनः प्रतिपत्ता युगपत् संबध्यमानमध्यवस्यति । न तु तत्त्वतोऽसौ मनसः स्वभावः, तथा चोक्तम्—“युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम्” इति । यदि चोक्तन्यायेन सर्वेन्द्रियद्वारेणोत्पद्यमान उपलम्भे क्रमेण संचरतो मनसः संचारो दुर्लक्षः, तर्हि कथमेकस्यैव स्पर्शनेन्द्रियमात्रस्य शीतवेदनोपयोगादुष्णवेदनोपयोगरूपउपयोगान्तरे जन्ये तत्संचारः सुलक्षः स्यात्, अलक्ष्यमाणे च तत्क्रमसंचारे शीतो-ष्णक्रियाद्वयोपयोगविषयौ युगपदध्यवसायौ भवतः ? इति ॥२४३४॥

व्याख्यातार्थैव ॥२४३५॥

D. C. Mind does not come in contact with all sense-organs at the same time. So, it is not possible for it to come in contact with the senses of touch at feet and head simultaneously. Since the movement of mind is extremely quick, mind appears as if it is connected with all the *indriyas* simultaneously. As for example, a person eating a sesamum cake, perceives form by means

of the sense of sight (eye), smell by the sense of smell (nose), taste by the sense of taste (tongue), touch by the sense of touch (skin), and sound by the sense of hearing (ear) while seeing, smelling, eating, touching, and, hearing the sound of chewing.

All the five kinds of perception are attained, when the mind comes in contact with the respective five *indriyas* one after the other and not simultaneously. It is only due to the fact that mind is extremely quick in movement that it appears as if it is connected with all the *indriyas* simultaneously, but really speaking, that is not true. For, in that case, faults like *sāṅkarya* would arise, while in course of perception of *mati jñāna* etc; *avadhi jñāna* would work with it simultaneously and while considering an object like *ghaṭa*, innumerable *ghaṭas* would come up alternately without fail. But this does not actually happen in real life.

Although the afore-mentioned perceptions are attained one after the other, the observer being unable to mark the subtle differences in time etc, apprehends all of them as produced simultaneously. Here also, mind is employed in the senses of touch at head and feet respectively at different times. Still, however, one who feels the sensations of heat and cold, thinks that, mind is employed at both the places simultaneously. Really speaking, "Non-production of many cognitions at one time is the (essential) quality of mind⁶." Still, however, since the movement of mind passing from one object to another is difficult to be traced, the movement of mind from the cognition of heat to that of cold, becomes more difficult to be traced. In this way, it is only due to your inability to apprehend the movement of mind, that you seem to feel two sensations together at one time that you labour under such misapprehensions. For, when it is not detected in case of perception of all the *indriyas*, it is much more difficult to detect in case of its applications to one *indriya*. 140 (2435)

6. For, it has already been said "Yugapajñānanutpattir-manas lingam."

Again the author states a number of difficulties in case of accepting the mind as applicable to more than one object at a time :—

अन्नविणिउत्तमण्णविणिओगं लहइ जइ मणो तेणं ।
हत्थिं पि द्वियं पुरओ किमण्णचित्तो न लक्खेइ ? ॥१४१॥२४२६॥

141. Annaviṇiuttamaṇṇaviṇiōgam lahai jai maṇo teṇam ।
Hatthim pi tṭhiyam puraō kimaṇṇacitto na lakheī ? (2436)

[अन्यविनियुक्तमन्यविनियोगं लभते यदि मनस्तेन ।
हस्तिनमपि स्थितं पुरतः किमन्यचित्तो न लक्षयति ? ॥१४१॥२४३६॥

141. Anyaviniyuktamanyaviniyogam labhate yaḥi manastena ।
Hastinamapi sthitam purataḥ kimanyacitto na lakṣayati ?
(2436)]

Trans. 141. If the mind engaged (already) in (a particular) object, could be engaged in some other object at the same time, why could a person with his mind concentrated elsewhere, not observe an elephant standing in front of him ? 2436

टीका—१४१ अन्यस्मिन् शीतवेदनादिकेऽर्थे विनियुक्तमुपयुक्तमन्यविनियुक्तं मनो यदि “अण्णं ति” अन्यउष्णवेदनादिकोऽर्थस्तद्विषयोपयोगोऽन्यस्तमन्यं विनियोगमुपयोगं लभते, “तेणं ति” तर्हि किमित्यन्यचित्तोऽन्यार्थोपयुक्तचित्तो देवदत्तादिर्हस्तिनमपि पुरतो व्यवस्थितं न लक्षयति ? । तस्मादेकस्मिन्नर्थोपयुक्तं मनो न कदाचिदन्यार्थोपयोगं लभत इति ॥२४३६॥

D. C. If the mind engaged in the process of feeling the sensation of cold is taken to have been engaged in the process of feeling the sensation of heat at the same time, there is no reason why a person with his mind concentrated in a particular object, be not able to observe even an elephant standing in his very front. The main reason for this, is that the mind of the person being totally concentrated in some other object, it will not be able to recognize even objects like an elephant etc; standing even in his very front. 141 (2436).

विणिओगन्तरलाभे व किं त्थ नियमेण तो समं चेव ।

पइवत्थुमसंखेज्जाऽणंता वा जं न विणिओगा ? ॥१४२॥२४३७॥

142. Viṇiōgantaraḷābhe va kim ttha niyameṇa to samam ceva ।
Paivattthumasaṅkhejjā'ṇantā vā jam na viṇiōgā ? (2437)

[विनियोगान्तरलाभे वा किमत्र नियमेन ततः सममेव ।

प्रतिवस्त्वसंख्येया अनन्ता वा यद् न विनियोगाः ? ॥१४२॥२४३७॥

142. Vinīyogāntaraḷābhe vā kimatra niyamena tataḥ samameva ।
Prativastvasaṅkheyā anantā vā yad na viniyogāḥ ? (2437)]

Trans. 142. Or, if the (simultaneous) application (of mind) in another object (is accepted), what is the use of the rule (of the application of two processes) ? (And) then, why should innumerable or endless applications taking place simultaneously in (case of) each object be not accepted ? 2437.

टीका—१४२ एकोपयोगकाले विनियोगान्तरस्योपयोगान्तरस्य लाभे वेध्य-
माणे “ तो त्ति ” ततः किमत्र क्रियाद्वयोपयोगलक्षणेन नियमेन, “ जं ति ” यत्
प्रतिवस्त्वसंख्येया अनन्ता वा सममेव युगपदेव विनियोगा नेष्यन्ते ? । इदमुक्तं
भवति—यदि शीतवेदनोपयोगकाले उष्णवेदनोपयोगोऽपीष्यते, तर्हि किमत्रानेन
क्रियाद्वयोपयोगनैयत्येन, यदसंख्येया अनन्ता वा प्रतिवस्तु युगपदुपयोगा न
भवन्ति, यथैककाले द्वितीयोपयोगस्तथा बहवोऽपि भवन्ति भावः । इह च
“ दब्बाओ असंखेजे संखेजे यावि पज्जवे लहइ ” इति वचनादेकस्मिन्नर्थे सम-
कालमवधिज्ञानिनः किलोत्कृष्टतोऽसंख्येया उपयोगाः प्राप्नुवन्ति, शेषज्ञानिनां-
त्वनन्ता इत्यभिप्रायवता प्रोक्तम्—“ पइवत्थुमसंखेज्ज ”—इत्यादि ॥२४३७॥

D. C. If it is accepted that the mind is engaged in another object at the same time when it is engaged in one, the rule regarding the employment of two different processes becomes useless. For, in that case, why not to accept innumerable applications of mind in case of (perception of) each object ?

It has already been said before⁷ that every object attains

7. Vide v. 760

countable or even uncountable *paryāyas*. One possessing *avadhi jñāna*⁸ is able to observe *a-saṃkhyeya* or innumerable forms at a time, while those possessing the remaining two kinds of knowledge⁹, are able to apprehend *ananta* or endless *paryāyas* at one time. 142 (2437)

Now the author states the opponent's argument and refutes it :—

बहु-बहुविहाङ्ग्रहणे ननुवओगबहुया सुएऽभिहिआ ।
तमणेगगगहणं चिय उवओगाणेगया नत्थि ॥१४३॥२४३८॥

143. Bahu-bahuvihāṅgrahaṇe naṇuvaōgabahuyā sue'bhīhiā ।
Tamaṇegaggahaṇam ciya uvaōgaṇegayā natthi. (2438)

[बहु-बहुविधादिग्रहणे ननूपयोगबहुता श्रुतेऽभिहिता ।
तदनेकग्रहणमेवोपयोगानेकता नास्ति ॥१४३॥२४३८॥]

143. Bahu-bahuvīdhāḍigrahaṇe nanāpayogabahutā śrute'bhīhitā ।
Tadanekagrahaṇamevopayogaṇekatā nāsti. (2438)]

Trans. 143. "Plurality of applications has already been sanctioned by the Holy Writ, in (case of) apprehension of numerous varieties etc." It is only the comprehension of numerous forms in general (that is meant), (and) not the plurality of apprehensions." 2438.

टीका-१४३ ननु बहु-बहुविध-क्षिप्रा-ऽनिश्रिता-ऽसंदिग्ध-ध्रुव सेतर-
वस्तुग्रहणे पूर्वमिहैवावग्रहादीनामनुज्ञाने एकस्मिन्नुपयोगबहुता श्रुतेऽभिहितैव,
इति "पइवत्थुमसंखेज्ज" इत्यादि सिद्धसाधनमेव, इति परेणोक्ते सत्याह-"तम-
णेगेत्यादि" । तद् बहुविधादिरूपं वस्तुनोऽनेकपर्यायाणां सामान्यरूपतया ग्रहण-

8. Visual knowledge; direct knowledge of matter limited as to subject, place, time, and nature, i. e. without the help of the senses.

9. Viz. Manaḥ-paryaya (Mental Knowledge),—the state of mental perception which precedes the attainment of Kevala Jñāna (Perfect Knowledge) and Kevala Darśana (Absolute Perception).

मात्रमेव ज्ञाने उपयोगयोग्यतामात्रव्यवस्थापनमेव, एकस्मिंस्तु वस्तुन्येककालमु-
पयोगानेकता कापि नास्ति, क्रमेणैवोपयोगानां भावादिति ॥१४३॥२४३८॥

D. C.

Ārya Gaṅga —While describing the process of *avagraha* (general apprehension) etc, apprehension of plenty of *paryāyas*, has already been laid down by the Holy Writ. Then, what harm is there if we accept innumerable or endless applications (of mind) at the same time ?

Ācārya:—That is not proper. For, in that rule, general apprehension of innumerable *paryāyas* of an object (with regard to the perception of an object) is meant; but plurality of the application of mind in one object at one time is not at all meant. Applications of mind are always made one after the other. 143 (2438)

समयमणेगगग्रहणं जइ सीओसिणदुगम्मि को दोसो ? ।

केण व भणियं दोसो उवाओगदुगे विचारोऽयं ॥१४४॥२४३९॥

144. Samayamaṇegaggahaṇam jai sīōsiṇadugammi ko doso ? ।

Keṇa va bhaṇiyāṃ doso uvaōgaduge viyāro'yam. (2439).

[समकमनेकग्रहणं यदि शीतोष्णद्विके को दोषः ? ।

केन वा भणितं दोष उपयोगद्विके विचारोऽयम् ॥१४४॥२४३९॥

144. Samakamanekagrahaṇam yadi śītoṣṇadvike ko doṣaḥ ? ।

Kena vā bhaṇitam doṣa upayogadvike vicāro'yam (2439)]

Trans. 144. "If the simultaneous apprehension of many *paryāyas* (is acceptable), what harm is there (in accepting) sensations of heat and cold (being felt) simultaneously." Who says that there is any harm (in accepting so)?, Here the question is of two *upayogas* or applications (being simultaneous" 2439.

टीका—१४४ यद्याचार्य ! समकं युगपदनेकेषामर्थानां ग्रहणं त्वयाप्यनुज्ञायते तदा शीतोष्णद्वये गृह्यमाणे को दोषः येन गङ्गाभ्युपगमो ष्ठयते ? । स्वरिराह—

“केण वेत्यादि” केन पुनर्भणितम्-हन्त ! यत् समकमनेकार्थग्रहणे दोषः ? गृह्यन्ते युगपदपि सामान्यरूपतया सेना-वन-ग्राम-नगरादिवदनेकेऽर्था इति, एतद् न निवारयामो वयमित्यर्थः, केवलमिहोपयोगद्वये विचारोऽयं प्रस्तुतः । स च उपयोग एकदा एक एव भवति, न त्वनेक इति ॥२४३९॥

D. C.

Ārya Gaṅga :—If you have no objection in admitting apprehension of numerous objects together at a time, what harm is there in accepting apprehension of the sensations of heat and cold together ?

Ācārya :—If you say like that, you have not understood the relevant point under consideration. There is no harm in admitting the apprehension of a number of objects at a time. Generally, objects like army, forests, villages etc. could be apprehended together. We do not doubt that view-point. What we object to, is the theory of accepting numerous *upayogas* or applications being made simultaneously. There can never be more than one *upayoga* or application at one time 144 (2439)

Ārya Gaṅga, then puts another question and Ācārya replies :—

समयमणेगग्गहणे एगाणेगोवओगमेओ को ? ।

सामण्णमेगजोगो खंधावारोवओगो व्व ॥१४५॥२४४०॥

खंधावारोऽयं सामण्णमेत्तमेगोवओगया समयं ।

पइवत्थुविभागो पुण जो सोऽणेगोवओग त्ति ॥१४६॥२४४१॥

145. Samayamaṇegaggahane egāṇegovaōgabheō ko ? ।

Sāmaṇṇamegajogo khandhāvārovaōgo vva. (2440)

146. Khandhāvāro'yam sāmaṇṇamettamegovaōgayā samayaṁ ।

Paivatthuvibhāgo puṇa jo so'ṇegovaōga tti (2441)

[समकमनेकग्रहण एकानेकोपयोगभेदः कः ? ॥

सामान्यमेकयोगः स्कन्धावारोपयोग इव ॥१४५॥२४४०॥

स्कन्धावारोऽयं सामान्यमात्रमेऽकोपयोगता समकम् ।

प्रतिवस्तुविभागः पुनर्यः सोऽनेकोपयोग इति ॥१४६॥२४४१॥

145. Samakamanekagrahaṇa ekānekopayogabhedah kaḥ ?

Sāmānyamekayogaḥ skandhāvāropayoga iva. (2440)

146. Skandhāvāro'yam sāmānyamātrame'kopayogatā samakam ।

Prati-vastuvibhāgaḥ punaryaḥ so'nekopayoga iti (2441)]

Trans. 145-146. "While admitting the apprehension of many objects at a time, what is the sense in believing in distinction of one and many applications at a time." General apprehension (constitutes) one application as in the case of the apprehension of a retinue of army. (While apprehending that) "This is a retinue of army" there is general apprehension only (constituting) one application at a time. But that which is (contained in) every portion of an object (gives rise to) plurality of application. (2440-2441)

टीका-१४५-१४६ ननु समकं युगपदनेकार्थग्रहणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने कोऽयमेकानेकोपयोगभेदो नाम, येनोच्यते-"उवओगाणेगया नत्थि" इति ? । अत्रोत्तरमाह-"सामण्णमेगजो गो ति" यः सामान्योपयोगः स एकोपयोगोऽभिधीयते, स्कन्धावारोपयोगवदिति दृष्टान्तः । अमुमेवार्थं स्पष्टयति-"खंधावारोऽयमित्यादि" समकं युगपदेव 'स्कन्धावारोऽयम्' इत्येवं यत् सामान्यं सामान्यमात्रग्राहको य उपयोग इत्यर्थः, स एकोपयोगता भण्यते । यः पुनः प्रतिवस्तु "एते हस्तिनः, अमी अश्वाः, इमे रथाः, एते पदातयः, एते खज्ज-कुम्भादयः, शिरस्त्राणकवचादयः, पट-कुट्टिकाः, ध्वजाः, पताकाः, ढका-सङ्घ-काहलादयः, करभ-रासमादयश्च इत्यादिको विभागो भेदाध्यवसायः सोऽनेकोपयोग इति ॥२४४०॥२४४१॥

D. C.

Ārya Gaṇa:—Apprehension of numerous objects is acceptable to you, as you say. Then, what is the sense in distinguishing between one and many *upayogas* working at one time ?

Ācārya:—General apprehension of many objects at a time, constitutes only one application (of mind). After apprehending

a retinue of army, when we say that "This is a retinue of army," there is only one application of mind at a time.

But when we apprehend each individual portion of it, by saying that "Those are the elephants," "Those are the horses", "These are chariots", "Here is infantry", "These are swords, pots etc." "Those are helmets, armours, tents, flags, banners, drums, conches, camels etc. the apprehension of each individual portion requires a separate application of mind, giving rise to plurality of application. 145-146 (2440-2441)

ते च्चिय न संति समयं सामण्णाणेगग्रहणमविरुद्धं ।

एगमणेगं पि तयं तम्हा सामण्णभावेणं ॥१४७॥२४४२॥

147. Te cciya na santi samayam sāmaṇṇāṇegagahaṇamaviruddham ।

Egamaṇegam pi tayam tamhā sāmaṇṇabhāveṇam. (2442)

[त एव न सन्ति समकं सामान्यानेकग्रहणमविरुद्धम् ।

एकमनेकमपि तत् तस्मात् सामान्यभावेन ॥१४७॥२४४२॥

147. Ta eva na santi samakam sāmānyānekagrahaṇamaviruddham ।

Ekamanekamapi tat tasmāt sāmānyabhāvena. (2442)]

Trans. 147. They do not come into existence simultaneously. General apprehension of many objects is not objectionable. For, in that way, even numerous objects become one in general. 2442.

टीका-१४७ त एवानेकोपयोगाः समकं युगपद् न सन्ति न भवन्तीति निषिध्यन्तेऽस्माभिः । यच्च सामान्येनानेकेषामर्थानां युगपद् ग्रहणं तदविरुद्धमेव 'तम्हा' त्ति 'तस्माद् युगपदनेकोपयोगनिषेधेन किमुक्तं भवति ? इत्याह- 'एगमणेगं पीत्यादि' यदिदं स्कन्धावाराद्युपयोगे युगपदनेकार्थग्रहणमस्माभिरनुज्ञायते 'तयं ति' तदनेकमप्यनेकार्थग्रहणमपि सदित्यर्थः । "एगंति" एकमेव तत्त्वत एकार्थग्रहणमेवेत्यर्थः । केन ? इत्याह-"सामण्णभावेणं ति" सामान्यरूपतयेत्यर्थः । अयमत्र तात्पर्यार्थः-यदनेकार्थग्रहणमनुज्ञायते तत् सामान्यमेव रूपमाश्रित्य,

विशेषरूपंतया त्वनेकार्थग्रहणं नास्त्येव एकस्मिन् काल एकस्यैव विशेषोपयोगस्य सद्भावादिति ॥२४४२॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—Our objection is against taking many *upayogas* to work simultaneously. But we do not contradict the acceptance of the general apprehension of numerous objects at a time. In case of examples such as “This is the retinue of army” etc. although we propose to apprehend numerous objects at a time, really speaking, it becomes the *general apprehension of one aggregate object only*. Thus, since there is only one application of mind in case of general apprehension, many objects are perceived simultaneously.

But simultaneous apprehension of many objects *in particular* is not possible, because there cannot be more than one *upayoga in particular* at one time. 147 (2442)

Applying the same principle to the sensations of heat and cold, the author states,

उसिणेयं सीयेयं न विभागो नोवओगदुगमित्थं ।

होज्ज समं दुगगहणं सामण्णं वेयणा मे त्ति ॥१४८॥२४४३॥

148. Usiṇeyam siyeyam na vibhāgo noṽaōgadugamittham ।

Hojja samam dugagahaṇam sāmaṇṇam veyañā me tti. (2443)

[उष्णेयं शीतेणं न विभागो नोपयोगद्विकमित्थम् ।

भवेत् समं द्विकग्रहणं सामान्यं वेदना ममेति ॥१४८॥२४४३॥

148. Uṣṇeyam śīteṇam na vibhāgo nopayogadvikamittham ।

Bhavet samam dvikagrahaṇam sāmānyam vedanā mameti, (2443)]

Trans. 148. (‘It is not possible) to divide it separately as “This is (the sensation of) heat, and “This is (the sensation of) cold”, and causing thereby two separate applications (of mind) to work simultaneously. Simultaneous apprehension

of the two is possible (only), if it is in the general form expressed as "I feel two sensations." 2443.

टीका-१४८ "उष्णेयं शीतेयं वेदना' इत्येवं योऽसौ विभागो भेदोऽसौ नेष्टः-शीतोष्णविभागे शीतोष्णविशेषरूपतया युगपद् ग्रहणं नेष्टमित्यर्थः । अत एव तद्विषयमुपयोगद्वयं युगपद् नेष्टम् । किं युगपद् वस्तुद्वयग्रहणं सर्वथा नेष्टम् ? । नैवम् । कुतः ? इत्याह-भवेत् समं युगपद् वस्तुद्वयग्रहणम् । किं विशेषरूपतया ? । न, इत्याह-सामान्यं सामान्यरूपतयेत्यर्थः । कथम् ? । "वेदना मे सम वर्तते" इत्येवं युगपद् द्वयग्रहणं भवेत्, न तु शीतोष्णवेदनाविशेषरूपतयेत्यर्थः, युगपदुपयोगद्वयप्रसङ्गात्, तत्र च दोषाणामुक्तत्वादिति ॥२४४३॥

D. C. It is not desirable to make two separate divisions and remark that "This is the sensation of heat" and "This is the sensation of cold" and thereby give rise to the simultaneous apprehension of both the sensations which is absolutely impossible. For, two separate *upayogas* of mind, which relate to both the sensations, could not take place simultaneously. Two sensations could be experienced only by saying in a general tone that "I feel two sensations." But the two sensations of heat and cold could never be experienced simultaneously. 148 (2443)

Now, explaining the difference between *sāmānya* or general cognition and *viśeṣa* or particular cognition, the author states:—

जं सामण्यविसेसा विलक्खणा तन्निबन्धनं जं च ।

नाणं जं च विभिन्ना सुदूरओवग्गहा-ऽवाया ॥१४९॥२४४४॥

जं च विसेसन्नाणं सामन्नानाणपुव्वयमवस्सं ।

तो सामण्यविसेसन्नाणाइं नेगसमयम्मि ॥१५०॥२४४५॥

149. Jam sāmāṇṇavisesā vilakkhaṇā tannibandhaṇam jaṃ ca ।
Nāṇam jaṃ ca vibhinnaṃ sudūraōvaggahā'vāyā. (2444)

150. Jam ca visesannāṇam sāmānnāṇapuvvayamavassam ।
To sāmāṇṇavisesannāṇāim negasamayammi. (2445)

[यत् सामान्यविशेषौ विलक्षणौ तन्निबन्धनं यच्च ।

ज्ञानं यच्च विभिन्नौ सुदूरतोऽवग्रहाऽवायौ ॥१४९॥२४४४॥

यच्च विशेषज्ञानं सामान्यज्ञानपूर्वकमवश्यम् ।

ततः सामान्य-विशेषज्ञाने नैकसमये ॥१५०॥२४४५॥

149. Yat sāmānya-viśeṣau vilakṣaṇau tannibandhanam yacca ।
Jñānam yacca vibhinnau sudūrato'vagraha'vāyau (2444)

150. Yacca viśeṣa-jñānam sāmānya-jñānapūrvakamavaśyam ।
Tataḥ sāmānya-viśeṣa-jñāne naikasamaye. (2445)]

Trans. 149-150. Since general (apprehension) and particular (apprehension) are mutually distinct, the respective cognitions, viz *avagraha* (or general cognition) and *avāya* (or definite cognition) are also widely different (from each other), and since, definite cognition certainly follows the general cognition, the two cognitions (could not take place) simultaneously (2444-2445)

टीका-१४९-१५० “ तो त्ति ” तस्मात् सामान्यग्राहकं विशेषग्राहकं च ज्ञानं द्वे अपि नैकसमये नैककालं भवत इति द्वितीयगाथायां संबन्धः । कुतः? इत्याह-“ जं सामणोत्थादि ” यद् यस्मात् सामान्य-विशेषौ परस्परमतीवविभिन्न-लक्षणौ भिन्नजातीयौ, अतः कथं तावेककालमेकज्ञाने प्रतिभासेते, एकत्वप्रसङ्गात्, सामान्यतत्स्वरूपवत् विशेषतत्स्वरूपवद् वा? । माऽभूत् तत्प्रतिभासः, तथापि तज्ज्ञाने युगपद् भविष्यत इत्याह-यस्माच्च तन्निबन्धनं सामान्यविशेषहेतुकं सर्वमपि ज्ञानं, तत् कथं तत्प्रतिभासमन्तरेणोत्पद्येत? सामान्यविशेषज्ञानयोरेक-त्वादेककालं ते भविष्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । कुतः? इत्याह-यस्माच्च सुदूरं विभिन्नौ सामान्य-विशेषज्ञानरूपावग्रहा-ऽवायौ, इति कथं समकालं भवतः? । यद् यस्माच्चावश्यकं सामान्यग्राहकज्ञानपूर्वकमेव विशेषग्राहकं ज्ञानम्, “ नानव-गृहीतमीह्यते, नानीहितं निश्चीयते ” इत्यादिवचनात् । अतः कथं तयोर्युगपत् सम्भवः? इति ॥२४४४॥२४४५॥

D. C.

Acārya :—Sāmānya and viśeṣa types of knowledge could

never be attained simultaneously, because they are extremely distinct from each other.

Ārya Gaṅga :—Since both happen to be jñānas, what harm in there if both are accepted to have been attained simultaneously ?

Ācārya :—That is not possible. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* types of knowledge represent *avagraha* and *apāya* types of knowledge respectively. Both these types are extremely different from each other as *avagraha* results in general cognition while *apāya* results in definite or particular cognition.

The general cognition always precedes the particular or definite cognition. For, it has already been said that “ Without general apprehension, there is no definite apprehension, without which there is no definite ascertainment.”

For all these reasons, it is not possible to take both the processes of jñānas to operate simultaneously. 149-150 (2444-2445)

Again, the opponent would ask--

होज्ञ न विलक्खणाइं समयं सामण्ण-भेयनाणाइं ।

बहुयाण को विरोहो समयम्मि विसेसनाणाणं ? ॥१५१॥२४४६॥

151. Hojja na vilakkhaṇāim samayam sāmaṇṇa-bheyanāṇāim ।
Bahuyāṇa ko viroho samayaṃmi visesaṇāṇāṇam ? (2446)

[भवेतां न विलक्षणे समकं सामान्य-भेदज्ञाने ।

बहुकानां को विरोधः समये विशेषज्ञानानाम् ? ॥१५१॥२४४६॥

151. Bhavetām na vilakṣaṇe samakam sāmānya-bhedajñāne ।
Bahukānām ko virodhaḥ samaye viśeṣajñānānām ? (2446)]

Trans. 151. There may not be simultaneous (applications) when there is wide difference between the general and definite types of knowledge. (But) what is the objection in (accepting) numerous knowledges of definite type, (being attained) simultaneously ? 2446.

टीका-१५१ नन्वाचार्य ! एवं तर्हि अस्ति यदुत-सामान्य वेदनामात्रग्राहकं सामान्यज्ञानं, शीतोष्णवेदनाविशेषग्राहकं विशेषज्ञानरूपं भेदज्ञानं च, इत्येते द्वे अपि सुदूरविलक्षणत्वात् समकं युगपद् न भवतः, बहूनां तु शीतोष्णादिविशेषज्ञानानां समय एकस्मिन् काले जायमानानां विशेषज्ञानरूपतया तेषां बहूनामपि तुल्यत्वेन वैलक्षण्याभावात् को विरोधः, येन शीतोष्णवेदनाविशेषज्ञाने युगपद् गङ्गस्य निषिध्यते ? इति ॥२४४६॥

D. C.

Ārya Gaṅga :—Since there is a wide difference between *sāmānya-jñāna* or general knowledge which apprehends simple sensations only, and *viśeṣa-jñāna* or definite knowledge which apprehends a definite sensation like that of heat or cold, they may not be taken to have been attained simultaneously. But since there is no difference in various *viśeṣa-jñānas*, what harm is there in accepting a number of *viśeṣa-jñānas* to have been attained simultaneously ? 151 (2446)

The Ācārya replies :—

लक्षणभेयाउ चिय सामण्णं च जमणेगविसयं ति ।
तमघेत्तुं न विसेसन्नाणाइं तेण समयम्मि ॥१५२॥२४४७॥
तो सामन्नगगहणाणंतरमीहियमवेइ तब्भेयं ।
इय सामन्नविसेसावेक्खो जावंतिमो भेओ ॥१५३॥२४४८॥

152. Lakkhaṇabheyāu cciya sāmaṇṇam ca jamaṇegavisayam ti ।
Tamaghattum na visesannaṇāim teṇa samayammi. (2447)

153. To sāmānaggagahaṇāṇantaramihiyamavei tabbheyam ।
Iya sāmānavisesāvekkho jāvantimo bheō. (2448)

[लक्षणभेदादेव सामान्यं यदनेकविषयमिति ।
तदगृहीत्वा न विशेषज्ञानानि तेन समये ॥१५२॥२४४७॥
ततः सामान्यग्रहणानन्तरमीहितमवैति तद्भेदम् ।
इति सामान्यविशेषापेक्षा यावदन्तिमो भेदः ॥१५३॥२४४८॥

152. Lakṣaṇabhedādeva sāmānyam yadanekaviśayamiti ।
Tadagrihitvā na viśeṣa-jñānāni tena samaye. (2447)
153. Tataḥ sāmānyagrahaṇānantaramihitamavaiti tadbhedam ।
Iti sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣā yāvadantimo bhedaḥ. (2448)]

Trans. 152-153. Since sāmānya or general apprehension (constitutes) a number of subjects on account of various distinctive characteristics, (there is) no (possibility of) viśeṣa jñānas or definite cognitions (being attained) at the same time without attaining it. Then, definite apprehension attained after general apprehension, recognizes their distinction. Such an inter-dependence of sāmānya and viśeṣa continues till final distinction. (2447-2448)

टीका-१५२-१५३ तेन कारणेन समय एकस्मिन् काले बहूनि विशेषज्ञानानि न भवन्ति । कुतः ? इत्याह-लक्षणं शीतोष्णादिविशेषणस्वरूपं तस्य परस्परं भेदाद् भिन्नत्वाद् न तद्ग्राहकाणि ज्ञानानि समकं भवन्ति, यस्माच्चानेकविषयमनेकाधारं सामान्यं, इत्यतस्तदगृहीत्वा न विशेषज्ञानसंभूतिरस्तीति, अतोऽपि न युगपद् विशेषज्ञानानि । इदमुक्तं भवति-पूर्वं वेदनासामान्यं गृहीत्वा तत ईहां प्रविश्य “ शीतेयं पादयोर्वेदना ” इति वेदनाविशेषं निश्चिनोति । शिरस्यपि प्रथमं वेदनासामान्यं गृहीत्वा तत ईहां प्रविश्य “ उष्णेयमिह वेदना ” इत्यध्यवस्यति । न हि घटविशेषज्ञानादनन्तरमेव पटाश्रयसामान्यरूपेऽगृहीते पटविशेषज्ञानमुपजायते “ उगग्रहो ईह अवाओ य ” इत्यमुनैव क्रमेण घटादिविशेषज्ञानोत्पत्त्यभिधानात् । एवं च सति विशेषज्ञानादनन्तरमपि विशेषज्ञानं नोत्पद्यते, आस्तां पुनः समकालम्, सामान्यस्यानेकविशेषाश्रयत्वात् । तच्च पूर्वमगृहीत्वा विशेषज्ञानस्याप्रसवादिति ।

यतश्चैवं सामान्येऽगृहीते नास्ति विशेषज्ञानम्, ‘ तो चि ’ ततः सामान्यग्रहणान्तरमीहितं तद्भेदं सामान्यभेदं घटत्वादिसामान्याश्रयं घटादिविशेषमित्यर्थः, अवैति-“ घटादिरेवाऽयम् ” इत्येव निश्चिनोतीत्यर्थः । तत उत्तरभेदापेक्षया घट एव सामान्यम् । तस्मिंश्च गृहीते ईहित्वा “ धातुजोऽयम्, न मार्तः ” इत्येवं निश्चिनोति । ततो धातुजोऽप्युत्तरभेदापेक्षया सामान्यम् । तस्मिंश्च गृहीते ईहित्वा ‘ ताम्रोऽयं न राजतादिः ’ इतीत्थं निश्चिनोतीति । एवं सामान्य-विशेषापेक्षा तावत् कर्तव्या यावदन्तिमो भेदः स कश्चिद् यदनन्तरमीहा न प्रवर्तते । ततश्चैवं

न कचिद् विशेषज्ञानानां युगपत्प्रवृत्तिसंभवः, सामान्यरूपतया तु समकालमपि विशेषाणां ग्रहणं भवेत्, यथा सेना, वनप्रित्यादि न तु युगपदुपयोग इत्युक्तमेव । तथा च भिन्नकाले एव शीतोष्णविशेषज्ञाने । ततो भ्रान्तमेव समकालं शीतोष्ण-क्रियाद्वयवेदनं भवत इति ॥२४४७॥२४४८॥

D. C. A number of *viśeṣa jñānas* could never be attained simultaneously. There are various reasons for this.

Firstly, because there is a clear distinction between various characteristics such as those of heat, cold etc, their respective *jñānas* could not be attained simultaneously.

Secondly, general apprehension contains a number of subjects. So, without its apprehension, the *viśeṣa-jñāna* or cognition in particular, could never be attained. On account of this reason also, many *viśeṣa jñānas* are not attained at the same time.

After apprehending a general sensation, one ascertains it as particular by saying that "There is a sensation of cold on my feet." Even in (case of) head, after apprehending a general sensation, one ascertains it in particular by saying that "Here I feel the sensation of heat."

One cannot attain *viśeṣa jñāna* of *paṭa* even after the apprehension of the *viśeṣa jñāna* of *ghaṭa* without apprehending the general form of *paṭa*. Thus, when *viśeṣa jñāna* is not produced even after a *viśeṣa jñāna*, how could that be attained at the same time ? *Sāmānya* is full of many *viśeṣas*, and without apprehending *sāmānya* at first, the *viśeṣa* is not apprehended in any case.

Since the attainment of *viśeṣa jñāna* is not possible without that of *sāmānya*, the definite apprehension attained after general apprehension, recognizes the various characteristics like *ghaṭa* etc. contained in the general form of *ghaṭatva* etc. and then ascertains it as *ghaṭa*. One more distinction of *ghaṭa* is recognized after this. With regard to a further characteristic, *ghaṭa* becomes *sāmānya*, after the apprehension of which, one ascertains it as "made of metal and not of earth" This form of metal

apprehended as a *viśeṣa* or distinct form of *ghaṭa* again becomes a *sāmānya* form with regard to further distinction. After the apprehension of this, one ascertains it as “made of copper and not of silver.” Such an inter-relation of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* continues upto the last distinction, further than which, the definite apprehension becomes impossible.

So, there is no possibility of many *viśeṣa jñānas* to be attained simultaneously, as stated above, but a simultaneous apprehension of a number of particular objects, such as an army, forest etc. is possible. Their *upāyogas* cannot be simultaneous.

Similarly, the *viśeṣa jñānas* of the sensations of heat and cold are attained only at different times, and not simultaneously.

Thus, your theory of accepting the processes of undergoing both the sensations at the same time, proves to be absolutely unfounded. 152-153 (2447-2448)

Then,

इय पण्णविओ वि जओ न पवज्जइ तो तओ कओ वज्झो ।
तो रायगिहे समयं किरियाओ दो परूवंतो ॥१५४॥२४४९॥
मणिनागेणारद्धो भओववत्तिओ पडिबोहिओ वोत्तुं ।
इच्छामो गुरुमूलं गंतूण तओ पडिक्कंतो ॥१५५॥२४५०॥

154. Iya paṇṇaviö vi jaö na pavajjai to taö kaö bajjho ।
To Rāyagihe samayaṁ kiriyāö do paravanto. (2449)

155. Maṇināgeṇāraddho bhaövvattiö paḍibohiö vottum ।
Icchāmo gurumūlam gantūṇa taö padikkanto. (2450)

[इति प्रज्ञापितोऽपि यतो न प्रपद्यते ततःसको कृतो बाह्यः ।
ततो राजगृहे समकं क्रिये द्वे प्ररूपयन् ॥१५४॥२४४९॥
मणिनागेनारब्धो भयोपपतितः प्रतिबोधित उक्त्व ॥
इच्छामो गुरुमूलं गत्वा ततः प्रतिक्रान्तः ॥१५५॥२४५०॥

154. Iti prajñāpito'pi yato na prapadyate tataḥ sako krito bāhyah ।
Tato Rājagrihe samakam kriye dve prarūpayan. (2449)

155. Maṇināgenārbdho bhayopapatitaḥ pratibodhita uktvā ।
Icchāmo gurumulam gatvā tataḥ pratikrāntaḥ. (2450)]

Trans. 154-155. Although persuaded in this way, when (Arya Gaṇa) was not convinced, he was expelled from the Gaccha (Order of Monks). Then, while asserting (his) theory of two processes (of feeling) being simultaneous, in Rājagriha he was threatened by Maṇināga, and brought to the right path by means of threat. Finally, he declared that "We wish to return to (the school of) our original preceptor and having returned (to him), at last he was re-initiated.

End of the Discussion with the Fifth Nihlava.



Chapter VII

॥ षष्ठनिहववकव्यता ॥



Discussion with the Sixth Nihava.

पंचसया चोयाला तहआ सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स ।
पुरिमंतरंजियाए तेरासियदिट्ठी उप्पन्ना ॥१५६॥२४५१॥

156. Pañcasayā coyālā taiā Siddhim gayassa Virassa ।
Purimantaranjiyāe terāsiya diṭṭhī uppannā (2451)

[पञ्चशतानि चतुश्चत्वारिंशता तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य ।
पुर्यामन्तरञ्जिकायां त्रैराशिकदृष्टिरुत्पन्ना ॥१५६॥२४५१॥

156. Pañcaśatāni catuṣcatvāriṃśatā tadā Siddhim gatasya
Virasya ।
Puryāmantarañjikāyām trairāśikadrṣṭirutpannā. (2451)]

Trans. 156. The theory of Trairāśikas (upholders of the principle of three categories) was founded in the city of Antarañjikā, five hundred and forty-four years after the Tīrthaṅkara Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra Swāmi had attained Niravāṇa. 2451.

टीका-१५६ पञ्चवर्षशतानि चतुश्चत्वारिंशदधिकानि तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य
श्रीमन्महावीरस्य, अत्रान्तरेऽन्तरञ्जिकायां पुर्या त्रैराशिकदृष्टिरुत्पन्नेति ॥२४५१॥

D. C. Easy. 156 (2451)

The story of the production of the theory of Trairāśikas is narrated in detail as follows :—

पुरिमंतरंजि भूयगिह बलसिरी सिरिगुत्त रोहगुत्त य ।

परिवायपोट्टसाले घोसणपडिसेहणा वाए ॥१५७॥२४५२॥

157. Purimantaranji Bhayagiha, Balasirī, Sirigutta Rohagutte ya ।
Parivāyapoṭṭasāle ghoṣaṇa paḍisehaṇā vāe. (2452)

[पुर्यन्तरञ्जिका भूतगृहं बलश्रीः श्रीगुप्तो रोहगुप्तश्च ।

परिव्राजकपोट्टशालो घोषणप्रतिषेधना वादः ॥१५७॥२४५२॥

157. Puryantaranjikā Bhūtagriham Balaśrīḥ Srīgupto Roha-
guptaśca ।

ParivrājakaPoṭṭasālo ghoṣaṇapratishedhanā vādaḥ. (2452)]

Trans. 157. (There was) a city (named) Antarañjikā. Bhatagriha (was a temple). Balaśrī (was the king), Srīgupta (was the Ācārya), and Rohagupta (his pupil). Discussion (took place) with a parivrājaka (a mendicant ascetic) named Paṭṭasāla (as a result of) taking up (his) challenge. 2452.

टीका-१५७ संग्रहगाथेयम् । अस्याश्च कथानकादर्थोऽवसेयः । तच्चेदम्-
अन्तरञ्जिका नाम नगरी । तस्याश्च बहिर्भूतगृहं नाम चैत्यम् । तत्र च श्रीगुप्त-
नामाचार्यः स्थितः । तस्यां च नगर्या बलश्रीर्नाम राजा । श्रीगुप्ताचार्याणां च
रोहगुप्तो नाम शिष्योऽन्यत्र ग्रामे स्थित आसीत् । अतोऽसौ गुरुवन्दनार्थमन्तर-
ञ्जिकायामागतः । तत्र चैकः परिव्राजको लोहपटकेनोदरं बद्ध्वा जम्बूवृक्षशाखा
च हस्ते गृहीतया नगर्यां आम्यति । किमेतत् ? इति च लोकेन पृष्ठो वदति-
“मदीयोदरमतीवज्ञानेन पूरितत्वात् स्फुटतीति लोहपट्टेन बद्धम्, जम्बूद्वीपमध्ये
च मम प्रतिवादी नास्ति” इत्यस्यार्थस्य सूचनार्थं जम्बूवृक्षशाखा हस्ते गृहीता ।
ततस्तेन परिव्राजकेन सर्वस्यामपि नगर्यां “शून्याः सर्वेऽपि परप्रवादाः, नास्ति
कश्चिद् मम प्रतिवादी” इत्युद्घोषणापूर्वकः पटहको दापितः । लोहपट्टबद्धपोट्ट-
जम्बूवृक्षशाखायोगाच्च तस्यलोके “पोट्टशाल” इति नामजातम् । ततस्तत्पटहको
नगर्यां प्रविशता रोहगुप्तेन दृष्टः, उद्घोषणा च श्रुता । ततो “अहं तेन सार्धं वादं
दास्यामि” इत्यभिधाय गुरुनपृष्ट्वापि निषिद्धस्तेनासौ पटहकः । गुरुसमीपं
चागत्यालोचयता कथितोऽयं व्यक्तिकरस्तेषाम् । आचार्यैः प्रोक्तम् न युक्तं त्वयाऽ-
नुष्ठितम्, स हि परिव्राजको वादे निर्जितोऽपि विद्यास्वतिकुशलत्वात् ताभिरुपति-
ष्ठति । तस्य चैताः सप्तविद्या बाढं स्फुरन्ति ॥२४५२॥

D. C. Outside the city of Antarañjikā there was a temple known as Bhūtagriha. There lived a preceptor named Śrī Gupta. Śrī Gupta had a pupil named Rohagupta, who stayed in some other village from where he usually came to pay his homage to the preceptor every now and then.

Once upon a time when Rohagupta was coming to the city of Antarañjikā in order to pay his usual homage to the preceptor, he saw a parivrājaka (a wandering ascetic) with an iron belt tied around his belly, and with a branch of the Jambū tree in his hand signifying thereby that his stomach was filled to the brim with knowledge, and that there was no body in the whole of Jambūdvīpa who could defeat him. This mendicant was known as Poṭṭaśāla in the city as his stomach was tide with an iron-belt. This Poṭṭaśāla wandered throughout the city announcing his challenge with the beating of drum that "All my opponents have failed. There is no body who can return my challenge. On hearing this, Rohagupta took up the challenge even without consulting his preceptor. When he narrated the whole incident to his preceptor afterwards, the preceptor said, "You have incurred a risk by doing so." For, though defeated, Poṭṭaśāla will harass you with various magical spells. 157 (2452)

Because,

विच्छ्र य सप्पे मूसग मिगी वराही य काग पोयाई ।

एयाहिं विज्जाहिं सो य परिवायगो कुसलो ॥१५८॥२४५३॥

158. Viccha ya sappe masaga migi varāhī ya kāga poyāi ।

Eyāhim vijjāhim so ya parivāyago kusalo. (2453)

[वृश्चिकी सर्पी मूषकी मृगी वराही काकी पोताकी ।

एताभिर्विद्याभिः स च परिव्राजकः कुशलः ॥१५८॥२४५३॥

158. Vriścīkī sarpī mūṣakī mṛigī varāhī kākī potākī ।

Etābhirvidyābhiḥ sa ca parivrājakaḥ kuśalaḥ. (2453)]

Trans. 158. That *parivrājaka* (mendicant) has achieved the magical spell of scorpion, serpent, mouse, deer, boar, crow and parrot. 2453.

टीका-१५८ “विच्छ य त्ति” वृश्चिकप्रधाना विद्या गृह्यते । “सण्णे त्ति” सर्पप्रधाना विद्या । “सूसणे त्ति” मूषकप्रधाना । तथा मृगी नाम विद्या मृगी-रूपेणोपघातकारिणी । एवं वराही च । “काग पोयाइ त्ति” काकविद्या, पोताकी-विद्या च । पोताक्यःशकुनिकाः एतासु विद्यासु, एताभिर्वा विद्याभिः स परिव्राजकः कुशल इति । ततो रोहगुप्तेनोक्तम्-“यद्येवम्, तत किमिदानीं नष्टं कापि शक्यते?, निषिद्धस्तत्पटहकः, यद् भवति तद् भवतु” । ततःसूरिभिःप्रोक्तम्-यद्येवम्, तर्हि पठितसिद्धा एवैताः सप्त तत्प्रतिपक्षविद्या गृहाण ॥२४५३॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—That parivrājaka (mendicant) is proficient in magical spells of scorpions, serpents, mice, boars, crows and parrots.

Rohagupta:—If it is so, is there, now, any way to defeat him, any how? Since I have accepted the challenge, let things happen as they do.”

Ācārya:—If you desire so, you shall have to achieve the various counteracting spells that would overpower the above-named tricks successfully. 158 (2453)

The counter-acting spells are—

मोरी नउली बिराली वग्घी सिही य उलुगि उवाई ।

एआओ विज्जाओ गिण्ह परिव्यायमहणीओ ॥१५९॥२४५४॥

159. Morī naulī birālī vagghī sihī ya ulugi uvāī ।

Eāō vijjāō giṇha parivyāyamahanīō (2454)

[मोरी नकुली बिडाली व्याघ्री सिंही चोलुकी उलावकी ।

एता विद्या गृहाण परिव्राजकमथनी : ॥१५९॥२४५४॥

159. Morī nakulī bidālī vyāghrī simhī colukī ulāvakī ।

Etā vidyā grihāṇa parivrājakamathanīh. (2454)]

Trans. 159. Achieve the under-mentioned (counter-acting) spells that (would) vanquish the parivrājaka (mendicant) viz that of peacock, mangoose, cat, tiger, lion, owl and hawk. 2454.

टीका—१५९ वृश्चिकाणां प्रतिपक्षभूता मोरीविद्या । सर्पाणां तु प्रतिपक्षभूता नकुली । मूषकाणां बिडाली । एवं व्याघ्री, सिंही, उलूकी । “उवाइ चि” पोताकीप्रतिपक्षभूता उलावकप्रधाना विद्येत्यर्थः । एताः परिव्राजकमथनीविद्या गृहाण त्वम् । इति सूरिणा प्रोक्ते गृह्णाति रोहगुप्तः । तथा रजोहरणं चाभिमन्य सूरिभिस्तस्य समर्पितम् । अभिहितश्च यथा यद्यन्यदपि किञ्चित् तत्प्रणीतक्षुद्र-विद्याकृतमुपसर्गजातमुपतिष्ठते तदा तन्निवारणार्थमेतद् मस्तकस्योपरि भ्रमणीयम् । ततश्चन्द्राणामप्यजेयो भविष्यसि, किमुत मनुष्यमात्रस्य तस्येति । ततश्च गतो राजसभां रोहगुप्तः । प्रोक्तं च तत्र तेन—“किमेष द्रुमकःपरिव्राजको जानाति ? । करोत्वयमेव यद्वक्ष्या पूर्वपक्षम्, येनाहं निराकरोमि ।” ततः परिव्राजकेन चिन्तितम्—निपुणाःखल्वमी भवन्ति, तदमीषामेव संमतं पक्षं परिगृह्णामि, येन निराकर्तुं न शक्नोति । विचिन्त्य चेदमभ्यधायि—“इह जीवाश्चाजीवाश्चेति द्वावेव राशी, तथैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्, शुभा-ऽशुभादिराशिद्वयवत्” इत्यादि । ततो रोहगुप्तेन तद्बुद्धिपरिभवनार्थं स्वसंमतोऽप्ययं पक्षो निराकृतः । कथम् ? इति चेत् । उच्यते—असिद्धोऽयं हेतुः, अन्यथोपलम्भात्, जीवा अजीवा नोजीवाश्चेति राशि-त्रयदर्शनात् । तत्र जीवा नरकतिर्यगादयः, अजीवास्तु परमाणु-घटादयः, नोजी-वास्तु गृहकोलिकापुच्छादयः । ततो जीवा-ऽजीव-नोजीवरूपास्त्रयो राशयः, तथैवोपलभ्यमानत्वात्, अधम-मध्यमो-त्तमादिराशित्रयवत्, इत्यादियुक्तिभि-निष्प्रश्नव्याकरणः कृत्वा जितः परिव्राजको रोहगुप्तेन । ततोऽसौ क्रुद्धो वृश्चिक-विद्यया रोहगुप्तविनाशार्थं वृश्चिकान् मुञ्चति, ततो रोहगुप्तस्तत्प्रतिपक्षभूतमयूरी-विद्यया मयूरान् मुञ्चति । तैश्च वृश्चिकेषु हतेषु परिव्राजकःसर्पान् मुञ्चति । इतरस्त-त्प्रतिघातार्थं नकुलान् विसृजति । एवं मूषकाणां बिडालान्, मृगीणां व्याघ्रान्, शूकराणां सिंहान्, काकानामुलूकान्, पोतकीनामुलावकान् मुञ्चति । ततो गर्दभी मुक्ता । तां चागच्छन्तीं दृष्ट्वा रोहगुप्तेन रजोहरणं मस्तकस्योपरि भ्रमयित्वा तेनैव रजोहरणेन ताडिता सती परिव्राजकस्योपरि मूत्र-पुरीषोत्सर्गं कृत्वा गतासौ । ततः सभापतिना, सभ्यैः, समस्तलोकेन च निन्द्यमानो, नगराद् निर्वासितः परिव्राजकः ॥२४५४॥

D. C The spells of scorpions, serpents, mice deer, boars, crows, and parrots are respectively nullified by those of pea-cocks, mangleese, cats, tigers, lions, owls, and hawks. You should pick up all those spells properly if you want to defeat the parivrājaka.

Thus advised by the preceptor, Rohagupta studied all the methods. In addition to that, he was also supplied with a रजोहरण Rajoharṇa* consecrated with a spell by his preceptor with instructions that he should wave it over his own head for the prevention of any other trouble created by *parivrājaka*.

Rohagupta, then, went to the Royal Assembly, and said "What does this poor mendicant know? Let him open any topic he likes, I will refute it. The shrewd *parivrājaka* knew that Rohagupta was very clever, and so, he thought of opening the topic with the acceptance of Rohagupta's own principles, so that, Rohagupta would not be able to refute the same.

He, then, opened the topic with this remark:— Like the two categories of good and evil, there are only two categories of (1) Jīvas or animate beings and (2) A-jīvas or in-animate ones in this world. This theory is acceptable to the Jainas, but for the sake of defeating the mendicant, Rohagupta refuted it by saying that all the objects in the Universe, could be divided into three categories:—Jīva, A-jīva and No-jīva. Hellish denizens, tiryancas manuṣyas etc come under the category of Jīva. Atoms, and ghaṭa, paṭa etc are Ajīvas and the dissected limbs such as a tail etc. of animals like house-lizard etc would come under the category of No-jīva. He argued that, like the three categories of best, medium, and the lowest, found in this world, there were three categories, of Jīvas. A-Jīvas, and No-jīvas in the Universe.

The *parivrājaka* was defeated by such an unexpected argument. So, being naturally enraged at Rohigupta, the parivrājaka, let loose his scorpions upon him. Rohagupta removed them with the help of his pea-cocks. In this way, the mendicant tried to defy Rohagupta by means of serpent, mice, deer, boars, crows and parrots, while Rohagupta over-powered all of them by means of mangeese, cats, tigers, lions, owls, and hawks respectively.

* Rajoharṇa a sacred broom of wool-threads always carried by Jaina Monks and Nuns for the purpose of cleaning beds, seats, etc. without inflicting any injury to vermin and insects which may happen to be there.

Finally the *parivrājaka* released a she-ass to kill Rohagupta. But, on seeing the she-ass coming towards him, Rohagupta waved the *Rajoharaṇa* (which his preceptor had given him) over his own head, and beat the she-ass with it, as a result of which, the she-ass ran away from him after passing urine and foeces etc. upon the *parivrājaka*.

The *parivrājaka*, who was thus vanquished in all ways, was then, driven away from the city with great humiliation. 159 (2454)

Now, the author proceeds to narrate the next incident in this connection—

जेऊण पोदशालं छट्ठओ भणइ गुरुमूलमागतुं ।
 वायम्मि मए विजिओ सुणह जहासौ सहामज्जे ॥१६०॥२४५५॥
 रासिदुगगहियपक्खो तइयं नोजीवरासिमादाय ।
 गिहकोलिकाइपुच्छच्छेओदाहरणओऽभिहिए ॥१६१॥२४५६॥
 भणइ गुरु सुट्ठु कय किं पुण जेऊण कीस नाभिहियं ।
 अयमवसिद्धंतो णे तइओ नोजीवरासि त्ति ॥१६२॥२४५७॥
 एवं गए वि गंतुं परिसामज्झम्मि भणसु नायं णे ।
 सिद्धंतो किंतु मए बुद्धिं परिभूय सो समिओ ॥१६३॥२४५८॥
 बहुसो स भणमाणा गुरुणा पडिभणइ किमवसिद्धतो ।
 जइ नाम जीवदेसो नोजीवो हुज्ज को दोसो ? ॥१६४॥२४५९॥

160. Jeṇṇa Poṭṭasālam chalaö bhaṇai gurumūlamāgantum ।
 Vāyammi maö vijjio suṇaha jahāsau sahāmajjhe. (2455)
161. Rāsīdugagahiyapakkho taiyam no-jīvarāsimādāya ।
 Gihakolīkāipucchacehōdāharaṇaö'bhīhie. (2456)
162. Bhaṇai gurū suṭṭhu kayam kim puṇa jeṇṇa kīsa nābhihiyam ।
 Ayamavasiddhanto ṇe taiö nojīvarāsi tti. (2457)
163. Evam gae vi gantum parisāmajjhammi bhaṇasu nāyam ṇe ।
 Siddhanto kintu mae buddhim paribhaya so samīö. (2458)

164. Bahuso sa bhaṇṇamāṇo gurunā paḍibhaṇai kimavasiddhanto ।
Jai nāma jīva-deso no-jīva hujja ko doso ? (2459)

[जित्वा षोडशालं षडुलूको भणति गुरुमूलमागतः ।
वादे मया विजितः शृणुत यथा स सभामध्ये ॥१६०॥२४५५॥

राशिद्विकगृहीतपक्षस्तृतीयं नोजीवराशिमादाय ।
गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छच्छेदोदाहरणतोऽभिहिते ॥१६१॥२४५६॥

भणति गुरुः सुष्ठु कृतं किं पुनर्जित्वा कस्माद् नाभिहितम् ।
अयमपसिद्धान्तो नस्तृतीयो नोजीवराशिरिति ॥१६२॥२४५७॥

एवं गतेऽपि गत्वा परिषन्मध्ये भण नायं नः ।
सिद्धान्तः किन्तु मया बुद्धिं परिभूय स शमितः ॥१६३॥२४५८॥

बहुशः स भण्यमानो गुरुणा प्रतिभणति किमपसिद्धान्तः ।
यदि नाम जीवदेशे नोजीवो भवेत् को दोषः ? ॥१६४॥२४५९॥

160. Jitvā Paṭṭasālam Ṣaḍulūko bhaṇati gurumulamāgataḥ ।
Vāde mayā vijitaḥ śruṇuta yathā sa sabhāmadhye. (2455)
161. Rāśīdvikagrihītapakṣastṛitīyam nojīvarāśīmādāya ।
Grihakolikādipuccacchedodāharaṇato'bhīhīte. (2456)
162. Bhaṇati guruḥ suṣṭhu kṛitaṁ kim punarjitvā kasmād nā-
bhihitam ।
Ayamapasiddhānto nastṛitīyo nojīvarāśīriti. (2457)
163. Evam gate'pi gatvā pariṣanmadhye bhaṇa nā'yam naḥ ।
Siddhāntaḥ kintu mayā buddhim paribhūya sa śamitaḥ. (2458)]
164. Bahuśaḥ sa bhaṇyamāno gurunā pratibhaṇati kimapasindhāntaḥ ।
Yadi nāma jīvadeśe no-jīvo bhavet kim doṣaḥ. (2459)]

Trans. 160-161-162-163.164 Having defeated Paṭṭasāla, Ṣaḍu-
luka approached the preceptor, and said “ (Please) hear how
he is defeated by me in discussion in the Royal Assembly.
(His) theory of two categories was refuted by me, resorting
to a third category of *no-jīva* with an illustration of the dis-

sected tail of a house-lizard.” “You have done a good deed by defeating him” said the preceptor, (but), then, why did you not declare that this principle of the third category (of) *no-jīva* was not acceptable to us? Even now, you may go to the Royal Assembly, and declare that, “That is not our principle, but (that was resorted to by me only temporarily) in order to defy his talents, and bring down (his pride).” When persuaded by the preceptor in many such ways, Rohagupta said “How (can you call it) a bad principle? What harm is there if we take a particular part of a living being to be No-jīva or slightly animate? (2455-2459).

टीका-१६०-१६१-१६२-१६३-१६४ व्याख्या-पोट्टशालपरिव्राजकं जित्वा गुरुचरणमूलमागत्य रोहगुप्तोऽपरनाम्ना तु षडुलूको भणति-स परिव्राजकाधमः समस्तनृपसभामध्ये यथा वादे मया विजितस्तथा शृणुत यूयं कथयामीति । तदेवाह-राशिद्वयगृहीतपक्षः स परिव्राजको मया वादे विजित इति प्राक्तनेन संबन्धः । किं कृत्वा ? इत्याह-तृतीयं जीवराशिमादाय पक्षीकृत्य । कुतो दृष्टान्तादसौ पक्षीकृत्य ? इत्याह-गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छमेव छिन्नत्वाच्छेदस्तदुदाहरणतस्तद्दृष्टान्तादित्यर्थः । एवं रोहगुप्तेनाभिहिते गुरुर्भणति-मुष्टु कृतं त्वया यदसौ जितः, किन्तु तत्रोत्तिष्ठता त्वया किमेतद् नाभिहितम् ? । किम् ? इत्याह-तृतीयो नोजीवराशिरत्ययं “णे त्ति” नोऽस्माकमपसिद्धान्तः जीवाऽजीवलक्षणराशिद्वयस्यैवाऽस्मत्सिद्धान्तेऽभिहितत्वादिति । तस्मादेवं गतेऽप्येतावत्यपि गत इत्यर्थः, तत्र परिषन्मध्ये गत्वा भण प्रतिपादय “नायं णे त्ति” नोऽस्माकं नायं सिद्धान्तः, किन्तु स परिव्राजकस्तद्बुद्धिं परिभूय तिरस्कृत्य शमित उपशमं नीतो दर्प त्याजित इत्यर्थः । एवं बहुशोऽनेकधा गुरुणा भण्यमानः स रोहगुप्तः प्रतिभणति प्रत्युत्तरयति-आचार्य ? किमयमपसिद्धान्तः ? । यदि हि नोजीवलक्षण तृतीयराश्यभ्युपगमे कोऽपि दोषः स्यात् तदा स्यादयमपसिद्धान्तः, न चैतदस्ति । कुतः ? इत्याह-यदि नाम गृहकोलिकापुच्छादिजीवदेशो नोजीव भवेत्-नोजीवत्वेनाभ्युपगम्येत, तर्हि को दोषः स्यात् ? न कमपि दोषमत्र पश्याम इत्यर्थः । ततः किमित्यपसिद्धान्तत्वे दोषपहिरार्थं पुनर्मां तत्र प्रेषयसि ? इति भावः ॥ २४५५॥२४५६॥२४५७॥२४५८॥२४५९॥

D. C. Having defeated the parivrājaka known as Poṭṭaśāla,

in discussion in the Royal Assembly, Rohagupta, who was also known as *Saduḷka, came to the preceptor and requested him to hear the whole incident of his success. "His theory of two categories' he said" was refuted by me by advancing a third category of *no-jīva* supported by the example of a house lizard with its tail dissected."

Ācārya :-You have done a good deed by defeating him But while leaving the assembly at the end, why did you not declare that the theory of the third category of *No-jīva* is not acceptable to us? Even, now, you may go to the assembly and declare that this is not our theory but it was advanced by us only for the sake of bringing down the pride of Poṭṭasāla.

Rohagupta:—Revered sir, how can we take as an unacceptable theory? What difficulty does it give rise to? For, if a dissected part like the tail of an animal like house-lizard were apprehended as *no-jīva* or slightly animate, I do not see any harm in holding the theory of three categories. 160-164 (2455-2459)

Rohagupta, now tries to justify his theory in this way:-

जं देसनिसेहपरो नोसद्धो जीवदव्वदेसो य ।

गिहकोइलाइपुच्छं विलक्खणं तेण नोजीवो ॥१६५॥२४६०॥

165. Jam desanisehaparo nosaddo jīvadavvadeso ya ।

Gihakōlāipuccham vilakkhaṇam teṇa no-jīvo. (2460)

[यद् देशनिषेधपरो नोशब्दो जीवद्रव्यदेशश्च ।

गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं विलक्षणं तेन नोजीवः ॥१६५॥२४६०॥

165. Yad deśaniṣedhaparo nośabdo jīvadravyadeśaśca ।

Grihakolikādipuccham vilakṣaṇam tena no-jīvaḥ. (2460)]

Trans. 165. As the term 'no' suggests the removal of a portion and that (too) a portion of the animate body, the tail of a house-lizard etc. being separated (from the animate

* Saduḷka- A believer in six substances with Ulūka as his gotra, i.e. Rohagupta, who belonged to Ulūka gotra.

body of house-lizard etc.) should be taken as no-jīva (slightly animate) 2460.

टीका-१६५ यद् यस्माद् “नोजीवः” इत्यत्र नोशब्दो देशनिषेधपरो न तु सर्वनिषेधपरः, नोजीवो जीवैकदेशो, न तु सर्वस्यापि जीवस्याभाव इत्यर्थः । भवत्वेवं देशनिषेधको नोशब्दः, परं गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं जीवदेशो न भविष्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह-जीवद्रव्यैकदेशश्च गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छम्, आदिशब्दाच्छिन्नपुरुषादिहस्तादयः परिगृह्यन्ते । कथंभूतं तद् गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छम् ? इत्याह-विलक्षणं “जीवा-ऽजीवेभ्यः” इति गम्यते, तथाहि न तावद् गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं जीवत्वेन व्यपदेष्टुं शक्यते, तत्कार्यैकदेशत्वेन तद्विलक्षणत्वात् । नाप्यजीव इत्यभिधातुं पार्यते, स्फुरणादिभिस्तेभ्योऽपि विलक्षणत्वात् । येनैवम्, तेन कारणेन पारिशेष्याद् नोजीव एतदुच्यत इति ॥२४६०॥

D. C. Since ‘no’¹ signifies dissection of a particular portion and not of the whole body, negation of the whole jīva is not implied thereby. Such dissected portions being different from jīva (animate body) as well as from a-jīva (inanimate body), should be taken as no-jīva. Since a tail dissected from the body of a house-lizard and a hand dissected from the body of a man, are only the portions of the respective jīvas, they cannot be taken as jīvas. They cannot be taken even under the category of a-jīvas, because they move even after they are cut off from the animate bodies.

Thus, being different from jīva and a-jīva, they are known as no-jīva or slightly animate bodies by the method of elimination. 165 (2460)

It has also been sanctioned by the Holy Writ viz:-

धम्ममाइदसविहादेसओ य देसो वि जं पिहुं वत्थुं ।

अपिहुब्भूओ किं पुण च्छिन्नं गिहकोलियापुच्छं ? ॥१६६॥२४६१॥

166. Dhammāidasavihādesaō ya deso vi jam pihum vatthum ।

· Apihubbhūō kim puṇa cchinnam gihakoliyāpuccham ? (2461)

इच्छद् जीवपएसं नोजीवं जं च समभिरूढो वि ।

तेण त्थि तओ समए चडदेसो नोघडो जह वा ॥१६७॥२४६२॥

167. Icchai jīvapaesam no-jīvam jam ca samabhirūḍho vi ।
Teṇa tthi taṭṭha samae ghaḍa-deśo no-ghaḍo jaha vā. (2462)

[धर्मादिदशविधादेशतश्च देशोऽपि यत् पृथग् वस्तु ।
अपृथग्भूतः किं पुनश्छिन्नं गृहकोलिकापुच्छम् ? ॥१६६॥२४६१॥
इच्छति जीवप्रदेशं नोजीवं यच्च समभिरूढोऽपि ।
तेनास्ति सकः समये घटदेशो नोघटो यथा वा ॥१६७॥२४६२॥

166. Dharinādidaśavidhādeśataṣca deśo'pi yat prithag vastu ।
A-prithagbhritaḥ kim punaśchinnam grihakolikāpuccham ?
(2461)
167. Icchati jīvapradeśam no-jīvam yacca samabhirūḍho'pi ।
Tenāsti sakaḥ samaye ghaṭa-deśo no-ghaṭo yathā vā. (2462)]

Trans. 166-167. By the commandment of the ten varieties of the category of Dharmastikāya and others, when even a portion (actually) combined (with the body), is (taken as) a separate entity, what to talk of the tail of a house-lizard that has already been cut off (from the body)? The *samabhirūḍha* view-point also admits *jīvapradeśa* or a part of *jīva* as *no-jīva*. So, just as a portion of *ghaṭa* is *no-ghaṭa*, a part of *jīva* should be taken as *no-jīva*, as a (matter of) principle. (2461-2462)

टीका-१६६-१६७ व्याख्या-चकारस्य भिन्नक्रमत्वाद् यद् यस्मात् कारणाद् देशोऽपीत्यपिशब्दस्यापि भिन्नक्रमत्वाद् धर्मास्तिकायादिदेशिनः “अपि-हुब्भूओ ति” अपृथग्भूतोऽप्येकत्वमापन्नोऽपि देशः “पिहं वत्थुं ति” सिद्धान्ते पृथग् वस्तु “भणितः” इति शेषः, पृथग्वस्तुत्वेन निर्दिष्ट इत्यर्थः । किंपुनर्यच्छिन्नमात्मनः पृथग्भूतं कृतं तद् गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छं पृथग्वस्तु न भविष्यति ? भविष्यत्येवेति । तच्च जीवच्छिन्नत्वेन पृथग्भूतत्वात्, स्फुरणादिना चाजीवविलक्षणत्वात् सामर्थ्याद् नोजीव एवेति भावः । कुतः पुनर्वचनादेष सिद्धान्ते पृथग्

1. For, ‘no’ means slight or little, and hence it does not signify the negation of the whole body, but only a portion of the whole.

वस्तु भणितः ? इत्याह—“ धम्माइदसविहादेसउ त्ति ” धर्मास्तिकायादिनाममूर्ता-
जीवानां दशविधादेशतो दशविधत्वभणनात् । एतदुक्तं भवति—अजीवप्ररूपणां
कुर्वद्भिरुक्तं परममुनिभिः—“ अजीवा दुविहा पणत्ता, तं जहा—रूवि अजीवा य,
अरूवि अजीवा य । रूवि अजीवा चउव्विहा पणत्ता, तं जहा—खंधा, देसा,
पएसा, परमाणुपोग्गला । अरूवि अजीवा दसविहा पणत्ता, तं जहा—धम्मत्थिकाए,
धम्मत्थिकायस्स देसे, धम्मत्थिकायस्स पएसे, एवमधम्मत्थिकाए वि, आगास-
त्थिकाए वि, अद्वासमए ” । तदेवं धर्मास्तिकायादीनां दशविधत्वभणनेन तद्देशस्य
पृथग्वस्तुत्वमुक्तमेव, अन्यथा दशविधत्वानुपपत्तेः । यदा च धर्मास्तिकायादीनां
देशस्तेभ्योऽपृथग्भूतोऽपि पृथग्वस्तुच्यते, तथा गृहकोलिकापुच्छादिकं छिन्नत्वेन
जीवात् पृथग्भूतं सुतरां वस्तु भवति । तच्च जीवा—ऽजीवविलक्षणत्वाद् नोजीव
इत्युक्तमेवेति । अपि च, यद् यस्मात् कारणाज्जीवप्रदेशं नोजीवं समभिरूढनयोऽ-
पीच्छति, तेन तस्मात् तकोऽसौ नोजीवः समये सिद्धान्तेऽप्यस्ति, न पुनर्मयैव
केवलेनोच्यते, तथा चानुयोगद्वारेषु प्रमाणद्वारान्तर्गतं नयप्रमाणं विचारयता
प्रोक्तम्—“ समभिरूढो सदनयं भणइ—जइ कम्मधारण भगसि तो एवं भणाहि-
जीवे य से पएसे य से सपएसे नोजीवे ” इति । तदनेन प्रदेशलक्षणो जीवैकदेशो
नोजीव उक्तः, यथा घटैकदेशो नोघट इति । तस्मादस्ति नोजीवलक्षणस्तृतीय-
राशिः, युक्त्या—ऽऽगमसिद्धत्वात् जीवा—ऽजीवादितत्त्ववदिति ॥२४६१—२४६२॥

D. C. It has been laid down in Siddhāntas that—

“ A-jīvā duvihā paṇattā, taṃ jahā-Rūvi a-jīvā ya, a-ravi
a-jīvā ya. Ravi a-jīvā cauvvihā paṇattā, taṃ jahā-Khaṇḍā, desā,
paesā, paramāṇu poggalā. A-ravi a-jīvā dasavihā paṇattā, taṃ
jahā 1. Dhammatthikāe, 2. dhammatthikāyassa dese, 3. dhamma-
tthikāyassa paese, 4. a-dhammatthi-kāyo, 5. a-dhammatthikāyassa
deśe, 6. a-dhammatthikāyassa paese, 7. āgāsattikāe, 8. āgāsatti-
kāyassa dese, 9. āgāsattikāyassa paese and 10. adbhāsamae. ”

[The a-jīvas or inanimate objects are divided into two types:
Corporal (rapī) and in-corporal (a-rapī). The corporal a-jīvas
are of four types :—1. Elements (Skandha) 2. their parts—deśas
3. their praśeśas (bodies) and 4. their atoms (Paramāṇu pūḍgalas).

The in-corporal a-jīvas (a-rapī a-jīvas) are of ten types

viz 1. *Dharmāstikāya, 2. Dharmāstikāya deśa (part of Dharmāstikāya), 3. Dharmāstikāya pradeśa (Body of Dharmāstikāya) 4. A-dharmāsti kāya, 5. A-dharmāstikāya deśa (part of A-dharmāsti kāya), 6. A-dharmāsti kāya pradeśa (body of a-dharmāsti kāya), 7. Ākāśāstikāya (predicament of space), 8. Ākāśāsti kāya deśa (part of Ākāśāsti kāya), 9. Ākāśāsti kāya pradeśa (body of Ākāśāsti kāya), 10. Addhā samaya (kāla) the predicament of time.]

While describing the ten varieties of Dharmāstikāya etc. mentioned above, although the deśas or various portions of each one of them, are one with them, they are necessarily taken as completely different entities. So, there is all the more reason for taking parts like tail etc. of house-lizard etc, that have already been cut off from the main bodies of jīvas as separate entities, which being naturally different from jīvas, as well as *a-jīvas*, may again be taken under the category of *no-jīvas*.

According to Samabhirūḍha naya² a part of the whole jīva is taken as *no-jīva*. Thus, the category of *no-jīva* is not only my conception, but it is laid down by the religious principles, as well. It has also been said in Anuyogadvāra Sūtra "Samabhirūḍho saddanayam bhaṇai jai kammadhāraṇa bhaṇasi to evam bhaṇāhi.—Jīve ya se paese, ya se sa-paese no-jīve."

* Dharmāstikāya. There is no English equivalent for the Jaina terms -Dharmāstikāya and A-dharmāstikāya. Dharmāstikāya may be rendered as the cosmic principle which upholds (or simply conditions), the order of simultaneous (or consentaneous) *movements* in the world answering somewhat to Leibnitz's Pre-established harmony. Dharmāstikāya is not simply the accompanying cause of movements—it is something more—it is the cause (or condition) of the system of movements—the fact of an order in movements of Jīva and Pūdgala. (—Dr. Seal.) A-dharmāstikāya is the reverse of Dharmāstikāya.

2. For detailed explanation of Samabhirūḍha naya. See Chapter I.

[The *samabhiradha* naya explains the etymological interpretation. So, if you interpret it according to the Karmadhāraya compound, dissolve it as follows:—*Jīvaśca sa pradeśaśca tasya svapradeśo no-jīvaḥ*—a part of the animate body is *no-jīva* or slightly animate.]

Thus one portion of *jīva* is called *no-jīva*, just as one part of *ghaṭa* is *no-ghaṭa*. So, there is a third category of *no-jīva* like *jīva* and *a-jīva* supported by the commandments of *āgamas*.

The Ācārya replies to all these arguments in this way:—

जइ ते सुयं पमाणं तो रासी तेसु तेसु सुत्तेसु ।
दो जीवाऽजीवाणं न सुए नोजीवरासि त्ति ॥१६८॥२४६३॥

168. Jai te suyam pamāṇam to rāsī tesu tesu suttesu ।
Do jīvā'jīvāṇam na sue nojīvarāsi tti. (2463)

[यदि ते श्रुतं प्रमाणं ततो राशी तेषु तेषु सूत्रेषु ।
दो जीवाऽजीवानां न श्रुते नोजीवराशिरिति ॥१६८॥२४६३॥

168. Yadi te śrutam pramāṇam tato rāśī teṣu teṣu sūtreṣu ।
Do jīvā'jīvānām na śrute no-jīvarāśīriti. (2463)]

Trans. 168. If the Holy Writ is authentic (according) to you, then (only) two categories—of *jīvas* and *a-jīvas*—are laid down by the various commandments in the *Siddhāntas*, (but)* not the category of *no-jīvas*. 2463.

टीका—१६८ “धम्माइदसविहादेसओ य’ इत्याद्युपन्यासात् सूत्रप्रामाण्यवादी किल लक्ष्ये भवान् । तद् यदि सत्यमेव तव सूत्रं प्रमाणम्, ततस्तर्हि तेषु तेषु सूत्रेषु जीवाऽजीवरूपौ द्वावेव राशी प्रोक्तौ, तथा च स्थानाङ्गसूत्रम्—“दुवे रासी पणत्ता तं जहा—जीवा चेव अजीवा चेव” । तथा, अनुयोगद्वारसूत्रेऽप्युक्तम्—“कइविहा णं भन्ते ! दव्वा पणत्ता । गोयमा ! दुविहा पणत्ता, तं जहा—“जीवदव्वा य अजीवदव्वा य” । तथा, उत्तराध्ययनसूत्रे चाभिहितम्—“जीवा चेव अजीवा य एस लोए वियाहिए” इत्याद्यन्येष्वपि सूत्रेषु द्रष्टव्यम् । नोजीवराशिस्तु तृतीयः श्रुते न कचिदप्यभिहितः, तत् कथं तत्सत्त्वं प्ररूपणा न श्रुता-

शातना ? इति । न च धर्मास्तिकायादीनां देशस्तेभ्यो भिन्नः कोऽप्यस्ति, विवक्षामात्रेणैव तस्य भिन्नवस्तुत्वकल्पनात् ॥२४६३॥

D. C.

Ācārya:--Since you quote expressions like "dhammāi dasa vihāi etc., you seem to be a follower of the Holy Writ. If you really believe in the authenticity of its sūtras, you should note that they are in favour of the two categories of jīvas and a-jīvas only.

It is said in Sthānāṅga Sūtra³ that "Duve rāsī paṇṇattā tam jahā-Jīvā ceva, A-jīvā ceva."

[Only two categories are taught; the category of Jīvas and that of A-jīvas.]

It has also been mentioned in the Anuyogadvāra Sūtra "Kaiviha ṇam bhante ! davvā paṇṇattā ? ! Goyamā ! duvihā paṇṇattā, tam jahā-Jīva-davvā ya, A-jīva davvā ya."

[Of how many types are the elements, O Lord ! known ? O Gautama ! They are of two types-Jīvas and A-jīvas.]

It is also said in the Uttarādhyayana Sūtra⁴ that "Jīvā ceva A-jīvā ya esa loe viyāhie."

[They (i. e. objects of the Universe) are known as Jīvas and A-jīvas in this world.]

We can quote similar instances from other Sūtras, but there is no reference of the third category of *no-jīvas* in any part of the Holy Writ. So, if you try to establish its existence, you defy the authority of the Siddhāntas.

The deśas of dharmāstikāya etc. mentioned before, are not different from the bodies of those elements actually. They are merely imagined as different entities for the sake of argument.

3. Vide Sthānāṅga Sūtra, Adhyayana 2. Uldeśa 4. Sūtra 95. page 81. (Āgamodaya Samiti edition.)

4. Vide Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, Adhyayana 36 (Jīvā-jīva vibhatti) Gāthā 2.

Similarly, tail etc. are also one with the bodies of animals like house-lizard etc. on account of their intimate connection with each other. 168 (2463)

And hence, they are taken under the category of jīva and not of no-jīva (as you say), in the following way,

गिहकोलियाइपुच्छे छिन्नमि तदन्तरालसंबन्धो ।

सुत्तेऽभिहितो सुहृमासुत्तत्तणो तदग्गहणं ॥१६९॥२४६४॥

169. Gihakoliyāipucche chinnammi taṇṭantarālasambandho ।

Sutte'bhihiō suhumāmuttattaṇaō tadaggahaṇam. (2464)

[गृहकोलिकादिपुच्छे छिन्ने तदन्तरालसम्बन्धः ।

सूत्रेऽभिहितः सूक्ष्माऽमूर्तत्वतस्तदग्रहणम् ॥१६९॥२४६४॥

169. Grihakolikāḍipucche chinne taṇṭantarālasambandhaḥ ।

Sātre'bhihitāḥ suksmā'mūrtatvatastadagrahaṇam. (2464)]

Trans. 169. With regard to the tail of house-lizard etc. being cut off, the rule lays down their internal connection; (But) that is not apprehended on account of its being subtle and formless. 2464.

टीका—१६९ गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छादिकेऽवयवे छुरिकादिना छिन्नेऽपि तयोर्गृहकोलिक पुच्छादिवस्तुनोर्यदन्तरालं विचालं तत्र जीवप्रदेशानां संबन्धः संयोगस्तदन्तरालसम्बन्धः सूत्रेऽभिहित एव । तथा च भगवतीसूत्रम्—अहं भंते ! कुम्मा कुम्मावलिया, गोहा गोहावलिया, गोणे गोणावलिया, मणुसे मणुसावलिया, महिसे महिसावलिया, एएसिं णं दुहा वा, तिहा वा, संखेज्जहा असंखेज्जहा वा छिन्नाणं जे अंतरा ते वि णं तेहिं जीवपएसेहिं फुडा ? । हन्ता फुडा । पुरिसे णं भंते ! अंतरे हन्थेण वा, पाएण वा, अंगुलियाए वा, कट्टेण वा, किलिंचेण वा, आमुसमाणे वा, संमुसमाणे वा, आलिहमाणे वा, विलिहमाणे वा, अण्णयरेण वा तिव्वेणं सत्थजाएणं आछिंदमाणे वा, विछिंदमाणे वा अगणिकाएणं समोदुहमाणे तेसिं जीवपएसाणं किंचि आवाहं विवाहं वा उप्पाएइ, विच्छेयं वा करेइ ? । नो इण्ठे समट्ठे । नो खलु तत्थ सत्थं संकमइ” इति । यदि नामैवं सूत्रे जीवप्रदेशानां तदन्तरालसंबन्धोऽभिहितः, तर्हि तदन्तराले ते जीवप्रदेशाः किमिति नोपल-

भ्यन्ते ? इत्याह—“सुहुमेत्यादि” कर्मणश्शरीरस्य सूक्ष्मत्वात्, जीवप्रदेशानां चामूर्तत्वादन्तराले तेषां जीवप्रदेशानां सतामप्यग्रहणं तदग्रहणमिति ॥२४६४॥

D. C. Even when parts like tail etc. of animals like house-lizard etc. have been dissected by means of instruments like knife etc., the Sūtra, undoubtedly provides for the internal connection of atoms of jīvas in the intermediary region between body and its parts.

The Bhagavatī Sūtra speaks of the same principle:—

Aha bhante ! kummā kummāvaliyā, gohā gohāvaliyā, goṇe goṇāvaliyā, maṇuse maṇusāvaliyā, mahise mahisāvaliyā, èḥsim ṇam duhā vā, tiḥā vā, asaṃkhejjahā vā, chinnāṇam je antarā te vi ṇam tehim jīvapaesehim phuḍā (Hantā phuḍā) Purise ṇam bhante ! antare hattheṇa vā, pāeṇa vā, aṅguliya vā, kaṭṭheṇa vā, kilinceṇa vā, āmusamāṇe vā, - sammusamāṇe vā, ālihamāṇe vā, vilihamāṇe vā, aṇṇayareṇa vā tikkheṇam satthajāeṇam āchinda-māṇe vā, vichindamāṇe vā, aganikāeṇam samoduhamāṇe tesim jīvapaesāṇam kimci ābāham vi-bāham vā uppāḍi viccheyam vā karēi ? (No iṇaṭṭhe samaṭṭhe) No khalu tattha sattham saṃkamai. ”

[And, O Lord ! are the tortoise, lizard, bullock, man, and buffalo respectively (taken as) their parts also ? Are they divided into two, three or innumerable particles of jīva, so that, they are exhibited as the particles of jīva, even in their intermediary regions ? Or, can a person commit any harm or obstruction or complete destruction by means of rubbing, erasing, licking, sucking, or even destroying it with a sharp weapon, or by means of his hand, foot, wrist etc ?

“No, that is not the right implication. A weapon does not go beyond that.”]⁵

5. नैनं छिन्दन्ति शस्त्राणि नैनं दहति पावकं ।
न चैनं क्लेदयन्त्यापो न शोषयति मासतः ॥

—(श्रीमद् भगवद्गीता)

Thus, the Sātra lays down the principle of the internal relation between the *jīva* and its *pradeśas* in the intermediary regions between soul and body.

But since Kārmaṇa body is incorporeal, the atoms of Jīva are not apprehended in spite of their being present in the intermediary regions

These are not apprehended even from movements etc. as in the case of body, tail etc. 169 (2464)

Because,

गज्ज्ञा मुत्तिगयाओ नागासे जहा पईवरस्सीओ ।
तह जीवलक्खणाइं देहे न तदंतरालम्मि ॥१७०॥२४६५॥

170. Gajjhā muttigayāo nāgāse jahā paivarassīo ।

Taha jīvalakkhaṇāim dehe na tadantarālammi. (2465)

[ग्राह्या मूर्तिगता नाकाशे यथा प्रदीपरश्मयः ।
तथा जीवलक्षणानि देहे न तदन्तराले ॥१७०॥२४६५॥

170. Grāhyā mūrtigatā nākāśe yathā pradīparaśmayah ।

Tathā jīvalakṣaṇāni dehe na tadantārāle. (2465)]

Trans. 170. Just as rays of a lamp (become) apprehensible (only when) accompanied by a concrete object, and not (when spread) in sky, so also, the characteristics of a living being, (become apprehensible) (only) in body, and not in (its) intermediary space. 2465.

टीका-१७० इह भू-कुड्य-वरण्डका-ऽन्धकारादीनि वस्तुन्येव मूर्तियोगाद् मूर्तिरुच्यन्ते । ततश्च यथा मूर्तिगता यथोक्तवस्तुगता एवेत्यर्थः, प्रदीपरश्मयो ग्राह्या भवन्ति, न तु केवल आकाशे प्रसृताः, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण जीवो लक्ष्यते यैस्तानि जीवलक्षणानि भाषणो-च्छ्वास-निःश्वास-धावन-वल्लगन-स्फुरणादीनि देह एव गृह्यन्ते न तु तदन्तराल इति ॥२४६५॥

D. C. The rays of light proceeding from a lamp are perceived only when they come in contact with a concrete object like ground, a wall, verandah, or darkness, but not when spread in sky.

Similarly, various characteristics of a living being such as its speech, breathing in, breathing out, running, galloping, vibrating movements etc. are recognized only on body and not in its intermediary space. 170 (2465)

देहरहियं न गिण्हइ निरतिसओ नातिसुहुमदेहं व ।

न य से होइ विबाहा जीवस्स भवन्तराले व्व ॥१७१॥२४६६॥

171. Deharahiyam na giṇhai niratisaō nātisuhumadeham va ।
Na ya se hōi vibāhā jīvassa bhavāntarāle vva. (2466)

[देहरहितं न गृह्णाति निरतिशयो नातिसूक्ष्मदेहमिव ।

न च तस्य भवति विबाधा जीवस्य भवान्तराल इव ॥१७१॥२४६६॥

171. Deharahitam na grihṇāti niratiśayo nātisūkṣmadehamiva ।
Na ca tasya bhavati vibādhā jīvasya bhavāntarāla iva. (2466)]

Trans. 171. Just as the soul is not able to apprehend a body having an extremely minute form, so also, a person who does not possess superhuman powers, is not able to perceive (a soul) without body That soul is not damaged (in any way) as in (the case of its state) intermediary between (two) lives. 2466.

टीका-१७१ देहाभावे जीवलक्षणानामभावाद् देहरहितं मुक्तात्मानं छिन्नपुच्छाद्यन्तरालवर्तिनं वा जीवं निरतिशयः केवलज्ञानाद्यतिशयरहितो जन्तुर्न गृह्णाति । तथा, अतिसूक्ष्मो देहो यस्य तमतिसूक्ष्मदेहं निगोदादिजीवं कर्मणकाय-योगिनं वा जन्तुं नासौ गृह्णाति । न च "से" तस्य जीवस्यान्तरालवर्तिषु प्रदेशेष्वनन्तरदर्शितसिद्धान्तसूत्रीक्तयुक्त्या कुन्ता-असि-सेह्यादिशस्त्रैरग्नि-जलादि-मिवा विबाधा पीडा काचिद् भवति, भवान्तराले कर्मणशरीरवर्तिजीवप्रदेश-वदिति ॥२४६६॥

D. C A jīva is not perceptible, if it is not accompanied by body. So, a person who has not attained an excellence like Absolute Knowledge, is not able to perceive the soul unaccompanied by body.

On the other hand, the soul is, also, not able to apprehend an object which is *sukṣma* or extremely minute in form.

Like the atoms of *jīva* in the *Kārmaṇa* state, *Jīva* itself is not affected by spear, sword etc. or by fire, water etc. on the strength of the *Sūtras* mentioned before.⁶

Rohagupta :—Just as a separate piece of *ghaṭa* fallen in the street, is known as *no-ghaṭa* (or a part of *ghaṭa*), why should tails etc of *jīvas* like house-lizard etc. be not taken as *no-jīvas* (parts of *Jīva*) when they have already been cut off from the respective main body?

Ācārya :—No. It is not proper to do so. 171 (2466)

For,

दव्वामुत्तत्ताकयभावादविकारदरिसणाओ य ।

अविणासकारणाहि य नभसो व्व न खंडसो नासो ॥१७२॥२४६७।

172. Davvāmuttattākayabhāvādvikāradarisaṇāō ya ।

Avināsakāraṇāhi ya nabhaso vva na khaṇḍaso nāso. (2467)

[द्रव्यमूर्तत्वादकृतभावादविकारदर्शनाच्च ।

अविनाशकारणाच्च नभस इव न खण्डशो नाशः ॥१७२॥२४६७॥

172. Dravyāmurtatvādakṛitabhāvādvikāradarśanācca ।

Avināśakāraṇācca nabhasa iva na khaṇḍaśo nāśaḥ. (2467)]

Trans. 172. Since the matter (of which *jīva* is formed) is abstract, and since it is immutable, indestructible, and spontaneous, like sky, it could not be destroyed by part. (2467)

टीका—१७२ खण्डशो जीवस्य नाशो न भवतीति प्रतिज्ञा, अमूर्तद्रव्यत्वात्, अकृतकभावात्—अकृतकत्वादित्यर्थः, तथा घटादेः कपालादिवद् बिकारदर्शनाभावात्, अविनाशकारणत्वाच्च; विनाशकारणानामग्नि-शस्त्रादीनामभावाच्चेत्यर्थ इत्येते हेतवः । सर्वेषु “नभस इव” इति दृष्टान्त इति ॥२४६७॥

6. Vide verse 2464. Again,

॥ अच्छेद्योऽयमदाहोऽयमक्लेद्योऽशोष्य एव च ॥

(श्रीमद् भगवद् गीता)

D. C. Like 'sky, it is not possible to destroy soul, by means of dividing it, into various parts. Because, jīva is made of abstract matter, and it is immutable, indestructible, and spontaneous, like sky. 172 (2467)

And if the theory of destruction by parts were accepted—

नासे य सव्वनासो जीवस्स नासो य जिनमयच्चाओ ।
तत्तो य अणिमुक्खो दिक्खावेफल्लदोसा य ॥१७३॥२४६८॥

173. Nāse ya savvanāso jīvassa nāso ya Jinamayaccāo ।
Tatto ya aṇimukkho dikkhāvephalladosā ya. (2468)

[नाशे च सर्वनाशो जीवस्य नाशश्च जिनमतत्यागः ।
ततश्चानिर्मोक्षो दीक्षावैफल्यदोषाश्च ॥१७३॥२४६८॥

173. Nāse ca sarvanāśo jīvasya nāśaśca Jinamatatyāgaḥ ।
Tataścānirmokṣo dīkṣāvaiphalyadosāśca. (2468)]

Trans. 173. And in case of accepting this sort of destruction, there would also be entire destruction of jīva, (resulting in) the rejection of Jina mata (the Siddhāntas of the Tīrthaṅkaras). Then, there would be nothing like Final Emancipation and faults such as the futility of the observance of Dīkṣā (asceticism) etc. (would arise) 2468.

टीका—१७३ शस्त्रच्छेदादिना जीवप्रदेशस्य नाशे चेष्ट्यमाणे क्रमशः सर्वनाशोऽपि कदाचित् तस्य भवेत् । तथाहि—यत् खण्डशो नश्यति तस्य सर्वनाशो दृष्टः, यथा घटादेः, तथा च त्वयेष्ट्यते जीवः, ततः सर्वनाशस्तस्य प्राप्नोति । भवत्वेतदपि, किं न क्षूयते ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । कुतः ? इत्याह—“नासो येत्यादि” स च जीवस्य सर्वनाशो न युक्तः, यस्माज्जिनमतत्यागहेतुत्वाज्जिनमतत्यागोऽसौ । जिनमते हि जीवस्य सतः सर्वथा विनाशोऽसतश्च सर्वथोत्पादः सर्वत्र निषिद्ध एव । यदाह—“जीवा णं भंते ! किं वड्ढंति हायंति, अवड्ढिया ? । गोयमा ? नो वड्ढंति, नो हायंति, अवड्ढिया” इत्यादि । अतो जीवस्य सर्वथा नाशोऽभ्युपगम्यमाने जिनमतत्याग एव स्यात् । तथा ततस्तत्सर्वनाशादनिर्मोक्षो मोक्षाभावः प्राप्नोति, मुमुक्षोः सर्वथा नाशत् । मोक्षाभावे च दीक्षादिकष्टानुष्ठानवैफल्यम् ।

क्रमेण च सर्वेषामपि जीवानां सर्वनाशे संसारस्य शून्यताप्राप्तिः, कृतस्य च शुभाशुभकर्मणो जीवस्य सर्वनाश एवमेव नाशात् कृतनाशप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि वाच्यमिति, न जीवस्य खण्डशो नाशः । गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छादिखण्डस्य पृथग्भूतत्वेन प्रत्यक्षत एव नाशो दृश्यत इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम् । औदारिकशरीरस्यैव हि तत् खण्डमध्यक्षतो वीक्ष्यते, न तु जीवस्य, तस्यामूर्तत्वेन केनापि खण्डयितुमशक्यत्वादिति ॥२४६८॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—If a *jīva* were taken to have been damaged by the blows of weapons etc. it would gradually meet with complete destruction. For, that which is partially destroyed, is naturally susceptible to complete destruction, as in the case of *ghaṭa*. So, if you take *jīva* to be susceptible to partial destruction, it would naturally become susceptible to complete destruction also.

But looking to the Jaina Scriptures, this is entirely improper. According to them, neither complete destruction nor complete production of an existent being, is achieved.

It is said, “*Jīvā ṇam bhante ! kim vaḍḍhanti hāyanti avatṭhiyā ?* etc.

[O Lord ! are the *jīvas* susceptible to increase or destruction ? Or, do they, remain what they are ? “ O Gautama ! they neither increase, nor perish, but they remain what they are.”]

Thus, by accepting the view of complete destruction of *jīva*, you will chiefly violate the principle of the Jinās (Tirthaṅkaras).

Secondly, in that case, there would be nothing like Mokṣa. For, in absence of *Jīva*, who would attain Mokṣa ? And, when Mokṣa does not exist, nobody would see any sense in observing *dikṣā* and such other religious rites.

Thirdly, with the destruction of all *jīvas* one by one, the whole world will be deserted.

Fourthly, in case of all pervading negation, since all the actions, good or evil, will perish without yielding fruit, the fault of *kṛita-nāśa*⁷ will arise.

Thus, it is utterly improper to believe in entire destruction of Jīva.

Rohagupta :—Parts such as tail etc. of animals like house-lizard etc., that have already been separated from their bodies, are apprehended as perished directly. Then, why do you refuse to take such parts as *no-jvas* ?

Ācārya—Such parts do not actually belong to Jīva, but they belong to the gross body which invests the soul.

Since Jīva is *a-marta*, it is not possible to divide it into parts. 173 (2468)

Again, Rohagupta raises a question and the Ācārya replies—

अहं खंधो इव संघाय-भेदधम्मा स तो वि सव्वेसिं ।
अवरोप्परसंकरओ सुहाइगुणसंकरो पत्तो ॥१७४॥२४६९॥

174. Aha khandho iva saṅghāya-bheyadhammā sa to vi savvesim ।
Avaropparasaṅkaraō suhāigūṇasaṅkaro patto. (2469)

[अथ स्कन्ध इव सङ्घात-भेदधर्मा स ततोऽपि सर्वेषाम् ।
परस्परसंकरतः सुखादिगुणसंकरः प्राप्तः ॥१७४॥२४६९॥

174. Atha skandha iva saṅghāta-bhedadhammā sa tato'pi sarveṣām ।

Parasparasaṅkarataḥ sukhādigūṇasaṅkaraḥ prāptaḥ. (2469)]

Trans. 174. And, if that is (taken as) susceptible to association and dissociation, like a concrete object, then also, on account of their inter-combination (with each other), all objects will attain inter-combination of the properties like happiness etc. 2469.

टीका—१७४ अथ पुद्गलस्कन्ध इव सावयवत्वात् स जीवः संघात-भेदधर्मा-
ऽभ्युपगम्यते, तथा क्वचिद् विवक्षितपुद्गलस्कन्धेऽन्यस्कन्धगतं खण्डं समागत्य

7. Apprehension of an object as destroyed, in spite of its being existent.

संहन्यते संबध्यते, तद्गतं च खण्डं भित्वाऽन्यत्र गच्छति, एवं जीवस्याप्यन्यजीव-
खण्डं संहन्यते, तद्गतं तु भिद्यत इत्येवं संघातभेदधर्मा जीव इष्यत इति । अतः
खण्डशो नाशेऽपि संघातस्यापि सद्भावाद् न तस्य सर्वनाश इति परस्परमभिप्रायः ।
अत्र दूषणमाह—“तो वि सव्वेसिं इत्यादि” एवमपि च सति सर्वेषामपि सर्वलोक-
वर्तिनां जीवानां परस्परसंकरतः सुखादिगुणसंकरः प्राप्तः । इदमुक्तं भवति—यदैकं
जीवसम्बन्धिभूतशुभाशुभकर्मान्वितं खण्डमन्यजीवस्य संबध्यते, अन्यसम्बन्धि तु
खण्डं तस्य संबध्यते, तदा तत्सुखादयोऽन्यस्य प्रसजन्ति, अन्यसुखादयस्तु तस्य,
इत्येवं सर्वजीवानां परस्परं सुखादिगुणसंकर्य स्यात् । तथैकस्य कृतनाशः अन्य-
स्याकृताभ्यागम इत्यादि वाच्यमिति ॥२४६९॥

D. C.

Rohagupta :—Since Jīva appears as a body of parts like a concrete object, there would be no harm if we take it as susceptible to association and dissociation. Just as a part of one *pudgala-skandha* is united with another, and sometimes dissociates itself from it, so also, some portion of a jīva combines itself with another jīva, while some other portion may dissociate itself from the jīva. Thus, since jīva is susceptible to association and dissociation, it will always be in contact with some portion or the other, even when some of its portions have already been dissociated from it. Thus, jīva will never perish entirely.

Ācārya :—In that case, jīvas of the whole Universe, will attain inter-combination of properties like sukha etc., on account of their own inter-combination with each other. For, when a certain portion of one jīva, accompanied by good or evil action, is combined with some other jīva, its own properties of happiness or misery, etc., would be attached to another jīva, whose properties, in turn, would be attached to the first jīva.

In this way, all jīvas will undergo inter-combination of properties like sukha etc. resulting in the destruction of an action that has already been performed and attainment of another that was never performed. In order to stop such confusions, we should not take jīva to be susceptible to association and dissociation also.
174. (2469)

Here there is another difficulty also :—

अहं अविमुक्तो वि तओ नोजीवो तो पइप्पएसं ते ।
जीवम्मि असंखेज्जा नोजीवा नत्थि जीवो ते ॥१७५॥२४७०॥

175. Aha avimukko vi taō no-jīvo to paippaesam te ।
Jivammi asamkhejjā no-jivā natthi jīvo te. (2470)

[अथाविमुक्तोऽपि सको नोजीवस्ततः प्रतिप्रदेशं ते ।
जीवेऽसंख्येया नोजीवा नास्ति जीवस्ते ॥१७५॥२४७०॥]

175. Athavimukto'pi sako no-jīvastataḥ pratipradeśam te ।
Jīve'samkhyeyā no-jivā nāsti jīvaste. (2470)]

Trans. 175. And if Jīva is taken as *no-jīva*, in spite of its being unseparated (from its parts), then they, (no-jīvas) would pervade every small atom, there would be innumerable *no-jīvas* in a jīva, and (ultimately) there would be nothing like jīva. 2470.

टीका—१७५ अथैतद्दोषभयाद् न जीवस्य च्छेदोऽभ्युपगम्यते, किन्त्वविमुक्तोऽप्यविच्छिन्नोऽपि जीवसंबद्धोऽपि तकोऽसौ जीवदेशो नोजीवस्त्वयेष्यते, यथा धर्मास्तिकायाद्येकदेशो नोधर्मास्तिकायादिः । ततस्तर्हि प्रतिप्रदेशं ते तव नोजीवसद्भावादेकैकस्मिन्नात्मन्यसंख्येया नोजीवाः प्राप्ताः, ततस्ते तव नास्ति क्वापि जीवसंभवः, सर्वेषामपि जीवानां प्रत्येकमसंख्येयनोजीवत्वप्राप्तरिति ॥२४७०॥

D. C.

Rohagupta :—In order to prevent the difficulties mentioned before, you may not take jīva as different from its small regions. But, just as a small part of *Dharmāstikāya*, which is not actually different from *dharmāstikāya*, is said to be *no-dharmāstikāya* (a slight predicament of *dharmāstikāya*), what harm is there in taking a small region of jīva associated with jīva itself, as *no-jīva* (or slightly animate) ?

Ācārya :—In that case, every small particle of the jīva being occupied by a number of *no-jīvas*, there would be plenty of *no-jīvas* in one single jīva. And as the entire soul will be pervaded

completely by *no-jīvas*, there would be nothing like *jīva* at the end. 175 (2470)

Pointing out the possibility of one more difficulty, the author states—

एवमजीवा वि पइप्पएसभेएण नोअजीव त्ति ।

नत्थि अजीवा केइ कयरे ते तिन्नि रासि त्ति ? ॥१७६॥२४७१॥

176. Evamajīvā vi paippaesabhèṇa no-ajīva tti |

Natthi a-jīvā kēi kayare te tinni rāsi tti ? (2471)

[एवमजीवा अपि प्रतिप्रदेशभेदेन नोअजीवा इति ।

न सन्त्यजीवाः केचित् कतरे ते त्रयो राशय इति ? ॥१७६॥२४७१॥

176. Evamajīvā api pratipradeśabhèḍḍena no-ajīvā iti |

Na santyajīvāḥ kēcit katāre te trayo rāśaya iti ? (2471)]

Trans. 176. Similarly, *a-jīvas* (or in-animate beings) will also become *no-ajīvas* or slightly inanimate) by virtue of (there being) distinction of every single particle. There would be nothing like *a-jīva* (or inanimate beings) left (in that case). (And hence), how would three categories be possible according to you ? 2471.

टीका—१७६ एवमजीवा अपि धर्मास्तिकायादयो द्वयणुक्कस्सन्धादयो घटादयश्च प्रतिप्रदेशभेदतोऽजीवैकदेशत्वाद् नोअजीवाः, घटैकदेशनोघटवदिति, अतोऽजीवाः केचनापि न सन्ति, परमाणूनामपि पुद्गलास्तिकायलक्षणाजीवैकदेशत्वेन नोअजीवत्वात् सर्वत्र नोअजीवानामेवोपपद्यमानत्वात् । ततश्च कतरे ते त्रयो राशयः—त्वया ये राजसभायां प्रतिष्ठिताः, उक्तन्यायेन नोजीव नोअजीवलक्षणराशिद्वयस्यैव सद्भावात् ? इति । तस्माद् बहुदोषप्रसङ्गाद् न जीवश्छिद्यत इति स्थितम् ॥२४७१॥

D. C. The same will be the case with *a-jīvas* or the inanimate objects. *A-jīvas* such as *dharmāstikāya* etc., objects with aggregation of two atoms and *ghaṭa* etc., would be known as *no-jīvas* (or slightly inanimate objects) by virtue of their being

one or the other portions of *a-jīvas*. Further, even atoms that are actual portions of an *a-jīva* object, would be known as *no-ajīvas*. Thus, in the whole of an *a-jīva* or inanimate object, *no-ajīvatva* will be found in every atom, and there would be nothing like *a-jīvatva* left at the end.

Consequently, the theory of three categories (viz Jīva, A-jīva and No-jīva) advanced by you in the Royal Assembly, will be refuted. For, according to this view of yours, there would be two categories only :—viz No-jīvas and No-a-jīvas which proves to be self-contradictory. •

So, all these difficulties drive us to the conclusion that jīva never perishes entirely, and that there can never exist a category of *no-jīva* in addition to those of Jīva and A-jīva. 176 (2471)

However, *no-jīva* cannot be said to exist. Because,

छिन्नो व होउ जीवो कह सो तल्लक्खणो वि नोजीवो ? ।

अह एवमजीवस्स वि देसो तो नोजीवो त्ति ॥१७७॥२४७२॥

एवं पि रासओ ते न तिन्नि चत्तारि संपसज्जन्ति ।

जीवा तहा अजीवा, नोजीवा नो-अजीवा य ॥१७८॥२४७३॥

177. Chinno va hōu jīvo kaha so tallakkhaṇo vi no-jīvo ? ।

Aha evamajīvassa vi deso to no-a-jīvo tti. (2472)

178. Evam pi rāsaō te na tinni cattāri sampasajjanti ।

Jīvā tahā a-jīvā, no-jīvā no-a-jīvā ya. (2473)

[छिन्नो वा भवतु जीवः कथं स तल्लक्षणोऽपि नोजीवः ।

अथैवमजीवस्यापि देशस्ततो नोजीव इति ॥१७७॥२४७२॥

एवमपि राशयस्ते न त्रयश्चत्वारः संप्रसजन्ति ।

जीवास्तथाऽजीवा नोजीवा नोजीवाश्च ॥१७८॥२४७३॥

177. Chinno vā bhavatu jīvaḥ katham sa tallakṣaṇo'pi no-jīvaḥ ।

Athaivamajīvasyāpi deśastato no-a-jīva iti. (2472)

178. Evamapi rāśayaste na trayaścatvāraḥ samprasajanti ।

Jīvāstathā'jīvā no-jīvā no-a-jīvāśca. (2473)]

Trans. 177-178. Or, let *jīva* be (taken as) dissected. How could that be (called) *no-jīva* in spite of its being characterized by it? And if (it is) so, then, a portion of *a-jīva* will also become *no-a-jīva*. (But) even in that case, there would not be three categories (as proposed) by you. (There would be) four categories viz : 1. *Jīvas* (animate beings) 2. *A-jīvas* (in-animate beings) 3. *No-jīvas* (slightly animate) and 4. *No-a-jīvas* (slightly inanimate). 2472-2473.

टीका-१७७-१७८ पुच्छाद्यवयवच्छेदेन च्छिन्नोऽपि भवतु गृहकोलिकादि-जीवः, केवलं तस्य जीवस्य लक्षणानि स्फुरणादीनि यस्यासौ तल्लक्षणोऽपि सन्नसौ पुच्छादिदेशः कथं केन हेतुना नोजीवो भण्यते ? । इदमुक्तं भवति-संपूर्णोऽपि गृहकोलिकाजीवः स्फुरणादिलक्षणैरेव जीवो भण्यते, स्फुरणादीनि च लक्षणानि च्छिन्ने तदवयवेऽपि पुच्छादिके दृश्यन्ते, अतस्तल्लक्षणयुक्तोऽप्यसौ किमिति जीवो न भण्यते येन नोजीवकल्पनाऽत्र विधीयते ? इति । “अह एवमिति” अथैवं जीवलक्षणैः सद्भिरपि पुच्छादिकस्तदवयवो नोजीव एवैष्यते, न पुनः स्वाग्रह-स्त्यज्यत इत्यर्थः । अत्र सूरिराह-“तो च्छि” ततस्तर्हि अजीवस्यापि घटादेर्देशो नोजीवः प्राप्नोति, जीवैकदेशनोजीववदिति । अस्त्येव न किञ्चिद् मम विनश्य-तीति चेत् । नैवम् । कुतः इत्याह-एवं “पीत्यादि” एवमप्यभ्युपगम्यमाने ये भवता त्रय एव राशय इष्यन्ते ते न घटन्ते, किन्तु चत्वारो राशयः सप्रसजन्ति तद्यथा-जीवाः, तथाऽजीवाः, नोजीवाः, नोजीवाश्चेति ॥२४७२-२४७३॥

D. C.

Ācārya :—House-lizards etc. come under the category of *jīvas* by virtue of their movements etc. in spite of their movements etc. in spite of their tail etc., being dissected. The parts like tail etc., that are cut off from the body, should also be known as *jīvas* by virtue of their movement etc. It is absurd to know them as *no-jīvas*.

Rohagupta :—Parts like tail etc., should definitely be called *no-jīvas* in spite of their having characteristics of *jīvas*.

Ācārya :—In that case, a portion of an *a-jīva* object like *ghaṭa* would be known as *a-jīva*.

Thus, according to this theory of yours, there would be four categories-viz Jīva, A-jīva, No-jīva and No-ajīva-in stead of three mentioned by you in the Royal Assembly. 177-178 (2472-2473).

Also,

अह ते अजीवदेसो अजीवसामणजाइ-लिङ्गो त्ति ।

भिन्नो वि अजीवो चिय न जीवदेसो वि किं जीवो ? ॥१७९॥२४७४॥

179. Aha te ajīvadeso ajīvasāmaṇṇajāi-liṅgo tti ।

Bhinno vi a-jīvo cciya na jīvadeso vi kim jīvo ? (2474)

[अथ तेऽजीवदेसोऽजीवसामान्यजाति-लिङ्ग इति ।

भिन्नोऽप्यजीव एव न जीवदेशोऽपि किं जीवः ? ॥१७९॥२४७४॥

179. Atha te'jīvadeso'jīvasāmānyajāti-liṅga iti ।

Bhinno'pyajīva eva na jīvadeso'pi kim jīvaḥ ? (2474)]

Trans. 179. And, if a portion of *a-jīva*, though separated (from it), is *a-jīva* according to you by virtue of its species and gender being common to *a-jīva*, why not a portion of *jīva* also, be taken as *jīva* ? 2474.

टीका-१७९ अथ ते तवाजीवस्य जीवस्कन्धादेर्देश एकदेशो भिन्नोऽपि स्कन्धात् पृथग्भूतोऽप्यजीव एव न तु नोअजीवः । कुतः ? इत्याह-अजीवेन सामान्ये जाति-लिङ्गे यस्यासावजीवसामान्यजातिलिङ्ग इति कृत्वा । तत्राजीवत्वं जातिः, पुंलिङ्गलक्षणं च लिङ्गम् । एतच्च द्वयमप्यजीव-तद्देशयोः सामान्यमेव, ततस्तद्देशोऽप्यजीव एव । हन्त ! यद्येवम्, तर्हि जीवदेशोऽपि किमिति जीवो नेष्यते, तस्यापि जीवेन समानजाति-लिङ्गत्वादिति ॥२४७४॥

D. C.

Acārya :—When you take a part of a living being, though separated from its main body as *a-jīva*, and not as *no-ajīva* because its *jāti* (species) and *liṅga* (gender) are common to *a-jīva* you have all the more reason to take a portion of *jīva* as *jīva* on account of their *jāti* and *liṅga* being common. 179 (2474)

In support of the same argument, the author continues—

छिन्नगृहकोलिया वि हु जीवो तल्लखणेहिं सयलो व्व ।
अह देसो त्ति न जीवो अजीवदेशो त्ति नोऽजीवो ॥१८०॥२४७५॥

180. Chinnagihakoliyā vi hu jīvo tallakkhaṇehim sayalo vva ।
Aha deso tti na jīvo a-jivadeso tti no-a-jīvo. (2475)

[छिन्नगृहकोलिकापि खलु जीवस्तल्लक्षणैः सकल इव ।
अथ देश इति न जीवोऽजीवदेश इति नो-अजीवः ॥१८०॥२४७५॥

180. Chinnagrihakolikāpi khalu jīvastallakṣaṇaiḥ sakala iva ।
Atha deśa iti na jīvo'jivadeśa iti no-a-jivaḥ. (2475)]

Trans. 180. Even a dissected house-lizard is, in fact, jīva (or an animate being) like the whole (house-lizard) by virtue of its characteristics (as a living being). And if it is not jīva because it happens to be a part (of jīva), a part of a-jīva will (probably) become *nō-a-jīva*. 2475.

टीका—१८० छिन्नगृहकोलिकापिछिन्नःपृच्छादिको गृहकोलिकादिजीवा-
वयवोऽपीत्यर्थः । किम् ? इत्याह—जीवः, इति प्रतिज्ञा । हेतुमाह—“तल्लखणेहिं
ति तल्लक्षणैर्हेतुभूतैः—स्फुरणादितल्लक्षणयुक्तत्वादित्यर्थः । ? “सयलो व्व त्ति”
यथा सकलः परिपूर्णोऽच्छिन्नो गृहकोलिकादिजीव इत्यर्थः, एष दृष्टान्तः । अथ
गृहकोलिकादेर्जीवस्य पृच्छादिकस्तदवयवो देश एवेति कृत्वा न जीव इष्यते,
संपूर्णस्यैव जीवत्वात् । यद्येवम्, अजीवस्यापि घटादेर्देशो नो न वाजीवः प्राप्नोति,
संपूर्णस्यैवाजीवत्वात् । ततोऽयमजीवदेशोऽपि नो अजीव एव स्यात्, न त्वजीवः ।
तथा च सति स एव राशिचतुष्टयप्रसङ्ग इति ॥२४७५॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—Like the whole of house-lizard, its part (say a tail) cut off from the body, is also jīva, on account of its movements etc.

Rohagupta:—Since tail happens to be only a part of house-lizard, it cannot be called jīva. Jīvatva exists only in the whole of jīva.

Ācārya :—Then, a part of an *a-jīva* (or inanimate) object like *ghaṭa* will also cease to be *a-jīva* and thus be probably called *no-a-jīva*, in which case again, there would be four categories : *Jīva*, *A-jīva*, *No-jīva* and *No-a-jīva*. 180 (2475)

In reply to the argument that the system of *samabhirāḍha* *naya* accepts the *jīva* *pradeśa* as *no-jīva*,

नोजीवं ति न जीवादण्णं देसमिह समभिरूढो वि ।

इच्छइ बेइ समासं जेण समानाहिगरणं सो ॥१८१॥२४७६॥

जीवे य से पएसे, जीवपएसे एव नोजीवो ।

इच्छइ न य जीवदलं तुमं व गिहकोलियापुच्छं ॥१८२॥२४७७॥

न य रासिभेयमिच्छइ तुमं व नोजीवमिच्छमाणो वि ।

अन्नो वि नओ नेच्छइ जीवाजीवाहियं किं पि ॥१८३॥२४७८॥

181. No-jīvam ti na jīvādaṇṇam deśamiha samabhirūḍho vi ।
Icchai bēi samāsam jeṇa samāṇāhigaraṇam so. (2476)

182. Jīve ya se paēse jīvapaēse eva no-jīvo ।
Icchai na ya jīvādalam tumam va gihakoliyapuccham. (2477)

183. Na ya rāsibheyamicchai tumam va no-jīvamicchamāṇo vi ।
Anno vi naō necchai jīvājīvahiyaṁ kim pi. (2478)

[नोजीवमिति न जीवादण्यं देशमिह समभिरूढोऽपि ।

इच्छति ब्रवीति समासं येन समानाधिकरणं सः ॥१८१॥२४७६॥

जीवश्च स प्रदेशो जीवप्रदेश एव नोजीवः ।

इच्छति न च जीवदलं त्वमिव गृहकोलिकापुच्छम् ॥१८२॥२४७७॥

न च राशिभेदमिच्छति त्वमिव नोजीवमिच्छन्नपि ।

अन्योऽपि नयो नेच्छति जीवाजीवाधिकं किमपि ॥१८३॥२४७८॥

181. No-jīvamiti na jīvādanyam deśamiha samabhirūḍho'pi ।
Icchati bravīti samāsam yeṇa samānādhikaraṇam saḥ. (2476)

182. Jīvaśca sa pradeśo jīvāpradeśa eva no-jīvaḥ ।
Icchati na ca jīvādalam tvamiva grihakolikāpuccham. (2477)

183. Na ca rāśibhedamiechati tvamiva no-jīvamiechannapi ।
Anyo'pi nayo necchati jīvājīvādhikam kimapi. (2478)]

Trans. 181-182-183. Even the system of Samabhirūḍha naya (does) not (take) a part (that is) different from *jīva* as *no-jīva*, but mentions it merely as a compound (laying down both of them) in the same case. According to that (system), the portion of that which is animate (*jīva-pradeśa*) is *no-jīva*. (But) this does not accept a part of *jīva* like the tail of a house-lizard (which is separate from the body) as *no-jīva* as you (assert). Although admitting (the category of) *no-jīva*, this does not allow for difference in categories as you (allow). Other systems also do not admit anything beyond *jīva* and *a-jīva* (2476-2478)

टीका-१८१-१८२-१८३ व्याख्या-इह “जीवे य से पणसे य से सपणसे नोजीवे” इत्यत्रानुयोगद्वारोक्तसूत्रालापके समभिरूढ नयोऽपि नोजीवमिति नेच्छतीति सम्बन्धः-नोजीवत्वेन नेच्छतीत्यर्थः । कं कर्मतापन्नम् ? । देशम् । कथंभूतम् ? । जीवादन्त्यं जीवाद् व्यतिरिक्तं देशं नोजीव समभिरूढनयोऽपि नेच्छति-किन्त्वव्यतिरिक्तमेव तं तस्मादिच्छतीत्यर्थः । कुत एतद् विज्ञायते ? इत्याह-येन कारणेन देश-देशिनोः कर्मधारणलक्षणं समानाधिकरणमेव समास-समसौ समभिरूढनयो ब्रवीत्यभ्युपगच्छति, न पुनर्नैगमादिरिव तत्पुरुषमित्यर्थः । समानाधिकरणसमासश्च नीलोत्पलादीनामिव विशेषण-विशेष्याणामभेद एव भवति । अतो ज्ञायते जीवादनन्यरूपमेव देशं नोजीवमिच्छति समभिरूढ इति, एवं कथं तृतीयराशिः स्यात् ? इति । तदेव समभिरूढाभिमतं समानाधिकरण-समासं दर्शयति-“जीवे य से इत्यादि” । जीवश्चासौ प्रदेशश्च जीवप्रदेशः स एव “नोजीवो ति” स एव जीवादव्यतिरिक्तो जीवप्रदेशो नोजीव इत्येवमिच्छति समभिरूढनयः, न पुनर्जीवदलं जीवात् पृथग्भूतं तत्खण्डं नोजीवमिच्छत्यसौ, यथा गृहकोलिकादीनां पुच्छादिखण्डं नोजीवं त्वमिच्छसीति । अपि च, नोजीवमिच्छन्नपि समभिरूढनयो यथा त्वं तथा नोजीवाजीवराशिद्वयाद् भेदं नेच्छति, किन्तु जीवाजीवलक्षणं राशिद्वयमेवेच्छति, नोजीवस्यात्रैवान्तर्भावात् । तथाऽन्योऽपि नैगमादिर्नयो जीवा-ऽजीवेभ्योऽधिकं किमपि नोजीववस्तु नेच्छत्येव । ततस्त्वदीय एवायं नूतनः कश्चिद् मार्ग इति ॥२४७६॥२४७७॥२४७८॥

D. C. Even in the statement-viz *Jīve ya ye paese, ya se sapaese no-jīve* " of Anuyogadvāra Sūtra, the *samabhirūḍha naya* does not admit a part separated from *jīva* as *no-jīva* but only that which is intimately connected with *jīva*. This *naya* interpretes the statement thus :-A part of the animate region is *no-jīva*. *Jīva-pradeśa* is here explained as a karmadhāraya compound and not as a Tat-puruṣa one. *Jīva* therefore becomes the adjective of *pradeśa*, meaning thereby " Animate region." Thus, according to the *samabhirūḍha naya*, a part of the animate region is *no-jīva*, and it does not take anything different from the animate region as *no-jīva* as you take.

How would the third category be found in such a case ? For, although, considering the existence of *no-jīva*, there is no difference between *jīva* and *no-jīva* according to the *Samabhirūḍha naya*. *No-jīva* is nothing but a part of *jīva* and hence there are only two categories viz *jīva* and *a-jīva*. (which naturally includes *no-jīva*.) Other *nayas*, also, do not admit anything like *no-jīva* as different from *jīva* and *a-jīva*. The category of *no-jīva* therefore, seems to be an original conception of none but yourself.

181-183 (2476-2478) -

Even further than that, the Ācārya argues :—

इच्छु व समभिरूढो देसं नोजीवमेगनइयं तु ।

मिच्छत्तं सम्मत्तं सव्वनयमयोवरोहेणं ॥१८४॥२४७९॥

तं जइ सव्वनयमयं जिणमयमिच्छसि पवज्ज दो रासी ।

पयविप्पडिवत्तीए वि मिच्छत्तं किं नु रासीसु ? ॥१८५॥२४८०॥

184. Icchau va samabhirūḍho desam no-jīvameganaiyam tu ।

Micchattam sammattam savvanayamayovarohēṇam. (2479)

185. Tam jaī savvanayamayam Jīṇamayamicchasi pavajja do rāsī ।

Payavippaḍivattīe vi micchattam kim nu rāsīsu ? (2480)

[इच्छतु वा समभिरूढो देशं नोजीवमैकनयिकं तु ।

मिथ्यात्वं सम्यक्त्वं सर्वनयमतोपरोधेन ॥१८४॥२४७९॥

तद् यदि सर्वनयमतं जिनमतमिच्छसि प्रपद्यस्व द्वौ राशी ।
पदविप्रतिपत्त्याऽपि मिथ्यात्वं किं न राशिषु ॥१८५॥२४८०॥

184. Tcchatu vā Samabhirūḍho deśam no-jīvamaikanayikamitu ।
Mithyātvam samyaktvam sarvanayamatoparodhena. (2479)
185. Tat yadi sarvanayamatam Jīnamatamicchasi prapadya-
sva dvau rāśī ।
Padavipratipattyā'pi Mithyātvam kim nu rāśiṣu. (2480)]

Trans. 184-185. Or, let the system of Samabhirūḍha (philosophy) admit (the existence of) no-jīva. (But) that being supported by one system (of philosophy) (alone), turns out to be false. That which is supported by all the (philosophical) systems, is accepted as true. So if you (really) wish (to follow) the principle of Tīrthaṅkaras, then accept (the theory of) two categories. For, even by twisting a syllable, (you are led to accept) falsehood; what (to say) about the theory of) categories. (2479-2480).

टीका-१८४-१८५ इच्छतु वा समभिरूढनयस्त्वमिव जीवाद् भिन्नमपि तद्देशं नोजीवम् । तथाप्येकनयस्येदं मतमैकनयिकम्, मिथ्यात्वं चैतच्छाक्यमतवत्, इत्यतो न तत् प्रमाणीकर्तव्यम् । सम्यक्त्वं तु सर्वनयमतावरोधेन समस्तनयमतसंग्रहेणैव भवति । ततो यदि सर्वनयमयं जिनमतं प्रमाणमिच्छसि तदा प्रतिपद्यस्व जीवाऽ-जीवलक्षणौ द्वावेव राशी, अन्यथा-

पयमक्खरं पि एकं पि जो न रोएइ सुत्तनिदिट्ठं ।

सेसं रोयन्तोऽवि हु मिच्छदिट्ठी मुणेयव्वो ॥ १ ॥

इति वचनात् पदविप्रतिपत्त्यापि मिथ्यात्वमापद्यते, किमुत सकलेषु राशिषु विप्रतिपत्त्या तद् न भविष्यति ? इति ॥२४७९॥२४८०॥

D. C.

Acārya :—Or, let the Samabhirūḍha naya itself accept a part of jīva as no-jīva, like you. But that theory being supported by only one naya, will become utterly unacceptable like the theory of Śākyas. For, a principle which is jointly supported by all the

philosophical systems, is alone taken as acceptable. So, if you really want to follow the doctrine of the Tīrthaṅkaras which is supported by all the philosophical systems, you shall have to admit only two categories: 1. The category of jīvas or animate beings and 2. The category of a-jīvas or inanimate objects.

Otherwise,

Payamakkharam pi ekkam pi jo na rōḍi suttanidditṭham ।
Sesāṃ royanto'vi hu micchadditṭhī muṇeyavvo ॥

[If one dislikes only one syllable of a word in a sūtra, and likes the rest of the sūtra, then also, his view-point should be recognized as false belief.]

According to this rule, if misinterpretation of even one syllable results in acceptance of falsehood, what to talk of misinterpreting the whole theory of categories? 184-185 (2479-2480).

एवं पि भण्णमाणो न पव्वज्जइ सो जओ तओ गुरुणा ।
चित्तिमयं पणट्ठो नासिहई मा बहुं लोमं ॥१८६॥२४८१॥
तो णं रायसभाए निग्गिण्हामि बहुलोगपच्चकखं ।
बहुजणनाओवसिओ होही अगेज्झपक्खो त्ति ॥१८७॥२४८२॥
तो बलसिरिनिवपुरओ वाय नाओवणीयमग्गाणं ।
कुणमाणानमईया सीसा-ssयरियाण छम्मासा ॥१८८॥२४८३॥
एको वि नावसिज्जइ जाहे तो भणइ नरवई नाहं ।
सत्तो सोउ सीयंति रज्जकज्जाणि मे भगवं ! ॥१८९॥२४८४॥
गुरुणाभिहिओ भवओ सुणावणत्थमियमेत्तिर्य भणियं ।
जइ सि न सत्तो सोउं तो निग्गिण्हामि णं कल्लं ॥१९०॥२४८५॥

186. Evam pi bhaṇṇamāṇo na pavvajjai so jaō taō guraṇā ।
Cintiyamayam paṇaṭṭho nāsīhai mā bahum loṇam. (2481)
187. To ṇaṃ rāyasabhāe nigginhāmi bahulogapaccakkham ।
Bahujanānāo'vasiō hohī agejjhapakkho tti. (2482)
188. To Balasiriniṇvapuraō vāyaṃ nāovaṇīyamaggāṇaṃ ।
Kuṇamāṇānamaiyā sīsā"yariyāṇa chammaṣā. (2483)

189. Elkko vi nāvaṣijjai jāhe to bhaṇai naravaṭ nāham ।
Satto sōum siyanti rajjakajjāṇi me bhagavaṃ. (2484)
190. Guruṇā'bhihiṣ bhavaṣ suṇāvaṇatthamiyamettiyam bhaṇiyam ।
Jai si na satto sōum to niggiṇhāmiṇam kalam. (2485)

[एवमपि भण्यमानो न प्रपद्यते स यतस्ततो गुरुणा ।
चिन्तितमयं प्रनष्टो नाशयतु मा बहुं लोकम् ॥१८६॥२४८१॥
ततो राजसभायां निगृह्णामि बहुलोकप्रत्यक्षम् ।
बहुजनज्ञातोऽवसितो भवेदग्राह्यपक्ष इति ॥१८७॥२४८२॥
ततो बलश्रीरूपपुरतो वादं न्यायोपनीतमार्गणम् ।
कुर्वतामतीताः शिष्याचार्याणां षड् मासाः ॥१८८॥२४८३॥
एकोऽपि नावसद्यते यदा ततो भणति नरपतिर्नाहम् ।
शक्तः श्रोतुं सीदन्ति राज्यकार्याणि मे भगवन् ॥१८९॥२४८४॥
गुरुणाऽभिहितो भवतः श्रावणार्थमिदमियद् भणितम् ।
यद्यसि न शक्तः श्रोतुं ततो निगृह्णामि कल्ये ॥१९०॥२४८५॥

186. Evamapi bhaṇyamāno na prapadyate sa yatastatto gurunā ।
Cintitamamayam pranaṣṭo nāśayatu mā bahum lokam. (2481)
187. Tato rājasabhāyām nigrihṇāmi bahulokapratyakṣam ।
Bahujanajñāto'vasito bhavedagrāhyapakṣa iti. (1482)
188. Tato Balaśrīripapurato vādam nyāyopanītamārgaṇām ।
Kurvatāmatitāḥ śiṣyācāryāṇām ṣaḍmāsāḥ. (2483)
189. Eko'pi nāvasadyate yadā tato bhaṇati narapatirnāham ।
Śaktaḥ śrotum sīdanti rājyakāryāṇi me Bhagavaṃ. (2484)
190. Guruṇā'bhihīto bhavaṭaḥ śravaṇārthamidamiyad bhaṇitam ।
Yadyasi na śaktaḥ śrotum tato nigrihṇāmi kalye. (2485)

Trans. 186-187-188-189-190. Though persuaded in this way, when he was not convinced, the preceptor thought "This (man) has been corrupted, but let him not corrupt the world. I shall, therefore, defeat him in the midst of many people in the Royal Assembly. He will be known to many people as

defeated, (and hence) his theory will be unacceptable." Consequently, the preceptor and the pupil passed six months in discussion of (the various) systems of philosophy before the King Balaśrī. When neither of the two was defeated, the king said "Revered Sir, I can't witness this any more. (My) state-affairs are getting delayed." The preceptor replied "All this was told for your guidance. If you are not able to hear (any more), I shall defeat him to-morrow. (2481-2485)

टीका-१८६-१८७-१८८-१८९-१९० प्रकटार्था एवैताः, नवरं "बहु-
जणनाओऽवसितुं चि" बहुजनस्य ज्ञातो विदितोऽवसितो मया जितः सन्नग्राह्य-
वचनः सर्वस्यापि भविष्यति । "तो बलसिरिनिवपुरउ चि" ततो बलश्रीनाम्नो
राज्ञः पुरत इत्यर्थः । "नाओवणीयमग्गाणं ति" नीयते संवित्तिं प्राप्यते वस्त्वनेन
इति न्यायः प्रस्तुतार्थसाधकं प्रमाणं, येनोपन्यस्तेन संतोपनीतो दौकितः प्रसङ्गे-
नागतः सकलस्यापि तर्कस्य मार्गो येषां ते तथा तेषां न्यायोपनीतमार्गाणां रोह-
गुप्त-श्रीगुप्तसूरीणामिति ॥२४८१॥२४८२॥२४८३॥२४८४॥२४८५॥

D. C. The meaning is clear. Thinking that Rohapupta will not be listened to by any one if he is defeated in the public assembly, the preceptor discussed with him openly in the Royal Assembly of king Balaśrī, the principles of various philosophical systems⁸ constantly for six months. But when King Balaśrī showed his inability to witness the controversy anymore as this state-affairs were being delayed, the Ācārya promised to defeat Rohagupta on the next day. 186-190 (2481-2485)

Then,

वीयदिणे बेइ गुरु नरिंद ? जं मेइणीए सब्भूयं ।

तं कुत्तियावणे सब्बमत्थि सब्बप्पतीयमियं ॥१९१॥२४८६॥

तं कुत्तियावणसूरो नोजीवं देहि जइ न सो नत्थि ।

अहं भणइ नत्थि तो नत्थि किंवे हेउप्पवधेणं ॥१९२॥२४८७॥

8. The tracks of discussion of both were based upon Nyāya and hence their syllogism consisted of Pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana.

तं मग्गिज्जउ सुल्लेण सव्ववत्थूणिः किंथ कालेण ।
 इय होउ त्ति पवण्णे नरिंद-पइवाइ-परिसाहिं ॥१९३॥२४८८॥
 सिरिगुत्तेणं छल्लुगो छम्मासा विकट्टिऊण वाए जिओ ।
 अहरण कुत्तिआवण चोयालसएण पुच्छाणं ॥१९४॥२४८९॥

191. Biyadiṇe bēi gurū narinda ? jam meiṇṭe sabbhayam ।
 Tam kattiyaṇaṇe savvamatti savvappatiyam. (2486)
192. Tamkuttiyaṇasūro no-jīvam dehi jai na so natthi ।
 Aha bhāṇai natthi to natthi kimva hēu ppabanddenam.
 (2487)
193. Tam maggiijau mulleṇa savvavatthūṇi kintha kāleṇa ।
 Iya hōu tti pavaṇṇe narinda-paivāi-parisāhim. (2488)
194. Siriguttenam Chalugo chammāsā vikaṭṭiūṇa vāe jiō ।
 Aharāṇa kuttiāvaṇa coyālasaṇṇa pucchāṇam. (2489)]

[द्वितीयदिने ब्रवीति गुरुर्नरेन्द्र ! यद् मेदिन्यां सद्भूतम् ।
 तत् कुत्रिकापणे सर्वमस्ति सर्वप्रतीतमिदम् ॥१९१॥२४८६॥
 तत् कुत्रिकापणसुरो नोजीवं देहि यदि न सं नास्ति ।
 अथ भणति नास्ति ततो नास्ति किं वा हेतु-प्रबन्धेन ? ॥१९२॥२४८७॥
 तद् मार्ग्यन्तां मूल्येन सर्ववस्तूनि किमत्र कालेन ? ।
 एवं भवत्विति प्रपन्ने नरेन्द्र-प्रतिवादि-परिषद्भिः ॥१९३॥२४८८॥
 श्रीगुप्तेन षडुल्लूकः षड्मासान् विकृष्य वादे जितः ।
 उदाहरणानां कुत्रिकापणे चतुश्चत्वारिंशताशतेन पृच्छानाम् ॥
 ॥१९४॥२४८९॥

191. Dvitiyadine bravīti gurur-narendra ! yad medinyām sad-
 bhatam ।
 Tat kutrikāpaṇe sarvamasti sarvapratītamidam. (2486)
192. Tat kutrikāpaṇasūro no-jīvam dehi yadi na sa nāsti ।
 Atha bhaṇati nāsti tato nāsti kim vā hetu-prabandhena ?
 (2487)

193. Tad mārgyantām mūlyena sarvavastāni kimatra kālena ?
 Evam bhavatviti prapanne narendra-prativādi-pariṣadbhiḥ.
 (2488)

194. Śrīguptena Śaḍulūkaḥ ṣaḍmāsān vikriṣya vādē jitaḥ ।
 'Udāharāṇānām kutrikāpaṇe catuṣcatvāriṃśatāśatena pri-
 cchānām. (2489)]

Trans. 191-192-193-194. On the next day, the preceptor said "It is known to all that everything that exists on the earth is included in the Universal Shop (Kutrikāpaṇa)⁹. Hence, if the deity (in charge) of the Universal shop supplies *no-jīva* (then), it is not (correct to assert that) *no-jīva* does not exist. And if he says that it is not (available), then (it should be accepted that) *no-jīva* does not exist. What is the use of logical arguments ? So, demand all things at (various) prices. Why waste time ? When it was agreed upon by the Royal Assembly as well as the opposite party (with the words) "Let it be so." Śaḍulūka was defeated by Śrīgupta with the questions of one hundred and fortyfour illustrations (set) at the Universal Shop after having passed six months in discussion. (2486 - 2489)

टीका-१९१-१९२-१९३-१९४ व्याख्या-द्वितीयदिने ब्रवीति गुरुः श्रीगुप्तस्वरिः-नरेन्द्र ! पृथिवीपते !-इह मेदिन्यां पृथिव्यां यत् किमपि सद्भूतं विद्यमानं वस्तु तत् सर्वमपि कुत्रिकापणेऽस्तीति सर्वजनस्य भवतां च प्रतीतमेवेदम् । तत्र कूनां स्वर्ग-पाताल-मर्त्यभूमीनां त्रिकं कुत्रिकं तात्स्थ्यात् तद्व्यपदेश इति कृत्वा तत्स्थलोका अपि कुत्रिकमुच्यते, कुत्रिकमापणयति व्यवहरति यत्र हट्टेऽसौ कुत्रिकापणः । अथवा, धातु-जीव-मूल-लक्षणेभ्यस्त्रिभ्यो जातं त्रिजं सर्वमपि वस्त्वित्यर्थः, कौ पृथिव्यां त्रिजमापणयति व्यवहरति यत्र हट्टे स कुत्रि-

9. Kutrikāpaṇa could be interpreted in this way :—Ku= Prithivi=Earth, world. Trika=Three, Trio-Kutrika=The three worlds (viz. Svarga, Mṛitya and Pātāla) Āpaṇa=Shop. Kutrikapaṇa could thus conveniently be called Universal Shop wherefrom all objects of the three worlds could be had.

जापणः । अस्मिंश्च कुत्रिकापणे वणिजः कस्यापि मन्त्राद्याराधितः सिद्धो व्यन्तर-
सुरः क्रायकजनसमीहितं सर्वमपि वस्तु कुतोऽप्यानीय संपादयति । तन्मूल्यद्रव्यं
तु वणिगेव गृह्णाति । अन्ये तु वदन्ति—“वणिग्रहिताः सुराधिष्ठिता एव त आपणा
भवन्ति । ततो मूल्यद्रव्यमपि स एवं व्यन्तरसुरः स्वीकरोति” । एवं च कुत्रि-
कापणाः प्रतिनियतेष्वेवोज्जयिनी-भृगुकच्छनगरादिस्थानेषु क्वापि कियन्तोऽप्या-
सन्, इत्याममेऽभिहितम् । ततस्तस्मात् कुत्रिकापणसुरो यदि मूल्येन याचितः
सन् नोजीवं जीवाजीवव्यतिरिक्तवस्तुरूपं कमपि ददाति तदाऽसौ न नास्त्यपि तु
निर्विवादमस्त्येव । अथायमेव वदति—नष्टं तद्व्यतिरिक्तः कोऽपि नोजीवस्तदा
नास्त्येवासौ, किं तन्नास्तित्वसाधनाय युष्मद्राज्यप्रयोजनक्षतिकारिणा क्लेशफलेन
हेतुप्रबन्धोपन्यासेन ? इति । तत् तस्माद् याच्यन्तां मूल्येन सर्ववस्तुनि कुत्रिका-
पणसुरः, किमत्र कालेन कालविलम्बेन ? इत्यर्थः । एवं गुरुभिरुक्ते बलश्रीनरेन्द्रेण
प्रतिवादिना रोहगुप्तेन सम्बन्धपर्वदा च युक्तियुक्तत्वात्, “एवं भवतु” इति प्रति-
पन्ने श्रीगुप्ताचार्येण षड्लुको रोहगुप्तं पूर्वं षड् मासान् विकृष्यातिवाह्य वादे जितो
निगृहीतः । केन ? इत्याह—कुत्रिकापणे यानि वक्ष्यमाण भू-जल-ज्वलनाद्याहरणा-
न्युदाहरणानि तद्विषयपृच्छानां चतुश्चत्वारिंशेन शतैर्न, प्राकृतशैल्या छन्दोबन्धानु-
लोम्पादार्पत्वाद्वात्र व्यत्ययेन निर्देश इति ॥२४८६॥२४८७॥२४८८॥२४८९॥

D. C. Next day, the preceptor Śrī Guptācārya said “O king !
it is wellknown that *Kutrikāpaṇa* supplies everything that exists
in the three worlds. So, it will supply all that exists on the
earth also. For *ku* means “world” and the three worlds are
heaven-earth and-the nether-world. *Apaṇa* means a shop. A shop
where objects existing in the three worlds are sold is known as
Kutrikāpaṇa. Or, it may be called *Kutrijāpaṇa* also. Since every-
thing is produced from *dhātu* or primary substance, *jīva* or con-
sciousness and *mala* or root, they could also be said to be *trija*
(product of the three). A place on earth where all such objects
are sold, is known as *Kutrikāpaṇa*. Such *Kutrikāpaṇas* or Uni-
versal Shops, were usually managed by merchants who used to
propitiate a *Vyantara* or semi-god¹⁰ who would bring for them

10. There are eight classes of *Vyantarās* :—*Pisāca*, *Bhūta*,
Yakṣa, *Rākṣasa*, *Kinnara*, *Kimpuruṣa*, *Mahoraga* and *Gandharva*.

any object required from anywhere in the three worlds. The money procured by sale, was appropriated by the merchants concerned.

According to another theory, these shops were managed by *Vyantaras* themselves and not by merchants. And hence, the money procured happened to be their property. It has been mentioned in the Āgamas that such Universal Shops were situated at Ujjain and Broach.

It was proposed:—"Let us approach such a shop and demand *no-jīva* as distinguished from *jīva* and *a-jīva*. If the god in charge supplies us the same, the existence of *no-jīva* will be accepted. But if he refuses to believe in such an entity as "*no-jīva*" we shall have to believe unanimously that *no-jīva* does not exist. Why waste time? Let us approach the Universal Shop and settle the dispute."

King Balaśrī, Rohagupta and all the members of the Royal Assembly, consented to this proposal and proceeded to the *Ku-trikāpaṇa*. They demanded one hundred and forty-four objects by means of a number of questions but they could not get, *no-jīva* as distinguished from "*jīva*" and "*a-jīva*." Consequently, Rohagupta was defeated. 191-194 (2486-2489)

The one hundred and forty-four questions referred to above are counted as follows:—

भू-जल-जलणानिल-नह-काल-दिसा-ऽऽया मणो य दब्बई ।

भण्णंति नवेयाइं सत्तरस गुणा इमे अण्णे ॥१९५॥२४९०॥

रूव-रस-गंध-फासा संखा परिमाणमहमह-पुहुत्तं च ।

संजोग-विभाग-परा-ऽपरत्तबुद्धी सुहं दुक्खं ॥१९६॥२४९१॥

इच्छा-दोस-पयत्ता एत्तो कम्मं तयं च पंचविहं ।

उक्खेवण-वक्खेवण-पसारणाऽऽकुंचणं-गमणं ॥१९७॥२४९२॥

सत्ता-सामण्णं-पिय-सामण्णविसेसया-विसेसो य ।

समवाओ य पयत्था छ इत्तीसप्पभेया य ॥१९८॥२४९३॥

पगईए अगारेण य नोगारोभयनिसेहओ सव्वे ।

गुणिआ ओयालसयं पुच्छाणं पुच्छिओ देवो ॥१९९॥२४९४॥

195. Bhū-jala-jalanā-ñila-naha-kāla-disā-āyā-maṇo ya dāvvaīm ।
Bhaṇṇanti naveyāim sattarasa guṇā ime aṇṇe. (2490)

196. Rūpa-rasa-gandha-phāsā-samkhā parimāṇamamahā-pu-
ttam ca ।
Saṅjoga-vibhāga-parā-'parattā-buddhī-suham-dukkham.
(2491)

197. Icebā-doṣa-payattā etto kammam tayaṃ ca pañcaviham ।
Ukkhevaṇa-vakkhevaṇa-pasāraṇa'kumcanam gamaṇaṃ. (2492)

198. Sattā-sāmaṇṇam piya-sāmaṇṇavisesayā-viseso ya ।
Samavāo ya payatthā cha chattisappabheyā ya. (2493)

199. Pagaiḍe agāreṇa ya nogārobhayanisehaō savve ।
Guṇiya ōyālasayaṃ pucchāṇaṃ pucchiō devo. (2494)

[भू-जल-ज्वलना-निल-नभः-काल-दिगा-ऽऽत्मानो-मनश्च द्रव्याणि ।

भण्यन्ते नवैतानि सप्तदशगुणा इमेऽन्ये ॥१९५॥२४९०॥

रूप-रस-गंध-कासा-संखा-परिणाम-महत्-पृथक्त्वं च ।

संयोग-विभाग-परा-ऽपरत्व-बुद्धयः-सुखं-दुःखम् ॥१९६॥२४९१॥

इच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्नावितः कर्म तच्च पञ्चविधम् ।

उत्क्षेपणाऽवक्षेपण-प्रसारणा-ऽऽकुञ्चनानि-गमनम् ॥१९७॥२४९२॥

सत्ता सामान्यमपि च सामान्य-विशेषका-विशेषश्च ।

समवायश्च पदार्थाः षट् षट्त्रिंशत्प्रभेदाश्च ॥१९८॥२४९३॥

प्रकृत्याऽकारेण च नोकारोभयनिषेधतः सर्वे ।

गुणितास्त्वेकचत्वारिंशताशतं पृच्छानां पृष्ठो देवः ॥१९९॥२४९४॥

195. Bhū-jala-jalanā'-ñila-nabhaḥ-kāla-digā-'tmāno manaśca
dravyāṇi ।
Bhaṇyante navaitāni śaptadaśaguṇā ime'nye. (2490)

196. Rūpa-rasa-gandha-phāsā-samkhā-parināmatha-mahat-pri-
thaktvam ca ।
Saṃyoga-vibhāga-parā-'paratva-buddhayaḥ - sukham - duḥ-
kham. (2491)
197. Icchā-dveṣa-prayatnāvitaḥ karma tacca pañcavidham ।
Utkṣepaṇā'vakṣepaṇa-prasāraṇā-'kuñcanāni-gamanam. (2492)
198. Sattā sāmānyamapi ca sāmānyavisēṣakā-viśeṣaśca ।
Samavāyaśca-padārthāḥ ṣaṭ ṣaṭ trimśat prabhedāśca. (2493)
199. Prakṛitya'kāreṇa ca nokāroḥbhayanīśedhataḥ sarve ।
Guṇitastvekatvārimśatāśatam pricchānām priṣṭo devaḥ.
(2494)

Trans. 195-196-197-198-199. The deity (in charge) was asked one hundred and forty-four questions as follows :-Earth, Water, Fire, Wind, Sky, Time, Direction, Soul, and Mind are called the nine main substances. Form, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Shape, Length, Distinction, Combination, Separation, Remoteness, Vicinity, Intellect, Happiness, Misery, Desire, Aversion, and Effort—these are seventeen Guṇas or properties. And there is Karman or Action which is of five varieties viz Those of 1. Throwing up, 2. Throwing down, 3. Expanding, 4. Contracting and 5. Moving. The sāmānya or Genus (divided into) generality of existence, general property, and (generality of) particular (elements). There are viśeṣa (particularity), and sāmānya (co-inherence). (Thus there are) six (categories of) elements¹¹, of which there are thirty-six varieties. On multiplying these (thirty-six) by prakṛiti or the root-form, a-kāra (i. e. prefixing अ to the word), no-kāra (i. e. prefixing नो to the word), and both together (i. e. prefixing अ and नो both together), there will be one hundred and forty-four questions. (2490 - 2494)

11. According to Vaiśeṣikas there are seven elements : Dravya (substance) Guṇa (quality) Karman (action) Sāmānya (Genus) Viśeṣa (particularity) Samavāya (co-inherence) and Abhāva (Non-existence). Jains do not admit *abhāva*.

टीका-१९५-१९६-१९७-१९८-१९९ इह द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवायलक्षणाः षट् मूलपदार्थास्तेन षड्लक्षेण कल्पिताः । तत्र द्रव्यं नवधा । कथम् ? इत्याह-“भू-जलेत्यादि” भूमिः, जलम्, ज्वलनः, अनिलः, नभः, कालः, दिक्, आत्मा, मनश्चेतानि नवद्रव्याणि भण्यन्ते । गुणाः सप्तदश भवन्ति, तद्यथा-रूपं, रसः, गन्धः, स्पर्शः, संख्या, परिमाणम्, महत्त्वम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोगः, विभागः, परा-ऽपरत्वे, बुद्धिः, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेषः, प्रयत्नश्चेति । इतः कर्म तत् पुनः पञ्चविधम्, तद्यथा-उत्क्षेपणम्, अवक्षेपणम्, आकुञ्चनम्, प्रसारणम्, गमनमिति । सामान्यं त्रिविधम्, तद्यथा सत्ता, सामान्यम्, सामान्यविशेषश्चेति । तत्र द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मलक्षणेषु त्रिषु पदार्थेषु सद्बुद्धिहेतुः सत्ता, सामान्यं द्रव्यत्व-गुणत्वादि, सामान्यविशेषस्तु पृथिवीत्व, जलत्व-कृष्णत्व-नीलत्वाद्यवान्तरसामान्यरूप इति । अन्ये त्वित्थं सामान्यस्य त्रैविध्यमुपवर्णयन्ति-अविकल्पं महासामान्यम्, त्रिपदार्थसद्बुद्धिहेतुभूता सत्ता, सामान्यविशेषो द्रव्यत्वादि । महासामान्य-सत्तयोर्विशेषणव्यत्यय इत्यन्ये । द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मपदार्थत्रयसद्बुद्धिहेतुः सामान्यम्, अविकल्पा सत्तेत्यर्थः । सामान्यविशेषस्तु द्रव्यत्वादिरूप एव । इत्यलं प्रसङ्गेनेति । विशेषश्चान्त्यः । समवायपदार्थश्चेति ।

तदेवमेते द्रव्यादयः षट् पदार्थाः षट्त्रिंशत्प्रभेदाः-नवानां द्रव्याणां, सप्तदशानां गुणानां, पञ्चानां कर्मणां, त्रयाणां सामान्यानाम्, विशेष-समवाययोश्च मीलने षट् त्रिंशद् विकल्पा भवन्तीत्यर्थः । एते च सर्वे प्रकृत्या, अकारेण, नोकारेण, उभयनिषेधतश्चत्येतश्चेतुर्भिः प्रकारैर्गुणिताः सन्तो यच्चतुश्चत्वारिंशं शतं पृच्छानां भवति तत् पृष्टः कुत्रिकापणदेवः । इदमत्र हृदयम्-नञ्चरहितं शुद्धं पदमिह प्रकृतिरुच्यते, तथा शुद्धपदरूपया प्रकृत्या पृथिव्यादयः पदार्थाः पृच्छयन्ते, तद्यथा-“पृथिवीं देहि” इत्यादि । तथा, लुप्तस्य नञः स्थाने योऽकारस्तेन चाकारेण संयुक्तया प्रकृत्या पृच्छा विधीयते, यथा “अपृथिवीं देहि” इत्यादि । तथा नोकारेण संयुक्तया प्रकृत्या पृच्छा यथा-“नोपृथिवीं देहि” इत्यादि । तथा, नोकाराऽकारलक्षणं तदुभयं तेन योऽसौ प्रकृत्या निषेधस्तस्माच्च पृष्टः सरो यथा-“नोअपृथिवीं देहि” इत्यादि । एवं जलादिष्वपि प्रत्येकमेते प्रकृत्य-ऽकार-नोकारोभयनिषेधलक्षणाश्चत्वारः पृच्छाप्रकारा वक्तव्या इति । एतदभिप्रायवता प्रोक्तम्-“सर्वे गुणिओ” इति । आह-ननु “पृथिवीं देहि” इत्यादिका याचना एव कथं पृच्छाः प्रोच्यन्ते ? सत्यम्, किन्तु “पृथिवीं देहि” इत्यादि-

याचनाद्वारेण पृथिव्याद्यस्तित्वमेवासौ देवः पृच्छयते, “नोजीव याचितो यद्यसौ जीवाऽजीवव्यतिरिक्तं तं दास्यति तदाऽयमस्ति, नान्यथा इत्येवमेव प्रतिज्ञातत्वात् । ततो याचना अप्येतास्तच्चतः पृच्छा एवेत्यदोषः ॥२४९०॥२४९१॥ २४९२॥२४९३॥२४९४॥

D. C. 1. *Dravya* (substance), 2. *Guṇa* (quality), 3. *Karman* (action), 4. *Sāmānya* (genus), 5. *Viśeṣa* (particularity) and 6. *Sāma-vāya* (co-inherence) are the six main categories under which all the objects are classed. There are nine kinds of *dravya*: 1. Earth, 2. Water, 3. Fire, 4. Wind, 5. Sky, 6. Time, 7. Space, 8. Soul and 9. Mind.

There are seventeen types of *Guṇa*:—1. Form, 2. Taste, 3. Odour, 4. Touch, 5. Number, 6. Shape, 7. Length, 8. Distinction, 9. Combination, 10. Separation, 11. Remoteness, 12. Vicinity, 13. Intellect, 14. Pleasure or Pain, 15. Desire, 16. Hatred and 17. Effort.

Karman is divided into five types:—the acts of 1. Throwing up, 2. Throwing down, 3. Expanding, 4. Contracting and 5. Moving.

Sāmānya is three-fold:—1. Existence, 2. General Property and 3. Generality in particular. Three types of *sāmānya* are explained in two ways viz (1) *Sattā* or existence means acceptance of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman* as existing. *Sāmānya* means quality of being *dravya* and *guṇa* etc. while *sāmānya-viśeṣa* constitutes qualities of being *prithvī*, *jala* etc. (2) The general case of generality (*mahāsāmānya*) covers everything and hence has no alternative. *Sattā* or existence admits the various substances as *dravya* while *dravyatva*, *guṇatva* etc. constitute *sāmānya-viśeṣa*.

According to others, *mahāsāmānya* and *sattā* are exactly opposite to each other.

Viśeṣa is final distinction and *samavāya* is co-inherence or intimate connection.

Thus, there are six main categories of substances of which there are thirty-six varieties in all. Each one of these, was demanded at the Kutrikāpaṇa (a) in its original form (b) with the prefix अ. (c) with the prefix नो (d) and with both the prefixes (अ and नो) together, one after the other. In this way, one hundred and forty-four questions in all, were put before the said *Kutrikāpaṇa*. Take for example the case of *prithivī*. While demanding *prithivī*, firstly, the element of *prithivī* is demanded, in its original form. Then the demands of *A-prithivī* (अ-पृथिवी) *No-prithivī* (नो-पृथिवी) and *No-a-prithivī* (नो-अ-पृथिवी) are respectively made.

On demand of *prithivī*, its existence is inquired. Similarly, on demanding “*no-jīva*” if the deity in charge satisfies the demand, it is taken for granted that “*no-jīva*” exists. But if the demand is not fulfilled, the existence of *no-jīva* will be denied. It is, therefore, better to settle this dispute by putting such demands and save time. 195–199. (2490–2494)

Now, explaining how the various demands were made and fulfilled, the author states—

पुढवि त्ति देइ लेद्धुं देसो वि समानजाइ-लिङ्गो त्ति ।
पुढवि त्ति सोऽपुढवीं देहि त्ति देइ तोयाइं ॥२००॥२४९५॥

200. Puḍhavi tti dēi lēṭṭhum deso vi samāṇajāi-liṅgo tti ।
Puḍhavi tti so’puḍhaviṁ dehi tti dēi toyāim. (2495)

[पृथिवीति ददाति लेष्टुं देशोऽपि समानजाति-लिङ्ग इति ।
पृथिवीति सोऽपृथिवीं देहीति ददाति तोयादि ॥२००॥२४९५॥

200. Prithivīti dadāti leṣṭum deśo’pi samāṇajāti-liṅga iti ।
Prithivīti so’prithivīm dehīti dadāti toyādi. (2495)]

Trans. 200. (On demanding) “earth” he gives a lump of earth. (For), even a part is of the same genus and gender, (and hence) is nothing (but) *prithivī*. But when asked that “Give us a-*prithivī*” he supplies water etc. (2495)

टीका-२०० पृथिवीं याचितः कुत्रिकापणसुरो लेष्टुं ददाति । आह-अप्रस्तुत-
मिदम्, अन्यस्मिन् याचितेऽन्यस्य प्रदानात् । नैवम् । कुतः इत्याह-“ देसो
वीत्यादि ” देशोऽपि लेष्टुलक्षणः “ पुढवि ति ” पृथिव्येव मन्तव्या, पृथिवीत्व-
लक्षणाया जातेःस्त्रीलिङ्गलक्षणस्य लिङ्गस्य च समानत्वात् । इह यत्र पृथिवीत्व-
जातिःस्त्रीलिङ्गं च वर्तते तत् ‘पृथिवी’ इति व्यवहर्तव्यम्, यथा रत्नप्रभादि,
तथा च लेष्टुः, तस्मात् पृथिवीति । “अपृथिवीं देहि” इत्येवं याचितोऽसौ
देवस्तोयादि ग्रयच्छति ॥२४९५॥

D. C. On demand of “*prithivī*”, the deity in charge of the
Kutrikāpaṇa supplies a lump of earth. Here, if it is objected that
on demand of one thing, something else is given, it is not so.
The clod which is but a portion of *prithivī* is nothing but *prithivī*
as the genus and gender of both are common.

On the demand that “Give (us) a-*prithivī*” the deity sup-
plies water etc. 200 (2495)

And in case of no-*prithivī*—

देसपडिसेहपक्खे नोपुढवीं देइ लेट्ठुदेसं सो ।

लेट्ठुदव्वावेक्खो कीरइ देसोवयारो से ॥२०१॥२४९६॥

इहरा पुढवि च्चिय सो लेट्ठु व्व समाणजाइलक्खणओ ।

लेट्ठुदलं ति व देसो जइ तो लेट्ठु वि भूदेसो ॥२०२॥२४९७॥

201. Dēsapaḍisehapakkhè no-puḍhaviṃ dèi leṭṭhudesam so ।
Leṭṭhuddavvāvekkho kīrai desovayāro se. (2496)

202. Iharā puḍhavi cciya so leṭṭhu vva samāṇajāilakkhaṇaō ।
Leṭṭhudalam ti va deso jai to leṭṭhū vi bhūdeso. (2497)

[देशप्रतिषेधपक्षे नोपृथिवीं ददाति लेष्टुदेशं सः ।

लेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षः क्रियते देशोपचारतस्तस्य ॥२०१॥२४९६॥

इतरथा पृथिव्येव स लेष्टुरिव समानजातिलक्षणतः ।

लेष्टुदलमिति वा देशो यदि ततो लेष्टुरपि भूदेशः ॥२०२॥२४९७॥

201. Deśapratishedhapakṣe no-prithivīm dadāti leṣṭudeśam saḥ |
Leṣṭudravyāpekṣaḥ kriyate deśopacāratastasya. (2496)
202. Itarathā prithivyeva sa leṣṭuriva samānajātilakṣaṇataḥ |
Leṣṭudalamiti vā deśo yadi tato leṣṭurapi bhūdeśaḥ. (2497)]

Trans 201-202. (On demanding) “no-prithivī” in case of (interpreting it as) the negation of a part, he supplies a piece of clod on account of its usage as a portion with regard to clod as *dravya*. Otherwise, that (also) will be nothing but *prithivī* on account of its (being characterised by the) same genus and gender. Or, if the piece of clod is (taken) merely (as) a portion then clod is also nothing but a portion of earth. (2496-2497)

टीका-२०१-२०२ नोऽशब्दस्य देशप्रतिषेधपक्षे नोपृथिवीं याचितोऽनन्तरमेव समस्तपृथिवीत्वेनोपचरितस्य लेष्टोरेव देशं तत्खण्डरूपं ददात्यसौ देवः । आह-ननु देशनिषेधपक्षे नोपृथिवी तद्देश एव गृह्यते, यस्तु लेष्टुदेशः स पृथ्वीदेशस्यापि देश एव, न तु पृथ्वीदेशः, तत् कथं नोपृथ्वीं याचितस्तं ददाति ? इत्याह-“लेष्टुद्वेत्यादि” लेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षः “से” तस्य लेष्टुदेशस्य देशोपचारः क्रियते । इदमुक्तं भवति-लेष्टौ तावदनन्तरोक्तयुक्तेः संपूर्णपृथ्वीद्रव्यत्वमारोपितम्, ततो लेष्टुलक्षणपृथ्वीद्रव्यापेक्षया तद्देशस्यापि पृथ्वीदेशत्वमुपचर्यते, इतरथाऽन्यथा पुनः परमार्थतो लेष्टुवत् समानजात्यादिलक्षणत्वादिति पूर्वोक्तहेतोः सोऽपि लेष्टुदेशः पृथ्व्येव मन्तव्या । अथ पराभिप्रायमाविष्कृत्य परिहारार्थमाह-“लेष्टुदलं ति व देसो जइ चि” यदि तु भोः पर ! त्वं मन्यसे-योऽयं लेष्टो देशः सदलं लेष्टोरेव खण्डमात्रम्, ततः समानजातिलक्षणत्वेऽपि नासौ पृथ्वीति । अत्र परिहारमाह-“तो लेष्टू वि भूदेसो चि” ततस्तर्हि पुढवीचि देइ लेष्टुं देसो वि “इत्यादौ यः पूर्व लेष्टुः पृथ्वीत्वेनोक्तः सोऽपि भुवः पृथिव्या देश एव । ततस्त्वदभिप्रायेण सोऽपि पृथ्वीदलरूपत्वाद् न पृथ्वी, लेष्टुदेशवदिति ॥२४९६॥२४९७॥

D. C. When “no-prithivī is demanded, the deity-in-charge interpretes it as a negation of part and accordingly he supplies a portion of clod which was firstly taken as earth in general,

Here, if it is objected that by the word “no-prithivî” a part of prithivî would be understood, but since a piece of clod is the portion of a portion of earth, how could that be called “no-prithivî? The reply is this:—Just as the substance of *prithvî* has been transposed upon clod as stated before, the sense of portion has been transposed upon a piece of clod. In other words, clod represents ‘prithvî’ and a piece of clod represents a portion of “prithvî” in this case; otherwise, really speaking, the portion of clod is nothing but “prithvî” as *jāti* etc. of ‘prithvî’ are found in it also. The objection that a portion of clod could not be called ‘prithvî’ in spite of their *jāti* etc. being common, is not proper. For, in that case, even clod which has already been taken as ‘prithvî’ before, will not be called ‘prithvî’ as it happens to be only a portion of ‘prithvî’. 201–202 (2496–2497)

This argument is explained with illustrations—

देहि भुवं तो भणिए सव्वाणेया न यावि सा सव्वा ।

सक्का सक्केण वि याणेउ किमुय.वसेसेणं ? ॥२०३॥२४९८॥

203. Dehi bhuvam tō bhaṇie savvāṇēyā na yāvi sā savvā ।

Sakkā Sakkēṇa vi yāṇeum kimuyāvaseseṇaṃ ? (2498)

[देहि भुवं ततो भणिते सर्वानेया न चापि सा सर्वा ।

शक्या शक्केणापि चानेतुं किमुतावशेषेण ? ॥२०३॥२४९८॥

203. Dehi bhuvam tato bhaṇite sarvāṇēyā na cāpi sā sarvā ।

Śakyā Śakrēṇāpi cānētum kimutāvaśeṣeṇa ? (2498)]

Trans. 203. On the demand that “Give (us) prithivî” the whole of earth should be brought. But (ca) since the whole of it could not brought even by Indra, what, then, to talk of the rest (of gods) 2498.

टीका—२०३ यदि लेष्टुर्न पृथ्वी, ततस्तर्हि “भुवं देहि” इत्युक्ते सर्वापि संपूर्णा सा—ऽऽनेया प्रसज्यते, न च सा सर्वा शक्केणाप्यानेतुं शक्या, किमुतावशेषेण कुत्रिकापणदेवादिमात्रेण ? इति । तर्हि किमत्र तत्त्वम् ? इति भवन्त एव कथयन्तु इति ॥२४९८॥

D. C. If clod is not taken as earth, then, on saying that “Give (us) earth” the whole of earth should be supplied by him. But that is impossible. Even Indra will not be able to bring the whole of earth; what, then, to talk of the capacity of ordinary deities such as the one at the *Kutrikāpaṇa* etc.? 203 (2498)

Hence,

जह् घडमाणय भणिए न हि सव्वाणयसंभवो किंतु ।
 देसाइविसिट्ठं विय तमत्थवसाओ समप्पेइ ॥२०४॥२४९९॥
 पुढवि त्ति तहा भणिए तदेगदेसे वि पगरणवसाओ ।
 लेट्ठुम्मि जायइ मई जहा तहा लेट्ठुदेसे वि ॥२०५॥२५००॥

204. Jaha ghaḍamāṇaya bhaṇie na hi savvāṇayasambhavo kintu
 Desāivisiṭṭhaṃ ciya tamatthavasāo samappēi. (2499)

205. Puḍhavi tti tahā bhaṇiē tadegadēsē vi pagaraṇavasāo ।
 Leṭṭhummi jāyai maī jahā tahā leṭṭhudēsē vi. (2500)

[यथा घटमानय भणिते न हि सर्वानयनसंभवः किन्तु ।
 देशादिविशिष्टमेव तमर्थवशातः समर्पयति ॥२०४॥२४९९॥
 पृथिवीति तथा भणिते तदेकदेशेऽपि प्रकरणवशात् ।
 लेष्टौ जायते मतिर्यथा तथा लेष्टुदेशेऽपि ॥२०५॥२५००॥

204. Yathā ghaṭamāṇaya bhaṇite na hi sarvāṇayanasaṃbhavaḥ
 kintu ।

Dēśādiviśiṣṭameva tamarthavaśataḥ samarpayati. (2499)

205. Prithivīti tathā bhaṇite tadekadēśē’pi prakaraṇavaśāt ।

Leṣṭau jāyate mati-r-yathā tathā leṣṭudēśē’pi. (2500)]

Trans. 204–205. Just as, on saying “Bring ghaṭa”, there is no possibility of bringing all (ghaṭs) but he gives (only) that one (which is) characterised by place etc. by means of usage, so also, on demand of ‘prithivī’, the purpose being attached to one of its parts, (the deity) is inclined (to give) the clod and consequently a piece of clod. (2499–2500)

टीका-२०४-२०५ यथा सामान्येन “घटमानय” “पटमानय” इत्युक्तेऽपि न खलु सर्वस्यापि घटस्य सामान्यतयैवानयनसंभवेऽस्ति, किन्तु सर्वस्यानेतुमशक्यत्वात् प्रायः सर्वेण प्रयोजनाभावाच्च, अर्थवशात् सामर्थ्यत एव नियत-देशकालाद्यवच्छिन्नं विशिष्टमेव कश्चिद् घटमानीय समर्पयति, तथाऽत्रापि “पृथिवीं देहि” इति भणिते सर्वस्यानेतुमशक्यत्वात्, प्रायस्तथा प्रयोजनाभावाच्च यथा तदेकदेशेऽपि पृथिव्येकांशेऽपि लेष्टौ देवस्य समर्पणमतिर्जायते । कुतः ? इत्याह-प्रकरणवशात्, “अनेनापि तदेकदेशेन लेष्टुना प्रस्तुतार्थः सेत्स्यति” इत्येवं प्रस्ताववशादित्यर्थः-। प्रकृतमाह-“तहा लेट्ठुदेसे वि च्छि” यथा “पृथिवीं देहि” इत्युक्ते सति प्रतिपादितन्यायेन तदेकदेशेऽपि लेष्टौ समर्पणमतिर्जायते तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण “नोपृथ्वीं देहि” इत्युक्ते तत्खण्डरूपे तदेकदेशेऽपि समर्पणबुद्धिरुत्पद्यत इति ॥२४९९॥२५०॥

D. C. Ordinarily when a *ghaṭa* or *paṭa* is demanded, by saying “Bring *ghaṭa*” or “bring *paṭa*”, all the *ghaṭas* or *paṭas* are not supplied. Nor is it meant so. Only a particular *ghaṭa* belonging to a definite *deśa*, *kāla* etc. is supplied.

Similarly, when it is said that “Give (us) *prithvī*”, the whole of *prithvī* is not asked for, and that is not physically possible also. Hence the deity is naturally inclined to give a lump of earth anticipating that the object of demand will be satisfied by it.

The same is the case with the demand of “*no-prithvī*”. Just as, on demand of “*prithvī*”, its portion—a lump of earth—is given, on demand of “*no-prithvī*” a portion of the lump of earth is supplied with a view that the object of demand will be satisfied by it. 204-205 (2499-2500).

Explaining how a portion of clod could be taken to serve the purpose of “*no-prithvī*”, the author states—

लेट्ठुदव्वावेक्खाए तह वि तद्देसभावओ तम्मि ।

उवयारो नोपुढवि पुढवि च्छिय जाइलक्खणओ ॥२०६॥२५०१॥

206. Leṭṭhudaṇvāvekkhāe taha vi taddēsabhabhavaō tammi ।

Uvayāro no-puḍhavi puḍhavi cciya jāilakkhaṇaō. (2501)

[लेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षया तथापि तद्देशभावतस्तस्मिन् ।

उपचारो नोपृथिवी पृथिव्येव जातिलक्षणतः ॥२०६॥२५०१॥

206. Leṣṭudravyāpēkṣayā tathāpi taddēśabhāvatatastasmin ।

Upacāro no-prithivī prithivyeva jātilakṣaṇataḥ. (2501)]

Trans. 206. “No-prithivī” is nothing but “prithivī” from (the point of view of) general characteristics. Still, however, with regard to clod (as a) substance, the application (of no-prithivīva), is made on that, because of its being a portion (of clod). 2501.

टीका—२०६ यद्यपि लेष्टुकदेशः पृथिव्येव, तथापि “उपचारो ति” तस्मिन् लेष्टुकदेशे नोपृथिवीत्वस्योपचारः क्रियतेः इत्यर्थः । कया ? इत्याह—लेष्टुद्रव्यापेक्षया लेष्टोः प्रागुक्तन्यायेन यत् पृथिवीद्रव्यत्वमारोपितं तदपेक्षयेत्यर्थः । कुतः ? इत्याह—तद्देशभावतो लेष्टुद्रव्यैकदेशत्वादित्यर्थः । प्रागुक्तन्यायेन तावल्लेष्टुरेव पृथ्वीद्रव्यं तदपेक्षया च तदेकदेशे नोपृथ्वीत्युपचर्यत इति भावः । परमार्थतः स्वियं लेष्टुकदेशलक्षणं नोपृथ्व्येव मन्तव्यम्, समानजातिलक्षणत्वादिति को वै न मन्यते, अस्माभिरेव प्रागुक्तत्वात्, इदानीमपि च स्मर्यमाणत्वात् ? इति ॥२५०१॥

D. C. Although a portion of clod is nothing but “*prithvī*”, an *upacāra* of the property of ‘no-prithivī’ could be made to it. Since clod was a portion of *prithvī*, the property of *prithvī* was attributed to it. Now, taking clod as *prithvī*, the property of ‘no-*prithvī*’ will further be attributed to the portion of clod on the same ground. (2501)

With regard to the implications of negation by prefixes नो and अ, the author explains—

पडिसेहदुगं पगइं गमेइ जं तेण नोअपुढवि ति ।

भणिए पुढवि ति गईदेसनिसेहे वि तद्देसो ॥२०७॥२५०२॥

207. Paḍischadugam pagaim gamēi jam teṇa no-a-puḍhavi tti ।

Bhaṇiē puḍhavi tti gāidesanisehē vi taddēso. (2502)

[प्रतिषेधद्विकं प्रकृतिं गमयति यत् तेन नोअपृथिवीति ।

भणिते पृथिवीति गतिर्देशनिषेधेऽपि तद्देशः ॥२०७॥२५०२॥

207. Pratiṣedhadvikam prakritim gamayati yat tena no-a-prithivīti ।

Bhaṇite prithivīti gatirdēśaniṣēdhē'pi taddēśaḥ. (2502)]

Trans. 207. Since two negatives bring about the original sense, when 'no-a-prithvī' is uttered, *prithvī* is asserted. (So) even in (case of) negation of a portion, (the existence of) that portion (is implied). 2502.

टीका-२०७ “द्वौ नञौ प्रकृतमर्थं गमयतः” इति वचनाद् नोकाराकार-लक्षणं प्रतिषेधद्वयं यस्मात् प्रकृतिं गमयति-प्रकृतमेवार्थं प्रतिपादयतीत्यर्थः । तेन कारणेन “नोअपृथ्वी” इति भणिते नोशब्दस्य सर्वनिषेधपरत्वात् पृथिवी-गतिर्भवति-पृथिव्याः प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीत्यर्थः । “देसनिसेहे वि तद्देशो च्छि” देश-निषेधवाचके तु नोशब्दे तस्या जलादिरूपाया अपृथिव्या एवोत्तरपदे श्रूयमाणाया देशस्तद्देशो गम्यते, देशनिषेधके नोशब्दे नोअपृथिवीति याचिते जलादिरूपा-पृथिव्येकदेशं देवो ददातीत्यर्थः ॥२५०२॥

D. C. Two negatives viz नो and अ would make one affirmative. 'No-a-prithvī' would, therefore, mean *prithvī*.

Taking नो no to signify negation, of only a portion, *no-a-prithvī* would mean a portion of *a-prithvī*, i. e. a portion of water etc., as a consequence of which, the deity would give a portion of water etc. 207 (2502)

Thus,

उवयाराओ तिविहं भुवमभुवं नोभुवं च सो देइ ।

निच्छयओ भुवमभुवं तह सावयवाइं सव्वाइं ॥२०८॥२५०३॥

208. Uvayārāō tiviham bhuvamabhuvam no-bhuvam ca so dēi ।

Nicchayaō bhuvamabhuvam taha sāvayavāim savvāim. (2503)

[उपचारात् त्रिविधं भुवमभुवं नोभुवं च स ददाति ।

निश्चयतो भुवमभुवं तथा सावयवानि सर्वाणि ॥२०८॥२५०३॥

208. Upacārāt trividham bhuvamabhuvam no-bhuvam ca sa
dadāti ।

Nīscayato bhuvamabhuvam tathā sāvayavāni sarvāṇi. (2503)]

Trans. 208. By (way of) formality, he supplies three types: *prithvī*, *a-prithvī* and *no-prithvī*, but practically *prithvī* and *a-prithvī* in that manner, all objects having portions (are arranged). 2503.

टीका-२०८ स कुत्रिकापणदेवो याचितः सन् वस्तु ददाति । कतिविधम्?, किं वा तत्? इत्याह-त्रिविधं त्रिप्रकारम्, चतुर्थस्य नोअभूपक्षस्य प्रथमपक्ष एवान्तर्भावात् । तत्र भुवं लेष्टुम्, अशुवं जलादि, नोभुवं भूम्येकदेशं ददाति । कुतः? इत्याह-उपचारात् व्यवहारनयमताश्रयणादित्यर्थः, स एव हि देशदेशिव्यवहारं मन्यते, न तु निश्चय इति भावः । अत एवाह-“निच्छयउ इत्यादि” निश्चयतस्तु भुवमशुवं चेत्येवं द्विविधमेव वस्तु ददाति, तृतीयस्य नोभूपक्षस्य देश-देशिव्यवहारएवोपपद्यमानत्वात्, तस्य च निश्चयनयेनानभ्युपगमादिति । तदेवं “भू-जल-जलण” इत्यादौ पृथिव्याः प्रथमं निर्दिष्टत्वात् तामधिकृत्योक्तम् । अथ शेषाणि जलादिवस्तून्यधिकृत्याह “तह सावयवाइं वि” न केवलमित्थं भुवं ददाति, तथा शेषाण्यपि जलादिवस्तूनि-“पगईए अगारेणं” इत्यादि प्रकारेण विशेष्ययाचितः सन् व्यवहारनयमतेन यथोक्तविधिना त्रिप्रकाराणि ददाति । कुतः? इति चेत् । उच्यते-यतः सावयवानि सदेशान्येतानि सर्वाण्यपि जलादिवस्तूनि । अतस्तृतीयोऽपि देशविषयो दानप्रकार एतेषु संभवतीति भावः । निश्चयनयमतेन तु देशदेशिव्यवहाराभावादेतान्यपि जलादीनि द्विप्रकाराण्येव ददातीति । तदेवं सावयवे वस्तूनि प्रकारत्रयेण प्रकारद्वयेन च यथोक्तरीत्या दानं संभवति ॥२५०३॥

D. C. The deity in charge of Kutrikapaṇa satisfies demands of all objects in this way. On demand of ‘*prithvī*’, he supplies a lump of earth. On demand of *a-prithvī*, water etc., and on demand of ‘*no-prithvī*’ a portion of earth. Since “*no-a-prithvī*” either signifies ‘*prithvī*’ or water, as seen before, it would not be classed separately. Thus according to Vyavahāra-naya which apprehends an object with the detailed apprehension of all its

parts, all objects coming under the categories of 'prithvī', 'a-prithvī' and 'no-prithvī' are apprehended and hence supplied.

While, from the point of view of the Nīscaya-naya, the objects are supplied either in the form of *prithvī* or in the form of 'a-prithvī'.

This leads us, therefore, to an important conclusion that the objects that have parts could be supplied either in two ways or in three ways, but those that have no parts could be given only in two ways. 208 (2503)

Objects that have no parts could be given only in two ways. Because,

जीवमजीवं दाउं नोजीवं जाइओ पुणरजीवं ।

देइ चरिमम्मि जीवं न उ नोजीवं स जीवदलं ॥२०९॥२५०४॥

209. Jīvamajīvam dāum no-jīvam jāiö puṇarajīvam ।

Dēi carimammi jīvam na u no-jīvam sa jīvadalam. (2504)

[जीवमजीवं दत्त्वा नोजीवं याचितः पुनरजीवम् ।

ददाति चरमे जीवं न तु नोजीवं स जीवदलम् ॥२०९॥२५०४॥

209. Jīvamajīvam dattva "no-jīvam" yācitaḥ punarajīvam ।

Dadati carame jīvam na tu no-jīvam sa jīvadalam. (2504)]

Trans. 209. After having given 'jīva' and 'a-jīva', he was requested (to give) *no-jīva*. He gives *a-jīva* again. In (case of) the last one, he supplies *jīva* but he does not give a part of *jīva* as *no-jīva*. 2504.

टीका—२०९ 'जीवं देहि' इति याचितः सुरो जीवं शुक्र-सारिकादिकं दत्त्वा 'अजीवं देहि' इति याचितस्त्वजीवमुपलखण्डादिकं दत्त्वा कृतार्थो जायते । नोजीवं याचितः पुनरजीवमुपलखण्डादिकमेव ददाति, नोशब्दस्य सर्वनिषेधपरत्वात् । 'चरमे उ' नोअजीवलक्षणे विकल्पे जीवमेव शुक्रादिकं ददाति, द्वयोर्नञोः प्रकृतार्थगमकत्वात्, नोशब्दस्य च सर्वनिषेधकत्वादिति, न तु स कुत्रिकापणदेवो जीवं जीवदलं जीवखण्डरूपं कापि विकल्पे ददाति । इति जीवा-ऽजीवलक्षणौ द्वावेव राशी, न तु तृतीयः, असत्त्वात्, खरविषाणवदिति ॥२५०४॥

D. C. When 'jīva' is demanded, the deity-in-charge supplies birds like parrots etc. On demand of *a-jīva*, he gives a piece of earth or stone. On demand of *no-jīva* he again gives a piece of stone, interpreting नो (no), to signify absolute negation. In case of *no-a-jīva* being asked for, the deity supplies jīva like parrot, taking 'no' and 'a' together, signifying affirmation. But the deity does not supply a portion of jīva in any case. He does not interpret 'no-jīva' as a portion of jīva and supply the same accordingly.

It will be noted here that on demand of four entities (*jīva*, *a-jīva*, *no-jīva* and *no-a-jīva*), only two were supplied in fact. The third was considered as non-existing like the horn of an ass, and hence was not supplied. 209. (2504)

Then,

तो निग्गहिओ छलुओ, गुरु वि सक्कारमुत्तमं पत्तो ।

धिद्धिकारोवहओ छलुओ वि सभाहिं निच्छदो ॥२१०॥२५०५॥

210. To niggahiō Chaluō gura vi sakkāramuttamam patto ।

Dhiddhikkārovahaō Chaluō vi sabhā him nicchadho. (2505)

[ततो निगृहीतः षडुल्लको गुरुरपि सत्कारमुत्तमं प्राप्तः ।

धिग्धिक्कारोपहतः षडुल्लकोऽपि सभातो निष्कासितः ॥२१०॥२५०५॥

210. Tato nigrihitah Ṣaḍulako gururapi satkāramuttamam prāptah ।

Dhig dhikkāropahataḥ Ṣaḍulako'pi sabhāto niškāsitaḥ. (2505)]

Trans. 210. Hence Ṣaḍulaka was defeated, and the preceptor was accorded the best of reception. And Ṣaḍulaka overcome with many humiliations, was (consequently) driven away from the Assembly. 2505.

टीका-२१० ततो यदा कुत्रिकापणसुरेण जीवव्यतिरिक्तो नोजीवो न दत्तः, असच्चात्, तदा निगृहीतो निर्जितः षडुल्लकः । गुरुरपि श्रीगुप्ताचार्यो नरनाथाल्लोकाच्च सत्कारमुत्तमं प्राप्तः । षडुल्लकोऽपि गुरुप्रत्यनीकत्वाज्जनप्रयुक्तधिकारोपहतो राजसभातो निष्कासित इति ॥२५०५॥

D. C. When the deity-in-charge of the Kutrikāpaṇa did not supply 'nō-jīva' on grounds of non-existence, Rohagupta was declared, as defeated. The preceptor Śrī Guptācārya was greatly honoured by the King and the people. Rohagupta was eventually driven away from the Royal Assembly, with great humiliation. 210 (2505)

Then,

वाए पराजिओ सो निव्विसओ कारिओ नरिंदेण ।
घोसावियं च नयरे जयइ जिणो वद्धमाणो त्ति ॥२११॥२५०६॥

तेणभिनिवेशाओ समइविगप्पियपयत्थमादाय ।
वइसेसियं पणीयं फाईकयमण्णमण्णेहिं ॥२१२॥२५०७॥

211. Vāe parājiō so nivvisaō kārīō narindeṇa ।
Ghosāviyam ca nayare jayai Jiṇo Vaddhamāṇo tti. (2506)

212. Teṇābhinivesāō samaivigappiyapayatthamādāya ।
Vaisesiyam paṇiyam phāikayamaṇṇamaṇṇehim. (2507)

[वादे पराजितः स निर्विषयः कारितो नरेन्द्रेण ।
घोषितं च नगरे जयति जिनो वर्धमान इति ॥२११॥२५०६॥

तेनाभिनिवेशात् स्वमतिविकल्पितपदार्थमादाय ।
वैशेषिकं प्रणीतं स्फातीकृतमन्यान्यैः ॥२१२॥२५०७॥

211. Vāde parājitaḥ sa nirviṣayaḥ kārīto narendreṇa ।
Ghoṣitaṃ ca nagare jayati Jino Vardhamāna iti. (2506)

212. Tenābhiniveśāt svamativikalpitapadārthmādāya ।
Vaiśeṣikam praṇītaṃ sphātikṛitamanyānyaiḥ. (2507)]

Trans. 211-212. Defeated in discussion, as he was, the King discarded him And, it was announced in the city that the Tīrthaṅkara Vardhamāna (Swāmi) succeeds. Then taking (the six) entities which were recognized by his own intellect and propagated by various followers of his, an alto-gether

different theory was established by him, out of his (strong) adherence (to his own conviction). (2506-2507)

टीका-२११-२१२ स रोहगुप्तो गुरुणा वादे पराजितः सन् नरपतिना निर्विषयः समाज्ञातः, पटहकेन च वाद्यमानेन घोषापितं समस्तनगरे “जयति जिनः श्रीमान् वर्धमानः” इति । रोहगुप्तस्य च वादे निर्जितस्यापि प्रत्यनीकतो-
द्वेजितेन गुरुणा खेलमल्लकः शिरसि स्फोटितः । ततो भस्मस्फण्डितवपुषा तेना-
भिनिवेशात् स्वमतिकल्पितान् द्रव्यादिपदार्थानाश्रित्य वैशेषिकमतं प्रणीतम् ।
तच्चान्यान्यैस्तच्छिष्यादिभिरियन्तं कालं यावत् ख्यातिमानीतमिति ॥२५०६॥
२५०७॥

D. C. When Rohagupta was defeated by the preceptor, the king discarded his authority, and it was announced in the city with a beating of drum, that the great Tīrthanāṅkara Vardhamāna (Swāmi) succeeds.

Although Rohagupta was defeated in discussion, the preceptor Śrī Guptācārya was so much enraged at him that he dashed an earthen pot (full of ashes) against Rohagupta's head. Rohagupta went away with his body besmeared with ashes etc., and out of sheer adherence to his own convictions, he set out to propound an absolutely different theory (known as the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy) which was spread by his followers after him. 211-212 (2506-2507)

Finally explaining how Rohagupta came to be known as Śaḍulaka, the author says—

नामेण रोहगुप्तो गुत्तेण लप्पए स चोत्तूओ ।

दव्वाइछप्पयत्थोवएसणाओ छत्तूउ त्ति ॥२१३॥२५०८

213. Nāmeṇa Rohagutto gutteṇa lappaè sa Colāō ।
Davvāichappayatthovaṣaṇāo Chālūu tti. (2508)

[नाम्ना रोहगुप्तो गोत्रेण लप्यते स चोत्तूकः ।

द्रव्यादिषट्पदार्थोपदेशनात् षडुत्तूक इति ॥२१३॥२५०८॥

213. Nāmnā Rohagupto gotreṇa lapyate sa Colūkaḥ ।
Dravyādiṣaṭpadārthopadēśanāt Śaḍulūka iti. (1508)]

Trans. 213. He was known as Rohagupta by name, and Uluka by lineage. He was called Śaḍulūka because he preached (the theory of) six entities, such as Dravya etc. 2508.

टीका-२१३ नाम्नाऽसौ रोहगुप्तो गोत्रेण पुनरुलूकगोत्रसंभूतत्वादसावुलूक
इत्यालप्यते-द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवाय-लक्षणषट्पदार्थप्ररूपणेन
षट्पदार्थप्रधान उलूकः षडुलूक इत्ययं व्यपदिश्यते ॥२५०८॥

D. C. His name was Rohagupta and his gotra was Uluka. Since he preached the theory of six entities viz Dravya, Guṇa, Karman, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, and Samavāya, he was known as Śaḍulūka.

End of the Discussion with the Sixth Nihlava.



Chapter VIII

॥ अथ सप्तमनिहवक्तव्यता ॥



Discussion with the Seventh Nihnava.

पंचसयाचुलसीया तइया सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स ।
तो अबद्धियदिट्ठी दसउरनयरे समुत्पन्ना ॥२१४॥२५०९॥

214. Pañcasayāculasīyā taiyā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa ।
To Abaddhiyadiṭṭhī Dasaura nayarē samuppannā. (2509)

[पञ्चशतानि चतुरशीत्यधिकानि तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य ।
ततोऽबद्धिकदृष्टिर्दशपुरनगरे समुत्पन्ना ॥२१४॥२५०९॥

214. Pañcaśatāni caturaśītyadhikāni tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya ।
Tato'baddhikadriṣṭir-Daśapura nagarē samutpannā (2509)]

Trans. 214. Then, the theory of the Abaddhika Nihnava, came into existence in the city of Daśapura, five hundred, and eighty-four years, after Vīra (Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra) had attained Final Emancipation. 2509.

टीका-२१४ पञ्चवर्षशतानि चतुरशीत्यधिकानि तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य महा-
वीरस्य ततोऽबद्धिकनिहवदृष्टिर्दशपुरनगरे समुत्पन्नेति ॥२५०९॥

D. C. Clear.

दसउरनगरुच्छुघरे अज्जरक्खिय पूसमित्तिगयं च ।
गोढामाहिल नवम-ठ्ठमेसु पुच्छा य विंझस्स ॥२१५॥२५१०॥

215. Dasauranagarucchugharē Ajjarakkhiya Pūsamittigayam ca ।
Goṭṭhāmāhila navama-tṭhamesu puechā ya Vinjhassa. (2510)

[दशपुरनगर इक्षुगृहे आर्यरक्षितः पुष्पमित्रत्रिकं च ।

गोष्ठामाहिलोऽष्टम-नवमयोः पृच्छा च विन्ध्यस्य ॥२१५॥२५१०॥

215. Daśapurānagara Ikṣugrihē Ārya-Rakṣitaḥ Puṣpamitratrikam ca ।
Goṣṭhāmāhilo'sṭama-Navamayoh pricchā ca Vindhyasya.
(2510)]

Trans. 215. Ārya Rakṣita-sūri was (a preceptor) in (a (a monastery named) Ikṣugriha in (the) city (of) Daśapura. He had three (pupils named) Puṣpamitra (Ghrita-Puṣpamitra, Vastra Puṣpamitra, and Durbaṭikā Puṣpamitra). Goṣṭhā-Māhila had a discussion with (an ascetic named) Vindhya about the Eighth and Ninth (Pūrvas). 2510.

टीका-२१५ दशपुरनगर इक्षुगृहे आर्यरक्षितः “दीक्षां जग्राह” इति शेषः ।
तस्य च घृतपुष्पमित्र-वस्त्रपुष्पमित्र-दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रलक्षणं शिष्यत्रयं बभूव ।
गोष्ठामाहिलश्च तच्छिष्योऽष्टमे कर्मप्रवादपूर्वे नवमे च प्रत्याख्यानपूर्वे व्याख्यायमाने
कर्मबन्धविचारे प्रत्याख्यानविचारे च विप्रतिपन्नो विधिप्रेरितवानिति ॥२५१०॥

D. C. Ārya Rakṣitasūri was conducting a monastery named Ikṣugriha in the city of Daśapura. He had three pupils named Ghrita-Puṣpamitra; Vastra-Puṣpamitra and Durbaṭikā Puṣpamitra; respectively.

Another prominent pupil-Goṣṭhā-Māhila (who also happened to be the maternal uncle of ĀryaRakṣitasūri) had a discussion with an ascetic named Vindhya on the Eighth and Ninth Pūrvas (viz Karmapravāda-parva and Pratyākhyānapravāda-pūrva respectively).¹

The whole story is narrated as follows :—

‘सोऽण कालधम्मं गुरुणो गच्छम्मि पसमित्तं च ।

ठावियं गुरुणा किल गोष्ठमाहिलो मच्छरियभावो ॥२१६॥२५११॥

216. Soṇa kaḷadhammaṃ guruṇo gacchammi Pasamittam ca ।

Thāviyam guruṇā kila Goṣṭha-māhilo macchariyabhāvo.

(2511)

1. For details about Pūrvas, Vide Introduction and also Chapter II Foot note 2.

[श्रुत्वा कालधर्मं गुरोर्गच्छे पुष्पमित्रं च ।

स्थापितं गुरुणा किल गोष्ठामाहिलो मत्सरितभावः ॥२१६॥२५११॥

216. Śrutvā kāladharmam guro-r-gacche Puṣpamitraṃ-ca.।

Sthāpitam guruṇa kila Goṣṭhā-Māhilo matsaritaabhāvaḥ.

(2511)]

Trans. 216. Having heard, that the preceptor (Ārya Rakṣita-sūri) had attained *nirvāṇa* and that (Durbalikā) Puṣpamitra had (already) been appointed by the preceptor (as an Ācārya) in the Gaccha (Congregation-Saṅgha), Goṣṭhā-Māhila was really excited with jealousy. 2511.

टीका—२१६ इह च सर्वासामपि गाथानां भावार्थ आर्यरक्षितकथानकादवसेयः । तच्च विस्तरतो मूलावश्यकदावगन्तव्यम् । संक्षेपतस्त्विहापि किञ्चिदुच्यते । तद्यथा—

दशपुरं नाम नगरम् । तत्र च सोमदेवो नाम ब्राह्मणः । तस्य च रुद्रसोमा नाम भार्या । सा च जिनवचनप्रतिबुद्धाश्रमविका । तयोश्च रक्षितो नाम चतुर्दशविद्यास्थानपारगः पुत्रो बभूव । तेन च मातृप्रेरितेन तोसलिपुत्रचार्याणां समीपे दीक्षं प्रतिपन्नः । एकदशाङ्गानि दृष्ट्वा दौऽपि यावान् गुरुसमीपः असीत् तावान् सर्वोऽपि गृहीतः । शेषस्त्वार्यचैरस्वामिनः समीपेऽधीतो यावद् नवपूर्वाणि, तथा चतुर्विंशतियविकानि । ततः फल्गुरक्षितो नाम तद्वन्धुकरणार्थं मात्राप्रेषितः प्रव्रजितश्च । ततो द्वावपि मातापितृसमीपे समायातौ । ततश्चार्यरक्षितेन मातापितरौ तथा मातुलगोष्ठामाहिलप्रमुखः सर्वोऽपि स्वजनवर्गः प्रव्रजितः । एवमपरापरांश्च प्रव्रजयत आर्यरक्षितसुरेर्महान् गच्छो जातः । तत्र च गच्छे दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र-घृतपुष्पमित्र-वस्त्रपुष्पमित्रसंज्ञास्त्रयः पुष्पमित्रा आसन् । तत्र दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रेण नवपूर्वाण्यधीतानि । इह च गच्छे चत्वारः पुरुषाः प्रधानतराः, तद्यथा—दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रः, त्रिन्ध्यः, फल्गुरक्षितः, गोष्ठामाहिलश्चेति । तत्र स्त्रिभिर्दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रो त्रिन्ध्यस्य वाचनां दापितः । तस्य च तां प्रयच्छतो गुणनाभावादात्मनो नवमपूर्वं गलति । ततः स्त्रिभिरेवंभूतस्याग्निप्राज्ञस्य यद्विद्यंस्त्रयार्थस्मृतिः संपद्यते तदाऽशेषाणां स्त्रयाणां दुरुद्धरः स्त्रयार्थः संपत्स्यते, इति विचिन्त्य पूर्वोक्तक्रमेणानुयोगः पार्थक्येन व्यवस्थापितः । नयाश्च प्राप्तेः

निगूहितविभागाः कृता इति । अन्यदा च ते आर्यरक्षितसूरयो विहारक्रमेण मथुरानगरीं गताः । तत्र च भूतगुहायां व्यन्तरगृहे स्थिताः ।

इतश्च शक्रो महाविदेहे सीमन्धरस्वामितीर्थकरसमीपे निगोदवक्तव्यतां श्रुत्वा विस्मितः । पृष्ठवान्—“ किं भगवन् ? भरतक्षेत्रेऽपि सांप्रतममुमतीवसूक्ष्मं निगोद-विचारं कोऽपि बुध्यते प्ररूपयति च ? । ततो भगवता प्रोक्तम्—प्ररूपयन्त्यार्य-रक्षितसूरयः ” । एतच्च श्रुत्वा विस्मय-कौतुक-भक्तिभरपूर्यमाणमानसो देवेन्द्रः स्थविरब्राह्मणरूपं कृत्वा साधुषु भिक्षाचर्यां गतेष्वार्यरक्षितसमीपमुपययौ । ततस्ते-नार्यरक्षितसूरयो वन्दित्वा पृष्ठाः—‘ भगवन् ? महान् व्याधिर्वर्तते, तेनाहमनशनं कर्तुमिच्छामि, तत् कथयत मम कियदायुष्कम् ? इति ’ । ततो यविकेष्वायुःश्रेणा-वुपयोगं दत्त्वा सूरिभिर्ज्ञातम्—नायं मनुष्यो व्यन्तरादिर्वा किन्तु द्विसागरोपम-स्थितिकोऽसौ सौधर्माधिपतिः । ततश्च वार्धक्येनाधः पतिते करेण भ्रुवावुत्क्षिप्य निरीक्ष्य च प्रोक्तम् शक्रो भवान् । एवं चाभिहिते तुष्टेन देवाधिपतिना निवेदितः सर्वोऽपि तीर्थकरसमीपनिगोदश्रवणादिव्यतिकरः । ततः पृष्ठाः शक्रेण निगोद-जीवाः । प्ररूपिताश्च विस्तरतः । ततस्तुष्टमानसेन सुरपतिना प्रणम्य “ व्रजामि ” इति प्रोक्तेऽभिहितं गुरुभिः—‘ तिष्ठत क्षणमेकं, यावत् साधवः समागच्छन्ति येन युष्माभिर्दृष्टैरिदानीमपि देवेन्द्रागमनमस्तीति विज्ञाय स्थैर्यमुत्पद्यते तेषामिति ’ । ततस्त्रिदशपतिना प्रोक्तम्—“ भदन्त ! करोम्येवम्, केवलं स्वाभाविकं मत्स्वरूपं दृष्ट्वाऽल्पसत्त्वा निदानं करिष्यन्ति ” । ततो गुरुणा प्रोक्तम्—‘ तर्हि निजागमनसूचकं किमपि चिह्नं कृत्वा व्रजत ’ । ततस्तस्योपाश्रयस्यान्यतोऽभिमुखं द्वारं कृत्वा गत-स्त्रिदशपतिः । आगतैश्च साधुभिर्द्वारान्यत्वदर्शनविस्मितैः पृष्ठैः कथितं सर्वं सूरिभि-रिति । अन्यदा च ते विहरन्तो दशपुरनगरमागताः ।

इतश्च मथुरानगर्यां मातापित्रादिकमपि नास्ति इत्यादिनास्तिकवादं प्ररूपयन् वादी समुत्थितः । तत्र च प्रतिवादिनः कस्यचिदभावात् संधेनार्यरक्षितसूरयः एव सांप्रतं युगप्रधाना इति कृत्वा तत्समीपे प्रस्तुतव्यतिकरकथनाय साधुसङ्घाटकं प्रेषितम् । स्वयमतीववृद्धत्वाद् गन्तुमशक्तैः “ वादलब्धिसंपन्नः ” इति कृत्वा गोष्ठामाहिलो निरूपितः । तत्र च तेन गत्वा निगूहीतोऽसौ वादी । श्रावकैश्चायं तत्रैव वर्षाकालं कारितः ।

इतश्चार्यरक्षितसूरिभिर्निजपट्टे दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रः स्थापयितुमध्यवसितः । शेषस्तु स्वजनभूतः साधुवर्गो गोष्ठामाहिलं, फल्गुरक्षितं वा, तमीहते । ततश्च

सर्वमपि गच्छमुपवेश्य सूरयः संबोधयन्ति, तद्यथा—“इह किल त्रयो घटा भृताः । तत्रैको वल्लानाम्, द्वितीयो तिलस्य, तृतीयस्तु घृतस्य । एतेषु चावाङ्मुखेषु कृतेषु वल्लाः सर्वेऽपि निर्गच्छन्ति । तैलं तु किञ्चिद् घटेऽपि लगति । घृतं तु बहुतरं तत्र लगति । तदहं दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रं प्रति सूत्रार्थो समाश्रित्य वल्लघटकल्पः संजातः सद्गतयोः समस्तयोरपि तयोस्तेन ग्रहणात् । फल्गुरक्षितं तु प्रति तिलघटकल्पोऽहं संपन्नः, सर्वयोरपि सूत्रार्थयोस्तेनाग्रहणात् । गोष्ठामाहिलं तु प्रति घृतघटकल्पोऽहमभूवम्, बहुतरयोः सूत्रार्थयोर्ममापि पार्श्वेऽवस्थानात् । तस्माद् मद्गतशेषसूत्रार्थसंपन्नत्वाद् दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र एव भवतां सूरिर्भवतु ” । ततः “इच्छामः” इति भणित्वा तैः सर्वैरपि प्रतिपन्नमिदम् । सूरिभिरप्यभिहितो दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रा “यथाऽहं वर्तितः फल्गुरक्षिते गोष्ठामाहिले च तथा भवतामपि वर्तितव्यम्” । गच्छोऽप्यभिहितः—“यथा मया सार्धं भवद्भिर्वर्तितं तथाऽनेनापि सार्धं वर्तितव्यम् । अपि च, अहं कृतेऽकृते वा नारूप्यम्, अयं तु न सहिष्यति, ततः सुतरामस्य विनयेन वर्तितव्यम्” । इत्याद्यनुशास्ति दत्त्वा भक्तं प्रत्याख्याय देवलोकमुपगताः सूरयः ।

गोष्ठामाहिलेन च श्रुतमिदं यथा—“गुरवः परलोकं गताः । ततो मथुरातः समागतेन पृष्ठमनेन यथा—“को गणधरः स्वपदे सूरिभिर्निवेशितः ? ।” ततः सर्वोऽपि वल्लादिघटप्ररूपणादिको व्यतिक्रमः समाकणितो लोकात् । तच्छ्रवणाच्चातीवदूनोऽसौ स्थित्वा पृथक् प्रतिश्रये, दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रोपाश्रये तच्चर्योपलम्भार्थगतः । तैश्च सर्वैरप्यभ्युत्थितोऽसौ, भणितश्च यथा—‘तिष्ठत यूयमत्रेवोपाश्रये, किमिति पृथग् व्यवस्थिताः ?’ । तच्च नेच्छत्यसौ । पृथगुपाश्रयव्यवस्थितश्च दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रापवादग्रहणादिना व्युद्ग्राहयति साधून्, न च व्युद्ग्राहयितुं शक्नोति । दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रसमीपे चाभिमानतो न किञ्चित् शृणोति किन्तु व्याख्यानमण्डलिकास्थितस्य चिन्तनिकां कुर्वतो विन्ध्यस्यान्तिके समाकर्णयति । अन्यदा अष्टम-नवमपूर्वयोः कर्म-प्रत्याख्यानविचारेऽभिनिवेशाद् विप्रतिपन्नो वक्ष्यमाणनीत्या निह्नवो जातः इति ॥

अथ प्रकृतगाथाक्षरार्थोऽनुश्रीयते—कालो मरणं तल्लक्षणो धर्मः पर्यायः काल-धर्मस्तं गुरोरारक्षितस्य श्रुत्वा, तथा पुष्पमित्रं च गच्छेऽधिपतिं स्थापितमाकर्ण्य गोष्ठामाहिलो मत्सरितभावः संजातः ॥२५११॥

D. C. Before proceeding to the story of the Seventh Nihava, and his theory, it is necessary to narrate briefly the story of Ārya Raksitācārya as told by the Original Āvaśyaka Sātras:—

There was a Brahmin named Somadēva in Daśapura nagara. His wife Rudrasomā, of whom Somadēva had a son named Raksita, was a devoted follower of the Tirthaṅkaras. Raksita was proficient in all the fourteen lores.² On the advice of his mother, he accepted *dīkṣā* at the hands of Ācārya Tosaliputra, under whose guidance he studied all the eleven Āngas and whatever he could of the Twelfth Ānga. In addition to that, he learnt nine pūrvas and twenty-four *yavikās* from Ārya Vajraswāmi. His brother Falguraksita was also initiated as an ascetic when he came to Raksitasari. Then gradually both of them made all their relatives including their father, mother, and maternal uncle Goṣṭhā-Māhila accept *dīkṣā*. Since a number of persons were initiated in this way, Ārya Raksitasari got his *gaccha* established.

In the *gaccha*, there were three disciples named Puṣpamitra: Ghrita Puṣpamitra, Vāstra Puṣpamitra, and Durbalikā Puṣpamitra, of whom Durbalikā Puṣpamitra was conversant with the nine Pūrvas. Durbalikā Puṣpamitra, Vindhya, Falguraksita and Goṣṭhāmāhila were the four chief ascetics in the *gaccha*. Durbalikā Puṣpamitra was entrusted with the work of teaching parvas to Vindhya. In course of his teaching the ninth parva he found that he forgot his own study. Knowing this, the preceptor thought that if such an able disciple forgets the part of *sātras*,

2. According to some, these fourteen *vidyās* are the Four Vēdas; the six Vēdāṅgas, the Puraṇas, the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and Dharma. Others add four Upavēdas to these and take the *vidyās* to be eighteen in all.

According to Manu Smṛiti they are five: (1) Trayi, the Triple Vēdas. (2) Anvikṣiki, Logic and Metaphysics. (3) Daṇḍanīti, the science of Government. (4) Vārttā, practical arts such as Agriculture, Commerce, Medicine etc. and (5) Ātma-vidyā—Knowledge of Soul or Sublime Theological Truth.

Vide Manu VII. 43 |

there is no wonder if all the *sūtras* could not be committed to memory by anyone. Consequently, he divided all the *sūtras* into four *anuyogas*³ as mentioned before. Then, Ārya Rakṣitasūri proceeded on *vihāra* and stayed in a *Vyantara griha* in Bhūtaguphā at Mathārā.

In the mean time, once upon a time, while returning after paying his homages to Śrī Sīmandhara Swāmi, in the regions of Mahāvidhā, Indra (Saudharmendra) astonished at his wonderful discourse on “nigoda”⁴ asked the Tirthaṅkara “O worthy Lord! does anyone in the whole of Bharata-kṣetra understand and explain the subtle form of ‘nigoda’ at present?” “Ārya Rakṣitasūri teaches it” was the reply. Saudharmendra impelled by surprise, curiosity, and devotion approached Ārya Rakṣitasūri in the attire of an old Brāhmin, at the time when all the sādhus had retired for their meals. Having paid his respects, the Indra said “Revered Sir, I am suffering from a fatal disease. So, I wish to observe fasts from to-morrow. Will you kindly tell me how long is the rest of my life?” Then, concentrating his mind on the category of age in *yavikās*, the Ācārya recognized at once that he was neither a human being nor a *Vyantara* etc. but he was Saudharmendra—the lord of the Saudharma dhva-loka—with an age-limit as long as two Sāgaropams. He up-raised his lifted eye-brows, which were bent down due to old age, looked at the Brahmin and said:—“You are none but Saudharmendra. Being pleased at this, Indra narrated the whole incident of Tirthaṅkara Śrī Sīmandhara Swāmi, from whom he had studied the forms of “nigoda beings.” Indra asked the Ācārya about the nature of ‘nigoda’ living beings also. The Ācārya

3. These are (1) Dravyānuyoga, (2) Carāṇa-karaṇānuyoga, (3) Gaṇitānuyoga and (4) Kathānuyoga.

4. The division of the Sūtras into four *anuyogas* was done by Ārya Rakṣitasūri. But with reference to the knowledge of ‘nigoda’ some attribute superior knowledge of ‘nigoda’ to Ārya Rakṣitasūri, while others attribute it to Kālikācārya. For a detailed explanation of ‘Nigoda’, Vide Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra Vol. I Part I page 12.

explained the same in full details exactly in the same way as the Tīrthaṅkara had done. Indra said "Worthy sir ! you have told the same thing as the Tīrthaṅkara Śrī Sīmandhara Swāmi did. Now I shall take your leave." The Ācārya replied "But, O Lord of Deities ! Kindly wait till the inmates of the *gaccha* return. They will stick to the *gaccha* more firmly at your sight" The Indra replied 'I will do like that, but what if the lower type of jīvas humiliated me on seeing me in such an ordinary attire ? Then the Ācārya said 'You are right. In that case, you may leave something as a token of your visit. Accordingly, Saudharmendra shifted the main-door of the *upāśraya* from one direction to another, and went away.

When the ascetics returned and found the main-door of the *upāśraya* in the opposite direction, they were surprised. The Ācārya, explained the whole incident, and satisfied their curiosity. Then, moving about from one place to another, the Ācārya at last came back to Daśapura nagara.

In the mean-time, a great atheist rose up in Mathūrā, denying even the existence of father and mother. When a competent combatant was not available, taking Ācārya Rakṣitasūri as '*Yuga pradhāna*' a deputation of ascetics was sent to him, to inform him of this incident. Due to his old age, he could not go there himself. So, he appointed Goṣṭhā-Māhila for the task. The atheist was defeated by Goṣṭhā-Māhila who passed his monsoon season at Mathūrā

On the other side, in Daśapura nagara Ārya Rakṣitasūri decided to appoint Durbalikā Puṣpamitra as an Ācārya after him. Many of his disciples were in favour of Goṣṭhā-Māhila and Phalgurakṣita. So, in order to convince them of his right choice, he called a meeting all the monks of the *gaccha*, and showing three pots full of different things, he said, "These are three pots. One is full of Valla (beans of winnowing corn), another is full of oil, and a third one is full of ghee (clarified butter). When all of them are up-turned, all the beans from one will come out, oil contained in another pot will stick to the pot only to some

extent, while in the third pot a large quantity of ghee will be stuck. My tendency towards Durbalikā Puṣpamitra is like that of the pot containing beans. That is to say, I have poured out all my knowledge into him and he has grasped the same very well. Since Phalgurakṣiṭa has not been able to grasp the meaning of all the *sūtras* my tendency towards him is like that of the pot full of oil, and as most of the knowledge has stuck to me instead of being grasped by Goṣṭhā-Māhila, my behaviour towards him will be corresponding to that of the ghee-pot. Thus, since Durbalikā Puṣpamitra has grasped all the knowledge that I possess, you shall have to honour him as an Ācārya (preceptor) after me. The monks agreed upon this proposal saying "We all accept him as our Ācārya." The Ācārya, then, asked Durbalikā Puṣpamitra to behave with Goṣṭhā-Māhila and Phalgumitra with the same respect as he did. On the other side, instructing the inmates of the *gaccha* to respect Durbalikā Puṣpamitra in the same way, as they used to respect himself, he warned them that they should behave with him more humbly than they did with himself, as Durbalikā Puṣpamitra would not tolerate a slight immodesty on their part as he himself used to tolerate at times.

Having advised both the parties, in this way, Ārya Rakṣitasari departed to heaven.

On hearing that Ārya Rakṣitasari had departed to the other world, Goṣṭhā-Māhila returned to Daśapura nagara immediately. He inquired and came to know about the appointment of Durbalikā Puṣpamitra as the Ācārya of the *gaccha*. He was vitally afflicted by the news. So, he did not stay in the *gaccha* but he stayed outside and then he went to the *gaccha-upāśraya* in order to see his fellow-ascetics. The ascetics at once received him with great warmth, and earnestly requested him to stop with them in the *gaccha-upāśraya*. But Goṣṭhā-Māhila did not accede to their request.

Durbalikā Puṣpamitra was giving sermons on the Eighth Pārva (Pratyā-khyāna pūrva). Goṣṭhā-Māhila did not even care to listen to his sermons out of jealousy and impudence. He heard

the same from Vindhya who carefully attended and understood the sermons.

Once in course of discussion of the eighth and ninth parvas, Goṣṭhā-Māhila contradicted the Truth, laid down by the Original sūtras, and hence he became a *nihnava*. 216 (2511)

वीसुवसहिए ठिओ छिदनेसणपरो य स कयाए ।

विंझस्स सुणइ पासेऽणुभासमाणस्स वक्खाणं ॥२१७॥२५१२॥

217. Visuvasahie ṭhiō chiddaṇnesaṇaparo ya sa kayāe ।

Vinjhassa suṇai pāse'ṇubhāsamāṇassa vakkhāṇam. (2512)

[विष्वग्वसतौ स्थितश्छिद्रान्वेषणपरश्च स कदाचित् ।

विन्ध्यस्य शृणोति पार्श्वेऽनुभाषमाणस्य व्याख्यानम् ॥२१७॥२५१२॥

217. Viṣvagvasatau sthitaschidrānveṣaṇaparaśca sa kadācit ।

Vindhasya Śṛṇoti pāśvè'nubhāsamāṇasya vyākhyānam. (2512)]

Trans. 217. He, stopping at a separate place, and (always) bent on finding faults, sometimes heard the sermon from Vindhya who used to repeat (what Durbalikā Puspamitra had said) 2512.

टीका-२१७ विष्वग्वसतौ स्थितश्छिद्रान्वेषणपरः स गोष्ठामाहिलः कदाचिद् विन्ध्यस्यानुभाषमाणस्य चिन्तनिकां कुर्वतः पार्श्वे व्याख्यानं शृणोतीति ॥२५१२॥

D. C. Clear,

Then,

कम्मप्पवायपुव्वे बद्धं पुट्ठं निकाइयं कम्मं ।

जीवपएसेहिं समं सूईकलावोवमाणाओ ॥२१८॥२५१३॥

उव्वट्ठणमुक्केरो संथोमो खवणमणुभवो वावि ।

अणिकाइयम्मि कम्मे निकाइए पायमणुभवणं ॥२१९॥२५१४॥

सोउं भणइ सदोसं वक्खाणमिणं ति पावइ जओ भे ।

मोक्खाभावो जीवप्पएसकम्माविभागाओ ॥२२०॥२५१५॥

218. Kammappavāya puṇṇe baddham puṭṭham nikāiyam kammam ।
Jivapaṇṇasāhim samam saikalāvovamaṇāō. (2413)
219. Uvvaṭṭaṇaṇukhero santhomo khavaṇamaṇubhavo vāvi ।
Anikāiyammi kamme nikāie pāyamaṇubhavaṇam. (2514)
220. Soum bhaṇai sadosam vakkhāṇamaṇam ti pāvai jaō bhe ।
Mokkhābhavo Jivappaesaakammāvibhāgāō. (2515)

[कर्मप्रवादपूर्वे बद्धं स्पृष्टं निकाचितं कर्म ।

जीवप्रदेशैः समं सूचीकलापोपमाज्ञात् ॥२१८॥२५१६॥

अपवर्तनमुत्करः संस्तोमः क्षपणमनुभवो वापि ।

अनिकाचिते कर्मणि निकाचिते प्रायोऽनुभवनम् ॥२१९॥२५१८॥

श्रुत्वा भणति सदोषं व्याख्यानमिदमिति प्राप्नोति यतो भवताम् ।

मोक्षाभावो जीवप्रदेशकर्माविभागात् ॥२२०॥२५१५॥

218. Karmappravādapūrve baddham sprīṣṭam nikācitam karma ।
Jivapradeśaiḥ samam saikalāpopamānāt. (2513)
219. Apavartanamutkaraḥ saṁstomaḥ kṣapaṇamanubhavo vāpi ।
Anikācitē karmaṇi nikācite prāyo'nubhavanam. (2514)
220. Śrutvā bhaṇati sa-doṣam vyākhyānamidamiti prāpnoti yato
bhavatām ।
Mokṣābhavo jivapradeśakarmāvibhāgat. (2515)

Trans 218-219-220. In (course of discussion of the) Karmappravāda parva when he heard that Karman is tied (baddha) touched (sprīṣṭa) and infused (nikācita) with (all) the regions of jīva, like a bond of needles and that reduction, exaltation, transformation, destruction, or even perception (of the final consequence) (could be worked) upon an independent Karman, while that which has already been infused (with jīva) is probably susceptible to the perception of final consequence only, he said "This sermon is faulty. For in case of Karman and the (various) regions of jīva being intimately connected (with each other), there would be nothing like *mokṣa*." (2513-2515)

टीका-२१८-२१९-२२० इह कर्मप्रवादनाभ्यष्टमे पूर्वे कर्मविचारे प्रस्तुते दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्र एवं व्याख्यानयति, तद्यथा-जीवप्रदेशे समं बद्धं बद्धमात्रमेव कर्म भवति, यथाऽक्षपायस्येयपथप्रत्ययं कर्म । तच्च कालान्तरस्थितिमवाप्यैव जीवप्रदेशेभ्यो विघटते, शुष्ककुडचापतितचूर्णमुष्टिवदिति । अन्यत्तु 'पुट्टं ति' "बद्धम्" इत्यत्रापि संबध्यते । ततश्च बद्धं स्पृष्टं चेत्यर्थः । तत्र बद्धं जीवेन सह संयोगमात्रमापन्नम्, स्पृष्टं तु जीवप्रदेशैरात्मीकृतम् । एतच्चेत्थं बद्धं सत् कालान्तरेण विघटते, आद्रलेपकुड्ये सस्नेहचूर्णवदिति । "निकाइयं ति" "बद्धं" "स्पृष्टं" "च" इत्यत्रापि संबध्यते । ततश्चापरं किमपि कर्म बद्धं स्पृष्टं निकाचितं भवतीत्यर्थः । तत्र तदेव बद्धस्पृष्टं गाढतराध्यवसायेन बद्धत्वादपवर्तनादिक्रियायोग्यतां नीतं निकाचितमुच्यते । इदं च कालान्तरेऽपि विपाकतोऽनुभवमन्तरेण प्रायो नापगच्छति, गाढतरबद्धत्वात्, आद्रकुड्याश्लेषितनिविडचेटिकाहस्तकवदिति । अयं च त्रिविधोऽपि बन्धः सूचीकलापोपमानाद् भावनीयः, तद्यथा-गुणाऽऽवेष्टितसूचीकलापोपमं बद्धमुच्यते, लोहपट्टबद्धसूचीसंघातसदृशं तु बद्धस्पृमित्यभिधीयते, बद्धस्पृष्टनिकाचितं त्वग्निप्रसघनाहतक्रोडीकृतसूचीनिचयसंनिभं भावनीयमिति । नन्वनिकाचितस्य कर्मणः को विशेषः ? इत्याह-"उव्वट्टणेत्यादि" इह कर्मविषयाण्यष्टौ कारणानि भवन्ति । उक्तं च—

बंधण-संकमणु-व्वट्टणा य उव्वट्टणा उईरणया ।

उवसावणा निवत्ती निकायणा च त्ति करणाइं ॥ १ ॥

तत्र निकाचिते कर्मणि स्थित्यादिखण्डनरूपा "उव्वट्टणं ति" अपवर्तना प्रवर्तते । तथा "उक्केरो त्ति" स्थित्यादिवर्धनरूप उत्क्रोच उद्वर्तना । तथा "संथोमो त्ति" असातादेः सातादौ क्षेपणरूपः संक्रमः । तथा "खवणं ति" प्रकृत्यन्तरसंक्रमितस्य कर्मणः प्रदेशोदयेन निर्जरणं क्षयणम् । तथा "अणुभवो त्ति" स्वेन स्वेन रूपेण प्रकृतीनां विपाकतो वेदनानुभवः । इदं चोऽलक्षगुदीरणादीनाम् । तदेतान्यपवर्तनादीनि सर्वाण्यनिकाचिते कर्मणि प्रवर्तन्ते, निकाचिते तु प्रायो विपाकेनानुभव एव प्रवर्तते, न पुनरपवर्तनादीनि, इत्यनयोर्विशेषः । समाकीर्णविकृष्टतपसामुत्क्राध्यवसायबलेन "तवसा उ निकाइयाणं पि" इति वचनाद् निकाचितेऽपि कर्मण्यपवर्तनादिकरणप्रवृत्तिर्भवतीति प्रायोप्रहणम् ।

तदत्र व्याख्याने क्षीरनीरन्यायेन बद्धितसायोगोलकन्यायेन वा जीवप्रदेशैः सह कर्म संबद्धमिति पर्यवसितं विन्ध्यसमीपे श्रुत्वा तथा विधकर्मोदयादभिनिवेशेन

विप्रतिपन्नो गोष्ठामाहिलः प्रतिपादयति—“ननु सदोषमिदं व्याख्यानम्, यस्मादेवं व्याख्यायमाने भवतां मोक्षाभावः प्राप्नोति, जीवप्रदेशैःसह कर्मणामधिभागेन तादात्म्येनावस्थानादिति ॥२५१३॥२५१४॥२५१५

D. C. In course of his lecture on Karma-pravāda parva, Durbalikā Puspamitra explains the relation between jīva and Karman as follows :—

Karman is attached to the *jivapradeśas* only externally e. g. Karman constituting the observances of religious mendicant is tied to the holy regions of the *jīva*, only externally. It is separated from *jīva* soon after it comes in contact, like a handful of powder separating itself from a dry wall. Such a type of Karman is known as “*baddha karman*.”

There are some karmans which are connected with *jīva pradeśas* more closely. They could be separated from the *jīva pradeśas* after a long time, like a moist powder from a wet wall. These are known as “*baddhaspriṣṭa Karmans*”.

Again, there are some which are completely infused into the *jivapradeśas*. They have almost become one with the *jivapradeśas*, and so, they could not be separated from the *jīva pradeśas* without undergoing a change in their original condition. Such a type of Karman is known as “*baddha-spriṣṭa-nikācita Karman*.”

All the three types are better explained with the help of an illustration of a band of needles. Karman is ‘*baddha*’ like a band of needles with a piece of string tied round it. It is ‘*baddha sprīṣṭa*’ like the same with a strap of iron fastened round it, and the condition of “*baddha-spriṣṭa* and *nikācita*,” is like that of a band of needles heated red-hot and hammered in such a way, that all the needles are completely infused with one another. None of them could be separated from each other without undergoing a change in its original condition.

The distinctive characteristics of an independent or *anikācita* karman, are described as follows :—

Bandhaṇa-saṅkamaṇu-vvaṭṭaṇa ya uvattāṇā uīraṇayā |
Uvasāvaṇā nivatti nikāyaṇā ca tti karaṇāim ||

[It is susceptible to the processes of combination, transformation, division, exaltation, liberation, reduction, determination and even infusion.]

Thus, it is seen that an *a-nikācita* Karman which is separated from the Soul, is susceptible to processes of division, transformation, exaltation, and even the experience of undergoing a change in the original condition. But that which is *nikācita* is not susceptible to any such process except perhaps that of undergoing change of state. Still however, processes of division etc. could also be made to work upon *nikācita* Karman by the capacity of high penances.

In the discourse as regard Karman, it is pointed out that the relation between jīva and karman resembles that of milk and water or fire and iron. When Goṣṭhā-Māhila heard this from Vindhya he contradicted this view in the light of the above theory of Karman. He said "This discourse is faulty. For, if jīva and karman were inseparable as said above, there would be nothing like *Mokṣa*.

In support of his belief, Goṣṭhā-Māhila proceeds :—

न हि कम्मं जीवाओ अवेइ अविभागओ पएसो व्व ।
तदणवगमादमुक्खो जुत्तमिणं तेण वक्खाणं ॥२२१॥२५१६॥

221. Na hi kammam jīvāo avēi avibhāgaō paḥeso vva |

Tadaṇavagamādamukkho juttamiṇam teṇa vakkhāṇam. (2516)

[न हि कर्म जीवादपैत्यविभागतः प्रदेश इव ।
तदनपगमादमोक्षो युक्तमिदं तेन व्याख्यानम् ॥२२१॥२५१६॥

221. Na hi karma jīvādapaityavibhāgataḥ pradēśa iva |

Tadanapagamādamokṣo yuktamidam tena vyākhyānam. (2516)]

Trans. 221. Karman is not inseparable from Soul like its portion. In case of (its) being inseparable, there would be no *Mokṣa*. This discourse of mine is (thus) justified. 2516.

टीका-२२१ “न हि-नैव कर्म जीवादपैति” इति प्रतिज्ञा । अविभागात्-
वह्नययोगोलकन्यायेन जीवेन सह तादात्म्यादित्यर्थः, एष हेतुः । “एषो व्व
त्ति” जीवप्रदेशराशिवदित्यर्थः, एष दृष्टान्तः । इह यद् येन सहाविभागेन
व्यवस्थितं न तत् ततो वियुज्यते, यथा जीवात् तत्प्रदेशानिकुरम्बम्, इष्यते
चाविभागो जीव-कर्मणोर्भवद्भिः, इति न तत् तस्माद् वियुज्यते । ततस्तदनपग-
मात् तस्य कर्मणो जीवादनपगमादवियोगात् सर्वदैव जीवानां सकर्मकत्वाद् मोक्षा-
भावः । तेन तस्मादिदमिह मदीयं व्याख्यानं कर्तुं युक्तमिति ॥२५१६॥

D. C. According to you, Karman is intimately connected with jīva. Karman, in that case, will invariably be accompanying jīva and there will be no scope for jīva to attain *Mokṣa*. I shall therefore be justified in giving a discourse about it. (2516)

The discourse is—

पुट्ठो जहा अबद्धो कञ्चुइणं कञ्चुओ समन्नेइ ।
एवं पुट्ठमबद्धं जीवं कम्मं समन्नेइ ॥२२२॥२५१७॥

222. Puṭṭho jahā abaddho kañcuṇaṃ kañcuō samannēi ।
Evam puṭṭhamabaddham jīvaṃ kammaṃ samannēi. (2517)

[स्पृष्टो यथाऽबद्धः कञ्चुकिनं कञ्चुकः समन्वेति ।
एवं स्पृष्टमबद्धं जीवं कर्म समन्वेति ॥२२२॥२५१७॥

222. Sprīṣṭo yathā'badḍhaḥ kañcukinaṃ kañcukaḥ samanveti ।
Evam sprīṣṭamabaddham jīvaṃ karma samanveti. (2517)]

Trans. 222. Just as, the cast-off skin of a snake goes along with the snake even with a slight touch, so also, Karman though separate, goes with jīva (even) with a (slight) touch 2517.

टीका-२२२ यथास्पृष्टः स्पर्शनमात्रेण संयुक्तोऽबद्धः क्षीरनीरन्यायादलोली-
भूत एव कञ्चुको विषधरनिर्मोकः कञ्चुकिनं विषधरं समन्वेति समनुगच्छति,
एवं कर्मापि स्पृष्टं सर्पकञ्चुकवत् स्पर्शनमात्रेणैव संयुक्तमबद्धं वह्नयः पिण्डादि-
न्यायादलोलीभूतमेव जीवं समन्वेति, एवमेव मोक्षापत्तेरिति ॥२५१७॥

D. C. The cast-off skin of a snake though separate but touched by the snake, is always accompanying the serpent. The same is the case with Karman. Although considered as external, Karman accompanies jīva everywhere even by slight touch giving rise thereby to the complete denial of Mokṣa. 222 (2517)

Controversy about the Ninth Pūrva (Pratyākhyāna pūrva) is this :—

सोऽण भन्नमाणं पच्चक्खाणं पुणो नवमपुव्वे ।
 सो जावज्जीवविहियं तिविहं तिविहेण साहूणं ॥२२३॥२५१८॥
 जंपइ पच्चक्खाणं अपरिमाणाए होइ सेयं तु ।
 जेसिं तु परिमाणं तं दुट्ठं आससा होइ ॥२२४॥२५१९॥

223. Soṇa bhannamāṇam paccakkhāṇam puṇo navamapuvve ।
 So jāvajjīvavihiyam tiviham tivihēṇa sāhūṇam. (2518)

224. Jampai paccakkhāṇam a-parimāṇāḍe hoi seyam tu ।
 Jesim tu parimāṇam tam duṭṭham āsasā hōi. (2519)

[श्रुत्वा भण्यमानं प्रत्याख्यानं पुनर्नवमपूर्वे ।
 स यावज्जीवविहितं त्रिविधं त्रिविधेन साधूनाम् ॥२२३॥२५१८॥
 जल्पति प्रत्याख्यानमपरिमाणतया भवति श्रेयस्तु ।
 येषां तु परिमाणं तद् दुष्टमाशंसा भवति ॥२२४॥२५१९॥

223. Śrutvā bhanyamānam pratyākhyānam puna-r-navamapūrve ।
 Sa yāvajjīvavihitam trividham trividhena sādhanām. (2518)

224. Jalpati pratyākhyānamaparimāṇatayā bhavati śrēyastu ।
 Yeṣām tu parimāṇam tad duṣṭamaśamsā bhavati. (2519)]

Trans. 223-224. Having heard the discourse of the religious vow laid down in the Ninth Parva, to be observed, trividham (acting, commanding, consenting, either in the past, or the present, or the future) trividhena (in mind, speech and body) by the ascetics till the end of their life, he objects that the vow becomes excellent by (virtue of) its (being)

limitless. Those that are limited are spoiled by (the rise of) temptation. (2518-2519)

टीका—२२३ स गोष्ठामाहिलः कर्मविचारे विप्रतिपन्नः पुनरन्यदा नवमपूर्वे “करेमि भन्ते ! सामाइयं सव्वं सावज्जं जोगं पच्चक्खामि” इत्यादि यावज्जीवावधिकं साधूनां संबन्धिप्रत्याख्यानं भण्यमानं विन्ध्यसमीपे विचार्यमाणं शृणोति ॥२५१८॥

टीका—२२४ गोष्ठामाहिलो जल्पति—ननु प्रत्याख्यानं सर्वमप्यपरिमाणतयाऽवधिरहितमेव क्रियमाणं श्रेयोहेतुत्वात् श्रेयः शोभनं भवति । येषां तु व्याख्याने यावज्जीवादिपरिमाणमवधिर्विधीयते, तेषां मतेन तत् प्रत्याख्यानमाशंसदोषदुष्टत्वाद् दुष्टं सदोषं प्राप्नोति ॥२५१८॥२५१९॥

D. C. In course of his listening to the Ninth *parva* from Vindhya, Goṣṭhā Māhila comes across the expression “*Karēmi bhantē ! sāmāiyam savvam sāvajjam jogam paccakkhāmi* etc., which lays down that the practice of *pratyākhyāna* is to be followed trividham (by means of acting, commanding, or consenting) trividhena (in mind, speech and body) by all the monks till the end of their life. He objects to this predicament and says that the religious vow appears excellent only if it is practised without a time-limit Those who preach the practice of vow to be followed only till the end of life, spoil the sanctity of the same by giving rise to temptation. 223-224 (2518-2519)

It is explained in details as follows—

आसंसा जा पुण्णे सेविस्सामि त्ति दूसियं तीए ।

जेण सुयम्मि वि भणियं परिणामाओ असुद्धं तु ॥२२५॥२५२०॥

225. Āsaṃsā jā puṇṇe seviṣṣāmi tti dāsiyam tiē ।

Jeṇa suyaṃmi vi bhaṇiyam pariṇāmāō asuddham tu. (2520)

[आशंसा या पूर्णे सेविष्य इति दूषितं तथा ।

येन श्रुतेऽपि भणितं परिणामादशुद्धं तु ॥२२५॥२५२०॥

225. Āsaṃsā yā parṇe seviṣya iti duṣitam tayā ।

Yena śrute'pi bhaṇitam pariṇamādaśuddham tu. (2520)]

Trans. 225. It is defiled by the expectation that "I shall (be able to) enjoy at the end (of life)" That is why it is laid down in the Scriptures also, that (a vow) is (said to be) unholy on account of consequence. 2520.

टीका—२२५ “आशंसातः प्रत्याख्यानं दुष्टम्” इत्युक्तम् । तत्राशंसा का ? इत्याह—‘ज त्ति’ यैवंविधपरिणामरूपा । कथंभूतः परिणामः ? इत्याह—पूर्णे प्रत्याख्याने देवलोकादौ सुराङ्गनासंभोगादिभोगानहं सेविष्ये” इत्येवंभूतपरिणामरूपा च याऽऽशंसा तया प्रत्याख्यानं दूषितं भवति । कुतः ? इत्याह—येन श्रुतेऽप्यागमेऽपि भणितम्—दुष्टपरिणामाशुद्धेः प्रत्याख्यानमशुद्धं भवति । तथागमः—

सोही संदहणां जाणंणा य विणएऽणुभासणा चेव ।

अणुपालणा विसोही भावविसोही भवे छट्ठो ॥ १ ॥

तत्र “पञ्चक्खाणं संवन्नुदेसियं” इत्यादिना श्रद्धानादिषु व्याख्यातेषु भावविशुद्धे यद् व्याख्यानं तत् प्रकृतोपयोगीति दर्शते—

रागेण व दोसेण व परिणामेन व न दूसियं जं तु ।

तं खलु पञ्चक्खाणं भावविशुद्धं सुण्येयव्वं ॥ १ ॥ इति ।

तदेवं विप्रतिपन्नेवं गोष्ठामाहिलेन यत् पूर्वपक्षीकृतं तद् विन्ध्येन गत्वा गुरोर्दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रस्य निवेदितम् । गुरुणा चोत्तरपक्षभूतं सर्वमपि प्रतिविधानं तस्योपदिष्टम्, तेनापि गत्वा गुरुपदेशेन सर्वं गोष्ठामाहिलस्य प्रतिपादितम् । स च मिथ्याभिमानाद् गाढमाविष्टो यावद् न किञ्चित् प्रतिपन्नवान्, तावद् गुरुणा स्वयमाभिमुख्येनोक्त इति ॥२५२०॥

D. C. The practice of *pratyākhyāna* is defiled by means of expectation or desire in this way:—A person practising a religious vow during this life, would be cherishing a desire throughout that “When the *pratyākhyāna* will be over at the end of this life, I shall be able to enjoy pleasures with damsels etc., in the divine world.” The practice of *pratyākhyāna* is blotted by means of such motives. It is forbidden in the Āgamas also.

The Āgama says—

Sohi saddahaṇā jāṇaṇā ya viṇae’nu bhāsaṇā ceva ।
Aṇupālaṇa visohi bhāvavisoḥi bhave chaṭṭho ॥

[There are six types of purity :—1. Freedom from defilement, 2. (observance of) purificatory rites, 3. right knowledge, 4-5. modest speech and action and 6. purity of motive.]

Then explaining the purity of motive by means of expressions like “paccakkhāṇam savvaṇṇudesiyam.”

(Religious vow is directed by Omniscient) etc., it has been laid down that—

“Rāgeṇa va doṣeṇa va pariṭāmena va na dūsiyam jaṇ tu
Tam khaṇṇaṃ paccakkhāṇam bhāvaṇṇasuddhaṃ muṇeyavvaṃ ॥

[That which is not blotted by passion, prejudice or (evil) consequence is, in fact known to have been (goaded by) pure motive.]

When Goṣṭhā Māhila opposed the establishment of predicament of pratyākhyāna, the matter was reported to the preceptor, Durbalikā Puṣpamitra, who sent a reply through Vindhya. But when Goṣṭhā Māhila was not convinced even by that, the preceptor himself had to come to the spot to defeat him. 225. (2520)

विंशपरिपुच्छियगुरुवएसकहियं पि न पडिवन्नो सो ।

जाहे ताहे गुरुणा सयमुत्तो पसमित्तेणं ॥२२६॥२५२१॥

226. Vinjjhaparipucchiyaḡuruvāsaśakahiyaṃ pi na paḍivaṇṇo so ।
Jāhe tāhe guruṇā sayamutto Paśamitteṇaṃ. (2521)

[विन्ध्यपरिपृष्टगुरुपदेशकथितमपि न प्रतिपन्नः सः ।

यदा तदा गुरुणा स्वयमुक्तः पुष्पमित्रेण ॥२२६॥२५२१॥

226. Vindhyaparipriṣṭaḡurūpadeśakathitaṃapi na pratipannaḥ saḥ ।
Yadā tadā guruṇā svayamuktaḥ Puṣpamitreṇa. (2521)]

Trans. 226. When he was not convinced even by the argument advanced by Vindhya advised by the preceptor, the preceptor (Durbalikā) Puṣpamitra himself had to argue (with him). 2521.

He asks--

किं कंचुओ व्व कम्मं पइप्पएसमह जीवपज्जंते ।
 पइदेसं सव्वगयं तदंतरालाणवत्थाओ ॥२२७॥२५२२॥
 अह जीवबहिं तो नाणवत्तए तं भवंतरालम्मि ।
 तदणुगमाभावाओ बज्झंगमलो व्व सुव्वत्तं ॥२२८॥२५२३॥
 एवं सव्वविमुक्खो निक्कारणउ व्व सव्वसंसारो ।
 भवमुक्काणं च पुणो संसरणमओ अणासासो ॥२२९॥२५२४॥

227. Kim kañcuö vva kammmam paippaësamaha jīvapajjantè ।
 Paidësam savvagayam tadantarālānavatthāö. (2522)

228. Aha jīvabahim to nāṇuvattāe tam bhavantarālammi ।
 Tadaṇugamābhavāö bajjhaṅgamalo vva suvvattam. (2523)

229. Evam savvavimukkho nikkāraṇau vva savva samsāro ।
 Bhavamukkāṇam ca puṇo samsaranamaö aṇāsāso. (2524)

[किं कञ्चुक इव कर्म प्रतिप्रदेशमथ जीवपर्यन्ते ।
 प्रतिदेशं सर्वगतं तदन्तरालानवस्थातः ॥२२७॥२५२२॥
 अथ जीव बहिस्ततो नानुवर्तते तद् भवान्तराले ।
 तदनुगमाभावाद् बाह्याङ्गमल इव सुव्यक्तम् ॥२२८॥२५२३॥
 एवं सर्वविमोक्षो निष्कारणको वा सर्वसंसारः ।
 भवमुक्तानां च पुनः संसरणमतोऽनाश्वासः ॥२२९॥२५२४॥

227. Kim kañcuka iva karma pratideśamatha jīvaparyante ।
 Pratideśam sarvagatam tadantarālānavasthātaḥ. (2522)

228. Atha jīvabahistato nānuvartate tad bhavāntarāle ।
 Tadanugamābhavād bāhyāṅgamala iva suvyaktam. (2523)

Evam sarvavimokṣo niṣkāraṇako vā sarvasamsāraḥ ।
 Bhavamuktānām ca punaḥ saṃsaraṇamato'naśvāsaḥ. (2524)].

Trans. 227-228-229. Is Kārman (attached to) every por-
 tion of jīva like the cast-off skin of a snake or) only) to
 the (out-ward) extreme of a jīva ? If it is (attached to)

every portion it would be pervading the whole (of jīva) on account of (its) intermediary portions not being raised. And if it is (attached to) the external surface of jīva, it is clear that it does not follow (jīva) to the next world on account of its inability to accompany (soul) like the filth on the exterior limb. In that case, there would be attainment of mundane world by all without any reason. And those who have already been finally emancipated from this mundane world, will have to come down to the mundane world again (proving) thereby futility (of righteous deeds). (2522-2524)

टीका-२२७-२२८-२२९, व्याख्या-“पुट्टो जहा अबद्धो कंचुइणं” इत्यादिगाथायां कञ्चुकवत् स्पृष्टमेव जीवे कर्म न तु बद्धमिति यदुच्यते भवता, तद् विचार्यते-किं कञ्चुकवत् स्पृष्टं कर्म जीवस्य प्रतिप्रदेशं वृत्तं सदुच्यते, आहोस्वि-जीवपर्यन्ते त्वक्पर्यन्त एव वृत्तं स्पृष्टमिष्यते ? इति द्वयीगतिः । तत्र यदि प्रतिप्रदेशं वृत्तत्वात् स्पृष्टमिष्टम्, तर्हि जीवे सर्वगतं कर्म प्राप्नोति, नभोवत् । कुतः सर्वगतम् ? इत्याह-“तदन्तरालेत्यादि” तस्य जीवस्यान्तरालं मध्यं तदन्तरालं तस्यानवस्थातः तस्य कर्मव्याप्तस्यानवस्थानादनुद्धारणादित्यर्थः । न हि प्रतिप्रदेशं वृत्ते कर्मणि जीवस्य कोऽपि मध्यप्रदेश उद्हरति । येन कर्मणस्तत्रासर्वगतत्वं स्यात् । तस्मादाकाशेनेव कर्मणा जीवस्य प्रतिप्रदेशं व्याप्तत्वात् तस्य जीवे सर्वगतत्वं सिद्धमेव । एवं च सति साध्यविकलत्वात् कञ्चुक दृष्टान्तोऽसंबद्ध एव प्राप्नोति, साध्यस्य यथोक्तस्पर्शनस्य कञ्चुकेऽभावादिति । द्वितीयविकल्पमधिकृत्याह-‘अहेत्यादि’ अथ जीवस्य बहिस्त्वक्पर्यन्ते वृत्तत्वात् कञ्चुकवत् स्पृष्टं कर्मिष्यते, तर्हि भवाद् भवान्तरं संक्रामतोऽन्तराले तद् नानुवर्तते तदनुवर्तिनं प्राप्नोति त्वक्पर्यन्ते वृत्तत्वेन तदनुगमाभावात्, बाह्याङ्गमलवदिति सुव्यक्तमेव, बालानामपि प्रतीतत्वादिति । भवत्वनुवृत्तिः कर्मणो भवान्तराले को दोषः ? इत्याह-“एवमित्यादि” एवं कर्मणोऽननुवृत्तौ सत्यां सर्वेषामपि जीवानां विमोक्षः संसाराभावः प्राप्नोति, संसारकारणस्य कर्मणोऽभावात् । अथ निष्कारणोऽपि संसार इष्यते, तर्हि ये व्रततपो-ब्रह्मचर्यादिकष्टानुष्ठानानि कुर्वन्ते तेषामपि सर्वेषां संसार एव स्यात्, निष्कारणत्वाविशेषात् । निष्कारणं च जायमानं भवमुक्तानामपि सिद्धानामपि पुनरपि संसरणं संसारः स्यादिति मुक्तावप्यनाश्वास इति ॥ २५२२॥२५२३॥२५२४॥

D. C.

Ācārya : If you believe that the relation between jīva and Karman is like that of cast-off skin and a snake, and not like that of water and milk, I put this question : Is Karman attached to jīva at all portions of jīva or is it attached only to the skin, at the outward extreme of jīva ?

If Karman were attached to jīva at all portions, none of the regions would be spared from the influence of Karman. This proves that the relation between Karman and jīva does not exist like that of a cast-off skin and snake. For, if Karman were to be connected like the cast-off skin to a snake on the surface of jīva, it would not be able to follow the soul to the other life.

Now, when Karman does not go with jīva, all jīvas will attain Mokṣa rendering saṃsāra to nothing thereby. Thus, if the Saṃsāra is accepted as existing without reason, persons observing celibacy, penances, and other religious rites etc., will have to come down to the mundane world. And, if the attainment of saṃsāra takes place without any reason, even Muktātmās or free souls will have to come down to saṃsāra indicating the futility of Mokṣa. 227-229 (2522-2524).

There is another difficulty also, in taking Karman as existing on the surface of jīva :—

देहंतो जा वेयणा कम्माभावमि किंनिमित्ता सा ?
निककारणं वा जइ तो सिद्धो वि न वेयणारहिओ ॥२३०॥२४२५॥

जइ बज्झनिमित्तं सा तदभावे सा न हुज्ज तो अंतो ।
दिट्ठा अ सा सुबहुसो बहिं निवेयणस्सावि ॥२३१॥२५४६॥

जइ वा विभिण्णदेसं पि वेयणं कुणइ कम्ममेवं तो ।
कहमण्णसरीरणं न वेयणं कुणइ अप्पणस्स ? ॥२३२॥२५२७॥

230. Dehanto jā vēyaṇā kammabhāvammi kimnimittā sā ?
Nikkāraṇā vā jai to Siddho vi na vēyaṇārahio. (2525)

231. Jai bajjhanimittā sā tadabhāve sā na hujja to anto |
Diṭṭhā ya sā subahuso bāhinnivveyaṇassāvi. (2526)
232. Jai vā vibhinṇadēsampi vèyaṇāṃ kuṇai kammamevam to |
Kahamaṇṇasarīragayam na vèyaṇāṃ kuṇai āṇṇassa ? (2527)

[देहान्तर्या वेदना कर्माभावे किंनिमित्ता सा ? ।

निष्कारणा वा यदि ततः सिद्धोऽपि न वेदनारहितः ॥२३०॥२५२५॥

यदि बाह्यनिमित्ता सा तदभावे सा न भवेत् ततोऽन्तः ।

दृष्ट्वा च सा सुबहुशो बहिर्निवेदनस्यापि ॥२३१॥२५२६॥

यदि वा विभिन्नदेशामपि वेदनां करोति कर्मैव ततः ।

कथमन्यशरीरगतां न वेदनां करोत्यन्यस्य ? ॥२३२॥२५२७॥

230. Dēhāntaryā vèdanā karmābhāve kimnimittā sā ? |
Niṣkāraṇā vā yadi tataḥ Siddho'pi na vèdanārahitaḥ. (2525)
231. Yadi bāhyanimittā sā tadabhāve sā na bhavet tato'ntaḥ |
Driṣṭvā ca sā subahuśo bahirnivèdanasyāpi. (2526)
232. Yadi vā vibhinṇadośāmapi vèdanām karoti karmaivam tataḥ |
Kathamanyaśarīragatām na vèdanām karotyanyasya ? (2527)]

Trans. 230-231-232. Or, in absence of Karman, what is the cause of ailments (produced) in the body ? If it is causeless, then, even the Accomplished (Soul) will not be free from ailment. If it is (due to) (some) external cause, then, internal ailment would not have been produced in its absence. But that wretched (ailment) (is) frequently (experienced) even by one who is free from external ailment. Or, if Karman gives rise to ailment even at a different place, why should Karman of one body not produce ailment to an (absolutely) different body ? (2525-2557)

टीका-२३०-२३१-२३२ व्याख्या-यदि कञ्चुकवद् बहिरेव वर्तते कर्म, तदा देहस्यान्तर्मध्ये या शूल-नालगुल्मादिवेदना सा किंनिमित्तेति वक्तव्यम्, मध्ये तत्कारणभूतस्य कर्मणोऽभावात् ? । अथ निष्कारणापि देहान्तर्वेदनाऽभ्यु-

पगम्यते, ततस्तर्हि सिद्धोऽपि न वेदनारहितः स्यात् निष्कारणत्वाविशेषादिति । अथ बाह्यवेदनानिमित्ता साऽन्तर्वेदनाऽभ्युपगम्यते, बहिर्वेदना हि लगुडघातादि-जन्या प्रादूर्भवन्ती मध्येऽपि वेदनां जनयत्येवेति यदि तथाभिप्रायः, तर्हि तदभावे लगुडघातादिजन्यवेदनाविरहे साऽन्तर्वेदना न भवेद् न जायेत । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, यतो दृष्टाऽसौ बहुशः शूलादिप्रभवान्तर्वेदना । कस्य ? इत्याह “बाहिर्मित्यादि” बहिर्निवेदनस्यापि बहिर्लगुडादिघातजन्यवेदनारहितस्यापी-त्यर्थः । यदि ह्ययं नियमः स्याद् यदुत-बहिर्लगुडघातादिवेदनासद्भाव एवान्त-वेदना प्रादुरस्तीति, तदा स्यादपि त्वदभिप्रेतम् । न चैवम्, यतोऽनुभूयते दृश्यते च बहिर्वेदनाऽभावेऽपि यथोक्तान्तर्वेदना, ततस्तत्कारणभूतेन मध्ये कर्मणापि भाव्यमिति सिद्धोऽस्मत्पक्ष इति । अथैवं मन्यसे-बहिस्त्वक्पर्यन्तवर्त्यपि कर्म मध्येऽपि शूलादिवेदनां जनयति न पुनर्मध्ये कर्मास्ति । तदयुक्तम्, यतो यदि बहिर्वर्तिविभिन्नदेशस्थितमपि कर्मान्यस्मिन् मध्यलक्षणे देशान्तरे वेदनां करो-तीत्यभ्युपगम्यते, एवं तर्हि कथं केन हेतुनाऽन्यशरीरगतं कर्मान्यस्य यज्ञदत्ता-देवेदनां न करोति ?-ननु करोतु नाम, एवमपि देशान्तरत्वाविशेषादिति भावः ॥२५२५॥२५२६॥२५२७॥

D. C.

Ācārya :—If Karman is taken as existing only on the surface and not inside jīva, what is the cause of ailments such as gripe, tympanitis etc. experienced inside the human body ? If the body is taken as susceptible to such ailments without any cause, like Karman etc., even Siddhātmas or Accomplished Souls, will not be taken as free from such ailments.

Goṣṭhā Māhila :—Inner ailments are caused by outer ones such as those produced by blows of stick etc.

Ācārya :—In that case, there would be no possibility of inner ailment in absence of external ailment. But that is not so. Even if there is no external ailment, the inner ailment of gripe etc. is positively experienced. This shows that there is no such rule to the effect that inner ailment is caused only by the external ailment. It follows, therefore, that there does exist something like Karman which decidedly works as the cause of inner ail-

ment as well. So, it is not proper to believe that Karman does not exist in the body.

Gosṭhā Māhila:—Karman which is attached to the exterior surface (viz skin etc.) of body, causes the ailment inside the body and hence that is taken as the cause of interior ailment.

Acārya:—This view of yours is also not correct. Karman existing outside the body (i. e. residing in a totally different body) should not be taken as causing ailment inside the body. For, according to that rule, Karman residing in one's body would be the cause of ailment in another's body, as the distinction of place is common in both. 230-232 (2525-2527)

अहं तं संचरइ मई न बहिं तो कंचुगो व्व निच्चत्थं ।
जं च जुगवं पि वियणा सव्वमि वि दीसई देहे ॥२३३॥२५२८॥

233. Aha tam sañcarai maī na bahim to kañcugo vva niceattham ।
Jam ca jugavam pi viyaṇā savvammi vi dīsaī dēhē. (2528)

[अथ तत् संचरति मतिर्न बहिस्ततः कञ्चुक इव नित्यस्थम् ।
यच्च युगपदपि वेदना सर्वस्मिन्नपि दृश्यते देहे ॥२३३॥२५२८॥

233. Atha tat sañcarati matirna bahistataḥ kañcuka iva nityastham ।
Yacca yugapadapi vèdanā sarvasminnapi dṛśyate dēhē. (2528)]

Trans. 233. If it is said that it (i. e. Karman) moves (in and out), then, it would not be permanently existing outside (the body) like a cast-off skin of a serpent. For, the ailment is experienced all over the body at one and the same time. (2528)

टीका—२३३ अथ भवतो मतिः—एकस्य देवदत्तशरीरस्य बहिरन्तश्च संचरति तत्कर्म, ततस्तत्र बहिरन्तश्च वेदनां जनयति, न शरीरान्तरे स्वाधारशरीरे बहिरन्तश्च संचरणात्, अन्यशरीरे त्वसंचरणादिति । अत्रोच्यते—“न बहिमित्यादि” ततस्तर्हि सर्पस्य कञ्चुकवज्जीवस्य बहिरेव कर्म नित्यं तिष्ठतीति नित्यस्थितमिति यद् भवतो मतं तद् न प्राप्नोति, किन्तु कदाचिद् बहिः कदाचि त्वन्तः कर्मणः

संचरणाभ्युपगमात्, कञ्चुकवद् बहिरेव तिष्ठति इति नियमस्याघटनात् प्लवत
एव तदिति भावः । किञ्च, कर्मणः संचरणमुपपद्यत इति ॥२५२८॥

D. C.

Goṣṭhā Māhila:—Karman of one person, say Dēvadatta, moves inside and outside the body producing ailment both inside and outside the body (by his movements). Karman of one person does not enter or affect the body of another in any way.

Ācārya:—In that case, the principle that Karman exists on the surface of body like the cast-off skin of a serpent, will be null and void. The principle of accepting Karman as moving inside at one time and outside at another, is not consistent with that of accepting it as existing only on the surface like the cast-off skin of a snake.

Secondly, if Karman moves in and out, the ailment should be felt one after the other. But that is not so. For, the ailments caused outside, as well as, inside the body as a result of striking a stick are felt simultaneously. So, it is not proper to take Karman as moving inside and outside the body. 233 (2528)

There is another difficulty in taking Karman as moving—

न भवंतरमण्णेइ य सरीरसंचारओ तदनिलो व्व ।

चलियं निज्जरियं चिय भणियमकम्मं च जं समए ॥२३४॥२५२९॥

234. Na bhavantaramaṇṇei ya sarīrasañcāraō tadanilo vva ।

Caliyam nijjariyam ciya bhaniyamakammam ca jam samaḇe.

(2529)

• [न भवान्तरमन्वेति च शरीरसंचारतस्तदनिल इव ।

चलितं निर्जर्णमेव भणितमकर्म च यत् समये ॥२३४॥२५२९॥

234. Na bhavāntaramanvēti ca śarīrasañcāratastadanila iva ।

Calitam nirjirṇameva bhaṇitamakarma ca yat samayē. (2529)]

Trans. 234. Like the wind, moving in the body, it does not depart to the other world. For, it is said in the Scriptures

that the moving (Karma) is a nullified (Karman) or Non-Karman. 2529.

टीका-२३४ किञ्च, यदि संचरिणुकर्माभ्युपगम्यते, तर्हि मृतस्य तद् भवान्तरं नान्वेति-भवान्तरे तस्यानुगमनं न प्राप्नोतीत्यर्थः । शरीरे संचरणादिति हेतुः । अनिलवदिति दृष्टान्तः । इह यत् शरीरे बहिरन्तश्च संचरति न तद् भवान्तरमन्वेति, यथोच्छ्वास-निःश्वासानिलः, तथा च कर्म, तस्माद् न भवान्तरमन्वेतीति । आह-नन्वागमेऽपि “चलमाणे चलि” इति वचनात् कर्मणश्चलनमुक्तम्, चलनं च संचरणमेवोच्यते, तत् किमिति तदिह निषिध्यते ? । तदयुक्तम्, अभिप्रायापरिज्ञानादित्याह-“चलियमित्यादि” “नेरईए जाव वेमाणिए जीवाउ चलियं कम्मं निज्जरइ” इत्यादिवचनात्, तथा ‘निर्जीर्यमाणं निर्जीर्णम्’ इति वचनाच्च यद् यस्मात् समये आगमे चलितं कर्म निर्जीर्णमुक्तं तदकर्मैव भणितम्, तच्च मध्ये गतमपि न वेदनां जनयितुमलम्, अकर्मणो नभः परमाणादेरिव तत्सामर्थ्याभावात् । तस्मादित्थमनेकदोषदुष्टत्वादयुक्तं कर्मणः संचरणमिति । अतो मध्ये व्यवस्थितं कर्मास्तीति स्थितम् ॥२५२९॥

D. C.

Acārya :—If Karman is taken as dynamic, it would not accompany the Soul to the other world. Because, like inhalations and exhalations, that which is moving in and out, cannot depart to the other world.

Goṣṭhā-Māhila :—The assertion “Calamāṇḍe caliḍ”⁵ in the Agamas speaks for the dynamic character of Karman. Why do you attempt to deny it ?

Ācārya :—You have not grasped the real sense of that assertion. “Calamāṇḍe caliḍ” etc. and Nēraīe jāva Vḍmāṇie jīvāo caliyam kamman nijjarai” etc. indicate that all jīvās right from the category of Nārakās or hellish denizens to the Vaimānika divine beings, tend to nullify or destroy the (bondage of) dynamic karman. “Nirjīryamaṇam nirjīrṇam” implies that, that which is being destroyed, has already been destroyed. The āgamas thus imply the dynamic character of Karman as a nullified

5. Vide Bhagawatī Sātra, Śātaaka I Uddeśaka I.

Karman or Non-karman. You are not justified in holding the view of dynamic karman. (2529)

Establishing the position of Karman, he says--

अंतो वि अत्थि कम्मं वियणासब्भावओ तयाए व्व ।
मिच्छत्ताईपच्चयसब्भावओ य सव्वत्थ ॥२३५॥२५३०॥

235. Anto vi atthi kammam viyaṇāsabbhāvaō tayāe vva ।
Micchattāipaccayasabbhāvaō ya savvattha. (2530)

[अन्तरप्यस्ति कर्म वेदनासद्भावतस्त्वचीव ।
मिथ्यात्वादिप्रत्ययसद्भावाच्च सर्वत्र ॥२३५॥२५३०॥

235. Antarpyasti karma vedaṇāsadbhāvatastvacīva ।
Mithyātvādipratyaayasadbhāvācca sarvatra. (2530)].

Trans. 235. Karman exists in the interior, as well as, on the surface, because of the (feeling of) ailment. And, it exists all over the body on account of the motives like vanity etc. (2530)

टीका-२३५ अन्तर्मध्येऽप्यस्ति कर्मेति प्रतिज्ञा । वेदनासद्भावादिति हेतुः । त्वचीवेति दृष्टान्तः । इह यत्र वेदनासद्भावस्तत्रास्ति कर्म, यथा त्वक्पर्यन्ते, अस्ति चान्तर्वेदना, ततः कर्मणापि तत्र भवितव्यमेवेति । किञ्च, मिथ्यात्वादिभिः प्रत्ययैः कर्म बध्यते, ते च जीवस्य यथा बहिस्तनप्रदेशेषु तथा मध्यप्रदेशेष्वपि, यथा मध्यप्रदेशेषु तथा बहिष्प्रदेशेष्वपि सर्वत्र सन्ति, तेषामध्यवसाय-विशेषरूपत्वात्, अध्यवसायस्य च समस्तजीवगतत्वादिति । तस्माद् मिथ्यात्वादीनां कर्मबन्धकारणानां जीवे सर्वत्र सद्भावात् तत्कार्यभूतं कर्मापि सर्वत्रैव तत्रास्ति, न पुनर्बहिरेव । तस्माद् वहन्ययः पिण्ड-क्षीरनीरादिन्यायाज्जीवेन सहाविभागेनैव स्थितं कर्मेति प्रतिपद्यतां सत्पक्षः, त्यज्यतां मिथ्याभिमान इति ॥२५३०॥

D. C. The proposition is that Karman exists in the interior, as well as, exterior regions of the body on account of the sensation of ailment felt inside, as well as, outside the body. Wherever there is ailment, there is Karman. So, Karman should exist all over the body, because ailment is felt by the body inside out.

Karman is bound by motives such as Mithyātva etc. also. These motives exist on the inner, as well as, outer side of the body. Their kārya viz Karman should, therefore, exist on the surface, as well as, inside the body. Hence, O Goṣṭhā Māhila, leave aside your vanity, and accept the true principle that Karman is united with jīva like fire and iron-bar or water and milk. 235. (2530)

Now, in reply to the argument that there would be negation of Mokṣa, if Karman were inseparably united with jīva, the Ācārya says—

अविभागस्थस्स वि से विमोचणं कंचणो-वलाणं व ।
नाण-किरियाहिं कीरइ मिच्छताईहिं चायाणं ॥२३६॥२५३१॥

236. Avibhāgatthassa vi se vimoyaṇaṁ kañcaṇo-valāṇaṁ va ।
Nāṇa-kiriyaḥim kirai micchattāiḥim cāyaṇaṁ. (2531)

[अविभागस्थस्यापि तस्य विमोचनं काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव ।
ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां क्रियते मिथ्यात्वादिभिश्चादानम् ॥२३६॥२५३१॥

236. Avibhāgasthasyāpi tasya vimocanaṁ kañcano-palayoriva ।
Jñāna-kriyābhyāṁ kriyate mithyātvādibhiścādānam. (2531)].

Trans. 236. Like (that of) gold and stone (united together), its separation (from jīva) is brought about by means of cognition and action in spite of its close contact (with jīva), while its re-union (with jīva) is (brought about) by (means of) vanity etc. 2531.

टीका-२३६ 'से' तस्य कर्मणो जीवेन सहाविभागेन स्थितस्यापि काञ्चनो-पलयोरिव विमोचनं वियोगो ज्ञान-क्रियाभ्यां क्रियते । तथा, तस्यैव कर्मणो मिथ्यात्वादिभिरादानं ग्रहणं जीवेन सह संयोगो विधीयत इत्यर्थः । इदमत्र हृदयम्-इह जीवस्याविभागेनावस्थानं द्विधा विद्यते-आकाशेन सह, कर्मणा च । तत्राकाशेन सह यदविभागावस्थानं तद् न वियुज्यत एव, सर्वाद्वयमवस्थानात् । यच्च कर्मणा सहाविभागावस्थानं तदप्यभव्यानां न वियुज्यते । भव्यानां तु कर्मसंयोगस्तथाविधज्ञान-दर्शन-चारित्र-तपः-सामग्रीसद्भावे वियुज्यते, वह्न्यौ-

षध्यादिसामग्रीसत्त्वे काश्चनो-पलसंयोगवदिति । तथाविधज्ञानादिसामग्र्यभावे तु भव्यानामपि कर्मसंयोगः कदापि न निवर्तते, “नो चेव णं भवसिद्धयविर-
हिए लोए भविस्स” इतिवचनात् । तर्हि भव्याः कथं ते व्यपदिश्यन्ते ? इति चेत् । उच्यते-योग्यतामात्रेण । न च योग्यः सर्वोऽपि विवक्षितपर्यायेण युज्यते, प्रतिमादिपर्याययोग्यानामपि तथाविधदारु-पाषाणादीनां तद्विधसामग्र्यभावे केषाञ्चित् तदयोगादित्यलं विस्तरेण प्रागेव गणधरवादेऽस्यार्थस्य विस्तरेणोक्त-
त्वात् । तस्मात् “कर्म जीवाद् न विद्युज्यते, अन्योन्याविभागेनावस्थितत्वात्, इत्यनैकान्तिकम्, उपायतो दृश्यमानवियोगैः क्षीरनीरकाश्चनोपलादिभिर्व्यभि-
चारात् । ननु प्रस्तुतो जीव-कर्माविभागः केनोपायेन विघटत इति चेत् । नन्व-
भिहितमेव “ज्ञान-क्रियोपायतः” इति । मिथ्यात्वादिभिर्हि जीव-कर्मसंयोगः क्रियते, मिथ्यात्वादिविपक्षभूताश्च सम्यग्ज्ञानादयः अतस्तैस्तद्वियोगो युक्तियुक्त एव, अन्नभोजनादिविपक्षभूतैर्लङ्घनादिभिस्तज्जनिताजीर्णसंयोगवदिति ॥

२३६॥२५३॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—Jīva and Karman are united together like gold and stone. They could be separated from each other by means of jñāna and kriyā.

Jīva is inseparably united with two things:— (1) Ākāśa or space and (2) Karman or action. The contact of jīva with ākāśa is so intimate that it is never separated. In case of contact with Karma, that with the lower types of jīvas is always inseparable, while that with the excellent ones, is broken off by means of excellent qualities such as knowledge, philosophy, character, penances etc. In case of these excellent qualities being absent, the bhavya or excellent jīvas will not be separated from the bondage of Karman.

Goṣṭhā Māhila:—Then, how could they be recognized as “bhavya?”

Ācārya:—They are known as bhavya by virtue of their fitness for the attainment of Mokṣa. But this does not mean that all attain a certain spiritual form only by virtue of their fitness.

Just as, an idol could not be constructed without the necessary materials such as wood, stone etc., the excellent souls also could never be created in absence of certain necessary qualities. This leads us to the conclusion that Jīva and Karman are inseparably united with each other. Just as, water and milk and gold and stone, united together, are separated from each other with the help of proper means, Jīva and Karman are also separated from each other with the help of jñāna, darśana and cāritra.

Goṣṭhā Mahila :—Karman is attached to Jīva only on account of actions like those of bowing to false gods, as real ones, committing violence etc. But they are not separated from each other by virtue of qualities such as sympathy, generosity self-restraint etc. 236. (2531)

The Acārya replies :—

कह वादाणे किरियासाफल्यं नेह तद्विधायमि ।

किं पुरिसगारसज्जं तस्सेवासज्जमेगं तो ॥२३७॥२५३२॥

असुभो तिव्वाईओ जह परिणामो तदज्जणेऽभिमओ ।

तह तद्विहो चिय सुभो किं नेट्ठो तद्विओगे वि ? ॥२३८॥२५३३॥

237. Kaha vādāṇe kiriyāsāphallam nēha tavvidhāyammi :

Kim purisagārasajjham tassēvāsajjamēgam to. (2532)

238. Asubho tivvāīō jaha pariṇāmo tadajjāṇe'bhimaō :

Taha tivviho cciya subho kim neṭṭho tavviōgē vi ? (2533)

[कथं वाऽऽदाने क्रियासाफल्यं नेह तद्विधाते ।

किं पुरुषकारसाध्यं तस्यैवासाध्यमेकं ततः ॥२३७॥२५३२॥

अशुभस्तीव्रादिको तथा परिणामस्तदर्जनेऽभिमतः ।

यथा तद्विध एव शुभः किं नेष्टस्तद्वियोगेऽपि ? ॥२३८॥२५३३॥

237. Katham vā'dāne kriyāsāphalyam nēha tadvighāte :

Kim puruṣakārasādhyam tasaivāsādhyamekam tataḥ. (2532)

238. Aśubhastīvrādiko tathā pariṇāmastadarjane'bhimataḥ :

Yathā tadvidha eva śubhaḥ kim neṣṭastadviyoge'pi ? (2533)]

Trans. 237-238. Or, how is (it that the) success of action (is accepted) in (case of) admitting Karman and not in (case of) its destruction? (How is it that) one action is inaccessible to an effort which achieves another? So, why don't you expect beneficial result in separating (Karman from jīva), just as you apprehend an extremely inauspicious result in (case of) accepting (the existence of) Karman? (2532-2533).

टीका-२३७-२३८ वाशब्दो युक्तेरभ्युच्यते । कथं वा हन्त ! कर्मण आदाने ग्रहणे हिंसादिक्रियाणां साफल्यमिह त्वयेष्यते ?-न तु दया-दानादिक्रियाणां तद्विघाते साफल्यमभिप्रेयते, किमत्र राज्ञामाज्ञा प्रभवति, न तु युक्तिः ? । किञ्च, इदमपि प्रष्टव्योऽसि, किं पापस्थानव्यापृतपुरुषकारसाध्यं “एगं” इतीहापि संबध्यते, एकं कर्मण आदानमिष्यते, एकं तु यत् तस्य निर्जरणं तत् तस्यैव संयमादिस्थानविहितपुरुषकारस्यासाध्यमिष्यते ? इत्येतदपि व्यक्तमेवेश्वरचेष्टितं भवतः, स्वेच्छाप्रवृत्तेः । उपसंहारन्नाह-“तो ति” तस्माद् यथा येन प्रकारेण तीव्र-मन्द-मध्यम भेदमिन्नोऽशुभः परिणामस्तदर्जने तस्य कर्मणोऽर्जनमुपादानं ग्रहणं तत्र हेतुर्भवतोऽभिमतः तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण तद्विध एव तीव्रादिभेदमिन्नः शुभपरिणामोऽशुभविपक्षत्वात् कर्मार्जनविपक्षभूतैतद्वियोगेऽपि हेतुः किं नेष्टः ?-ननु युक्तियुक्तत्वादेष्टव्य एवेति भावः । तस्माज्जीवेन सहाविभागेन स्थितस्यापि कर्मणः सिद्धो वियोग इति । तदेवं निराकृता कर्मविचारविषयाविप्रतिपत्तिः ॥२५३२॥२५३३॥

D. C. What is the definite purpose in accepting the validity of actions like committing violence etc., when the bondages of Karman are accepted, and why don't you accept the validity of actions such as expressing charity, sympathy etc. when the bondages of Karman are being destroyed? According to you, a sinful effort brings about the accomplishment of the bondages of Karman, while a meritorious deed such as that of charity or sympathy, does not bring about the destruction of bondages of Karman. This belief of yours is absurd. The whole view-point of yours about Karman is based upon such absurdity. Really speaking, the auspicious consequence of meritorious deeds des-

troys the bondages of Karman, in the same way, as an inauspicious consequence (of sinful deeds) brings about the accomplishment of the bondages of Karman. This shows that Jīva and Karman though united intimately with each other, could be separated from each other by the help of proper means. 237-238. (2532-2533).

Now refuting the arguments advanced by Goṣṭhā Māhila, as regards the Pratyākhyāna Pūrva, the Ācārya states--

किमपरिमाणं सत्ती अणागयद्धा अहापरिच्छेओ ? ।
जइ जावदत्थि सत्ती तो नणु सच्चेव परिमाणं ॥२३९॥२५३४॥
सत्ति-किरियाणुमेओ कालो सूरकिरियाणुमेओ व्व ।
नणु अपरिमाणहाणी आसंसा चेव तदवत्था ॥२४०॥२५३५॥

239. Kimaparimāṇam sattī aṇāgayaddhā ahāpariccheō ।
Jai jāvadatthi sattī to naṇu saccēva parimāṇam. (2534)

240. Satti-kiriyaṇumēō kālo sūrakiriyaṇumēō vva ।
Naṇu a-parimāṇahāṇī āsaṃsā cēva tadavatthā. (2535)

[किमपरिमाणं शक्तिरनागताद्धाऽथापरिच्छेदः ? ।
यदि यावदस्ति शक्तिस्ततो ननु सैव परिमाणम् ॥२३९॥२५३४॥
शक्ति-क्रियानुमेयः कालः सूरक्रियानुमेय इव ।
नन्वपरिणामहानिराशंसा चैव तदवस्था ॥२४०॥२५३५॥

239. Kimaparimāṇam śaktiranāgatāddhā' thāparicchedaḥ ?
Yadi yāvadasti śaktistato nanu saiva parimāṇam. (2534)

240. Śakti-kriyānumēyaḥ kālaḥ sūrakriyānumēya iva ।
Nanvaparīṇāmahanirāśaṃsā caiva tadavasthā. (2535)]

Trans. 239-240. What is (meant by) a-parimāṇa (immeasurable) ? Is it (immeasurable) capacity, (or) the (immeasurable) time that is not (yet) come, (or) the (unlimited) continuance ? If (it means to exert) the capacity till it is finally exhausted, then, that itself becomes a limit. (The observan-

ce of vow) is measured by the limits of energy and actions, just as, Time is measured by the movements of the Sun. (The principle of) *a-parimāṇa* is (therefore) violated, and in (case of) its acceptance, the (fault of) desire will be produced. (2534-2535)

टीका-२३९-२४० यदुक्तम्-“प्रत्याख्यानपरिमाणमेव विधीयमानं श्रेयो भवति” इति । तत्र प्रतिविधीयते-किमिदं नामापरिमाणं ?-किं शक्तिर्यावच्छ-
क्रोमीत्यपरिमाणम् ? उत सर्वान्यनागताद्वा, आहोस्विदपरिच्छेदः ? इति त्रयी
गतिः । तत्र यदि “यावदस्ति शक्तिस्तावदहमिदं न सेविष्ये” इत्यपरिमाण
मिष्यते, ततस्तर्हि ननु सैव शक्तिः परिमाणमापन्नम्, अतो यदेव निषिध्यते
तदेवाभ्युपगतमिति । कुतः ? इत्याह-“सत्तीत्यादि” “यावच्छक्रोमि तावदिदं
न सेविष्ये” इत्येवंभूतया हि शक्तिक्रियया प्रत्याख्यानस्यावधिभूतः काल एवा-
नुमीयते-यावन्तं कालं शक्तिस्तावन्तं कालमिदं न सेविष्य इत्यर्थः । दृष्टान्त-
माह-यथा सूर्यादिगतिक्रियया समया-ऽऽवलिकादिः कालोऽनुमीयते, तथाऽत्रापि
शक्तिक्रियया प्रत्याख्यानावधिकाल इत्यर्थः । अस्त्वेवमिति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्,
यतो नन्वेवं सति त्वया प्रतिज्ञातस्यापरिमाणपक्षस्य हानिः प्राप्नोति, शक्तिक्रि-
यानुमितकालपरिमाणस्येदानीं स्वयमेवाभ्युपगमादिति । यदुक्तम्—

“तं दुष्टं आसंसा होइ” इति, तत्राह-“आसंसेत्यादि” ननुशक्तिरूपेऽप-
रिमाणेऽपि त्वयेष्यमाणे आशंसादोषस्तदवस्थ एव, “शक्तेरुत्तरकालमिदं सेवि-
ष्ये” इत्याशंसायास्तदवस्थत्वादिति ॥२५३४॥२५३५॥

D. C.

Goṣṭhā Mahila :—The *pratyākhyāna* accomplished without any time-limit or the limit of energy is the most beneficial of all.

Acārya :—What is *a-parimāṇa* according to you? Does it imply exerting till the last drop of energy? Or, is the whole of future time included in *a-parimāṇa*? Or, is it that *a-paricchēda* or continuance without break, is *a-parimāṇa* according to you?

When you say that “I shall refrain from enjoying a particular pleasure till I have the capacity to do so,” the *pratyākhyāna* does not become *a-parimāṇa* or limitless, but *parimāṇa* or limited by the bounds of capacity expressed by means of actions.

Just as, the measurement of time is ascertained by the help of movements of the Sun etc., that of the limit of *pratyākhyāna* is ascertained by the help of actions exerted by capacity. Thus, your theory of *a-parimāṇa* or immeasurable *pratyākhyāna* is refuted, and the fault of *āsāṃsā* or expectation is all the while retained therein. For, the person observing *pratyākhyāna* would all the while be cherishing a desire in his heart that “after the whole of my energy is over in observing this vow, I shall be able to enjoy the objects of pleasure in the other world.” 239-240 (2534-2535)

Not only that your theory is self-contradictory in this way, but there are other difficulties also—

जह न वयभंगदोसो मयस्स तह जीवओ वि सेवाए ।
वयभंगनिब्भयाओ पच्चक्खाणाणवत्था य ॥२४१॥२५३६॥

241. Jaha na vayabhaṅgadoṣo mayassa taha jīvāo vi sevāe ।
Vayabhaṅganibbhayāo paccakkhāṇāṇavatthā ya. (2536)

[यथा न व्रतभङ्गदोषो मृतस्य तथा जीवतोऽपि सेवायाम् ।
व्रतभङ्गनिर्भयात् प्रत्याख्यानानवस्था च ॥२४१॥२५३६॥

241. Yathā na vratabhaṅgadoṣo mritasya tathā jīvato’pi sevāyām ।
Vratabhaṅganirbhayāt pratyākhyānānavasthā ca. (2536)]

इत्तियमित्ती सत्ति त्ति नाइयारो न यावि पच्छित्तं ।
न य सव्वव्वयनियमो एगेण वि संजयत्त त्ति ॥२४२॥२५३७॥

242. Ittiyamittī satti tti nāiyāro na yāvi pacchittam ।
Na ya savvavvayaniamo egeṇa vi saṅjayatta tti. (2537)

[एतावन्मात्रा शक्तिरिति नातिचारो न चापि प्रायश्चित्तम् ।
न च सर्वव्रतनियम एकेनापि संयतत्वादिति ॥२४२॥२५३७॥

242. Etāvanmātrā śaktiriti nāticāro na cāpi prāyaścittam ।
Na ya sarvavrataniyama ekēnāpi saṃyatadvāditi. (2537)]

Trans. 241-242. In cherishing (a desire) just as there is no fault of violation of a vow to a dead (being), the living

(being) will also be free from fear of violating the vow, in (case of) enjoyment. And (thus), there would be confusion as regards observance of the vow. (On saying that) “This much is my capacity”, there would be neither excessive practice nor remonstrance. And there would be no (necessity of) observing the rule of practising all vows, as (according to you) asceticism could be attained even by (observing) one vow. (2536-2537).

टीका-२४१-२४२ यथा मृतस्य पञ्चत्वमुपगतस्य सुरलोकादौ सुरकामिनी-संभोगादिभोगान् भुञ्जतोऽस्मत्पक्षे दोषो न भवति तथा शक्तिरूपमपरिमाणमभ्युपगच्छतस्त्वमते जीवतोऽपि भोगोपसेवायां न दोषः प्राप्नोति, “एतावत्येव मम शक्तिः, अतो मत्प्रत्याख्यानस्य पूर्णत्वाज्जीवंन्नपि भुनक्ति भोगान्” इत्यभिप्रायवतस्तदभ्युपगमेन जीवतोऽपि भोगानासेवमानस्य दोषानुषङ्गो न स्यादित्यर्थः । न चैतद् दृष्टमिष्टं वा जिनशासने । किञ्च, इत्थमभ्युपगमे “एतावती मम शक्तिः” इत्यवष्टम्भवतो व्रतभङ्गनिर्भयत्वात् प्रत्याख्यानानवस्थैव स्यात्, “एतावती मम शक्तिः” इति भोगासेवनात् पुनः प्रत्याख्यानात्, पुनरप्यासेवनात् पुनः प्रत्याख्यानादिति । किञ्च, व्रतानामतिचारः, तदाचरणे च प्रायश्चित्तम्, एकव्रतभङ्गे सर्वव्रतभङ्गनियमेन सर्वाण्यपि व्रतानि पालनीयानि, इति यदागमरूढं तत् सर्वमपि भवदभिप्रायेण न प्राप्नोतीति सयुक्तिकं दर्शयन्नाह—“इत्ति यमिच्छीत्यादि” “एतावत्येव मम शक्तिर्नाधिका” इत्यव्यवसायेन प्रतिसेवां कुर्वतोऽपि साधोः शक्त्यपरिमाणवादिनो भवतोऽभिप्रायेण नातिचारः, न चापि व्रतभङ्गः, न चापि प्रायश्चित्तम्, तथा सर्वव्रतपरिपालननियमश्च न स्यात्, शक्त्यवष्टम्भात्, एकव्रतपरिपालनेनापि त्वदभिप्रायेण संयतत्वादिति ॥२५३६॥२५३७॥

* D. C. According to us, there is no objection if a person enjoys pleasures with damsels in the heavenly regions after death. Similarly, there is no objection in accepting that a living being also could enjoy pleasure etc., according to you, who apprehend the limit of energy to be immeasurable. For, by plainly saying that “This much is my capacity and at the end of that much energy, my *pratyākhyāna* will be over. So, there is no

harm if I enjoy pleasures ", one would think that his duty was over, and you, too, would find no objection in accepting that view. But according to the Jaina Scriptures, that is not permissible.

Moreover, on the plain assertion that " only this much-and nothing more-is my capacity " there would be no fear of violating the vow. But this would create confusion in the observance of vow. For, at first, one would enjoy pleasure by saying that, " my capacity is this much " and after some time, he would again accept the observance of *pratyākhyāna*, and again, he would start enjoying on the same excuse, and so on, leading ultimately the observance of vow to confusion.

Thus, according to you, those who act contrary to the religious vow on the ground of *a parimāṇa pratyākhyāna*, will not be bound by excessive enjoyment, transgression of vow, or even remonstrance.

Nor, will they be required to abide by the law of observance of all vows on the same ground. For according to you, the observance of one vow is enough for the attainment of asceticism. 241-242 (2536-2537).

Taking the alternative interpretation of *a-parimāṇa* as the Future Time or continuance, the Acārya states--

अहवा सव्वाणागयकालग्रहणं मयं अपरिमाणं ।
तेनापुण्णपइण्णो मओ वि भग्गवओ नाम ॥२४३॥२५३८॥
सिद्धो वि संजओ छिय सव्वाणागयद्धसंवरधरो त्ति ।
उत्तरगुण-संवरणाभाओ छिय सव्वहा चेव ॥२४४॥२५३९॥

243. Ahavā savvāṇāgayakālaggahaṇaṃ mayam a-parimāṇam
Teṇāpuṇṇapaṇṇo mao vi bhaggavaō nāma. (2538)
244. Siddho vi saṇjaō cciya savvāṇāgayaddhasaṃvaradharo tti
Uttaragūṇa-saṃvaraṇābhāvo cciya savvabhā cēva. (2539)

[अथवा सर्वानागतकालग्रहणं मतमपरिमाणम् ।
तेनापूर्णप्रतिज्ञो मृतोऽपि भगवतो नाम ॥२४३॥२५३८॥

सिद्धोऽपि संयत एव सर्वानागताद्वासंवरधर इति ।

उत्तरगुणसंवरणाभाव एव सर्वथा चैवम् ॥२४४॥२५३९॥

243. Athavā sarvānāgatakālagrahaṇam matamaparimāṇam ।

Tenāpārṇapratijño mrito'pi bhagnavratō nāma. (2538)

244. Siddho'pi saṃyata ēva sarvānāgatāldhāsaṃvaradhara iti ।

Uttaraguṇasaṃvaraṇābhāva ēva sarvathā caivam. (2539)]

Trans. 243-244 Or, (let) the *a-parimāṇa* be taken to imply) all the (Future) Time, that has not yet come. By (doing) so, even a dead being with his pledge unfulfilled, will be definitely violating (his) vow. Moreover, a Siddha being will be called a (mere) ascetic on account of (his) holding the religious vow for all the time that has not come. And (thus), there would be entire negation of the subsidiary qualities. (2538-2539)

टीका-२४३-२४४ व्याख्या-अथ सर्वस्याप्यनागतकालस्य ग्रहणमपरिमाणं भवतः, तेन तर्हि मृतोऽपि देवलोकादौ भोगानासेवमानाः, 'नाम' इत्यामन्त्रणे, अहो ? भगवत एव साधुः, अपूर्णप्रतिज्ञत्वात्, सर्वमप्यनागतकालं तदपरिपालनादिति सुव्यक्तमेवेति । अपि च, एवं सिद्धोऽपि संयत एव प्राप्नोति, सर्वानागताद्वासंवरधरत्वात् । अस्यापि सर्वाद्वागृहीतप्रत्याख्यानकालाभ्यन्तरवर्तित्वादित्यर्थः । यावज्जीवगृहीतविरतिकालाभ्यन्तरवर्तिसाधुवदिति दृष्टान्तः स्वयमेव द्रष्टव्यः । भवतु सिद्धः संततः, को दोषः ? इति चेत् । तदयुक्तम्, “सिद्धे नो संजए नो असंजए, नो संजयासंजए” इति वचनादिति । अपि च, अन्योऽपि दोषः । कः ? इत्याह-“उत्तरगुणेत्यादि” उत्तर गुणः पौष्पी-पुरिमार्धै-कासनाको-पवासादितपोरूपः, संवरणं बहुभिराकारैर्गृहीतस्यैकासनादिप्रत्याख्यानस्य भोजनानन्तरमाकारसंक्षेपेण स्वरूपम्, उत्तरगुणश्च संवरणं चोत्तरगुण-संवरणे तयोरेवं सर्वानागताद्वाप्रत्याख्यानपक्षेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वथैवाभावः प्राप्नोति, पौष्प्यादिषु सर्वानागताद्वाप्रत्याख्यानत्वानुपपत्तेः, एकासनादिषु पुनस्तदभिप्रायेण सर्वाद्वाप्रमाणेषु संवरणं कदाचिदपि न घटत इति व्यक्तमेवेति ॥२५३८॥२५३९॥

D. C. If, according to the second interpretation, you take *a-parimāṇa* to mean all the future time that is to come, the

pratyākhyāna will naturally be said to have been observed in Future Time. In such a case, a person enjoying pleasures etc. in places like heavenly regions after death, will be said to have violated the vow. Because, he being engrossed in pleasures after his life is finished, will not be said to have observed the *pratyākhyāna* for all the future time. According to this interpretation of a-parimāṇa *pratyākhyāna*, even Mukatātmā will be said to be holding the vow and hence will be called an ascetic. But that is against the practice of the *āgamas*.

For, it is said—

“ Siddhe no sañjaḍe, no a-sañjaḍe, no sañjayāsañjayḍe ”

[A Siddha being is not restrained, nor unrestrained, nor between the two.]

There will be another difficulty also. The subsidiary quality formed of penances such as pauruṣī (पौरुषी) purimārdha (पुरिमार्ध), ekāsanaka, upavāsa etc., as well as, the samvaraṇa would not be found at all during the whole of Future Period. For, according to you, the apprehension of *pratyākhyāna* does not fit in pauruṣī etc. and samvaraṇa does not fit in ekāsanā etc. 243-244 (2538-2539).

Taking the third interpretation, the Ācārya replies as follows—

अपरिच्छेदो वि समान एव दोषो जाओ सुए तेण ।
वयभंगभयाउ चिय जावज्जीवं ति निदिट्ठं ॥२४५॥२५४०॥

245. Aparicchēḍe vi samāṇa eṣa doṣo jaō suē teṇam ।

Vayabhaṅgabhayāu cciya jāvajjīvaṁ ti nidditṭham. (2540)

[अपरिच्छेदेऽपि समान एव दोषो यतः श्रुते तेन ।
व्रतभङ्गभयादेव यावज्जीवमिति निर्दिष्टम् ॥२४५॥२५४०॥

245. Aparicchēḍē'pi samāṇa eṣa doṣo yataḥ śrutē tena ।

Vratabhāṅgabhayādēva yāvajjīvamiti nirḍiṣṭam. (2540)]

Trans. 245. In (case of taking) continuance without break also, the same fault (arises) That is why for fear

of violation of vow, (the words) “ yāvajjīvam (till the end of life) ” are mentioned in the Scriptures. 2540.

टीका-२४५ यतोऽपरिच्छेदरूपेऽप्यपरिमाणेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने एष सर्वानाग-
ताद्वाप्रत्याख्यानोक्तदोषः समान एव तथाहि-कालापरिच्छेदेनापि प्रत्याख्याने
कृते किं घटिकादिमात्रं किञ्चित् कालं प्रतीक्ष्य प्रतिसेवां करोतु, आहोस्वित् सर्व-
मप्यनागताद्वाप्रत्याख्यानं पालयतु ? । यद्याद्यः पक्षः, तर्ह्यनवस्था, यावद् हि
घटिकां प्रतीक्षते तावद् द्वे घटिके किं न प्रतीक्षते, यावच्च द्वे प्रतीक्षते तावत्
तिस्रोऽपि किं न प्रतीक्षते ? इत्यादि । अथ द्वितीयपक्षः, तर्हि मृतस्यापि भोगा-
नासेवमानस्य व्रतभङ्ग एव, सिद्धस्यापि संयतत्वम्, उत्तरगुणसंवरणाभावश्चेति
त एव दोषाः । उपसंहारन्नाह-“ सुए तेणेत्यादि ” तेनैतानपरिमाणप्रत्याख्यान-
दोषानभिवीक्ष्य व्रतभङ्गमयादेव त्रिपक्षपरिहारेण श्रुत आगमे “ सव्वं सावज्जं
जोगं पच्चक्खामि जावज्जीवाए ” इत्यत्र साधुप्रत्याख्यानस्य “ यावज्जीवम् ” इति
परिमाणमादिष्टम् । अतो मुच्यतामपरिमाणताग्रह इति ॥२५४०॥

D. C. Even if a-parimāṇa is interpreted as a-paricched or continuance, the same difficulty (as in the case of the first two interpretations), will arise.

When there is no time-limit, should a person observing *pratyākhyāna* enjoy pleasure after a definite period of time, say *ghaṭikā* or should he observe the same for the whole of *anāgata-kāla* (future time) ? If it is said that one should enjoy pleasure after a definite time, say a *ghaṭikā*, there would be a lot of confusion, on account of questions contending as to why not after two *ghaṭikās*, three *ghaṭikās* or even more *ghaṭikas*, and so on.

Secondly, if it is said that one should observe *pratyākhyāna* for the whole of “ *anāgata kāla* ” or the period of time that is yet to come, then those in the *pra-loka* will be said to have broken the vow on account of their enjoying pleasure etc. after death. The *Muktātmans* will be called ascetics and there would be absolute negation of *uttara-guṇa* and *saṃvaraṇa*.

Thus, a number of difficulties arises, if the theory of a-parimāṇa *pratyākhyāna* is accepted.

It is, therefore, said in the āgamas that—

“Savvam sāvajjam jogam paccakkhāmi jāvajjivāḇ”

[I abandon all the disgraceful contact till the end of my life.]

The commandment of the Holy Writ clearly indicates that the limit of observing vow for an ascetic is the end of his life. So, give up your false persistence for a-parimāṇa pratyākhyāna and abide by the commandment of the āgamas. 245. (2540)

The Ācārya now proceeds to show that the fault of āśaṃsā or expectation does not arise in case of sa-parimāṇa pratyākhyāna etc.

नासंसा सेविस्सामि किंतु मा मे मयस्स वयभंगो ।

होही, सुरेषु को वा वयावगासो विमुक्कस्स ? ॥२४६॥२५४१॥

246. Nāsaṃsā sevissāmi kintu mā me mayassa vayabhaṅgaḥ ।

Hohī, suresu ko vā vayāvagāso vimukkassa? (2541)

[नाशंसां सेविष्ये किन्तु मा मे मृतस्य व्रतभङ्गः ।

भूत् सुरेषु को वा व्रतावकाशो विमुक्तस्य ? ॥२४६॥२५४१॥

246. Nāsaṃsām seviṣye kintu mā me mṛitasya vratabhaṅgaḥ ।

Bhut sureṣu ko vā vratāvakāśo vimuktasya? (2541)]

Trans. 246. I do not cherish any desire, but (while observing the vow, I only expect that) let there be no violation of vow after death in (the regions of) gods. And, where is the scope of (observing) a vow to a Siddha or Accomplished Soul? 2541.

टीका-२४६ यावज्जीवावधिना प्रत्याख्यानं कुर्वतः “मरणानन्तरमहं भोगान् सेविष्ये” इत्येवंभूता हन्त ! न कचिदाशंसा वर्तते-नैवंभूतेन परिणामेन सावधिकं प्रत्याख्यानं करोतीत्यर्थः, किन्तु “मा मे मृतस्य”—सुरेषूपन्नस्य सतो भोगानासेवमानस्य व्रतभङ्गो भविष्यति “इत्यध्यवसायेन मा मे व्रतभङ्गस्तत्र भूयात्” इत्येवंभूतेनैव शुभपरिणामेनेत्यंभूतं प्रत्याख्यानं करोतीत्यर्थः । अतस्तत्र काऽऽशंसा ? । स हि विरत्यावारककर्मणः क्षयोपशमावस्थत्वादत्र

स्वायत्तः, सुरलोके त्ववश्यं तदुदयात् परायत्त इत्यतः शक्यत्वाद् यावज्जीवावधिना प्रत्याख्याति, परतस्त्वशक्यत्वाद् न प्रत्याख्याति, इति कथमाशंसादोषवानयम् ? इति । अथैवं ब्रूयास्त्वम्—किमितीत्थं व्रतभङ्गाद् विभेत्यसौ ? । अयं हि मृतो मुक्तिं यास्यति, तत्र च कामभोगाभावाद् व्रतभङ्गासंभव एव, इति कस्तस्य व्रतभङ्ग संक्षोभः ? । तदयुक्तम्, सांप्रतमिह मुक्तिगमनासंभवात्, महाविदेहेष्वपि सर्वस्यापि तद्गमननिश्चयायोगादिति । अथ कोऽपि तावद् मुक्तिं गच्छति, तस्य च विमुक्तस्य मदभिमतेऽपरिमाणे प्रत्याख्याने गृह्यमाणे मुक्तावपि महाव्रतानुगमादपरिमाणप्रत्याख्यानस्य सफलता भविष्यतीति चेदित्यत्राह—“को वा वयेत्यादि” योऽपि मुक्तिं गच्छति तस्यापि विमुक्तस्य निष्ठितार्थस्य को व्रतानामवकाशः ? किं व्रतानां साफल्यम् ? तत्कार्यस्य सिद्धत्वाद् न किञ्चिदिति भावः । तस्माद् मुक्तिगामिनमपि प्रत्यसंगतमेवापरिमाणप्रत्याख्यानमिति । तदेवं मुग्धमभिज्ञं वा व्यक्त्याऽनपेक्ष्य सामान्येनैवापरिमाणप्रत्याख्याने दूषणान्युक्तानि ॥२५४१॥

D. C.

Ācārya :—One who observes *pratyākhyāna* till death, never cherishes a desire to enjoy pleasures after death. That is to say, his *pratyākhyāna* is not defiled by means of any desire. On the contrary, he attaches good intention to his *pratyākhyāna*, when he desires that his vow may not be violated after death while enjoying pleasures in the divine regions. On account of good intention, the fault of *āśaṃsā* does not arise.

It should be noted that the observance of vow is limited to this life, only with a definite purpose. The condition of the observer of *pratyākhyāna* in the heavenly regions is different from his condition in this life. During his life, he being a *vrataadhārin* will be free from the bondages of Karman by virtue of his dispassion etc., but while enjoying in the heavenly regions, bondages of Karman will definitely arise and that will obstruct the observance of vow. This shows that the *pratyākhyāna* is limited only to this life, and it is not possible to follow its practice in the next world. The theory of *a-parimāṇa* or unlimited *pratyākhyāna* is impracticable in this way.

Goṣṭhā Māhila :—Why should one be afraid of the violation of vow in the other world, while following the practice of *pratyākhyāna*. It is likely that an observer of *pratyākhyāna* may attain Mokṣa after death, and thus he may not violate his vow in absence of enjoying.

Ācārya :—Your argument is not valid. There is no possibility for any one to attain Mokṣa at this time. There is no rule even in a heavenly abode like Mahāvīdḍha-kṣetra that all its inhabitant creatures will attain Mokṣa.

Goṣṭhā Māhila :—Since great vows are already included in *mokṣa*, the theory of *a-parimāṇa* *pratyākhyāna* will succeed without doubt.

Ācārya :—Even that is not correct. How could one who has already attained *mokṣa*, have any scope for the observance of vows? As he has fulfilled all the metaphysical aims, he does not need the practice of *pratyākhyāna* in any way.

Thus, your theory of *a-parimāṇa pratyākhyāna* is not beneficial even to those who have been attaining Mokṣa. 246 (2541)

Moreover,

जो पुनरव्ययभावं मुणमाणोऽवस्सभाविनं भणइ ।
वयमपरिमाणमेवं पच्चक्खं सो मुसावाई ॥२४७॥२५४२॥

247. Jo puṇaravyayabhāvaṁ muṇamāṇo'vassabhāvinam bhaṇai ।
Vayamaparimāṇamevaṁ paccakkham so musāvāī. (2542)

[यः पुनरव्रतभावं जानन्नवश्यंभाविनं भणति ।
व्रतमपरिमाणमेवं प्रत्यक्षं स मृषावादी ॥२४७॥२५४२॥

247. Yaḥ punaravratabhāvaṁ jānannavaśyambhāvinam bhaṇati ।
Vratamaparimāṇamevaṁ pratyakṣam saḥ mriṣāvādī. (2542)]

Trans. 247. One who accepts a vow, as *a-parimāṇa* (to be observed permanently) in spite of his knowing the possibility of breaking the vow as certain (in future), is an evident liar. 2542.

टीका—२४७ यः पुनरग्रेऽपि किञ्चित् शास्त्रपरिकर्मितमतिर्विशो व्रतं गृह्णाति, विज्ञत्वादेव च “चीर्णव्रतः सुरलोकमेव गच्छति” इत्यवबुध्यमानः सुरेषु चाव्रतभावमविरतिभावमवश्यं भाविनं मुणन् जाननोऽपि व्रतं प्रत्याख्यानमपरिमाणं यावज्जीवपरिमाणरहितं भणत्युच्चरति, स एवं ब्रुवाणः प्रत्यक्षं साक्षादेवं मृषावादी, अन्यथाभणित्वाऽन्यथाकरणादिति ॥२५४२॥

D. C. When a person well-versed in Scriptures, says that the practice of *pratyākhyāna* should be continued even after death for ever, in spite of his knowing that it will be certainly obstructed while enjoying pleasures in the heavenly regions, he should be called a perfect liar. For, he says something else than what he actually bears in his mind. 247 (2542)

Also,

भावो पच्चक्खाणं सो जइ मरणपरओ वि तो भगं ।

अह नत्थि न निद्दिस्सइ जावज्जीवं ति तो कीस ? ॥२४८॥२५४३॥

248. Bhāvo paccakkhāṇam so jai maraṇaparaō vi to bhaggam ।
Aha natthi na niddissai jāvajjīvam ti to kīsa ? (2543)

[भावः प्रत्याख्यानं स यदि मरणपरतोऽपि ततोभग्नम् ।

अथ नास्ति न निर्दिश्यते यावज्जीवमिति ततः कस्मात् ? ॥२४८॥

॥२५४३॥

248. Bhāvaḥ pratyākhyānam sa yadi maraṇaparato'pi tato bhag-
nam ।

Atha nāsti na nirḍīśyate yāvajjīvamiti tataḥ kasmāt ? (2543)

Trans. 248. Pratyākhyāna is (nothing but) a dispassionate inclination (of mind). If that (persists) even after death, the violation (of vows) certainly takes place. And if it is not so, why is it not mentioned as limited to this life ? 2543.

टीका—२४८ भावश्चैतसिको विरतिपरिणामः प्रत्याख्यानमुच्यते, स च प्रत्याख्यातुर्यावज्जीवावधिमेवास्ति, उत मरणपरतोऽपीति वक्तव्यम् ? । यद्यनन्तरपक्षः, तर्हि भग्नं तस्य प्रत्याख्यानम्, सुरलोकादौ भोगसेवनादवश्यंभावी

तद्भङ्ग इत्यर्थः । अथाद्यः पक्षः, तर्हि वचनेनापि “यावज्जीवम्” इति परिमाणं प्रगुणेन न्यायेन किं न निर्दिश्यते—किं न क्रियते, येनान्यच्चेतस्यन्य तु वचनेनोच्यते ? इति ॥२५४३॥

D. C. Inclination of mind tending to dispassion constitutes pratyākhyāna. Does such a dispassionate tendency continue ever after death? Or, is it limited only upto the end of this life? If it is taken to persist even after death it is certain that the practice of pratyākhyāna will be defiled by the enjoyment of pleasures in the divine regions. But if such a dispassionate inclination is taken to exist only in this life, there will be no fear of self-contradiction (as in the first case), why not accept, then, that pratyākhyāna is limited upto the end of life? 248 (2543)

जइ अन्नहेव भावो चैयओ वयणमन्नहा माया ।

किं वाऽभिहिं दोसो भावाओ किं वओ गुरुयं ? ॥२४९॥२५४४॥

249. Jai annahēva bhāvo cēyaō vavaṇamannahā māyā ।

Kim vā'bhiliñē doṣo bhāvāō kim vaō guruyam. (2544)

[यद्यन्यथैव भावश्चेतयतो वचनमन्यथा माया ।

किं वाऽभिहिते दोषो भावात् किं वचो गुरुकम् ? ॥२४९॥२५४४॥

249. Yadyanyathaiva bhavaścētayato vacanamanyathā māyā ।

Kim vā'bhihite doṣo bhāvāt kim vaco gurukam ? (2544)]

Trans. 249. When the inclination of mind is different and the (actual) statement is different (that is nothing but) fraud. Or, what harm is there in making a statement? Is word (even taken as) greater than feeling? 2544.

टीका—२४९ हन्त ! यद्यन्यथैव यावज्जीवावधिकं एव चेतसि भावः प्रत्याख्यानपरिणामः, अन्यथैव च यावज्जीवावधिपरिणामरहितमेव वचनम्, तर्हेतच्चेतयतो जानतः केवलैव माया निश्चीयते नान्यत् फलं दृश्यते, अन्यथा विचिन्त्यान्यथा भाषणादिति । अथवा, प्रष्टव्योऽसि त्वम्—किं भावे तथास्थितेऽपि “यावज्जीवाय” इत्यभिहिते दोषः कश्चिद् क्रीक्ष्यते भवता, येन वचनेनापि नेष्टमभि-

धीयते ? । यदि वा, किं भावात् सकाशाद् “ वउ त्ति ” वचनं गुरुकं प्रधानं पश्यसि त्वं, येन भावेऽन्यथास्थितेऽपि वचनमन्यथाऽभिदधासि ? । एतच्चायु-
क्तम्, आगमे भावस्यैव प्रामाण्येन, वचनस्य त्वप्रामाण्येनाभिधानादिति॥२५४४॥

D. C. Although you feel that the practice of *pratyākhyāna* is limited to this life, you do not actually say so. On the contrary, you try to assert something different when you say that *pratyākhyāna* is *a-parimita* or limitless. Why don't you say, without hesitation, that *pratyākhyāna* is *sa-parimāṇa* or limited. Is it because you believe that words are greater than Truth? The āgamas do not take *vacana* as authentic but *bhāva* or actual feeling. 249 (2544).

The āgamas state—

अन्नत्थ निवडिणं वंजणम्मि जो खलु मनोगओ भावो ।
तं खलु पच्चक्खाणं, न पमाणं वंजणं छलणा ॥२५०॥२५४५॥

250. Annattha nivadie vanjaṇmmi jo khalu manogaō bhāvo ।

Tam khalu paccakkhāṇam, na pamāṇam vañjaṇam chalaṇā. (2545)

[अन्यत्र निपतिते व्यञ्जनं यः खलु मनोगतो भावः ।

तत् खलु प्रत्याख्यानं, न प्रमाणं व्यञ्जनं छलना ॥२५०॥२५४५॥

250. Anyatra nipatite vyañjanam yah khalu manogato bhāvaḥ ।

Tat khalu pratyākhyānam, na pramāṇam vyañjanam chalanā. (2545)]

Trans. 250. When a statement is (made) with regard to something else (than the real feeling), that which is the real feeling of mind (should be taken as) real vow. Word is no standard on account of its being susceptible to deception. 2545

टीका—२५०—इह केनापि त्रिविधाहारादिप्रत्याख्यानं कर्तुमध्यवसितम्, अधिकतरसंयमकरणाक्षिप्तचेतसा पुनः “ चतुर्विधमाहारं प्रत्याख्यामि ” इत्यादि व्यञ्जनं शब्दे उच्चरितः । एवं च मानसभावाननुवृत्त्या व्यञ्जने शब्देऽन्यत्र

निपतितेऽन्यविषये समुच्चारिते यः खलु प्रत्याख्यानविषयानेकसूक्ष्मविवक्षाति-
क्रान्तः स्पष्टः प्रत्याख्यातुर्मनोगतो भावस्तदेव प्रत्याख्यानं प्रमाणं—स एव
प्रत्याख्यातुर्विवक्षितप्रत्याख्यानविषयो मनोगतो भावः प्रमाणम्, न तु व्यञ्जनं
शब्द इत्यर्थः । कुतो न व्यञ्जनं प्रमाणम् ? । यतश्छलना छलमात्रं तद् व्यञ्जन-
मतोऽप्रमाणम्, भावाननुरोधेन प्रवृत्तत्वात् । तदेवमागमेऽपि वचनस्याप्रामाण्येनो-
क्तत्वाद् यदि यावज्जीवावधिको मनसो भावस्त्वयेष्यते तदा वचनेनापि “याव-
जीवम्” इत्युच्चार्यताम्, किं मिथ्याग्रहेण ? इति ॥२५४५॥

D. C. Suppose somebody has decided in his mind to observe the vow of relinquishing three kinds of food and declares through mistake that “I relinquish ‘four kinds of food.’ In such a case, where the statement made is not consistent with the real object of mind, a wrong utterance of words should not be considered, but the real purpose formed in his mind should be given importance. Since such utterances are made without any fixed consideration of the real object of mind, they become (at times) deceitful. Therefore, the āgamas do not take vacana or verbal statement as (really) authentic but the true feeling in mind. Leaving aside your false persistence of verbal statement, you should, therefore, accept the true principle of sa-parimāṇa pratyākhyāna. 250 (2545).

Then,

इय पण्णविओ वि न सो जाहे सद्दहई पूसमित्तेण ।

अन्नगणत्थेरेहि य काउं तो संघसमवायं ॥२५१॥२५४६॥

आहूय देवयं वेइ जाणमाणो वि पच्चयनिमित्तं ।

वच्च जिणिंदं पुच्छसु गयाऽऽगया सा परिकहेइ ॥२५२॥२५४७॥

संघो सम्मावाइ गुरुपुरोगो त्ति जिणवरो भणइ ।

इयरो मिच्छावाइ सत्तमओ निहवोऽयं ति ॥२५३॥२५४८॥

एईसं सामत्थं कत्तो गंतुं जिणिंदमूलम्मि ।

वेई कडपूयणाए संघेण तओ कओ बज्झो ॥२५४॥२५४९॥

251. Iya paṇṇaviö vi na so jāhè saddahaī Pasaṇṇitṭeṇa ।

Annagaṇatthèrèhi ya kāum to saṅghasamavāyam. (2546)

252. Ahaya dēvayam bēi jānamāṇo vi paccayanimittam ।
Vacca Jīṇindam pucchasu gayā"gayā sā parikaheī. (2547)
253. Saṅgho sammāvāi gurapurogo tti Jīṇavaro bhaṇai ।
Iyaro micchāvāi sattamaō nihnavo'yam ti. (2548).
254. Eīsam sāmattam katto gantum Jīṇidamalammi ।
Bēi Kadapūyaṇāḇ, saṅghēṇa taō kaō bajjho. (2549).

[इति प्रज्ञापितोऽपि न स यावत् श्रद्धते पुष्पमित्रेण ।
अन्यगणस्थविरैश्च कृत्वा ततः संघसमवायम् ॥२५१॥२५४६॥
आहूय देवतां ब्रवीति जानन्नपि प्रत्ययनिमित्तम् ।
व्रज जिनेन्द्रं पृच्छ गताऽऽगता सा परिकथयति ॥२५२॥२५४७॥
संघः सम्यग्वादी गुरुपुरोग इति जिनवरो भणति ।
इतरो मृषावादी सप्तमको निहवोऽयमिति ॥२५३॥२५४८॥
ईदृशं सामर्थ्यं कुतो गन्तुं जिनेन्द्रमूले ।
ब्रवीति कडपूतनायाः संघेन ततः कृतो बाह्यः ॥२५४॥२५४९॥

251. Iti prajñāpito'pi na sa yāvat śraddhattē Puṣpamitreṇa ।
Anyagaṇasthaviraiśca kritvā tataḥ saṅghasamavāyam. (2546)
252. Āhūya devatām bravīti jānannapi pratyayanimittam ।
Vraja Jinendram priccha gatā"gatā sā parikathayati. (2547)
253. Saṅghaḥ samyagvādī gurupuroga iti Jinavaro bhaṇati ।
Itaro mriṣāvādī saptamako nihnavo'yamiti. (2548)
254. Īdriśam sāmāthyam kuto gantum Jīnēndramūle ।
Bravīti Kadaputanāyāḥ, saṅghena tataḥ krito bāhyaḥ. (2549)]

Trans. 251-252-253-254. Although persuaded in many such ways by Puṣpamitra and also by the old monks of other gacchas, when he did not put faith (in truth), then, having gathered, to-gether, the whole Saṅgha (of Jaina monks), they called a goddess, and in spite of their knowing the real cause of faith they told her to go to Mahāvidēha and inquire of the Tīrthāṅkara as to who was right. She went (to the Tīr-

thankara), came back, and declared that the gaccha led by the preceptor was right, the opponent was a liar, and she further said that, he was the Seventh Nihlava. "Whence could this wretched demon⁶ have this much capacity to go to the Tirthankara ? Goṣṭhā Māhila replied. As a result of this, he was expelled from the gaccha. 2546-2547-2548-2549.

टीका-२५१-२५२-२५३-२५४ चतसृणामप्यासामक्षरार्थः सुगम एव भावार्थस्तु कथानकशेषादवसेयः तच्चेदम्-एवं युक्तिभिः प्रज्ञाप्यमानो यावदसौ न किमपि श्रद्धते, तावत् पुष्पमित्राचार्यैरन्यगच्छगतबहुश्रुतस्थविराणामन्तिके नीतः । ततस्तैरप्युक्तोऽसौ यादृशं सूरयः प्ररूपयन्ति, आर्यरक्षितसूरिभिरपि तादृशमेव प्ररूपितम्, न हीनाधिकम् । ततो गोष्ठामाहिलेनोक्तम् " किं यूवमृषयो जानीथ ? तीर्थकरैस्तादृशमेव प्ररूपितम् यादृशमहं प्ररूपयामि । ततः स्थविरैरुक्तम्-मिथ्याभिनिविष्टो मा कार्षीस्तीर्थकराशातनाम्, न किमपि त्वं जानासि । ततः सर्वविप्रतिपन्ने तस्मिन् सर्वैरपि तैः संघसमवायः कृतः । सर्वेणापि च संघेन देवताह्वानार्थं कायोत्सर्गो विहितः । ततो भद्रिका काचित् देवता समागता । सा वदति संदिशत, किं करोमि ? । ततः संघः प्रस्तुतमर्थं जानन्नपि सर्वजनप्रत्ययनिमित्तं ब्रवीति-महाविदेहे गत्वा तीर्थकरमापृच्छस्व,-किं दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रप्रमुखः यद् भणति तत् सत्यम्, उत यद् गोष्ठामाहिलो वदति ? । ततस्तया प्रोक्तम्-मम महाविदेहे गमनागमनं कुर्वत्याः प्रत्यूहप्रतिघातार्थमनुग्रहं कृत्वा कार्योत्सर्गं कुरुत, येनाहं गच्छामि । ततस्तथैव कृतं संघेन । गता च सा । पृष्ठा च भगवन्तं प्रत्यागता कथयति यदुत-तीर्थकरः समादिशति-"दुर्बलिकापुष्पमित्रपुरस्सरः संघः सम्यग्वादी, गोष्ठामाहिलस्तु मिथ्यावादी, सप्तमश्चायं निहवः" इति । तदेतत् श्रुत्वा गोष्ठामाहिलो ब्रवीति-नन्वल्पद्विकेयं वराकी, का नामैतस्याः कडपूतनायास्तीर्थकरान्तिके गमनशक्तिः ? इति । एवमपि यावदसौ न किञ्चिद् मन्यते तावत् संघेनोद्वाह्य बाह्यः कृतः । अनालोचितप्रतिक्रान्तश्च कालं गतः ॥२५४६॥ २५४७॥२५४८॥२५४९॥

6. Kaṭapātana is a kind of demon. It is believed that a Kṣatriya not performing his duties well, is born after his death as such a goblin. It is a kind of *preta* or inhabitant of lower regions.

D. C. When Goṣṭhā Māhila did not put faith in the words of Ācārya Durbalikā Puṣpamitra, *sthaviras* of the gaccha tried to convince him of the Truth exposed by the preceptor. But Goṣṭhā Māhila replied arrogantly "You ascetics, what do you know?" The *Tīrthaṅkaras* have preached the same principle that I hold." The *sthaviras* said "Do not degrade the *Tīrthaṅkaras* by such words. You do not know the Truth."

Ultimately, the *sthaviras* called an assembly of all the monks, who propitiated a goddess with the help of Kāyotsarga. The goddess came to them and asked them as to what she could do for them. The monks though knowing the truth requested her for convincing other people, to go to Mahāvidēha and ask the *Tīrthaṅkara* there, as to who was right. The goddess returned with a message within a short time, and declared that the gaccha led by the preceptor Durbalikā Puṣpamitra was right and Goṣṭhā Māhila who had turned out as the Seventh *Nihnava* was a liar.

On hearing the message, Goṣṭhā-Māhila said "How could this wretch of a demon go to the *Tīrthaṅkara*?"

Then, when he refused to believe even in this, he was expelled from the gaccha. Finally, without returning to his original school, Goṣṭhā-Māhila wandered here and there, and died as a *Nihnava* without expiating himself for his sinful acts.

End of the Discussion with the Seventh Nihnava.



Chapter IX

॥ अथ बोटिकनिहववक्तव्यता ॥



Discussion with the Boṭika Nihava.

After dealing with the stories of the Seven *nihnava*s who contradicted the current religious ideals of Jainism as mentioned in the foregoing pages, the author now proceeds to give the story of another type of nihnavas (viz Boṭika) implied by the word (ca) in “Bahuraya paesa avvatta, samucchā duga tiga abaddhiyā cēva”¹ etc.

छव्वाससयाइं नवुत्तराइं तइआ सिद्धिं गयस्स वीरस्स ।
तो बोडियाण दिट्ठी रहवीरपुरे समुप्पण्णा ॥१॥२५५०॥

1. Chhavvāsasayāim navuttarāim taiā Siddhim gayassa Vīrassa ।
To Bodiyaṇa diṭṭhī Rahavīrapure samuppaṇṇā. (2550)

[षड्वर्षशतानि नवोत्तराणि तदा सिद्धिं गतस्य वीरस्य ।
ततो बोटिकानां दृष्टी रथवीरपुरे समुत्पन्ना ॥१॥२५५०॥

1. Ṣaḍvarṣaśātāni navottarāṇi tadā Siddhim gatasya Vīrasya ।
Tato Boṭikānām dṛiṣṭī Rathavīrapurē samutpannā. (2550)]

Trans. 1. Then was produced a doctrine of Boṭikas² in Rathavīrapura, six hundred and nine years after the Tīrthāṅkara (Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira Swāmi) had attained *nirvāṇa*. 2550.

1. Vide Chapter I. p. 9 (v. 2300).

2. Popularly known as Digambaras.

The story of the rise of Boṭika is given as follows :—

रहवीरपुरं नगरं दीवगमुज्जाणमज्जकण्हे य ।
सिवभूइस्सुवहिम्मि पुच्छा थेराण कहणा य ॥२॥२५५१॥
बोडियसिवभूईओ बोडियलिङ्गस्स होइ उप्पत्ती ।
कोडिन्न-कोट्टवीरा-परंपराफासमुप्पन्ना ॥३॥२५५२॥

2. Rahavīrapuram nagaram Divagamujjāṇamajjakaṇhè ya ।
Sivabhaissuvahimmi pucchā thērāṇa kahaṇā ya. (2551)
3. Boḍiya Sivabhaīō Boḍiyalingassa hōi uppattī ।
Koḍinna-Koṭṭavīrā paramparāphāsamuppannā. (2552)

[रथवीरपुरं नगरं दीपकमुद्यानमार्यकृष्णश्च ।
शिवभूतेरुपधौ पृच्छा स्थविराणां कथना च ॥२॥२५५१॥
बोटिकशिवभूतेर्बोटिकलिङ्गस्य भवत्युत्पत्तिः ।
कौण्डिन्य-कोट्टवीरात् परम्परास्पर्शमुत्पन्ना ॥३॥२५५३॥

2. Rathavīrapuram Nagaram Dipakamudyānamārya Kṛṣṇaśca ।
Śivabhūterupadhāu pricehā sthavirāṇām kathanā ca. (2551)
3. Boṭikaśivabhūte-r-Botikalingasya bhavatyutpattiḥ ।
Kaundīnya-Koṭṭa-Vīrat paramparāsparsāmutpannā. (2552).]

टीका- २-३ एतद्भावार्थः कथानकगम्यः, तच्चेदम्-रथवीरपुरं नाम नगरम् । तद्वहिश्च दीपकाभिधानमुद्यानम् । तत्र चार्यकृष्णनामानः स्त्रियः समागताः । तस्मिंश्च नगरे सहस्रमल्लः शिवभूतिर्नामराजसेवकः समस्ति । स च राजप्रसादाद् विलासान् कुर्वन् नगरमध्ये पर्यटति । रात्रेश्च ग्रहरद्वयेऽतिक्रान्ते गृहमागच्छति । तत एतदीयभार्या तन्मातरं भणति-निर्वेदिताऽहं त्वत्पुत्रेण, न खल्वेष रात्रौ वेलायां कदाचिदप्यागच्छति । तत उज्जागरकेण बुभुक्षया च बाध्यमाना प्रत्यहं तिष्ठामि । ततस्तया प्रोक्तम्-“वत्से ! यद्येवं, तर्हि त्वमद्य स्वपिहि, स्वयमेवाहं जागरिष्यामि” । ततः कृतं बध्वा तथैव, इतरयास्तु जाग्रत्या रात्रिग्रहरद्वयेऽतिक्रान्ते समागत्य शिवभूतिना प्रोक्तम्-“द्वारमुद्घाटयत” । ततः प्रकुपितया मात्रा प्रोक्तम्-“दुर्नयविधे ! यत्रैतस्यां वेलायां द्वाराण्युद्घाटितानि भवन्ति तत्र गच्छ,

न पुनरेवं तव पृष्टलग्नः कोऽप्यत्र मरिष्यति” । ततः कोपाऽहङ्काराभ्यां प्रेर्यमाणोऽसौ निर्गतः । पर्यटता चोद्घाटितद्वारः साधूपाश्रयो दृष्टः । तत्र च साधवः काल-ग्रहणं कुर्वन्ति । तेषां च पार्श्वे तेन वन्दित्वा व्रतं याचितम् । तैश्च “राजवल्लभः, मात्रादिभिरमुत्कलितश्च” इति न दत्तम् । ततः खेलमल्लकाद् दीक्षां गृहीत्वा स्वयमेव लोचः कृतः । साधुभिरिङ्गं समर्पितम् । विहृताश्च सर्वेऽप्यन्यत्र । कालान्तरेण पुनरपि च तत्रागताः । ततो राज्ञा शिवभूतेर्बहुमुल्यं कम्बलरत्नं दत्तम् । तत आचार्यैः शिवभूतिस्तुतः—किमनेन तव साधूनां मार्गादिष्वनेकानर्थहेतुना गृहीतेन ? ततस्तेन गुर्वप्रतिभासेनापि संगोऽप्य मूर्च्छया तद् विधृतम् । गोचर-चर्याभिश्चागतः प्रत्यहं तदसौ संभालयति, न तु क्वचिदपि व्यापारयति । ततः “गुरुभिर्मूर्च्छितोऽयमत्र” इति ज्ञात्वाऽन्यत्र दिने तमनापृच्छयैव बहिर्गतस्य परोक्षे तत् कम्बलरत्नं पादयित्वा साधूनां पादप्रोञ्छनकानि कृतानि । ततो ज्ञात-व्यतिकरः कषायितोऽसौ तिष्ठति । अन्यदा च सूरयो जिनकल्पिकान् वर्णयन्ति, तद्यथा—

जिणकप्पिया य दुविहा पाणिपाया पडिग्गहधरा य ।

पाउरणमपाउरणा इक्किता ते भवे दुविहा ॥१॥

दुग तिग चउकं पणगं नव दस एकारसेवः बारसगं ।

एए अट्ट विगप्पा जिणकप्पे हेांति उवहिस्स ॥२॥

इह केषाञ्चिज्जिनकल्पानां रजोहरणं, मुखवस्त्रिका चेति द्विविध उपधिः, अन्येषां तु कल्पेन सह त्रिविधः, कल्पद्वयेन तु सह चतुर्विधः, कल्पत्रयेण सह पञ्चविधः । केषाञ्चित्तु मुखवस्त्रिका, रजोहरणं च, तथा,

पत्तं पत्ताबन्धो पायट्ठवणं च पायकेसरिया ।

पटलाइं रयत्ताणं च गोच्छओ पायनिज्जोगो ॥१॥

इति सप्तविधः पात्रनियोग इति, एवं च नवविधः । कल्पेन तु सह दशविधः कल्पद्वयेन सहैकादशविधः, कल्पत्रयेण तु समं द्वादशविध उपधिः केषाञ्चिज्जिन-कल्पिनामिति । तदेतत् श्रुत्वा शिवभूतिना प्रोक्तम्—“यद्येवम्, तर्हि किमिदानीमौघिकऔपग्रहिकश्चैतावानुपधिः परिगृह्यते ? । स एव जिनकल्पः किं न क्रियते ? । ततो गुरुभिरुक्तम्—जम्बूस्वामिनि व्यवच्छिन्नोऽसौ, संहननाद्यभावात्, सांप्रतं न शक्यत एव कर्तुम्” । ततः शिवभूतिना प्रोक्तम्—“मयि जीवति

स किं व्यवच्छिद्यते ? , नन्वहमेव तं करोमि, परलोकार्थिना स एव निष्परिग्रहो जिनकल्पः कर्तव्यः, किं पुनरनेन कषाय-भय-मूच्छादिदोषविधिना परिग्रहानर्थेन ? । अत एव श्रुते निष्परिग्रहत्वमुक्तम् , अचेलकाश्च जिनेन्द्राः, अतोऽचेल-तैव सुन्दरेति ” । ततो गुरुणा प्रोक्तम्-हन्त ? यद्येवम् , तर्हि देहेऽपि कषाय-भय-मूच्छादयो दोषाः कस्यापि संभवन्ति, इति सोऽपि व्रतग्रहणानन्तरमेव त्यक्तव्यः प्राप्नोति । यच्च श्रुते निष्परिग्रहत्वमुक्तं तदपि धर्मोपकरणेष्वपि मूच्छा न कर्तव्या, मूच्छाभाव एव निष्परिग्रहत्वमवसेयम् , न पुनः सर्वथा धर्मोपकरणस्यापि त्यागः । जिनेन्द्रा अपि न सर्वथैवाचेलकाः “ सञ्चे वि एगदूसेण निग्गया जिणवरा चउव्वीसं ” इत्यादि वचनात् । तदेवं गुरुणा स्थविरैश्च यथोक्ताभिर्वक्ष्यमाणाभिश्च युक्तिभिः प्रज्ञाप्यमानोऽपि तथाविधकषायमोहादिकर्मोदयाद् न स्वाग्रहाद् निवृत्तोऽसौ, किन्तु चीवराणि परित्यज्य निर्गतः । ततश्च बहिरुद्याने व्यवस्थितस्यास्योत्तरा नाम भगिनी वन्दनार्थं गता । सा च त्यक्तचीवरं तं भ्रातरमालोक्य स्वयमपि चीवराणि त्यक्तवती । ततो भिक्षार्थं नगरमध्ये प्रविष्टा गणिकया दृष्टा । तत इत्थं विवस्त्रां बीभत्सामिमां दृष्ट्वा “ मा लोकोऽस्मासु विराङ्गीत् ” इत्यनिच्छन्त्यपि तया वस्त्रं परिधापिताऽसौ । तत एष व्यतिकरोऽनया शिवभूतेर्निवेदितः । ततोऽनेन “ विवस्त्रा योषिद् नितरां बीभत्साऽतिलज्जनीया च भवति ” इति विचिन्त्य प्रोक्ताऽसौ-“ तिष्ठत्वित्थमपि, न त्यक्तव्यं त्वयैतद् वस्त्रम् । देवतया हि तवेदं प्रदत्तमिति । ततः शिवभूतिना कौण्डिन्य-कोट्टवीरनामानो द्वौ शिष्यौ दीक्षितौ ।

गाथाक्षरार्थोऽपि किञ्चिदुच्यते-“ कौण्डिन्येत्यादि कौण्डिन्यश्च कोट्टवीरश्चेति “ सर्वो द्वन्द्वो विभाषयैकवद् भवति ” इति वचनात् कौण्डिन्य-कोट्टवीरम्, तस्मात् कौण्डिन्य-कोट्टवीरात् परम्परास्पर्शमाचार्य-शिष्यसंबन्धलक्षणमधिकृत्योत्पन्ना संजाता । “ बोटकदृष्टिः ” इत्यध्याहारः । इत्येव बोटिकाः समुत्पन्नाः ॥२५५१॥२५५२॥

D. C. A detailed account of the rise of the Boṭika type of Nihnavas is given below:—

Once upon a time an Ācārya named Arya Kṛiṣṇasari had come to the city of Rathavīrapura, and put up in the Dīpaka garden outside the city. In the city, there lived a Royal atten-

dant named Sahasramalla Śivabhūti, who being the king's favourite, wandered in the city till late at night. His wife was very much annoyed by his irregular conduct. She once complained of his irregularities to her mother-in-law saying that she had to wait for her husband till late after midnight, without taking food and sleep. The mother-in-law asked her to go to sleep, and she herself waited till her son returned. After midnight, Śivabhāti returned and asked her to open the door. The mother being enraged at his behaviour, replied "O impudent boy! go wherever the doors are open for you at this hour. Nobody is going to die after you." Overwhelmed with anger and pride, he went away. In course of his wanderings, he found the doors of a Jaina Upāśraya open at such a late hour. The Jaina sādhus were studying their lessons at that time. He approached them and requested them to initiate him into asceticism. The ascetics refused to give him *dīkṣā* as he was a Royal attendant and the permission to do so was not sanctioned by his mother etc. Consequently, Śivabhūti accepted *dīkṣā* by himself from an earthen spittoon lying there. The ascetics supplied him with the necessary apparel of an ascetic, and subsequently he entered the Jaina *gaccha*, as a Jaina Sādhu. Next day, all the sādhus proceeded on *vihāra* (going about from place to place).

In course of time, it so happened that they returned to the same place. The king received them with great respect, and gave Śivabhāti a *kāmbalaratna* (a costly woollen shawl). The preceptor asked Śivabhūti to renounce it, as it would create trouble in several ways. Still, however, Śivabhūti kept the shawl secretly with him without the consent of the preceptor. Being very much attached to the shawl, Śivabhāti used to see it carefully every day after returning from his begging tour etc. But he never used the same for fear of being detected. The preceptor knew that Śivabhāti was deeply attached to the woollen shawl, so, once he took the shawl in Śivabhāti's absence, tore it into several small pieces and gave each piece of the shawl to every sādhu for the purpose of cleaning his feet. When Śivabhāti came to know of this, his mind was greatly perturbed.

Then, once in course of his lecture on Jinakalpikas³, the Ācārya said:—

Jiṇakappiyā ya duvihā pāṇipāyā padiggahadharā ya |
Pāuraṇamapāuraṇā ikkikā te bhava duvihā (1)

Duga tiga caukka paṇagam nava dasa ekāraseva bārasaṅgam |
Eḍa aṭṭha vigappā jiṇakappe honti uvahissa. (2)

[There are two types of Jinakalpikas (1) One of these having their hands (to be used) as a vessel, and (2) the other of those who actually possess vessels of alms. Each one of these is again of two types:—(1) Those (covering their bodies) with garments, and (2) Those (going) without garments. A *jīnakalpika* has an upadhi (a combination of articles) of two, three, four, five, nine, ten, and twelve varieties, (serviceable in the performance of his religious duties)]

“There are some ascetics who have only two *upadhis*: viz. a *Rajoharaṇa* (a wollen chowry and a *mukhavastrikā* (a piece of cloth folded to be kept before the mouth). With an addition

3. Jinakalpikas are a variety of Jaina Sādhus who were strictly undergoing the principles of religious practices followed by the Tirthankaras irrespective of bodily discomforts and hardships. Before adopting these rigid religious practices, a Jinakalpi sādhu is required to undergo the following five tests—viz. (1) With regard to knowledge, he must have a thorough knowledge of at least nine—parvas from the beginning to the end, and also to repeat them from the end to the beginning. (2) With regard to austerities, he must have the strength to observe fasting lasting from one to several days at a time, and upto six months duration at a time, without any resulting weakness. (3) With regard to mental courage, he must remain in Kāyotsarga in deserted depilitated buildings, public squares, burning places (for dead bodies) etc. and be undaunted by several difficult sufferings and hardships. (4) He should think that he is alone, none else is his companion, and (5) With regard to bodily strength, he must balance his entire body on his toe.

of one, two, and three *kalpas* (articles) to the above-stated two *upadhis* or paraphernalias respectively.

Again, there are some who in addition to *rajoharaṇa* and *muhapatti* possess seven kinds of *pātras* in this way :—

Pattam, pattābandho, payatṭhavaṇam ca pāyakesariyā ।
Paṭalāim rayattāṇam ca gocchaṃ pāyā-nijjogo. (1)

[*Pātram* (alms-bowls, utensils etc.); *pātrabandham* (a square piece of cloth for fastening the *pātras* together when not in use and which can also be utilized for carrying them as in a sling, on a begging tour) Vern : जौली; *pātrasthapanam* (a square piece of woollen cloth about 11×11 inches with pieces of cord attached at four corners for tying up the *pātras*); *pātrakesarītā* (a small woollen chowrie, Vern : गुंजणी); *patalakāni* (oblong pieces of fine cloth 52" × 24". Three such pieces are to be used for the summer, four for winter, and five for the rainy season Vern पल्लु); *rajastrāṇam* (a piece of cloth to be placed between each *pātra*); *gucchakam* (a square piece of woollen cloth similar to *pātrasthāpana*, with a hole in the centre, but without cord useful for tying the *pātras* together) are useful for *Pātras*.]

This shows that there are nine kinds of *upadhi*. When one, two, and three types of *Kalpa* are respectively added to these nine varieties, there are ten, eleven and twelve *upadhis* in all, in case of several ascetics."

On hearing this, Śivabhaṭi said " If that is so, how is it that *aughika* (for daily use) *upadhi*, and *aupagrahika* (for occasional use) *upadhi* alone are apprehended ? Why is not *Jinakalpa* itself attained. " ? The preceptor replied :—*Jinakalpa* has disappeared with Jambū Swāmī⁴. And it is not possible to attain the same in absence of sufficient strength " etc.

4. Who died in Vīra Samvat 64. The following ten precepts are said to have disappeared with Ārya Jambū Swāmī—(1) *Manahparyaya Jñāna*, (2) *Paramāvadhi Jñāna*, (3) *Pulāka Labdhi*, (4) *Āhāraka Śarīra labdhi*, (5) *Kṣapakaśreṇi*, (6) *Upaśamaśreṇi*, (7)

Śivabhūti:—"How could that be when I am alive? I shall accomplish that. One who really desires to attain *Mokṣa* should observe the vow of Jinakalpa without any parigraha (possession) what-so-ever. What is the use of accepting objects that cause passions, fear, attachment etc? This is the reason why the Scriptures have preached ideal *niṣparigraha* (complete renouncement). The Tīrthaṅkaras have moved about without any garment or covering. It is, therefore, advisable to go without any covering what-so-ever.

Ācārya:—In that case, one should also abandon his body immediately after he undertakes to observe the vow. Because, vices of passion, fear, and attachment etc. lie in the body as well. The principle of *niṣparigraha* (complete renouncement) preached by the Scriptures, means to assert that one should not cherish attachment even in religious observances. Complete negation of attachment is itself nothing but a state of *niṣparigraha* or complete abandonment of property. It should also be borne in mind that entire abandonment of religious observances, does not necessarily mean *niṣparigraha*. The Tīrthaṅkaras do not really happen to be completely naked. This is seen from the statements like "Savve vi egaduseṇa niggayā Jīṇavarā cauvisam" etc., which prove that all the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras had come out with one divine garment.

Śivabhūti was persuaded by the preceptor and several other old Sādhus in many such ways, but out of vanity and passion, he did not give up his false notion of giving up garments etc. He stayed in the garden without a single garment to cover his body. His sister, Uttarā, who came to pay her respects to her brother found him in the naked condition. She, too, therefore, gave up her clothes. Then, while going about in the city for

Jinakalpa, (8) The three kinds of saṃyama—(viz 1. Parihāra viṣuddhi, 2. Sūkṣmasaṃparāya and 3. Yathākhyāta cāritram) 9. Kēvala Jñāna and 10. Siddhi pada. Vide Śrī Tapāgaccha Pattāvali p. 2-22. also Vide verse 2593.

alms in that condition, a whore saw her. Thinking that she would affect her profession, the whore gave her a cloth to cover her body, in spite of her reluctance. Eventually she narrated the whole incident before her brother. Śivabhati thought at last, that a woman would look obscene and disgusting if she did not wear a cloth, and asked her not to give up clothing.

Then, after some days, Śivabhati initiated two of his pupils viz. Kaundinya and Koṭṭavīra who prolonged the sect by tradition.

The whole account is discussed in details as follows:—

उवहिविभागं सोऽं सिवभूई अज्जकण्हगुरुमूले ।
 जिणकप्पियाइयाणं भणइ गुरुं कीस नेयाणि ? ॥४॥२५५३॥
 जिणकप्पोऽणुचरिज्जइ नोच्छिन्नो त्ति भणिए पुणो भणइ ।
 तदसत्तस्सोच्छिज्जउ वुच्छिज्जइ किं समत्थस्स ? ॥५॥२५५४॥
 पुच्छस्स पुव्वमणापुच्छछिण्णकंबलकसायकलुसिओ चेव ।
 सो बेइ परिग्गहओ कसाय-मुच्छा-भयाईया ॥६॥२५५५॥
 दोसा जओ सुबहुया सुए य भणियमपरिग्गहत्तं त्ति ।
 जमचेला य जिणिंदा तदभिहिओ जं च जिणकप्पो ॥७॥२५५६॥
 जं च जियाचेलपरिसहो मुणी जं च तीहिं ठाणेहिं ।
 वत्थं धरिज्ज नेगंतओ तओऽचेलया सेया ॥८॥२५५७॥

4. Uvahivibhāgam sōum Sivabhūi AjjaKaṇhagurumūle ।
 Jīṇakappiyāiyāṇam bhaṇai gurum kīsa neyāṇim ? (2553)
5. Jīṇakappo'ṇucarijjai nocchinno tti bhaṇiè puṇo bhaṇai ।
 Tadasattassocchijjau vucchijjai kim samatthassa ? (2554)
6. Pucchassa^{*} puvvamaṇāpucchachhiṇṇakambalakasāyakalusiö
 cèva ।
 So bèi pariggahaö kasāya-mucchā-bhayāiyā. (2555)
7. Dosā jaö subahuyā suè ya bhaṇiyamapariggahattam tti ।
 Jamacèlā ya Jīṇindā tadabhihiö jam ca Jīṇakappo. (2556)

8. Jam ca jiyācelapariśaho muṇi jam ca tihim ṭhāṇehim ।
Vattham dharijja negantaō taō'cēlayā sēyā. (2557)

[उपधिविभागं श्रुत्वा शिवभूतिरार्यकृष्णगुरुमूले ।
जिनकल्पिकादिकानां भणति गुरुं कस्माद् नेदानीम् ? ॥४॥२५५३॥
जिनकल्पोऽनुचर्यते नोच्छिन्न इति भणिते पुनर्भणति ।
तदशक्तस्योच्छिद्यता व्युच्छिद्यते कथं समर्थस्य ? ॥५॥२५५४॥
पृष्ठस्य पूर्वमनापृष्ठच्छिन्नकम्बलकषायकलुषित एव ।
स ब्रवीति परिग्रहतः कषाय-मूर्च्छा-भयादिकाः ॥६॥२५५५॥
दोषा यतः सुबहुकाः श्रुते च भणितमपरिग्रहतत्वमिति ।
यदचेलाश्च जिनेन्द्रास्तदभिहितो यच्च जिनकल्पः ॥७॥२५५६॥
यच्च जिताचेलपरिषहो मुनिर्यच्च त्रिभिः स्थानैः ।
वस्त्रं धारयेद् नैकान्ततस्ततोऽचेलता श्रेयसी ॥८॥२५५७॥

4. Upadhivibhāgam śrutvā ŚivabhatirāryaKṛṣṇagurumūle ।
Jinakalpikādikānām bhaṇati gurum kasmād nedānīm ? (2543)
5. Jinakalpo'nucaryate nocchinna iti bhaṇite puna-r-bhaṇati ।
Tadaśaktasyocchidyatām vyucchidyate katham samarthasya ?
(2554)
6. Priṣṭasya purvamanāpriṣṭacchina kambala kaṣāya kaluṣita eva ।
Sa bravīti parigrahataḥ kaṣāya-mūrccā-bhayādikāḥ. (2555)
7. Doṣā yataḥ subahukāḥ śrutē ca bhaṇitamaparigrahatvamiti ।
Yadacelaśca Jinendrastadabhihito yacca Jinakalpaḥ. (2556)
8. Yacca jītācelapariśaho muni-r-yacca tribhiḥ sthānaiḥ ।
Vastram dhārayed naikāntatastatō'celatā śrēyasī. (2557)

Trans. 4-5-6-7-8. Having heard from the preceptor the section on upadhis (possession of necessary articles) of Jina kalpika etc. he (i. e. Śivabhati) puts the question before the preceptor " Why is Jinakalpa (rites of a Tīrthaṅkara) not accomplished now ? " " It has died away " (was the reply). He said again :— Let it be dead to weak persons; why is it

dead to a capable person ?” He (i. e. Śivabhūti), who was previously asked by the preceptor (to renounce the woollen shawl) and whose mind was perturbed with passion as his (costly) shawl was cut (into pieces) without his consent, says that “many faults such as passion, fear, attachment etc. (arise) from *parigraha* (possession of property). That is why even in Scriptures, the doctrine of a-*parigrahatva* (renunciation of all worldly objects) has been preached, the Tīrthākaras (have moved about) without clothes, and they themselves have preached the Jinakalpa. Thus, one who has overcome the distress of naked condition, is (called) an ascetic, and since he would put on a garment at three places (i. e. on account of three reasons viz. out of shame, out of censure, and out of distress) but not in solitude, it is, therefore, better to remain in the state of being without garments. (2553-2557)

टीका-४-५-६-७-८ सर्वा अप्युक्तार्था एव, नवरं “जं च जिणाचेलेत्यादि” यस्माच्च “जिताचेलपरिषहो मुनिः” इत्यागमेऽभिहितम् । जिताचेलपरिषहत्वं च किल त्यक्तवस्त्रस्यैव भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । यस्माच्च त्रिभिरेव स्थानैर्वस्त्रधरणमनुज्ञातमागमे नैकान्ततः, तथा चागमवचनम्—“तिहिं ठाणेहिं वत्थं धरिज्जा हीरिवत्तियं, दुगंच्छावत्तियं, परीसहवत्तियं” । तत्र हीलज्जा संयमो वा प्रत्ययो निमित्तं यस्य धारणस्य तत् तथा, जुगुप्सा लोकविहिता निन्दा सा प्रत्ययो यस्य तत्तथा, एव परीषहाः शीतोष्णदंशमशकादयः प्रत्ययो यत्र तत्तथा । उपसंहरन्नाह—तस्मादुक्तयुक्तिभ्योऽचेलतैव श्रेयस्करीति पूर्वपक्षः ॥२५५३॥ २५५४॥२५५५॥२५५६॥२५५७॥

D. C. An ascetic could be called “jitācela pariṣaṇ” only if he has abandoned clothes. As regards wearing clothes on account of three reasons, the āgamas say that—

“Tihim ṭhaṇehim vattham dharijjā hīrivattiyam, dugaṃcchāvattiyam, pariṣahavattiyam.

[One should put on garment at three places : where shame, censure and torture (are counted).

The āgamas, thus, allow the wearing of clothes on three grounds:—(1) If an ascetic requires (it) for maintaining restraint, or out of shame. (2) if he needs it for saving himself from public censure, and (3) If he wants to protect himself from physical pain arising from exposure to heat, cold, or mosquitoes etc. Śivabhaṭi says that he does not require clothes for any of the three purposes mentioned here. Hence, he preferred absolute nakedness, to wearing even one garment. (2553-2557)

Then,

गुरुणाऽभिहिओ जइ जं कसायहेऊ परिग्गहो सो ते ।
तो सो देहो चिय ते कसायउप्पत्तिहेउ त्ति ॥९॥२५५८॥

9. Guraṇā'bhihiö jai jam kasāyahèū pariggaho so tè ।
To so dèho cciya tè kasāyauppattiheu tti. (2558)

[गुरुणाऽभिहितो यदि यत् कषायहेतुः परिग्रहः स ते ।
ततः स देह एव ते कषायोत्पत्तिहेतुरिति ॥९॥२५५८॥

9. Guraṇā'bhihito yadi yat kaṣāyahètuḥ parigrahaḥ sa te ।
Tataḥ sa dèha èva tè kaṣāyotpattihèturiti. (2558)]

Trans. 9. He was told by the preceptor that “If the cause of passion were (said to be) *parigraha* according to you, then your body itself would become the same, as that too happened to give rise to passions.” 2558.

टीका-९ गुरुणाऽऽर्यकृष्णेनाभिहितः शिवभूतिः-यदि हन्त ! यद् यत् कषायहेतुः, तत् तत् ते तव परिग्रहः, स च मुमुक्षुणा परिहर्तव्य एवोत्येकान्तः । “तो सो इत्यादि” ततस्तर्हि स्वकीयो देह एव ते तव स्वस्यात्मनोऽपि कषायोत्पत्तिहेतुरिति परिग्रहः परिहरणीयश्च प्राप्नोति । अतोऽपरिग्रहत्वस्य परिग्रहाणां चोत्सन्ना कथेति ॥२५५८॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—If O Śivabhaṭi! everything that happens to be the cause of passion is *parigraha* according to you, then, one who desires *Mokṣa* should renounce the body also, as the body gives rise to passions, and thus becomes *parigraha*. (2558)

Or, why say about body alone—

अत्थि व किं किञ्चि जए जस्स व तस्स व कसायबीयं जं ।
वत्थुं न होज्ज एवं धम्मो वि तुमे न घेतव्वो ॥१०॥२५५९॥
जेण कसायनिमित्तं जिणो वि गोसाल-संगमाईणं ।
धम्मो धम्मपरा वि य पडिणीयाणं जिणमयं च ॥११॥२५६०॥

10. Atthi va kim kiñci jaè jassa va tassa va kaṣāyabīyam jam ।
Vatthum na hojja evam dhammo vi tume na ghētavvo. (2559)

11. Jeṇa kaṣāyanimittam Jiṇo vi Gosāla-Saṅgamāīṇam ।
Dhammo dhammaparā vi ya paḍiṇīyāṇam Jīṇamayam ca.
(2560)

[अस्ति वा किं किञ्चिज्जगति यस्य वा तस्य वा कषायबीजं यत् ।
वस्तु न भवेदेवं धर्मोऽपि त्वया न ग्रहीतव्यः ॥१०॥२५५९॥
येन कषायनिमित्तं जिनोऽपि गोशाल-संगमादीनाम् ।
धर्मो धर्मपरा अपि च प्रत्यनीकानां जिनमतं च ॥११॥२५६०॥

10. Asti vā kim kiñcijjagati yasya vā tasya vā kaṣāyabījam yat ।
Vastu na bhavedevam dharmo'pi tvayā na grahītavyaḥ. (2559)

11. Yena kaṣāyanimittam Jino'pi Gośāla-Saṅgamādīnām ।
Dharmo dharmaparā api ca pratyānikānām Jinamatam ca.
(2560)]

Trans. 10-11. Is there any object in (this) world that would not become the object of passion to one person or the other ? In that way, even religion should not be acceptable to you. Even a Jina becomes the cause of kaṣāya to Gośāla and Saṅgama etc. Thus, religion, devotees of religion, and even doctrines (preached) by Tīrthaṅkaras (would become) the cause of evil motives to their opponents. (2559-2560)

टीका-१०-११ किं हि नामैतावति जगति तद् वस्तु, यद् यस्य वा तस्य वा कषायाणां बीजं कारणं न भवेत् ? । एवं च सति श्रुत-चारित्र्यभेदभिन्नो

धर्मोऽपि त्वया न ग्रहीतव्यः, तस्यापि कस्यचित् कषायहेतुत्वात् । कुतः ? इत्याह—‘ जेणेत्यादि ’ येन यस्मादास्तां तत्प्रणीतो धर्मः, किन्तु स त्रिभुवनबन्धु-निष्कारणवत्सलः सर्वसत्त्वानां जिनोऽपि भगवांस्तीर्थकरोऽपि क्लिष्टकर्मणां गोशालक-संगमकादीनां कषायनिमित्तं संजातः । एवं धर्मस्तत्प्रणीतः, तदुक्त-धर्मपरा अपि तदेकनिष्ठाः साधवः, जिनमतं च द्वादशाङ्गीरूपम्, सर्वमप्येतद् गुरुकर्मणां दुःखैकरूपदीर्घभवभ्रमणभाजां प्रत्यनीकानां जिनशासनप्रतिकुल-वर्तिनां कषायनिमित्तमेव, इत्येतदप्यग्राह्यं प्राप्नोति, न चैतदस्ति । तस्मात् “ यत् कषायहेतुस्तत् परिहर्तव्यम् ” इत्यनेकान्त एवेति ॥२५५९॥२५६०॥

D. C.

Ācārya:—Is there any object in this world that would not happen to be a root of sin or stupidity to one person or the other ? From that view-point, even religion will not be acceptable to you. Because, that would act as the cause of evil motive to somebody or the other. Even the Tīrthaṅkara himself happens to be the cause of *kaṣāya* to Gośālaka and Saṅgamaka etc. Thus, religion, its followers, and the doctrine of the Jinas along with twelve Aṅgas, would become the cause of *kaṣāya* to those who oppose the Tīrthaṅkara and His doctrine.

According to you, all this would be *parigraha* and hence should be renounced. But that does not actually happen. And, the principle that everything that gives rise to *kaṣāya* should be renounced, is not valid. 10-11 (2559-2560)

Now, the Ācārya tries to remove the doubt in the opponen-
t's mind, and assert his own principles as follows:—

अह ते न मोक्खसाहणमईए गंथो कसायहेऊ वि ।

वत्थाइ मोक्खसाहणमईए सुद्धं कहं गंथो ? ॥१२॥२५६१॥

12. Aha tē na Mokkhasāhaṇamaīḥ gantho kaṣāyaha vi ।

Vatthāi Mokkhasāhaṇamaīḥ suddham kaḥam gantho ? (2561)

[अथ ते न मोक्षसाधनमत्या ग्रन्थः कषायहेतवोऽपि ।

वत्थादिमोक्षसाधनमत्या शुद्धं कथं ग्रन्थः ? ॥१२॥२५६१॥

12. Atha tē na Mokṣasādhanaṁ grantaḥ kaṣāyahētaḥ'pi ।
 VastrādiMokṣasādhanaṁ śuddham katham grantaḥ ?
 (2561)]

Trans. 12. If they are not proved to be *parigraha* in spite of their being the cause of passion by virtue of their being the accessory means of (attaining) Mokṣa, how could pure clothes etc. also be taken as *parigraha* from the point of view of their being recognized as the implements for (the attainment of) Mokṣa ? 2561.

टीका-१२ अथ मन्येथाः-ते देहादयो जिनमतान्ताः पदार्थाः कषायहेत-
 वोऽपि सन्तो न ग्रन्थो न परिग्रहः, मोक्षसाधनमत्या गृह्यमाणत्वादिति । हन्त !
 यद्येवम्, तर्हि वस्त्र-पात्रादिकमप्युपकरणं शुद्धमेषणीयं मोक्षसाधनबुद्ध्या गृह्य-
 माणं कथं ग्रन्थः ?-न कथञ्चिदित्यर्थः, न्यायस्य समानत्वादिति ॥२५६१॥

D. C. When we have not accepted dēha etc. as *parigraha* in spite of their being the cause of kaṣāya on the ground that they happen to be the necessary implements for attaining Mokṣa, we should also accept clean clothes etc., as the implements required for the attainment of Mokṣa, and hence they should not be renounced by taking them as *parigraha*. 12. (2561)

In reply to the argument that clothes etc. should be abandoned on account of their being the object of murecchā or attachment, the Ācārya says—

मुच्छाहेज्ज गंथो जइ तो देहाइओ कहमगंथो ।

मुच्छावओ, कहं वा गंथो वत्थादसंगस्स ? ॥१३॥२५६२॥

अह देहा-स्सहाराइसु न मोक्खसाहणमईए ते मुच्छा ।

का मोक्खसाहणेसुं मुच्छा वत्थाइएसुं तो ? ॥१४॥२५६३॥

अह कुणसि थुल्लवत्थाइएसु मुच्छं धुवं सरीरे वि ।

अक्केज्जदुल्लभयरे काहिसि मुच्छं विसेसेणं ॥१५॥२५६४॥

वत्थाइगंथरहिया देहा-स्सहाराइमित्तमुच्छाए ।

तिरिय-सवरादओ नणु हवन्ति निरओवगा बहुसो ॥१६॥२५६५॥

अपरिग्रहा वि परसंतिपसु मुच्छा-कसाय-दोसेहिं ।
अविणिग्गाहियप्पाणो कम्ममलमणंतमज्जंति ॥१७॥२५६६॥

देहत्थवत्थ-मल्ला-ऽणुलेवणा-ऽऽभरणधारिणो केइ ।
उवसग्गाइसु मुणओ निस्संगा केवलमुर्विति ॥१८॥२५६७॥

13. Mucchāheṇ gantho jai to dehāiō kahamagantho ।
Mucchāvaō, kaham vā gantho vatthādasāṅgassa ? (2562)
14. Aha-dēhā"hārāisu na Mokkaṣāsāhaṇamaīe tē mucchā ।
Kā Mokkaṣāsāhaṇeṣum mucchā vatthāiesum to ? (2563)
15. Aha kuṇasi thullavatthāiēsu muccham dhuvam sarīre vi ।
Akkejjadullabbhayare kāhisi muccham visēṣeṇam. (2564)
16. Vatthāigantharahiyā dēhā-"hārāmittamucchāe ।
Tiriya-sabarādaō nanu havanti niraovagā bahuso. (2565)
17. A-pariggahā vi parasantiesu mucchā-kaṣāya-dosehim ।
Aviniggahiyappāṇo kammamalamanaṭatamajjanti. (2566)
18. Dēhāvatthā-Mallā-'ṇulevaṇā-"bharāṇadhārīṇo kei ।
Uvasaggaisu muṇaō nissāṅgā Kēvalamuvinti. (2567)

[मूच्छाहेतुर्ग्रन्थो यदि ततो देहादिकः कथमग्रन्थः ।

मूच्छावितः, कथं वा ग्रन्थो वस्त्राद्यसङ्गस्य ? ॥१३॥२५६२॥

अथ देहा-ऽऽहारादिषु न मोक्षसाधनमत्या ते मूच्छा ।

का मोक्षसाधनेषु मूच्छा वस्त्रादिकेषु ततः ? ॥१४॥२५६३॥

अथ करोषि स्थूलवस्त्रादिकेषु मूच्छां ध्रुवं शरीरेऽपि ।

अक्रेयदुर्लभतरे करिष्यसि मूच्छां विशेषेण ॥१५॥२५६४॥

वस्त्रादिग्रन्थरहिता देहा-ऽऽहारादिमात्रमूच्छया ।

तिर्यक्-शंभरादयो ननु भवन्ति निरयोपगा बहुशः ॥१६॥२५६५॥

अपरिग्रहा अपि परसत्केषु मूच्छा-कषाय-दोषः ।

अविनिर्गृहीतात्मनः कर्ममलमनन्तमर्जयन्ति ॥१७॥२५६६॥

देहस्थवस्त्र-माल्या-नुलेपना-ऽऽभरणधारिणः केचित् ।

उपसर्गादिषु मुनयो निःसङ्गाः केवलमुपयन्ति ॥१८॥२५६७॥

13. Mūrcehā hetu-r-grantho yadi tato dēhādikaḥ kathamagranthah ।
Mūrceāvataḥ, katham vā grantho vastrādyasaṅgasya ? (2562)
14. Atha dēhā''hārādiṣu na Mokṣasāadhanamatyā tē mūrcehā ।
Kā Mokṣasāadhanēṣu mūrcehā vastridikēṣu tataḥ ? (2563)
15. Atha karoṣi sthulavastrādikēṣu mūrcehām dhruvam śarirē'pī ।
Akrēya durlabhatarē kariṣyaṣi mūrcehām viśeṣēna. (2564)
16. Vastrādigrantharahitā dēhā''hārādimātra mūrcehayā ।
Tiryak-sābarādayo nanu bhavanti nirayopagā bahuśaḥ. (2565)
17. A-parigrahā api parasatkeṣu mūrcehākasāya doṣaiḥ ।
Avinigrihitātmāṇaḥ karmamalamanantamarjayanti. (2566)
18. Dēhasthavastra-mālyā-'nulepanā-'bharaṇadhariṇaḥ kēcit ।
Upasargādiṣu munayo niḥsaṅgāḥ Kēvalampayanti. (2567)]

Trans. 13-14-15-16-17-18. If the cause of attachment is *parigraha*, then, how could body etc. not become *parigraha* to one who has already got attachment, and how could clothes etc. become *parigraha* to a lonely ascetic ? If you do not bear attachment towards body, food etc., on the ground that they are necessary (instruments) for the attainment of Mokṣa, then, what attachment is there on garments etc., that are equally necessary for the attainment of Mokṣa ? And, if you attach desire to external objects like garments etc, you will be doing so all the more to body, which is more precious (than clothes etc.). The tiryancas (i. e. beasts, birds etc.), and savage people though without *parigraha* of clothes etc, very often go to hell only out of their attachment for body and food etc.. (There are some, who though *a-parigrahi* (or not possessing anything whatsoever) by themselves, earn a lot of (bondages of) Karmān, because of their vices such as desire, passion, etc., while other ascetics with their bodies decorated with garments, garlands, besmearings, and orna-

ments etc. on the occasion of *upasarga* etc., attain the Absolute State of Existence unaccompanied (by anyone). (2562-2567).

टीका-१३-१४-१५-१६-१७-१८ एताः सुगमा एव, नवरं यदि यो मूर्च्छाहेतुः स ग्रन्थः परिग्रहः, परिग्रहत्वादेव च त्याज्यः, ततस्तर्हि “मुच्छावउत्ति” मूर्च्छावतो वक्ष्यमाणयुक्त्या मूर्च्छायुक्तस्य देहा-ऽऽहारादिकस्तव हन्त ? कथमग्रन्थः ? अपि तु ग्रन्थ एव, ततः सोऽपि परित्याज्यः प्राप्नोति । कथं वा ममत्वमूर्च्छारहितत्वेनासङ्गस्य सङ्गविप्रमुक्तस्य साधोर्वस्त्रादिकं ग्रन्थो गीयते भवता ?-न भवत्येव तथाभूतस्य तद् ग्रन्थ इति । अथ देहा-ऽऽहारादिषु ते तव मूर्च्छा नास्ति, मोक्षसाधनमत्या तेषां ग्रहणात्, तर्हि मोक्षसाधनत्वेन तुल्येष्वपि वस्त्रादिषु तव हन्त ! का मूर्च्छा ? इति । अथ स्थूलेषु बाह्यत्वात्, क्षणमात्रेणैवाग्नि-तस्कराद्युपद्रवगम्यत्वात्, सुलभत्वात्, कतिपयदिनान्ते स्वयमेव विनाशधर्मकत्वात् शरीराद् नितरां निःसारेषु वस्त्रादिषु मूर्च्छा करोषि त्वम्, तर्हि ध्रुवं निश्चितं शरीरेऽपि विशेषतो मूर्च्छां करिष्यसि । कुतो विशेषेण तत्र तत्करणमित्याह-“अकेज्ज दुल्लभयरे त्ति” विभक्तिव्यत्ययात् शरीरस्याक्रय्यत्वात् क्रयेणालभ्यत्वात् । न हि वस्त्रादिवत् शरीरक्रयेण क्वापि लभ्यते । अत एव वस्त्राद्यपेक्षया दुर्लभतरत्वात्, तथा, तदपेक्षयैवान्तरङ्गत्वात्, बहुतरदिनावस्थायित्वात्, विशिष्टतरकार्यसाधकत्वाच्च विशेषेण शरीरे मूर्च्छां करिष्यसीति । अथ देहादिमात्रे या मूर्च्छा सा स्वल्पैव, वस्त्रादिग्रन्थमूर्च्छा तु बह्वी, ततो देहादिमात्र-मूर्च्छासंभवेऽपि नग्नश्रमणकाः सेत्स्यन्ति, न भवन्तः, बहुपरिग्रहत्वादित्याह-“वत्थाइ” इत्यादि गाथात्रयम् । अयमिह संक्षेपार्थः-तिर्यक्-शबरादयोऽल्प-परिग्रहा अपि, तथा शेषमनुष्या अपि महादारिद्र्योपहताः क्लिष्टमनसोऽविद्यमान-तथाविधपरिग्रहा अप्यनिविगृहीतात्मानो लोभादिकषायवर्गवशीकृताः परसत्केष्वपि विभवेषु मूर्च्छाकषायादिदोषैः कर्ममलमनन्तमर्जयन्ति, तद् बहूशो निरयोपगा भवन्ति, न मोक्षप्रापकाः । अन्ये तु महामुनयः केनचिदुपसर्गादिबुद्ध्या शरीरा-सञ्जितमहामुल्यवस्त्रा-ऽऽभरण-माल्य-विलेपनादिसंयुक्ता अपि सर्वसङ्गविनिर्मुक्ता निगृहीतात्मानो जितलोभादिकषायरिपवः समासादितविमलकेवलालोकाः सिद्धिमुपगच्छन्ति । तस्मादवश्यात्मनां क्लिष्टमनसां नाग्न्यमात्रमिदमकिञ्चित्कर-मेवेति ॥२५६२॥२५६३॥२५६४॥२५६५॥२५६६॥२५६७॥

D. C. When you believe that whatever happens to be the cause of *marcchā* is *parigraha*, and hence should be renounced, how is it that body and food etc. of one attacked by delusion is considered as *a-parigraha* according to you? For, if they happen to be *parigraha* they should be abandoned. But garments etc. of an ascetic, absolutely alone by himself, are not as causes of *parigraha* to him. If you say that there is no attachment for body etc. as they happen to be the necessary instruments for attaining Mokṣa, then clothes etc. should also be taken as instruments for attaining Mokṣa. There is no reason to take them as objects of *marcchā*. When you attach delusion into clothes etc. that are far less important and that are easily susceptible to the attacks of fire, thief etc., and that are destructible in a short time, there is certainly all the more reason to attach delusion into body etc., that are more precious and more lasting than clothes etc.

Secondly, if you say that delusion with regard to body etc. is very slight, and that with regards to clothes etc., is great, and therefore naked ascetics will attain Mokṣa in spite of their attachment into body etc., while those like us having clothes etc. will not attain Mokṣa, then, you should note that the *tiryancas* (beasts and birds) and the savage tribes of Bhils etc., who do not put on clothes etc. but who are attached only to body, and food etc., frequently attain hell. Persons suffering from poverty have to undergo ceaseless chain of Karman, on account of their souls being unrestrained due to their vices in the past life.

On the other hand, great ascetics etc., attain Mokṣa of Absolute Perception in spite of their being adorned by costly ornaments on the occasion of *upasarga* (a natural phenomenon supposed to forbode future evil). It should, therefore, be borne in mind, that mere renunciation of clothes does not help if the soul is impure. 13-18. (2562-2567)

Then, in reply to the assertion that the wearing of clothes etc., should be given up as that, sometimes, causes fear etc., the Acārya states—

जह भयहेऊ गंथो तो नाणाईण तदुपघाईहिं ।
 भयमिह ताई गंथो, देहस्स य सावयाईहिं ॥१९॥२५६८॥
 अह मोक्खसाहणमईए न भयहेऊ वि ताणि ते गथो ।
 वत्थाइ मोक्खसाहणमईए सुद्धं कहं गंथो ? ॥२०॥२५६९॥

19. Jai bhayahea gantho to nāṇāiṇa taduvaghāihim ।
 Bhayamiha tāim gantho, dēhassa ya sāvayāihim. (2568)
 20. Aha Mokkhasāhaṇamaīēna bhaya hēu vi tāṇi tē gantho ।
 VatthāiMokkhasāhaṇa maīē suddham kaham gantho ? (2569)

[यदि भयहेतुग्रन्थस्ततो ज्ञानादीनां तदुपघातिभ्यः ।
 भयमिति तानि ग्रन्थो देहस्य च श्वापदादिभ्यः ॥१९॥२५६८॥
 अथ मोक्षसाधनमत्या न भयहेतवोऽपि तानि ते ग्रन्थः ।
 वस्त्रादिमोक्षसाधनमत्या शुद्धं कथं ग्रन्थः ? ॥२०॥२५६९॥

19. Yadi bhayahetu-r-granthastato jñānādīnām tadupaghātibhyaḥ ।
 Bhayamiti tāni grantho dehasya ca śvapadādibhyaḥ. (2568)
 20. Atha Mokṣasādhānamatyā na bhayahetavo'pi tāni tē granthāḥ ।
 VastrādiMokṣasādhānamatyā suddham katham granthāḥ.
 (2569)]

Trans. 19-20. If that which causes fear is (known as) *parigraha*, then, knowledge etc., being susceptible to fear from the opponents, and the body (being susceptible to fear) from wild beasts etc., should be known as *parigraha*. And, if they are not object of *parigraha* in spite of their being causes of fear, because they act as the instruments for attaining Mokṣa, how could clothes etc., also be (recognized as) objects of *parigraha* in spite of their being instruments for attaining Mokṣa ? (2568-2569)

टीका-१९-२० यदि यद् भयहेतुस्तद् ग्रन्थः, तर्हि ज्ञान-दर्शन-चारित्र्या-
 णामपि तदुपघातकेभ्यः, देहस्य च श्वापदादिभ्यो भयमस्ति, इति तान्यपि ग्रन्थः
 प्राप्नुवन्ति । शेषं व्याख्यातप्रायम् ॥२५६८॥२५६९॥

D. C. If you believe that whatever becomes the cause of fear is *parigraha*, then, those having Knowledge, Perception and Character etc., would be susceptible to fear from their respective opponents, and body is susceptible to fear from beasts of prey. So, they should, also, be taken as objects of *parigraha*. (The remaining portion is clear) 19-20. (2568-2569)

In reply to the assertion that clothes etc., are the causes of inauspicious or fierce meditation, and hence, they should be abandoned, the Ācārya says—

सारक्खणाणुबन्धो रोद्धज्झाणं ति ते मई हुज्जा ।
तुल्लमियं देहाइसु पसत्थमिह तं तहेहावि ॥२१॥२५७०॥
जे जत्तिया पगारा लोए भयहेअवो अविरयाणं ।
ते चेव य विरयाणं पसत्थभावाण मोक्खाय ॥२२॥२५७१॥

21. Sārakkhaṇaṇubandho roddajjhāṇam ti tè maī hujjā ।
Tullamiyam dēhāisu pasatthamiha tam tahēhāvi. (2570)

22. Jē jattiyā pagārā lōē bhayahēavo a-virayāṇam ।
Tē cēva ya virayāṇam pasatthabhāvāṇa Mokkhāya. (2571)

[संरक्षणानुबन्धो रौद्रध्यानमिति ते मतिर्भवेत् ।
तुल्यमिदं देहादिषु प्रशस्तमिह तत् तथेहापि ॥२१॥२५७०॥
ये यावन्तः प्रकारा लोके भयहेतवोऽविरतानाम् ।
त एव च विरतानां प्रशस्तभावानां मोक्षाय ॥२२॥२५७१॥

21. Saṃrakṣaṇānubandho raudradhyānamiti tè mati-r-bhavèt ।
Tulyamidam dēhādiṣu praśastamiha tat tathēhāpi. (2570)

22. Yē yāvantāḥ prakārā lokē bhayahètavo'viratānām ।
Ta ēva ca viratānām praśastabhāvānām Mokṣāya. (2571)

Trans. 21-22. (Utility of clothes etc.) in connection with preservation (of body etc.) may be considered as (inspired by) evil motive according to you. But this is common in body etc. also, (and hence) it is desirable there, in the same

way, as it is here. (For), the various types of deeds that are causes of fear to unrestrained persons, are (helpful) for the (attainment of) Mokṣa to real ascetics having lofty ideals. (2570-2571).

टीका-२१-२२ व्याख्या-इहागमे रौद्रध्यानं चतुर्विधमुक्तम्-तद्यथा-“से किं तं रोदज्ज्ञाणं ? । रोदज्ज्ञाणे चउच्चिहे पन्नत्ते; तं जहा-हिंसाणुबन्धी, मोसाणुबन्धी, तेयाणुबन्धी, सारक्खाणुबन्धी” तत्र हिंसायाः सत्त्ववधादिरूपाया अनुबन्धः सातत्येन चिन्तनं यत्र तद् हिंसानुबन्धि । मृषाऽसत्यं तस्यानुबन्धो यत्र तत् तथा । स्तेयं चौर्यं तस्यानुबन्धो यत्र तत् तथा । संरक्षणं सर्वैर्मरणाद्युपायैस्तस्करादिभ्यो निजवित्तस्य संगोपनं तस्यानुबन्धः सातत्येन चिन्तनं यत्र रौद्रध्याने तत् तथा । एवं च सति संरक्षणानुबन्धो रौद्रध्यानस्य चतुर्थो भेदः । स च वस्त्रादौ गृहीते किलावश्यंभावी, रौद्रध्यानभेदत्वाच्च रौद्रध्यानमिति । एवं रौद्रध्यानहेतुत्वाद् वस्त्रादिकं दुर्गतिहेतुः, शस्त्रादिवत्, ततो न ग्राह्यमिति तव बुद्धिर्भवेत्; तर्हि यदुक्तयुक्त्या रौद्रध्यानं तदिदं देवानां प्रिय ! देहादिष्वपि तुल्यम्, तेष्वपि जले-ज्वलनं-मलिम्लुचं-श्वापदा-अहि-विष-कण्टकादिभ्यः संरक्षणानुबन्धस्य तुल्यत्वात् । अतस्तेऽपि परित्याज्याः प्राप्नुवन्ति । अथेह देहादेर्मोक्षसाधनोक्तत्वाद् यतनया तत्संरक्षणानुबन्धविधानं प्रसस्तं, न दोषाय । यद्येवम्, तर्हि तथा तेनागमप्रसिद्धेन यतनाप्रकारेणापि वस्त्रादौ संरक्षणानुबन्धविधानं कथं न प्रशस्तम् ? । ततः कथं वस्त्रादयोऽपि परित्याज्याः ? इति । अथैवं ब्रूषे-वस्त्रादिपरिग्रह एव मूर्च्छादिदोषहेतुत्वाल्लोकस्य “भवभ्रमणकारणम्” इत्येतदतिप्रतीतं वस्त्रादिपरिग्रहव्रतः साधोरपि कथं न स्यात् ? इत्याह-“जे जत्तियेत्यादि” । इह ये यावन्तः शयन-पान-भोजन-गमना-स्वस्थान-मनो-वाक्-क्रायचेष्टादयः प्रकारा अविरतानामसंयतानामप्रशस्ताध्यवसायवतां लोके भयहेतवो जायन्ते, त एव तावन्तः प्रकारा विरतानां संयतानां प्रसस्ताध्यवसायानां मोक्षायैव संपद्यन्ते । तस्माद् वस्त्रादिस्वीकारेऽपि नेतरजनवत् साधूनां मूलोच्छेदितलोभादिकषाय-भय-मोहनीयादिदोषाणां तदुद्भावितादोषः कोऽप्यनुपज्यत इति २५७०॥२५७१॥

D. C.

Sivabhūti:—There are four types of *Raudradhyāna* (evil meditation) mentioned in the āgamas. They are deeds concerning

(1) Violence (2) Falsehood (3) Theft, and (4) (Self) Preservation. Meditation in which violence by way of killing beasts and birds etc., is always thought of, is known as *himsā-nubandhi raudradhyāna*. That in which falsehood is resorted to, is known as *mriṣānubandhi raudradhyāna*, while meditation wherein preservation of one's property from thieves etc. is invariably aimed at, is known as *saṃrakṣaṇānubandhi raudradhyāna*. Acceptance of clothes etc., will also become the cause of *raudradhyāna*. Like weapons etc., clothes etc., will, also, become the cause of satisfying evil motives, and that is why they should be renounced without hesitation.

Ācārya :—That sort of *raudra-dhyāna* is common in body also, as the preservation of body from water, fire, robber, serpent, wild animals, poison, and thorns etc., is always sought. In that case, body too, shall have to be abandoned.

Śivabhati :—Since body etc. happen to be the necessary instruments for attaining Mokṣa, it is commendable to preserve them carefully.

Ācārya :—Why not apply the same principle to clothes etc., as well? As in the case of body etc., preservation of clothes etc; should, also, be commendable.

Śivabhati :—Since clothes etc. become the cause of attachment, they are objects of *parigraha* without doubt. They, thus, become causes of many *bhavas* to ordinary people, and consequently affect ascetics having *parigraha* of clothes etc. It is, therefore, advisable to give them up.

Ācārya :—This belief of yours is exclusively one-sided, and hence should not be accepted. Various acts of sitting, sleeping, eating, drinking, going, stopping, and various movements of mind, speech, and body, become causes of fear to an unrestrained person who has low motives. But the same acts become helpful for the attainment of Mokṣa to real ascetics who have high ideals. One who has subdued evil instincts from the beginning, is not liable

to any faults what-so-ever, if he accepts clothes. 21-22 (2570-2571).

Moreover, if you try to prove, with the help of the example of gold, that clothes etc. are *parigraha*, as they happen to be the causes of *mārechā*, we prove gold etc. as *a-parigraha* on the same ground:—

आहारो व्व न गंथो देहत्यं विसघायणट्ठाए ।

कणगं पि तहा जुवईधम्मंतेवासिणी मे त्ति ॥२३॥२५७२॥

23. Ahāro vva na gantho dehattham visaghāyaṇaṭṭhāe ।

Kaṇagampi tahā juvaīdhammantèvāsiniṇi me tti. (2572)

[आहार इव न ग्रन्थो देहार्थं विषघातनार्थतया ।

कनकमपि तथा युवतिर्धर्मान्तेवासिनी ममेति ॥२३॥२५७२॥

23. Ahāra iva na grantho dehārtham viṣaghātanārthatayā ।

Kanakamapi tathā yuvati-r-dharmāntèvāsiniṇi mamèti. (2572)]

Trans. 23. Like food, gold is not (the object of) *parigraha* as it is helpful to body, in as much as it is the antidote of poison. Similarly, young woman (is) also not an object of *parigraha* (to me), when (I take her to be) my pupil in the observance of religious duties. 2572.

टीका २३-कनकं तथा युवतिश्च धर्मान्तेवासिनी मे ममेति बुद्ध्या परिगृह्य-
णतो न ग्रन्थ इति संबन्धः, एषा किल प्रतिज्ञा । कुतः ? इत्याह-देहार्थमिति
कृत्वा, अयं च हेतुः, देहार्थत्वात्-देहप्रयोजनत्वात्-देहोपकारित्वादित्यर्थः । ननु
युवतेर्देहोपकारित्वं किल प्रतीतम्, कनकस्य तु तत कथम् ? इत्याह-“ विसघा-
यणट्ठाए त्ति ” विषघातकत्वादित्यर्थः, उक्तं च-

विसघाय-रसायण-मंगल-च्छवि-गया-पयाहिणावत्ते ।

गुरुए अ ढज्झकुट्ठे अट्ठ सुवण्णे गुणा होंति ॥१॥

आहारवदिति दृष्टान्तः । कनक-युवत्यादयोऽपि न ग्रन्थः, देहार्थत्वात्
आहारवदिति तात्पर्यम् ॥२५७२॥

D, C. Like food, gold and young woman, do not become *parigraha*, when they prove themselves helpful to the body. Gold is beneficial to body in as much as it acts as an antidote of poison. It has been said that.—

Visaghāya-rasāyaṇa-maṅgala-cehavi-ṇayā payāhiṇāvattè ।
Guruè a ḍhajjhakuṭṭhe aṭṭha suvaṇṇe guṇā honti. (1)

[Capacity as an antidote of poison, alchemic character, auspiciousness, brilliance, polity, property of turning clock-wise (from left to right), weight, and capacity of undergoing heat—these are the eight qualities of gold.]

When a young woman is looked upon with a lofty ideal that she is a companion in performing religious rites, she does not, in any way, become the object of *parigraha* but she becomes helpful in the attainment of Mokṣa. 23 (2572).

Finally, the Ācārya explains the distinction between *parigraha* and *a-parigraha* and tries to remove the confusion from the opponent's mind:—

तम्हा किमत्थि वत्थुं गन्थोऽगन्थो व सव्वहालोए ? ।
गन्थोऽगन्थो व मओ मुच्छममुच्छाहिं निच्छयओ ॥२४॥२५७३॥
वत्थाइं तेण जं जं संजमसाहणसराग-दोसस्स ।
तं तमपरिग्गहो चिय परिग्गहो जं तदुवघाइं ॥२५॥२५७४॥

24. Tamhā kimatthi vatthum gantho'gantho va savvhā lōè ? ।
Gantho'gantho va maō mucchamamucchāhim nicchayaō.
(2573)

25. Vatthāim teṇa jam jam sañjamasāhaṇasarāga-dosassa ।
Tam tampariggaho cciya pariggaho jam taduvaghāim. (2574)

[तस्मात् किमस्ति वस्तु ग्रन्थोऽग्रन्थो वा सर्वथा लोके ? ।
ग्रन्थोऽग्रन्थो वा मतो मूच्छा-ऽमूच्छाभ्यां निश्चयतः ॥२४॥२५७३॥
वस्त्रादि तेन यद् यत् संयमसाधनसराग-द्वेषस्य ।
तत् तदपरिग्रह एव परिग्रहो यत् तदुपधाति ॥२५॥२५७४॥

24. Tasmāt kimasti vastu grantho'grantho vā sarvathā lokè ?
 Grantho'grantho vā mato marcchā'marcchābhyām niścayataḥ.
 (2573)

25. Vastrādi tēna yad yat saṃyamāsādhanaśarāga-dvèśasya ।
 Tat tadaparigraha ēva parigraho yat tadupaghāti. (2574)

Trans. 24-25. "Then, what object is there in this world that should be known as *parigraha* or *a-parigraha* in all respects?" Really speaking, *parigraha* or otherwise, is ascertained according to attachment or aversion. Hence, whatever like clothes etc. that happens to be useful in the observance of austerities to one who is devoid of passion and prejudice, should be recognized as *a-parigraha*. That which acts against it, is *parigraha*. (2573-2574).

टीका-२४-२५ व्याख्या-तस्मात् किं नाम तद् वस्त्वस्ति लोके यदात्म-
 स्वरूपेण सर्वथा ग्रन्थोऽग्रन्थो वा ? नास्त्येवैतदित्यर्थः । ततश्च "मुच्छा परि-
 ग्राहो बुद्धो इह बुद्धं महेसिणा" इत्यादिवचनाद् यत्र वसु-देहा-ऽऽहार-कन-
 कादौ मूर्च्छा संपद्यते तद् निश्चयतः परमार्थतो ग्रन्थः । यत्र तु सा नोपजायते
 तदग्रन्थ इति । एतदेव व्यक्तीकरोति-"वत्थाइं तेणेत्यादि" तेन तस्मात् । शेषं
 सुगममिति ॥२५७३॥२५७४॥

D. C. There is not a single object in this world which can be recognized as *parigraha* or *a-parigraha* entirely by its own virtue. But by means of statements such as—"Mucchā pariggaho vutto ii vuttam mahēsina" etc. *parigraha* is ascertained on the standard of attachment to wealth, -body, -food-gold etc. Wherever such an attachment does not exist, there is *a-parigraha*. We can, therefore, conclude that whenever clothes etc. help to attain Mokṣa, they should be known as *a-parigraha*, and whenever they act contrary, there is *parigraha*. 24-25. (2573-2574).

किं संजमोव्वयारं करेह वत्थाइं जइ मई सुणसु ।

सीयत्ताणं ताणं जलण-तणगयाणं सत्ताणं ॥२६॥२५७५॥

तह निसि चाउक्कालं सज्झाय-झाण-साहणमिसीणं ।

महि-महिआ-वासो-सा-रयाइ रक्खानिमित्तं च ॥२७॥२५७६॥

मयसंवरोज्ज्ञानार्थं गिलाणपाणोवगारि वाभिमयं ।
 मुहपुत्तियाइ चैवं परूवणिज्जं जहाजोगं ॥२८॥२५७७॥
 संसत्तसत्तु-गोरस-पाणय-पाणीयपाणरक्खत्थं ।
 परिगलण-पाणघायण-पच्छाइकम्मइयाणं च ॥२९॥२५७८॥
 परिहारत्थं पत्तं गिलाण-बालादुवग्गहत्थं च ।
 दाणमयधम्मसाहणं समया चैवं परुप्परओ ॥३०॥२५७९॥

26. Kim saṃyamovayāram karēi vatthāim jai maī suṇasu ।
 Sīyattāṇam tānam jalāṇa-taṇagayāṇam sattāṇam. (2575)
27. Taha nisi cāukkālam sajjhāya-jhāṇa-sāhaṇamisīnam ।
 Mahi-mahiyā-vāso-sā-rayāi rakkhā-nimittam ca. (2576)
28. Mayasamvarujjhaṇattham gilāṇapaṇovagāri vābbhimayam ।
 Muḥaputtiyaī cēvam parūvaṇijjam jahājogam. (2577)
29. Saṃsattasattu-gorasa-pāṇaya-pāṇiyapāṇarakkhattham ।
 Parigalāṇa-pāṇaghāyaṇa-pacchāikammāiyāṇam ca. (2578)
30. Parihārattham pattam gilāṇa-bālāduvaggahattham ca ।
 Dāṇamayadhammasāhaṇam samayā cēvam parupparaō.
 (2579)

[किं संयमोपकारं करोति वस्त्रादि यदि मतिः शृणु ।
 शीतत्राणं त्राणं ज्वलन-तृणगतानां सत्त्वानाम् ॥२६॥२५७५॥
 तथा निशि चतुष्कालं स्वाध्याय-ध्यान-साधनमृषीणाम् ।
 मही-महिका-वर्षो-स्र-रजआदिरक्षानिमित्तं च ॥२७॥२५७६॥
 मृतसंवरोज्ज्ञानार्थं ग्लानपाणोपकारि चाभिमतम् ।
 मुखवस्त्रिकादि चैवं प्ररूपणीयं यथायोगम् ॥२८॥२५७७॥
 संसत्तसत्तु-गोरस-पानक-पानीय-प्राणिरक्षार्थम् ।
 परिगलन-प्राणघातन-पञ्चात्कर्मादिकानां च ॥२९॥२५७८॥
 परिहारार्थं पात्रं ग्लान-बालाद्युपग्रहार्थं च ।
 दानमयधर्मसाधनं समता चैवं परस्परतः ॥३०॥२५७९॥

26. Kim saṃyamopakāram karoti vastrādi yadi matiḥ śruṇu ।
Śītatrāṇam trāṇam jvalana-triṇagatānām sattvānām. (2575)
27. Tathā niśi catuṣkālam svādhyāya-dhyāna-sāadhanamrīṣiṇām ।
Mahī-mahikā-varṣo-sra-rajaādirakṣānimittam ca. (2576)
28. Mritasaṃvarojjhānārtham glānaprāṇopakāri cābhimatam ।
Mukhavastrikādi caivam prarūpaṇīyam yathāyogam. (2577)
29. Saṃsaktasaktu-gorasa-pānaka-pāṇīya-prāṇi rakṣārtham ।
Parigalana-prāṇaghātana-pāścātkarmādikānām ca. (2578)
30. Parihārārtham pātram glānā-bīlādyupagrahārtham ca ।
Dānamayadharmasāadhanam samatā caiva parasparataḥ.
(2579)]

Trans. 26-27-28-29-30. If you ask as to how clothes etc. are useful in (the practice of) austerity, (then) listen (to me). (They render) protection from cold (to ascetics), and protect creatures found in fire, and grass. (A garment) is also a (necessary) means of (conducting) study and meditation to the ascetics during all hours of night. It renders (them) protection from clods of earth, rain, fog, and dust particles. (It is used) in covering and carrying the corpse. (It is) considered as useful to sick persons. In that way, *muhapatti*. (a piece of cloth held between the nose and mouth to prevent dust, insects etc.) should, also, be (given) proper importance. Hence, a devoted ascetic ought to hold a vessel for the purpose of protecting insects found in milk, water, and such other drinks, in order to prevent it being spilt down, prevent killing of insects, and (avoid) faults like paścāt Karma, and for the benefit of the sick and young. Mutual tolerance is cultivated only in this way. (2575-2579).

टीका-२६-२७-२८-२९-३० व्याख्या-कं नाम संयमोपकारं करोति वस्त्रादिकम् ? इति यदि तव मतिः, तर्हि कथ्यते शृणु-सौत्रिकौणिककल्पैस्तावत् शीतार्तानां त्राणं साधूनामार्तध्यानापहरणं क्रियते । तथा ज्वलन-तृणादीन्धनगतानां सत्त्वानां त्राणं रक्षणं “क्रियते” इतीहापि दृश्यते । इदमुक्तं भवति,

यदि कल्पा न भवेयुः, तदा शीतार्ताः साधवोऽग्नि-तृणादीन्धन-ज्वलन्तं कुर्युः । तत्करण चावश्यभावा तद्गसत्त्वोपधातः । कल्पैस्तु प्रावृतैरेष न भवत्येव, अग्नि-तृणादिज्वलनमन्तरेणापि शीतार्तिनिवृत्तेरिति । तथा “कालचउकं उकोसए जहन्ने तियं तु बोधव्वं” इत्यादिवचनात् समस्तरात्रिजागरणं कुर्वद्भिः साधुभि-श्चत्वारः काला ग्रहीतव्याः । तच्च हिमकणमवर्षिणि शीते पतति चतुष्कालं गृह्णतां तेषामृषीणां । कल्पाः प्रावृताः सन्तो निर्विघ्नं स्वाध्यायध्यानसाधनं कुर्वन्ति, शीतार्त्यपहरणादिति । तथा “महि त्ति” महारात्रात्क्षिप्ता सचिता पृथिवी तस्याः पतन्त्या रक्षानिमित्तं प्रावृताः कल्पाः संजायन्ते, महिका धूमिका, “वास त्ति” वर्षा वृष्टिः, ‘उस त्ति’ आवश्यायः प्रतीतः रजोऽपि सचित्तमीषदाताम्रन-भसः पततीति प्रतीतमेव, आदिशब्दात् प्रदीप-तेजः प्रभृतीनां परिग्रहः । एतेषां च महिकादिगतानां सत्त्वानां रक्षानिमित्तं कल्पाः संजायन्त इति । तथा, मृतस्य संवरणं संवरं आच्छादनम्, उज्झनं बहिर्नयनं तदर्थं वा श्वेतोज्ज्वलप्रच्छादनपटि-कादिवस्त्रमभिहितम् । ग्लानप्राणोपकारि च तदभिमतं परमगुरुणाम् । एवं मुख-वस्त्रिका-रजोहरणादि चोपकरणं समयानुसारतः संयमोपकारित्वेन योज्यं भण-नीयम् । तथा चोक्तं कल्पभाष्यादिषु —

कप्पा आयप्पमाणा अड्ढाइज्झाइवित्थडा हत्था ।

दो चेव सोत्तिया उन्निओ य तइओ मुणेयव्वो ॥१॥

तणगहणाणलसेवानिवारणा धम्मसुकज्झाणट्ठा ।

दिट्ठं कप्पगहणं गिलाणं-मरणट्ठया चेव ॥२॥

संपाइमरयरेणुपमज्जणट्ठा वयंति मुहपत्तिं ।

नासं च मुहं च बंधइ तीए वसहिं पमज्जंतो ॥३॥

आयाणे निक्खेवे ठाणनिसीए सुयपट्टसंकोए ।

पुव्वं पमज्जणट्ठा लिंगट्ठा चेव रयहरणं ॥४॥

वेउव्वोऽवायेऽवाइए हीखदे पजपणे चेव ।

तेसिं अणुगहट्ठा लिंगुदयट्ठा य पट्टो य ॥५॥

तत्र प्रज्जनने मेहने “वेउव्वि त्ति” वैक्रिये विकृते, तथा, अप्रावृतेऽनावृते वातिके चोत्सन्नत्वभाजने, ह्रिया लज्जया सत्या खड्डे बृहत्प्रमाणे “लिंगुदयट्ट त्ति” स्त्री दर्शने लिङ्गोदयरक्षणार्थं च पटश्चोलपट्टो मत इति ।

अथ पात्रस्य मात्रकस्य च संयमोपकारित्वं दर्शनाह—“संस्तुतेत्यादि” । संस्तुतसक्तु-गोरस-द्रव्यादिपात्रक-प्राणीयमतसत्त्वसाणरक्षणार्थं पात्रमिति संबन्धः । पात्राभावे हि संस्तुतगोरसादयो हस्तएवानामोपादिकारणाद् गृहीताः क क्रिये-
रन् ? तद्वत्सत्त्वानां प्राणविपत्तिरेव स्यात् । पात्रे तु सति समयोक्तविधिना ते परिश्रमाप्यन्ते । तथा च सति तद्वत्सत्त्वग्राणरक्षा पात्रेण सिध्यतीति । तथा पात्राभावे पाणिमुट एव गृहीतानां घृत-गोरसादिरसानां परिगलने सति यत् कृत्तु-कीटकादिप्राणघाततम्, ये च भाजन-धात्रनादिभिः पश्चात्कर्मादयो दोषास्तेषां परिहारार्थं च पात्रमिष्यते जगद्गुरुभिः । तथा, ग्लान-बाल-दुर्बल-बुद्धाद्युपग्रहार्थं च तदिष्यते । पात्रे हि सति गृहस्थेभ्यः पथ्यादिकं समानीय ग्लान-बालादीनामुपग्रह उपष्टम्भः क्रियते, तदभावे पुनरसौ न स्यादेवेति । अपरञ्च, पात्रे सति भक्तपानादिकं समानीयान्यस्य प्रयच्छतां साधूनां दानमय-धर्मस्य साधनं सिद्धिर्भवति, पात्राभावे चैतद् न स्यात् । तदसत्त्वे कस्यापि केनचित् भक्त-पानादिदानासंभवात् । “समया चेवं परस्पर उ त्ति” एवं च पात्रे परिग्रहे सति लब्धिमतमलब्धिमतं च शक्तानामशक्तानां च वास्तव्यानां प्राघूर्णकानां च सर्वेषामपि साधूनां परस्परं समता स्वास्थ्यं तुल्यता भवति । पात्रे हि सति लब्धिमान् भक्त-पानादिकं समानीया लब्धिमते ददाति । एवं शक्तोऽशक्त्या, वास्तव्यः प्राघूर्णकायं तु प्रयच्छति । इति सर्वेषां सौस्थ्यम्, पात्राभावे तु नैतत्, स्यादिति ।

इह च पात्रग्रहणस्य गुणकथनेन मात्रकस्यापि तत्कथनं कृतमेव द्रष्टव्यम्, प्रायः समानगुणत्वात्, उक्तं च—

छक्कायरक्खणट्ठा पायगहणं जिणेहि पन्नत्तं ।

जे य गुणा संभोए हवंति ते पायगहणे वि ॥१॥

अतरंत-बाल-बुद्धा-सेहाएसा गुरु अ सहुवग्गा ।

साहारणुग्गहा अलद्धिकारणा पायगहणं तु ॥२॥

आयरिए य गिलाणे पाहुणए दुल्लहे सहसदाणे ।

संसत्तभत्तपाणे मत्तगपरिभोगणुणा उ ॥३॥

इति ॥२५७५॥२५७६॥२५७७॥२५७८॥२५७९॥

D. C.

Śivabhati:—In what ways, are the garments and vessels useful to the practice of austerities?

Ācārya:—A cotton or woollen piece of cloth protects the mendicant from cold. It protects the life of small creatures abounding in fire, grass and food. If a mendicant does not wear a garment, he lits up fire for the purpose of protecting himself from cold, and by doing so, he kills small insects abounding there-in.

On the other hand, if he has a piece of cloth to cover his body, he would prevent cold with it, without killing a single life.

Secondly, if an ascetic wears a garment, he is liable to pass the whole night in study and meditation without any hindrance by cold, dust, rain, and fog etc. He will also be able to save insects flocking round the lamp with his garment.

Thirdly, it has been laid down by the great preceptors that in covering or taking out a corpse, a white piece of cloth should be used. Such a piece of cloth is beneficial to sick persons also.

In this way, *muhapatti* and *rajoharaṇa* are useful in the practice of austerity and the same should be preached by you wherever you go.

It has been said in the Kalpa-Bhāṣya that—

Kappā ayappamāṇā aḍḍhāi jjhāvitthadā hatthāi

Do cēva sōttiyā unniṣ ya tāṣ muṇeyavvo. (1)

Taṇagahaṇāṇalasevānivarāṇā dhammamsukkajjhāṇaṭṭhā ।

Ditṭham kappagahaṇam gilāṇa-māraṇaṭṭhāyā cēva. (2)

Sampāyamarayareṇupamajjaṇaṭṭhā vayanti muhapattim ।

Nāsam ca muham ca bandhaṁ tie vasahim pamajjanto. (3)

Āyāṇe nikkheve thāṇa nīṣe sūyapatta saṅkoe ।

Puvvam pamajjaṇaṭṭhā liṅgaṭṭhā cēva rayaharaṇam. (4)

Veuṃve'vayade vāie hikkhadde pajanaṇe ceva |

Tesim aṇuggahaṭṭhā līṅgudayaṭṭhā ya paṭṭo o. (5)

[For the purpose of refraining from the use of fire produced by collecting straw, and for the observance of *dharma-dhyāna* and *śukla-dhyāna*, and also for the benefit of the sick, as well as (as a covering) for the dead, one should use a garment. The garments should be—two of cotton, and one woollen—as one's own self, and $2\frac{1}{2}$ hands broad. A sadhu carries a *muhapatti* with the object of removing collected particles of dust and he ties it over his mouth and nostrils, while cleaning the *upāsraya*. While taking an object, while removing it, while replacing it, while re-arranging a bed-sheet disturbed from a bedding prepared for the night, and as an emblem of asceticism one should use a *rajoharaṇa*. For the purpose of covering the exposed sexual organ of the male as well as of the female out of decency, and for covering the male organ excited by the sight of the female, a *cola-paṭṭa* a loin-cloth is necessary. All these garments are very useful for the preservation of *saṃyama-dharma*-duties of an ascetic.]

Uses of *pātra* and *mātraka* are now explained. If an ascetic possesses *pātra* he can save the life of so many creatures found in milk, grapes etc. For if milk etc. is received in hands, the small insects abounding there-in will perish without doubt. But if milk etc. is received in some vessel insects etc. would be placed inside the vessel in stead of falling down.

Secondly, when milk is received in hands the same would flow down on the ground, and give rise to small germs resulting in the loss of more lives.

Thirdly, in absence of vessels, faults like that of bondage of *Karman* etc, would arise.

Fourthly, good turns like that of distributing food etc. to the sick and poor, could only be done with the help of a *pātra*; in the absence of a *pātra* it is not possible to do so.

Thus, a *pātra* becomes a necessary means of discharging charitable duty to ascetics who receive food from rich persons and distribute the same among the poor. Moreover, if there is a *pātra*, it would be beneficial to mendicants of all categories—those who possess and who do not possess, the able as well as disabled ones, those staying in *upāsraya* and those coming as guests. If a mendicant possesses a *pātra* he can receive food into it, and impart the same to one who has not received food. Similarly, able-bodied monks would serve the disabled ones and church-inmate would treat a guest. In absence of *pātra*, no such convenience is enjoyed.

The same should be understood of *mātraka* also. It has been said—

Chakkāyarakkhaṇatṭhā pāyaggbhananam Jñehim pannatam ।
Je ya guṇa sambhōe havanti te pāyagahaṇe vi. (1)

Ataranta-bāla-vidḍhā-sehāesā gurā a sāhuvaggā ।
Sāhāraṇuggahā aladdhikāraṇā pāya-gahaṇam tu. (2)

[The Tīrthaṅkara has deemed fit the acceptance of *pātra*, fit for the purpose of protecting the bodies of the six varieties of living beings. Merits abounding in enjoyment are found in acceptance of *pātra* also. But the *pātra* should be accepted for (the benefit of) weak, young, old, new disciple, guests, and sick persons being advised by the preceptor on the grounds of security (of food etc.) in absence of a-labdhī. And, the acceptance of *mātra* is allowed in case of preceptor being sick, an outsider being rare, and food and drink of real mendicant being given away in charity.] 26-30. (2575-2578).

In reply to the assertion that “*suḍe bhaṇiyamapariggahattham*”, etc. the *Acārya* states—

अपरिग्गहया सुत्ते त्ति जा य मुच्छा परिग्गहोऽभिमाओ ।

सव्वदव्वेसु न सा कायव्वा सुत्तसम्भावो ॥३१॥२५८०॥

31. A-pariggahayā sutte tti jāya mucchā pariggaho' bhimaō ।
Savvadavvēsu na sā kāyavvā suttasabbhāvo, (2580)

[अपरिग्रहता सूत्रे इति या च मूर्च्छा परिग्रहोऽभिमतः ।

सर्वद्रव्येषु न सा कर्तव्या सूत्रसद्भावः ॥३१॥२५८०॥

31. A-parigrahatā sūtre iti yā ca mūrccā parigraho'bhimataḥ ।
Sarvadravyesu na sā kartavyā sūtra-sadbhāvaḥ. (2580)]

Trans. 31. Non-acceptance implied in the sūtra has taken *mūrccā* (attachment) as *parigraha*. That it should not be practised in (case of) all objects, is the main purport of the sūtra. 2580.

टीका-३१ या च “सव्वाओ परिग्रहाओ वेरमणं” इत्यादिनाऽपरिग्रहता सूत्रे प्रोक्तेति त्वया गीयते, तत्रापि मूर्च्छैव परिग्रहतीर्थकृतामभिमतो नान्यः, सा च मूर्च्छा यथा वस्त्रे तथा सर्वेष्वपि शरीरा-ऽऽहारादिषु द्रव्येषु न कर्तव्येति सूत्रसद्भावः सूत्रपरमार्थः, न पुनस्त्वदभिमतः सर्वथा. वस्त्रपरित्यागोऽपरिग्रहेति सूत्राभिप्रायः । तस्मादपरिज्ञातसूत्रभावाथो मिथ्यैव खिद्यसे त्वमिति हृदयम् ॥२५८०॥

D. C. The theory of *a-parigrahatā* advocated by you with regard to assertions like “*Savvāo pariggahāo veramaṇam*” etc. laid down in the Sūtra is obtained only when *mūrccā* or attachment has been completely removed. In other words, there is no *parigraha* without attachment. Attachment with regard to clothes etc. works in case of all objects including body, food, drink etc. The main purport of the Sūtra is that one should abandon attachment. But it should be noted that the above-mentioned sūtra in no way leads to establish that complete renunciation of clothes is *a-parigraha*. 31. (2580)

In reply to “*Jamacelā ya Jīṇindā*”⁵ etc. the Ācārya says—

निरुपमधिहसंधयणा चउनाणाइसयसत्तसंपण्णा ।

अच्छिद्दपाणिपत्ता जिणा जियपरिसहा सव्वे ॥३२॥२५८१॥

तम्हा जहुत्तदोसे पावन्ति न वत्थ-पत्तरहिया वि ।

तदसाहणं ति तेसिं तो तग्गहणं न कुव्वन्ति ॥३३॥२५८२॥

तह वि गहिंमवत्था सवत्थतित्थोवएसणत्थं ति ।

अभिनिक्खमंति सव्वे तस्मि जुएऽचेलया हुंति ॥३४॥२५८३॥

32. Nirupama dhiisaṅghayaṇā caunāṇaisayasattasampanṇā ।

A-cchiddapāṇipattā Jinā jiyapariśahā savve. (2581)

33. Tamhā jahuttadosē pāvanti na vattha-pattarahiyā vi ।

Tadasāhaṇam ti tēsim to taggaṇam na kuvvanti. (2582)

34. Taha vi gahiēgavatthā savatthattitthovaesaṇattham ti ।

Abhinikkhamanti savve tammi eue'celayā hunti. (2583)

[निरुपमधृतिसंहननाश्चतुर्ज्ञाना अतिशयसत्त्वसंपन्नाः ।

अच्छिद्रपाणिपात्रा जिना जितपरिषहाः सर्वे ॥३२॥२५८१॥

तस्माद् यथोक्तदोषान् प्राप्नुवन्ति न वस्त्र-पात्ररहिता अपि ।

तदसाधनमिति तेषां ततस्तद्ग्रहणं न कुर्वन्ति ॥३३॥२५८२॥

तथापि गृहीतैकवस्त्रा सवस्त्रतीर्थोपदेशनार्थमिति ।

अभिनिष्क्रामन्ति सर्वे तस्मिंश्च्युतेऽचेलका भवन्ति ॥३४॥२५८३॥

32. Nirupama dhriti samphananāscatu-r-jñānā atisaya sattvasampanṇā ।

Acchidrapāṇipātrā Jinā jitapariśahāḥ sarvè. (2581)

33. Tasmād yathoktadoṣāṇ prāpnuvanti na vastra-pātrarahitā api ।

Tadasādhanaṁ iti teṣāṁ tatastad grahaṇam na kurvanti. (2582)

34. Tathāpi grihītaikavastrā sa-vastratīrthopadēśanārtham iti ।

Abhiniṣkrāmaṁti sarve tasmimścyute'cēlakā bhavanti. (2583)

Trans. 32-33-34. All the Tirthaṅkaras possess exceptional fortitude, strength, and knowledge, with their compact hands as vessels, and since they are victorious over all sorts of strain, they are not susceptible to the afore-mentioned faults even though they (go) without a garment or vessel. These being useless to them are not accepted by them. Still however, in order to show that the inmates of the Church shall have to bear the garment for a long time, the Tirthaṅkaras renounce (the world) with one garment. When that is dropped automatically they go naked. (2581-2583).

टीका—व्याख्या—यस्माज्जिनास्तीर्थकराः सर्वेऽपि निरुपमधृतिसंहननाश्छद्म-
स्थावस्थायां चतुर्ज्ञानाः अतिशयसत्त्वसंपन्नाः, तथाऽच्छिद्रः पाणिरेव पात्रं येषां
तेऽच्छिद्रपाणिपात्रा जितसमस्त-परिषहाश्च “तम्ह त्ति” तस्माद् वस्त्राभावे ये
संयमविराधनादयो दोषाः प्रोक्तास्तान् यथोक्तान् दोषांस्ते वस्त्र-पात्ररहिता अपि
न प्राप्नुवन्ति, इत्यतस्तद्वस्त्रादिकं न साधनं न साधकं संयमस्य तेषां तीर्थकरा-
णाम् । “‘तो त्ति” तस्मादकिञ्चित्करत्वात् तस्यात्मगतसंयमस्यानुपकारिणो
वस्त्रादिग्रहणं न कुर्वन्ति तीर्थकरा इति । ननु यदि ते वस्त्रादिग्रहणं न कुर्वन्तीत्यु-
च्यते, तर्हि “सव्वे वि एगदूसेण निग्गया” इत्यादि विरुध्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह—
“तह वीत्यादि” यद्यपि तत्संयमस्यानुपकारिवस्त्रम्, तथापि सवस्त्रमेव तीर्थं
“सवस्त्रा एव साधवस्तीर्थे चिरं भविष्यन्ति” इत्यस्यार्थस्योपदेशनं ज्ञापनं तदर्थं
गृहीतैकवस्त्राः सर्वेऽपि तीर्थकृतोऽभिनिष्क्रामन्तीति । तस्मिंश्च वस्त्रेच्युते क्वापि
पतितेऽचेलका वस्त्ररहितास्ते भवन्ति, न पुनः सर्वदा । ततः “अचेलकाश्च
जिनेन्द्राः” इत्यैकान्तिकं यदुक्तं तद् भवतोऽनभिज्ञत्वसूचकमेवेति भावः
॥२५८१॥२५८२॥२५८३॥

D. C. Your idea about Tirthankaras as absolutely *acēlaka* is not quite correct. Even during their life incognito Tirthankaras are unusually bold, strong, and full of knowledge. Since they have subdued all the evil instincts they do not keep *pātra* or *vastra*, and go with their compact hands as *pātra*, and still they are not defiled by faults that would come in the way of the practice of austerities.

Śivabhati:—Then, how do you say that all the Tirthankaras had renounced the world with one garment?

Ācārya:—Although garment was not helpful to them in the practice of austerities etc, they, foreseeing that all the ascetics of the Church shall have to bear garments and vessels for a long time, accepted *dīkṣā* with one garment. In course of time, if the garment drops down by itself, they become uncovered. But that does not mean that they were uncovered for all the time. This, your belief that Tirthankaras were absolutely uncovered for all the time exhibits nothing but ignorance on your part. 32-34. (2581-2583).

जिनकप्पियादओ पुण सोवहओ सव्वकालमेगंतो ।

उवगरणमाणमेसिं पुरिसाविकखाए बहुभेयं ॥३५॥२५८४॥

35. Jinakappiyādaō puṇa sovahaō savva-kālamèganto ।

Uvagaraṇamāṇamèsim purisāvikkhāè bahubhèyam. (2584)

[जिनकल्पिकादयः पुनः सोपधयः सर्वकालमेकान्तः ।

उपकरणमानमेषां पुरुषापेक्षया बहुभेदम् ॥३५॥२५८४॥

35. Jinakalpikādayaḥ punaḥ sopadhayaḥ sarvakālamèkāntaḥ ।

Upakaraṇamānamèṣām puruṣāpekṣayā bahubhèdam. (2584)]

Trans. 35. And Jinakalpikas etc. are always exclusively full of (some) instrument (or the other). The standard of (their possessing) the instruments, depends upon the persons concerned, in various ways. 2584.

टीका—३५ अयमत्राभिप्रायः—तीर्थकर दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भेन, जिनकल्पिकोदाहरणावष्टम्भेन च त्वमचेलकत्वं प्रतिपद्यसे । एतच्च सर्वं भवतो दुर्बोधविलसितमेव, यतस्तीर्थकरा अपि पूर्वोक्तन्यायेन न तावदेकान्ततोऽचेलकाः । जिनकल्पिकस्वयंबुद्धादयः पुनः सर्वकालमेकान्तेन सोपधय एवेति । अत एव “दुग तिग चउक्क पणगं” इत्यादिना पूर्वमेतेषामुपकरणमानं पुरुषापेक्षया बहुभेदमुक्तम्, न पुनः सर्वथा निरूपकरणता । तदयं यस्त्वया सर्वथोपकरत्यागः कृतः स दृष्टान्तीकृतानां तीर्थकर—जिनकल्पिकादीनामपि न दृश्यते, केवलं नूतनः कोऽपि त्वदीय एवायं मार्ग इति ॥२५८४॥

D. C. It has already been shown above that you cannot preach the doctrine of going without clothes by advancing the example of Tirthaṅkaras.

Jinakalpikas and *svayambuddhas* etc. have always been possessing some material or the other as an *upakaraṇa* to the observance of *saṃyama*. The standard of accepting such *upakaraṇas* varies with different persons. But it is important to note that entire negation of *upakaraṇa* has never been referred to. Thus, the Tirthaṅkaras, by whose examples you have formed your belief, have also never been without *upakaraṇa*. 35 (2584).

Also,

अरहंता जमचेला तेणाचेलत्तणं जइ मयं ते ।

तो तव्वयणाउ चिय निरतिसओ होहि माऽचेलो ॥३६॥२५८५॥

36. Arahantā jamacēlā teṇācēlattañam jai mayam tē ।

To tāvvaṇāu cciya niratisaō hohi mā'cēlo. (2585)

[अर्हन्तो यदचेलास्तेनाचेलत्वं यदि मतं ते ।

ततस्तद्वचनादेव निरतिशयो भूर्माऽचेलः ॥३६॥२५८५॥

36. Arhanto yadacēlāstēnacēlafvam yadi matam tē ।

Tatastadvacanādēva niratiśayo bhu-r-mā'cēlaḥ. (2585)

Trans. 36. If naked condition is acceptable to you because Tīrthaṅkaras were naked, then, on their own words, do not become absolutely uncovered as you are devoid of that excellence. (2585).

टीका-३६ यद् यस्मादर्हन्तोऽचेलाश्चेलरहिता नाग्न्यधारिणस्तेन तस्मात् कारणादचेलत्वं नग्नत्वं यदि तव मतं संमतम्,

जारिसयं गुरुलिंगं सीसेण वि तारिसेण होयव्वं ।

न हि होइ बुद्धसीसो सेयवडो नग्गखवणो वा ॥१॥

इति वचनादिति । ततस्तर्हि तद्वचनादेव तीर्थकरोपदेशादेव निरुपमघृति-संहननाद्यतिशयरहितोऽचेलो नग्नो मा भूस्त्वम् । इदमुक्तं भवति-यदि तीर्थकर-शिष्यत्वात् तद्वेषस्तव प्रमाणम्, तर्हि तत एव हेतोस्तदुपदेशोऽपि भवतः प्रमाण-मेव । न हि गुरुपदेशमतिक्रम्य प्रवर्तमानः शिष्योऽभीष्टार्थसाधको भवति । परमगुरुपदेशश्चैवं वर्तते-निरुपमघृति संहननाद्यतिशयरहितेनाचेलकेन नैव भवित-व्यम् । तत् किं त्वमित्थं गुरुपदेशबाह्येन नाग्नेनात्मानं विगोपसीति ॥२५८५॥

D. C.

Ācārya :—O Śivabhūti ! you have accepted naked condition, because Tīrthaṅkaras were such. For, it has already been said that—

Jārisayam gurulingam sīsēṇa vi tarisēṇa hoyavvam ।

Na hi hōi Buddhasīso seyavado naggakhavaṇo vā. (1)

[A pupil should bear the same dress as (his) preceptor bears. A follower of Buddha would never be found with a white garment or naked.]

It is, therefore, in the fitness of things to follow the footsteps of Tīrthaṅkaras. But if you don't possess the qualities such as full restraint and spiritual strength as they possess, do not accept nakedness on their own words. Being the follower of the Tīrthaṅkara, if you initiate His dress and manners, you should behave according to his advice as well. One who behaves contrary to the advice of his preceptor, does not attain the fulfilment of his cherished desire. The great preceptors say that one should never accept *acēlakatva*, unless and until he has developed the necessary qualities of unequalled fortitude and strength. By accepting *a-cēlakatva*, why do you transgress the advice of the preceptors ?

Śivabhāti:—Just as it is necessary to behave according to the advice of the preceptor, one should certainly follow him in dress and manners also. 36 (2585).

The Acārya says:—

रोगी जहोवएसं करेइ वेज्जस्स हो अरोगो य ।

न उ वेसं चरियं वा करेइ न य पउणइ करंतो ॥३७॥२५८६॥

तह जिणवेज्जाएसं कुणमाणोऽवेइ कम्मरोगाओ ।

न उ तन्नेवत्थधरो तेसिमाएसमकरंतो ॥३८॥२५८७॥

37. Rogī jahovaṣam karēi vējjassa hō arogo ya ।

Na u vēsam cariyam vā karēi na ya paṇai karanto. (2586)

38. Taha Jīṇavejjāṣam kuṇamāṇo'vei kammarogāo ।

Na u tannēvatthadharo tēsimaesamakaranto. (2587)

[रोगी यथोपदेशं करोति वैद्यस्य भवत्यरोगश्च ।

न तु वेषं चरितं वा करोति न च प्रकरोति कुर्वन् ॥३७॥२५८६॥

तथा जिणवैद्यादेशं कुर्वाणोऽपैति कर्मरोगात् ।

न तु तन्नेपथ्यधरस्तेषामादेशमकुर्वन् ॥३८॥२५८७॥

37. Rogī yaṭhopaḍeśaṃ karoti vaidyasya bhaṭyaroḡaśca ।
Na tu veśaṃ caṛitaṃ vā karoti na ca prakaroṭi kurvan. (2586)
38. Tathā Jinavaidyādeśaṃ kurvāṇo'paiti karmarogāt ।
Na tu tannèpathyadharasteśamādeśamakurvan. (2587)]

Trans. 37-38. A sick person behaves according to the advice of a physician and cures himself, but (he) does not imitate him in dress and manners. For, doing so does not cure him.

Similarly, one who follows the advice of the Tīrthaṅkara-physician, is cured from the disease of Karman, while one who imitates him in dress but does not behave according to his commandments, is not (cured) (of the malady of Karman). 2586-2587.

टीका-३७-३८ व्याख्या-इह यथा रोगी वैद्यस्योपदेशं करोति, तत्करण-मात्रेणैव च रोगाद् विमुच्यते, न पुनस्सौ तद्वेषं करोति, नापि तच्चरितमाचरति, न च तत् कुर्वाणोऽप्यसौ प्रशुणीभवति, प्रत्युतक्षपणकादौ वैद्ये नाग्न्यादिकं तद्वेषं कुर्वन् सर्वरसांश्च स्वेच्छया तद्वद् भुञ्जानस्तच्चरितानुष्ठायी संनिपातस्यैव म्रियते । तस्माद् वैद्योपदेशानुष्ठानमेव रोगिणो रोगापगमहेतुः । प्रस्तुतयोजनामाह “तहे-त्यादि” तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण जिनवैद्यस्यादेशं कुर्वाणस्तद्वेषचरिते अनाचरन्नापि कर्मरोगादपैति विमुच्यते, न पुनस्तेषामादेशमकुर्वाणस्तन्नेपथ्य-चरिते बिभ्रा-णोऽपि तस्माद् विमुच्यते, केवलं तद्योग्यतारहितत्वाच्चन्नेपथ्य-चरिताभ्यां प्रवर्त-मान उन्मादादिभाजनमेव भवतीति ॥२५८६॥२५८७॥

D. C.

Acārya:—A sick person is cured of his illness only if he behaves according to the instructions of the physician. Imitating the physician in dress and manners (without following his instructions), does not help him in any way. By doing so, he would, on the contrary, become the victim of delirium.

Similarly, one who follows the instructions of the Tīrthaṅkara, without imitating his dress or external manners, is relieved of his bondages of Karman, while one who imitates the dress

and external manners without putting into practice the instructions given by the Tirthaṅkaras, is not able to escape from the clutches of Karman. On the contrary, such a person gives an impression of a mad man. 37-38 (2586-2587).

And, if you claim to be the follower of Tirthaṅkara's dress and manners, is your imitation similar to the behaviour of the Tirthaṅkara wholly or partly? If it is so wholly, then you should note that--

न परोवएसवसया न य छउमत्था परोवएसं पि ।
 दिंति, न य सीसवग्गं दिक्खंति जिणा जहा सव्वे ॥३९॥२५८८॥
 तह सेसेहि वि सव्वं कज्जं जइ ते हिं सव्वसाहम्मं ।
 एवं च कओ तित्थं न चेदचेलो त्ति को गाहो ? ॥४०॥२५८९॥

39. Na parovaṇsavasayā na ya chaumatthā parovaṇsam pi ।
 Dinti, na ya sīsavaggam dikkhanti Jiṇā jahā savvè. (2588)
 40. Taha sēsēhi vi savvam kajjam jai tēhim savvasāhammam ।
 Evam ca kao tittham na cēdacēlo tti ko gāho? (2589)

[न परोपदेशवशा न च च्छद्मस्थाः परोपदेशं पि ।
 ददति, न च शिष्यवर्गं दीक्षन्ते जिना यथा सर्वे ॥३९॥२५८८॥
 तथा शेषैरपि सर्वं कार्यं यदि तैः सर्वसाधर्म्यम् ।
 एवं च कुतस्तीर्थं न चेदचेल इति को ग्रहः ? ॥४०॥२५८९॥

all respects. And, in that case, where is the scope for the existence of Tīrth (the Jaina Church)? And, if there is no (church), where is the scope for insisting upon acēlakatva (or nakedness)? (2588-2589).

टीका-३९-४० व्याख्या-यदि तैर्जिनैस्तीर्थकरैः सह लिङ्ग-चरिताभ्यां सर्वसाधम्यम्, तर्हि यथा ते स्वयंबुद्धत्वाद् न परोपदेशवशगाः-न परोपदेशेन वर्तन्ते, न च च्छद्मस्थावस्थायां प्रतिबोधार्थं परस्याप्युपदेशं ददति, न च शिष्य-वर्गं दीक्षन्ते, तथा शेषैरपि तच्छिष्य-प्रशिष्यः सर्वमेतत् त्वदभिप्रायेण कार्यं करणीयं प्राप्नोति । भवत्वेवं तर्हि, को दोषः ? इति चेत् । इत्याह-एवं च सति कुतस्तीर्थम्, कस्यापि प्रतिबोधाभावाद् दीक्षाद्यभावाच्च ? । “न चेदिति” अथ न तैः सह सर्वसाधम्यमित्युच्यते, तर्हि “अचेलो भवाम्यहम्” इति कस्तवग्रहः ? अचिन्त्यत्वात् तच्चरितस्येति ॥२५८८॥२५८९॥

D. C. If you claim equality with Tīrthaṅkaras in all respects by following them in dress, manners etc., you must be able to practise everything that Tīrthaṅkaras were doing. In other words, like Tīrthaṅkaras, you should not accept instructions from others, should not give instructions to others as Tīrthaṅkaras do during their *chadmastha* life, and should not initiate pupils as Tīrthaṅkaras do, except when they have acquired Kēvala Jñāna. And, if such a thing happens there would be nothing like dīkṣā etc. and ultimately the entire Jaina Church would cease to exist in absence of imparting or receiving instructions etc.

On the other hand, if you accept that you are not in equality with the Tīrthaṅkaras in all respects, you shall have to give up insisting upon accepting *acelakatva* in vain. 39-40 (2588-2589).

Besides,

जह न जिणिंदेहि समं सेसाइसएहिं सव्वसाहम्मं ।

तह लिङ्गेणाभिमयं चरिएण वि किं चि साहम्मं ॥४१॥२५९०॥

41. Jaha na Jiṇindēhim samam sēsāisaēhim savvasāhammam ।

Taha liṅgeṇābhimayam carīeṇa vi kimci sāhammam. (2590)

[यथा न जिनेन्द्रैः समं शेषातिशयैः सर्वसाधर्म्यम् ।

तथा लिङ्गेनाभिमतं चरितेनापि किञ्चित् साधर्म्यम् ॥४१॥२५९०॥

41. Yathā na Jinēndraiḥ samam śeṣātiśayaiḥ sarvasādharmyam ।
Tathā liṅgēnābhimatam caritēnāpi kiñcit sādharṇyam. (2590)]

Trans. 41. (You have not acquired) equality with Tīrthaṅkaras in all respects, including the rest of their excellent qualities. But, you have accepted equality (only) to some extent so far as (their external) dress and manners are concerned. 2590.

टीका-४१ यथा जिनेन्द्रैः सह “निरुपमधिःसंघयणा चउनाणाइ सयसत्त-
संपण्णा” इत्यादिना ग्रन्थेन प्रतिपादितैर्लिङ्गाचरिताच्चशेषैरतिशयैः सर्वसाधर्म्यं
नाभिमतं भवतः, किं तर्हि ? किञ्चित् साधर्म्यमेव, तथा तेनैव प्रकारेण लिङ्गेन
चरितेन च किञ्चित् साधर्म्यमेव तैः सहाभिमतमस्माकम्, न तु सर्वसाधर्म्यम्,
तच्च किञ्चित् साधर्म्यं लिङ्गतो लोचकरणमात्रेण न पुनरचेलत्वेन, चरित्रेण त्वेष-
णीयाहारपरिभोगा-ऽनियतवासादिना, न तु पाणिभोजित्वेन, निरतिशयत्वेन
तदयोग्यत्वादस्मदादीनाम् । तस्मात् किञ्चित् साधर्म्यस्योक्तन्यायेनान्यथापि
सिद्धेः कोऽचेलताद्याग्रहो भवतः ? इति ॥२५९०॥

D. C. If you do not claim equality with Tīrthaṅkaras in all respects but admit the same to some extent, it is admissible to us. If you accept *loca* (plucking out of hair) etc., you attain similarity to some extent, but you do not attain the same with the principle of *acēlakatva*. You follow the Tīrthaṅkaras in dress and external behaviour when you renounce the dress and take food in hands or stay at undecided places, but since you do not possess the excellent qualities of a Tīrthaṅkara, you cannot be said to have attained complete equality with them. While non-similarity with the Tīrthaṅkaras could be proved in many other ways. So, why do you insist upon *a-celakatva* unnecessarily ? 41. (2590).

Then, in reply to “Tadabhihiḥ jam ca Jinakappo” etc, the Ācārya admits that Jinakalpa has been laid by the Tīrthaṅkaras

but explains as to how that Jinakalpa has been said and with regard to which persons—

उत्तमधिइसंघयणा पुव्वविदोऽतिसइणो सयाकालं ।

जिणकप्पिया वि कप्पं कयपरिकम्मा पवज्जंति ॥४२॥२५९१॥

तं जइ जिणवयणाओ पवज्जसि, पवज्ज तो स छिन्नो त्ति ।

अत्थि त्ति कहं पमाणं कह वुच्छिन्नो त्ति न पमाणं ? ॥४३॥२५९२॥

42. Uttamadhiisaṅghayaṇā puvvavido'tisaiṇo sayākalam ।

Jiṇakappiyā vi kappam kayaparikammā pavajjanti. (2591)

43. Tam jai Jiṇavayaṇāo pavajjasi, pavajja to sa chinno tti ।

Atthi tti kaham pamāṇam kaha vucchinno tti na pamāṇam ?

(2592)

[उत्तमधृतिसंहननाः पूर्वविदोऽतिशयिनः सदाकालम् ।

जिनकल्पिका अपि कल्पं कृतपरिकर्माणं प्रपद्यन्ते ॥४२॥२५९१॥

तद् यदि जिनवचनात् प्रपद्यसे, प्रपद्यस्व ततः स छिन्न इति ।

अस्तीति कथं प्रमाणं कथं व्युच्छिन्न इति न प्रमाणम् ॥४३॥२५९२॥

42. Uttamadhritisamghananāh pūrvavido'tiśayinaḥ sadākālam ।

Jinakalpikā api kalpam kṛtaparikramāṇaḥ prapadyantè. (2591)

43. Tad yadi Jinavacanāt prapadyase, prapadyasva tataḥ sa cchinna iti ।

Astiti katham pramāṇam katham vyuechinna iti na pramāṇam. (2592).

Trans. 42-43. Even Jinkalpikas who possess excellent fortitude, and (bodily) constitution, and who are conversant with (Nine) parvas, and who possess excellent qualities in Kalpa, and who have also undergone the (five) tests, always accept Jinakalpa. Following the words of the Tīrthaṅkaras, if you accept it, then, (you should) admit it to have been (already) perished. (For), what is the proof for establishing that it exists, and where is the proof (to show that) it has not perished ? (2591-2592).

टीका-४२-४३ । व्याख्याः-उत्तमधृतिसंहननाः पूर्ववेदिनो जघन्यतोऽपि किञ्चिद्भूतनवपूर्वपाठका इत्यर्थः सर्वदैव निरुपमशक्त्याद्यतिशयसंपन्ना जिनकल्पिका अपि “तवेण सुत्तेण सत्तेण” इत्यादि पूर्वोक्तविधिना कृतपरिकर्माण एव जिनकल्पं प्रतिपद्यन्ते, नान्यथेति न रथ्यापुरुषकल्पानां भवादृशां जिनकल्प-स्तीर्थकरैरनुज्ञात इति । तत् तस्माद् यदि जिनवचनादर्हदुपदेशाज्जिनकल्पं प्रतिपद्यसे त्वम्, ततस्तर्हि “स जिनकल्पो व्यवच्छिन्नः” इतीदमपि प्रतिपद्यस्व । अथैतद् न प्रतिपद्यसे, तर्हि “जिनकल्पोऽस्ति” इति कथं तीर्थकरवचनं तव प्रमाणम् ? । कथं च “व्यवच्छिन्नोऽसौ” इति न प्रमाणम् ? । नन्वाग्रहपिशा-चिकाग्रस्तचेष्टितामिदम् ? स्वेच्छामात्रप्रवृत्तत्वादिति ॥२५९१॥२५९२॥

D. C. Jinakalpakas, who possess the virtuous qualities like excellent fortitude and bodily constitution, who are conversant with Nine Pūrvas, and who possess excellent qualities, and who have also undergone the usual five tests, always admit the validity of Jinakalpa. The Tīrthaṅkaras have allowed the practice of Jinakalpa for such worthy persons, and not for unworthy persons like you. If you, therefore, believe in Jinakalpa, you should also admit the same to have already perished. For, otherwise, how could the words of the Tīrthaṅkaras laying down that Jinakalpa existed, be authentic to you ? And, how could the view that it has not perished, be authentic on the other hand ?

Śivabhūti:—Existence of Jinakalpa has already been admitted in the āgamas, but by which *pramāṇa* (authoritative statement) is the destruction of Jinakalpa laid down by the Tīrthaṅkara ? 42-43 (2591-2592).

The Acārya replies:—

मण-परमोहि-पुलाए-आहारग-खवग-उवसमे-कप्पे ।

संयमतिय-केवल-सिज्झणा य जंबुम्मि वुच्छिण्णा ॥४४॥२५९३॥

44. Maṇa-Paramohi-Pulāḇe-Abāraga-Khavaga-Uvasamē-Kappē ।

Samyamatiya-Kēvala-Sijjhaṇā ya Jambummi vucchiṇṇā. (2593)

[मनः-परमावधि-पुलाका-आहारक-क्षपको-पशमाः-कल्पः ।

संयमत्रिक-केवल-सिद्धयश्च जम्बौ व्युच्छिन्नाः ॥४४॥२५९३॥

44. Maṇaḥ-Paramāvadhi-Pulākā-Ahāraka Kṣapako-paśamāḥ-Kalpaḥ |

Samyamatrika-Kēvala-Siddhayaśca Jambau vyuochnnāḥ. (2593)

Trans. 44. (1) Maṇaḥ paryāya Jñāna (the intermediary stage of mental perception—the highest stage of concentration, (2) Paramāvadhi Jñāna (attainment of high visual knowledge, (3) Pulākā Labdhi (supernatural power possessed by a Pulāk variety of ascetics of crushing the army of a cakravartin, (4) Ahāraka śarīra (one of the five kinds of body, formed of very fine ahāraka molecules assumed only by highly advanced ascetics, which enables them to approach a Master, for the purpose of solving their doubts, (5) Kṣapaka-śreni (spiritual advancement in which destruction of right conduct—deluding Karmas takes place, (6) Upaśama-śreni, (spiritual advancement in which subsidence of such Karmas takes place), (7) Jinakalpa (the religious rites of a Tīrthaṅkara), (8) Samyamatrika (trio of restraint consisting of parihāra viśuddhi (removal of evil instincts), sūkṣma saṃparāya (experience of subtle conflicts), and yathakhyāta cāritra (attainment of the prescribed conduct), (9) Kēvala (the state of having attained Perfect Knowledge) and (10) Siddhipada-Mokṣa (Final Emancipation—these ten precepts disappeared after Jambū Swāmi⁶.

टीका—४४ मनः पर्यायज्ञानम्, परमावधिः, पुलाकलब्धि, आहारकशरीरम्, क्षपकश्रेणिः, उपशमश्रेणिः, जिनकल्प, परिहारविशुद्धिक-सूक्ष्मसंपराय-यथाख्यातलक्षणं संयमत्रिकम्, केवली, मोक्षगमनलक्षणा सिद्धिश्रेति सर्वेऽप्येते पदार्था जम्बूस्वामिनि व्यवच्छिन्ना जम्बूस्वामिनं यावत् प्रवृत्ताः, न तूत्तरेति ॥२५९३॥

D. C. The ten precepts that have been mentioned above existed only upto the days of Ārya Jamba Swāmi, (who died in Vira Samvat 64.). After him, all these precepts are said to have vanished. 44 (2593).

In reply to "a-cēlaka'pariśaha" the Acārya proceeds to say—

6. Vide vs. 2551-2552 (foot note 4).

जइ चेलभोगमेत्तादजिआचेलपरिसहो तेण ।
 अजियदिगिंछाइपरीसहो वि भत्ताइभोगाओ ॥४५॥२५९४॥
 एवं तुह न जियपरीसहा जिणिंदा व सव्वहावन्नं ।
 अहवा जो भत्ताइसु स विही चेले वि किं नेट्ठा ? ॥४६॥२५९५॥
 जह भत्ताइविसुद्धं राग-दोसरहिओ निसेवन्ते ।
 विजियदिगिंछाइपरीसहो मुणी सपडियारो वि ॥४७॥२५९६॥
 तह चेलं परिसुद्धिं राग-दोसरहिओ सुयविहीए ।
 होइ जियाचेलपरिसहो मुणी सेवमाणो वि ॥४८॥२५९७॥

45. Jai cēlabhogamēttādajīācēlayaparīsaho teṇa ।
 Ajīyadiginchāiparīsaho vi bhattāibhogāō. (2594)
46. Evam tuha na jīyaparīsahā Jīṇindā vi savvahāvannam ।
 Ahavā jo bhattaisu sa vihi cēlē vi kim neṭṭhā ? (2595)
47. Jaha bhattāivisuddham rāga-dosarahiō nisēvanto ।
 Vijiyadiginchāiparīsaho muṇi sa-padiyāro vi. (2596).
48. Taha cēlam parisuddhim rāga-dosarahiō suyavihīē ।
 Hōi jīyācēlaparīsaho muṇi sēvamāṇo vi. (2597).

[यदि चेलभोगमात्रादजिताचेलकपरिषहस्तेन ।
 अजितक्षुदादिपरीषहोऽपि भक्तादिभोगात् ॥४५॥२५९४॥
 एवं तव न जितपरीषहा जिनेन्द्रा अपि सर्वथापन्नम् ।
 अथवा यो भक्तादिषु स विधिश्चैलेऽपि किं नेष्टः ? ॥४६॥२५९५॥
 यथा भक्तादिविशुद्धं राग-द्वेषरहितो निषेवमाणः ।
 विजितक्षुदादिपरीषहो मुनिः सप्रतिकारोऽपि ॥४७॥२५९६॥
 तथा चेलं परिशुद्धं राग-द्वेषरहितः श्रुतविधिना ।
 भवति जिताचेलपरीषहो मुनिः सेवमानोऽपि ॥४८॥२५९७॥

45. Yadi cēlabhogamātrādajitācēlakaparīsahā stena ।
 Ajitakṣudādirīsaho'pi bhaktādi-bhogāt. (2594)

46. Evam tava na jitaparīṣahā Jinendrā api sarvathāpannam ।
Athava yo bhaktādiṣu sa vidhiścēlè'pi kim neṣṭaḥ ? (2595)
47. Yathā bhaktādivisuddham rāga-dvèṣarahito niṣèvamāṇaḥ ।
Vijitakṣudādīparīṣaho munīḥ sa-pratikāro'pi. (2596).
48. Tathā cēlam pariśuddham rāga-dvèṣarahitaḥ śrutavidhinā ।
Bhavati jitacēlaparīṣaho munīḥ sèvamāno'pi. (2597)

Trans. 45-46-47-48. By putting on a garment, if one is said to have been unable to overcome the strain of uncovered state, then, in taking food etc. he would as well be said to have been unable to overcome the distress of hunger etc. It would, therefore, follow according to you, that even Tīrthankaras are not able to overcome the distress of hunger etc. Or, has the rule applied to the case of (accepting) food etc. disappeared in case of (accepting) the garment? Just as, a true ascetic is said to have conquered the strain of hunger etc. in spite of his taking the prescribed food on account of the lack of passion or aversion (towards the same), in the same way, an ascetic who accepts the garment according to his religious commandment, is said to have conquered the distress of naked condition (as he does so without any passion or aversion. (2594-2297).

टीका-४५-४६-४७-४८ व्याख्या-जिताचेलपरीषहो मुनिर्भवतीति वयमपि मन्यामहे । केवलमिदं प्रष्टव्योऽसि-किं चेलभोगमात्रेणाप्यजिताचेलपरीषहत्वं भवति येन भवता सर्वथा वस्त्रपरित्यागः क्रियते, आहोस्विदनेषणीयादिदोषदुष्टवस्त्रपरिभोगेण ? । तत्राद्यपक्षे दूषणमाह-“जईत्यादि” यदि चेलभोगमात्रादपि तेन साधुनाऽऽचेलक्यपरीषहो न जित इति त्वया प्रोच्यते, तर्हि भक्तादिपरिभोगमात्रादजितदिगिच्छादिपरीषहोऽपि त्वदभिप्रायेणैव साधुः स्यात् । एतदुक्तं भवति-इह देशीवचनत्वाद् दिगिच्छाशब्देन क्षुत् प्रोच्यते, आदिशब्दात् पिपासादिपरिग्रहः, । ततश्च यद्येषणीयादिगुणोपेतवस्त्रपात्रपरिभोगाजिताचेलपरीषहो नेष्यते, तर्ह्येषणादिगुणसंपन्नभक्तपानादिपरिभोगाजितक्षुत्पिपासादिपरिषहोऽपि न कश्चिज्जगति स्यात् । भवत्वेवम्, न किञ्चिद् नः क्षुयत इति चेत् । अत्राह-“एवमि-

त्यादि” एवं सति त्वदभिप्रायेण जिनेन्द्रा अपि भगवन्तो निरुपमधृतिसंहननाः सच्चैकनिधयो न जितपरीषहा इति सर्वप्रकारैरापन्नम् । अर्धोद्गमादिदोषविप्रसृक्तं विशुद्धमेषणीयं राग-द्वेषरहितो भक्त-पानादिकं सेवमानोऽपि जितक्षुत्-पिपासा-दिपरीषहो मुनिर्भवति, तर्हि योऽयं भक्तादिषु विधिरुच्यते स चेलेऽपि वस्त्रेऽपि भण्यमानः किं नेष्टः कापि ?—ननु तदप्येषणीयं रागादिदोषरहितः परिभुञ्जानो जिताचेलपरीषहो मुनिः स्यादेवेति भावः । एतदेव व्यक्तीकुर्वन्नाह—“जह” इत्यादि गाथाद्वयं स्पष्टम् । नवरं “सपडिवारो वि त्ति” बुभुक्षा-पिपासा-शीतोष्णादीनां भक्त-पान-वस्त्रादिभिः सूत्रोक्तयतनया कृतः प्रतीकारः प्रतिविधानं येन स तथा । इदं च डमरुकमणिन्यायेन गाथाद्वयं संबध्यते । तस्मादनेषणीया-दिदोषदुष्टवस्त्रपरिमोगेणैवाजिताचेलपरीषहत्वं भवति, न तु सूत्रविधिना तदुपभुञ्जत इति ॥२५९४॥२५९५॥२५९६॥२५९७॥

D. C.

Acārya:—We fully agree with you, in believing that a person who overcomes the distress arising from naked condition, should be known as a true ascetic. But in connection with the same, I ask you this question: Are you in favour of completely renouncing the garment, because according to you, one cannot be said to have overcome *acēlaka pariśaha* if he puts on a garment? Or, do you hold the above-mentioned view in order to prevent the wearing of undesirable garments by the ascetics?

Taking the first alternative, if you are of the opinion of abandoning the garments on the ground that “*acēlaka pariśaha*” could be said to have been overcome only if the clothes are completely renounced, you are mistaken. According to this standard, even Tirthankaras will be said to have failed in overcoming the *pariśaha* of hunger etc. in spite of their having the best qualities of courage and strength.

Śivabhūti:—An ascetic who takes the pure prescribed food and drink, etc., without any desire or aversion on his part, would be said to have subdued the pangs of hunger etc.

Acārya:—The same standard should be applied to those who accept the prescribed garments without desire or aversion

on their parts. Why should they not be recognized to have overcome the pangs of being in an uncovered state? In short, we can plainly say that one who resists hunger, thirst, cold, and heat etc. with the help of food, water, garments etc., as directed by the religious rules, should be known to have overcome the respective *pariṣaha*. This shows that an ascetic is defeated by *a-cēlaka pariṣaha* only if he wears undesirable garments, but not if he accepts the same as directed by the religious rules.

Śivabhūti:—If an ascetic accepts a garment, how could he be said to have undergone the strain of *acēlakatva*? For, he is said to have endured the same only in absence of the garment.

Ācārya:—Your theory is wrong. 45-48 (2594-2597).

Because,

सदसंतचेलगोऽचेलगो य जं लोग-समयसंसिद्धो ।
तेणाचेला मुणओ संतेहिं, जिणा असंतेहिं ॥४९॥२५९८॥

49. Sadaśantacēlago'cēlago ya jam loga-samayasaṃsiddho ।
Teṇācēlā muṇaō santēhim, Jinā asantēhim. (2598)

[सदसचेलकोऽचेलकश्च यल्लोक-समयसंसिद्धः ।
तेनाचेला मुनयः सद्भिः, जिना असद्भिः ॥४९॥२५९८॥

49. Sadasaccēlako'cēlakśca yalloka-samayasaṃsiddhaḥ ।
Teṇācēlā munayaḥ sadbhiḥ Jinā asadbhiḥ. (2598)]

Trans. 49. Naked condition with, as well as, without clothes is welknown in the world, as well as, in Scriptures. The ascetics are (accepted as) naked with garments, (while) Tīrthaṅkaras (are naked) without garments. 2598.

टीका-४९ सच्चासच्च सदसती चेले यस्यासौ सदसचेलो यद् यस्माल्लोके समये चाचेलकः संसिद्धः प्रसिद्धः । च शब्दः प्रस्तावनायाम् । सा च कृतैव । तेन तस्मादिह मुनयः सामान्यसाधवः सद्भिरेव चेलैरुपचारतोऽचेला भण्यन्ते, जिनास्तु तीर्थकरा असद्भिश्चेलैर्मुख्यवृत्त्याऽचेला व्यपदिश्यन्ते । इदमुक्तं भवति-इहाचेलत्वं द्विविधम्,—मुख्यम्, उपचरितं च । तत्रेदानीं मुख्यमचेलत्वं संयमो-

पकारि न भवति, अत औपचारिकं गृह्यते, मुख्यं तु जिनानामेषासी-
दिति ॥२५९८॥

D. C. *Acēlakatva* or uncovered state is recognized in two ways : (1) By actual abandonment of clothes, and (2) By custom. Tirthaṅkaras are called *a-cēlaka*, on account of their complete abandonment of clothes. Ascetics who accept garments dispassionately on the ground that complete nakedness would not be beneficial to asceticism, are called *acēlaka* by custom, in spite of their putting on garments. 49 (2598).

Also,

परिसुद्ध-जुण्ण-कुच्छिय-थोवाऽनिययन्नभोगभोगेहिं ।
मुणओ मुच्छारहिया संतेहिं अचेलया होंति ॥५०॥२५९९॥

50. Parisuddha-juṇṇa-kucchiya-thovā'niyayannabhogabhogēhim ।
Muṇao mucchārahīyā santēhim acēlayā honti. (2599).

[परिशुद्धैर्जीणैः कुत्सितैः स्तोकैरनियतान्नभोगभोगैः ।
मुनयो मूर्च्छारहिताः सद्भिरचेलका भवन्ति ॥५०॥२५९९॥

50. Parisuddhai-r-jīṇaiḥ kutsitaiḥ stokaira-niyatānnabhogabhogaiḥ ।
Munayo mūrccārahitāḥ sadbhiracēlakā bhavanti. (2599)]

Trans. 50. The dispassionate ascetics become *acēlaka* in spite of their putting on, a few clean, but old, and cheap clothes in a disorderly manner. 2599.

टीका—५० मुनयः साधवो मूर्च्छारहिताः सद्भिरपि चेलैरुपचारतोऽचेलका भवन्ति । कथंभूतैश्चेलैः ? इत्याह—“परिसुद्धं चित्ति” लुप्तविभक्तिदर्शनात् परिशुद्धै-
रेषणीयैः, तथा जीर्णैर्बहुदिवसैः, कुत्सितैरस्यैः स्तोकैर्गणनाप्रभावतो हीनैस्तुच्छैर्वा
“अनिययन्नभोगभोगेहिं ति” अनियतभोगेन कादाचित्कासेवनेन भोगः परि-
भोगो येषां तानि तथा तैः । एवंभूतैश्चेलैः सद्भिरप्युपचारतोऽचेलका मुनयो
भण्यन्ते । तथा, “अन्नभोगभोगेहिं ति” एवमपि योज्यते । ततश्च लोकरूढ-
प्रकारान्यप्रकारेण भोग आसेवनम्, प्रकारलक्षणस्य मध्यपदस्य लोपात्, अन्य-
भोगस्तेनान्यभोगेन भोगः परिभोगो येषां तानि तथा तैरप्येवंभूतैश्चेलैरचेलकत्वं

लोके प्रसिद्धमेव, यथा कटीवस्त्रेण वेष्टितसिरसो जलावगाढपुरुषस्य । साधोरपि कच्छाबन्धाभावात्, कूर्पराभ्यामग्रभाग एव चोलपट्टकस्य धरणात्, मस्तकस्योपरि प्रावरणाद्यभावाच्च लोकरूढप्रकारादन्यप्रकारेण चेलभागो द्रष्टव्यः । तदेवं “परि-सुद्ध-जुण्ण-कुच्छिय” इत्यादिविशेषणविशिष्टैः सद्भिरपि चेलैस्तथाविधवस्त्राकार्या-करणात् तेषु मूर्च्छाऽभावाच्च मुनयोऽचेलका व्यपदिश्यन्त इतीह तात्पर्यम् ॥२५९९॥

-D. C. Ascetics who put on a few clean but old, and worth-
less clothes, dispassionately and in a disorderly manner, are recog-
nized as *acēlaka* out of custom. 50. (2599).

Besides,

जहजलमवगाहंतो बहुचेलो वि सिरवेष्टियकडिलो ।
भण्णइ नरो अचेलो तह मुणओ संतचेला वि ॥५१॥२६६०॥

51. Jaha jalamavagāhanto bahucēlo vi sirvetṭhiyakaḍillo ।
Bhaṇṇai naro acēlo taha muṇaō santacēlā vi. (2600).

[यथा जलमवगाहमानो बहुचेलोऽपि शिरोवेष्टितकटिकः ।
भण्यते नरोऽचेलस्तथा मुनयः सचेला अपि ॥५१॥२६००॥

51. Yathā jalamavagāhamāno bahucēlo'pi śiroveṣṭitakaṭikah ।
Bhaṇyate naro'cēlastathā munayaḥ sacēlā api. (2600)].

Trans. 51. Just as a person plunging into water with his lower garment turned round (his) head, is called naked in spite of his possessing many clothes, so also, the ascetics (are recognized) as *acēlaka* in spite of their possessing several garments. 2600.

टीका-गतार्था-

Also,

तह थोव-जुन्न-कुच्छियचेलेहि वि भन्नए अचेलो त्ति ।
जहत्तर सालिय ! लहुं दो पोत्ति नग्गिया मा त्ति ॥५२॥२६०१॥

52. Aha thova-junna-kucchiyacēlēhi vi bhannaē acēlo tti ।
Jahattara sāliya lahum do pottim naggiyā mā tti. (2601)

Trans. 52. Similarly, one is said to be *acēla* even with small, tattered, and worthless clothes, as in the case of a woman saying “O weaver! make haste, give me a *sāree*; I (look) almost naked” 2601.

टीका—५२ इयमपि सुगमा, नवरं “जहत्तरेत्यादि” दृष्टान्तः, यथेह कापि योषित् कटीवेष्टितजीर्णबहुच्छिद्रैकसाटिका कञ्चित् कोलिकं वदति—“त्वरस्व भोःशालिक ! शीघ्रो भूत्वा मदीयपोत्तीं शाटिकां निर्वाप्य ददस्व समर्पय, नयिका वर्तेऽहम्” तदिह सवस्त्रायामपि योषिति नाग्न्यवाचक शब्दप्रवृत्तेः “जस्सद्धा कीरइ नग्गभावो मुंडभावो अङ्गायं, अदत्तवणयं” इत्याद्यपि न विरुध्यत इति ॥२६०१॥

D. C. The “*acēlakatva*” attributed to the ascetics through tradition, could be understood from another example also. A woman putting on a very old and tattered *sāree* with many holes inside, would go to the weaver and say—“O weaver! make haste in preparing my garment, because I look (almost) naked without it.” Here the word ‘naked’ is used in spite of the woman putting on a garment; in the same way, ascetics are called *acēlaka* even though they put on a garment. 52 (2601).

Lastly, in reply to “Jam ca tihim ṭhāṇēhim vattham dharējja” etc., the Acārya says—

विहियं सुए चिय जओ धरेज्ज तिहिं कारणेहिं वत्थं ति ।

तेणं चिय तदवस्सं निरतिसएणं धरेयव्वं ॥५३॥२६०२॥

जिणकप्पाजोग्गाणं ही-कुच्छ-परीसहा जओऽवस्सं ।

ही लज्ज त्ति व सो संजमो तदत्थं विसेसेणं ॥५४॥२६०३॥

53. Vihiyam suē cciya jao dharejja tihim kāraṇēhim vattham ti ।
Tēṇam ciya tadavassam niratisaṇṇam dharēyavvam. (2602)

54. Jīṇakappājoggaṇam hī-kuccha-parisahā jao’vassam ।
Hī lajja tti va so saṃjamo tadattham visēsēṇam. (2603).

[विहितं श्रुत एव यतो धरेत् त्रिभिः कारणैर्वस्त्रमिति ।

तेनैव तदवश्यं निरतिशयेन धर्तव्यम् ॥५३॥२६०२॥

जिनकल्पायोग्यानांही-कुत्सा-परीषहा यतोऽवश्यम् ।
हीर्लज्जेति वा स संयमस्तदर्थं विशेषेण ॥५४॥२६०३॥

53. Vihitam śruta ēva yato dharēt tribhiḥ kāraṇai-r-vastramiti ।
Tēnaiva tadavaśyam niratiśayēna dhartavyam. (2602).

54. Jinakalpāyogyanām hrī-kutsā-parīṣahā yato'vaśyam ।
Hīrlajjēti vā sa saṁyamastadartham viśeṣeṇa (2603)].

Trans. 53-54. Since it is laid down in the Scriptures, that (an ascetic) should wear a garment on account of three reasons, he must certainly put it on in his own way. For, those who are unfit for (the practice of) Jinakalpa, should put on garments undoubtedly, for (the sake of) shame, (public) censure, and physical pain. For the sake of shame or restraint (one should do so) all the more. (2602-2603).

टीका-५३-५४ व्याख्या-ननु “त्रिभिः कारणैर्वस्त्रं धरणीयम्” इत्याग-
मोक्तं दर्शयता भगवताऽस्मत्पक्ष एव समर्थितो भवति, परं शून्यहृदयत्वाद् भवान्
न लक्षयति । तथाहि-इदानीं वयमपि वक्तुं शक्नुमः-“त्रिभिः कारणैर्वस्त्रं
धरेत्” इति सूत्रेऽपि विहितं प्रतिपादितं यतो यस्मात् तेनैव प्रकारेण तद् वस्त्रं
निरतिशयेन तथाविधवृत्तिसंहननादिरहितेन साधुनाऽवश्यं धरणीयमिति । कुतः
इत्याह-यतो यस्माद् निरतिशयत्वेन जिनकल्पायोग्यानां साधूनां ही-कुत्सा-
परीषह-लक्षणं वस्त्रधरणकारणं पूर्वाभिहितस्वरूपमवश्यमेव संभवति । ततो धरणी-
यमेव वस्त्रम् । यदि वा, कुत्सा-परीषहार्थं तद् न ध्रियते तथापि हीर्लज्जा, स च
संयमस्तदर्थं तावद् विशेषेणैव वस्त्रं धरणीयम्, अन्यथाऽग्निज्वलनादिना बृहद-
संयमापत्तेरिति ॥२६०२॥२६०३॥

D. C.

Acārya:—By saying that an ascetic should put on clothes for three reasons, you strengthen our case. You are not able to see that on account of the confusion in your mind. The sūtra implies that an ordinary ascetic who does not possess the necessary fortitude and strength of a Tirthāṅkara, and hence is unfit

(for the practice of) Jinakalpa, should put on garments for the sake of shame, (public) censure, and distress. He may not probably care for reproach and physical distress, but he should be very careful for shame or decency in order to practise perfect restraint. And, that is all the more reason why he should put on garments. Otherwise, there would be violence of austerity by means of litting up fire etc. 53-54 (2602-2603).

Concluding his arguments, the Ācārya explains—

जइ जिणमयं पमाणं तुह तो मा मुयसु वत्थ-पत्ताइं ।
पुव्वत्तदोसजालं लब्धिसि मा समिद्घायं च ॥५५॥२६०४॥
अणुवालेउमसत्तोऽपत्तो न समत्तमेसणासमिइं ।
वत्थरहिओ न समिओ निक्खेवादाणवोसग्गा ॥५६॥२६०५॥

55. Jai Jiṇamayam pamāṇam tuha to mā muyasu vattha-pattāim ।
Puvvuttadosajālam labbhisi mā samiḍghāyam ca. (2604)

56. Aṇuvāleumasatto'patto na samatta-mēsanāsamiim ।
Vattharahiō na samiō nikkhēvā-dāṇavosaggā. (2605)

[यदि जिनमतं प्रमाणं तव ततो मा मुञ्च वस्त्र-पात्रादि ।
पूर्वोक्तदोषजालं लब्धा मा समितिघातं च ॥५५॥२६०४॥
अनुपालयितुमशक्तोऽपात्रो न समस्तामेषणासमितिम् ।
वस्त्ररहितो न समितो निक्षेपादानव्युत्सर्गैः ॥५६॥२६०५॥

55. Yadi Jinamatam pramāṇam tava tato mā muñca vastra-pātrādi ।
Pūrvoktadoṣajālam labdhā mā samiti-ghātam ca. (2604)

56. Anupālayitumaśakto'pātro na samastāmēṣaṇāsamitim ।
Vastrarahito na samito nikṣepādāṇavyutsargaiḥ. (2605)]

Trans. 55-56. If the theory of the Tīrthaṅkaras is acceptable to you, then, do not (certainly) leave off clothes and vessels etc. Do not become susceptible to the faults mentioned before, and do not undergo violation of samiti⁷ thereby.

7. The rules of irreproachable conduct as an ascetic.

Without vessel etc., (you) will not be able to practise the whole of Eṣaṇā samitī⁸, and without garment, (you will) not (be able) to practise nikṣēpa (careful placing), ādāna (accepting with care), and vyutsarga (throwing away with due care). (2604-2605).

टीका-५५-५६ यदि जिनमतं तव प्रमाणम्, ततो वस्त्रपात्रादि मा मुञ्च मा त्याक्षीः । कुतः ? इत्याह-“तेणगहणानलसेवा” इत्यादिना पूर्वमुक्तं दोष-जालं मा लब्धाः । तथा, समितिघातं च तत्परित्यागे माऽऽप्नुहि त्वमिति । कस्याः पुनः समितेः पात्राद्यभावे विघातः ? इत्याह-“अणुवालेउमित्यादि” अशक्तोऽसमर्थो भवेत् । किं कर्तुम् ? । समस्तां परिपूर्णमेषणासमितिमनुपालयितुम् । कथंभूतः ? अपात्रः पात्ररहितः । पुनर्निक्षेपादानसमित्या व्युत्सर्गसमित्या च समितो न भवेत्, उपलक्षणत्वाद् भाषासमित्यापि समितो न भवेत्, वस्त्राद्यभावे रजोहरणमुखवस्त्रिकाद्यभावात् । तदभावे च यथोक्तसमितित्रयासिद्धेरिति ॥२६०४॥२६०५॥

D. C. If the theory of Tirthaṅkaras is acceptable to you, then, do not really abandon clothes, vessels etc; otherwise, you will be susceptible to faults that have already been mentioned⁹. You will also be violating the Samiti (Main Rule of an Ascetic's conduct) thereby. In absence of *pātra*, you will not be able to follow the whole of *eṣaṇā samitī* and being unable to practise *nikṣēpa*, *ādāna* and *vyutsarga*, you will not be able to perform *bhāṣā samitī* as well. In absence of *vastra* etc, like mukha-vastrikā, rajoharaṇa etc. you will be leaving a part of an ascetic's duties unperformed.

Thus, without *pātra* and *vastra*, you will be violating the principles of an ascetic's life. 55-56 (2604-2605).

Then,

8. The rule of moderation in desires.

9. Vide verses 2575-2579 particularly the extracts taken from Kalpa Bhāṣya etc. beginning with “Kappa āyappamāṇā.”

इय पण्णविओ वि बहुं सो मिच्छत्तोदयाकुलियभावो ।
 जिणमयमसद्दहंतो छड्ढियवत्थो समुज्जाओ ॥५७॥२६०६॥
 तस्स भगिणी समुज्झियवत्था तह चेव तदणुरागेणं ।
 संपत्थिया नियत्था तो गणियाए पुणो मुयई ॥५८॥२६०७॥
 तीए पुणो वि बद्धोरसेगवत्था पुणो विच्छंङ्गिती ।
 अच्छउ ते तेणं चिय समुणुण्णाया धरेसी य ॥५९॥२६०८॥
 कोडिन्न-कोट्टवीरे पज्जावेसी य दोण्णि सो सीसे ।
 तत्तो परंपराफासओऽवसेसा समुप्पन्ना ॥६०॥२६०९॥

57. Iya paṇṇaviö vi bahum so micchattodayākuliyabhāvo ।
 Jīṇamayamasaddahanto chaddiyavatto samujjāö. (2606).
 58. Tassa bhagiṇī samujjhiyavattā taha cèva tadanurāgeṇam ।
 Sampatthiya niyattā to gaṇiyāe puṇo muiyai. (2607)
 59. Tiè puṇo vi baddhorasegavattā puṇo vi vichanddintī ।
 Acchau tè tēṇam ciya samaṇuṇṇāyā dharēsī ya. (2608)
 60. Koḍinna-Koṭṭavīrè pajjāvèsī ya doṇṇi so sīsè ।
 Tatto paramparāphāsaö'vasēsā samuppannā. (2609).

[इति प्रज्ञापितो ऽपि बहु स मिथ्यात्वोदयाकुलितभावः ।
 जिनमतमश्रद्धानदृष्टिर्दितवस्त्रः समुद्यातः ॥५७॥२६०६॥
 तस्य भगिनी समुज्झितवस्त्रा तथैव तदनुरागेण ।
 संप्रस्थिता निवसिता ततो गणिकया पुनर्मुञ्चति ॥५८॥२६०७॥
 तथा पुनरपि बद्धोरसेकवस्त्रा पुनर्दृष्टयन्ती ।
 तिष्ठतु ते तेनैव समनुज्ञाताऽधार्षीच ॥५९॥२६०८॥
 कौण्डिन्य-कोट्टवीरौ प्राव्राजयच्च द्वौ स शिष्यौ ।
 ततः परम्परास्पर्शादवशेषाः समुत्पन्नाः ॥६०॥२६०९॥

57. Iti prajñāpito'pi bahu sa mithyātvo-dayākulitabhāvaḥ ।
 Jīnamatamaśraddhānascharditavastraḥ samudyātaḥ. (2606)

58. Tasya bhaginī samujjhitavastrā tathaiva tadanurāgeṇa ।
Samprasthitā nivasitā tato gaṇikayā puna-r-muñcati. (2607)
59. Tayā punarapi baddhorasèkavastrā punaschardayanti ।
Tiṣṭhtu tè tēnaiva samanujjātā'dhārṣicca. (2608)
60. Kaundinya-Kottavīrau prāvrajayacca dvau sa śīṣyau ।
Tataḥ paramparāsparsādavaśeṣāḥ samutpannāḥ. (2609)

Trans. 57-58-59-60. Although persuaded in many such ways, he, with his mind obsessed with vanity, did not put faith in the words of Tīrthaṅkaras, and went away, abandoning clothes. Following him, his sister also put off her clothes and went out. She was given a garment by a whore, but she put off the same again. She was again covered with a garment on the breasts by that (whore), and again, she was (on the point of) leaving the same. (But) at the advice of Śivabhūti "Let it be worn by you," she accepted it. He, then, initiated two pupils, named Kaundinya and Koṭṭavīra, by whose tradition, the sect of the Digambaras was produced. (2606-2609).

टीका-५७-५८-५९-६०-एताश्चतस्रोऽपि गतार्थाः, नवरं 'समुज्जाउ चि' त्यक्तवस्त्र उपाश्रयात् समुद्यातो निर्गतः । "नियत्था चि" ततो गणिकया निवसिता वस्त्रं परिधापितेत्यर्थः । "तीए चि" तया गणिकया "बद्धोरसेगवत्थ चि" बद्धमुरस्येकं वस्त्रं यस्याः सा तथेति । "ततो परंपरेत्यादि" ततः परम्परया योऽसौ स्पर्शो गुरुशिष्यसंबन्धस्तस्माद् बोटिकसंतानवर्तिनोऽवशेषा बोटिकाः समुत्पन्ना इति । एतासां च बोटिकव्यतिकरसंबद्धानां सर्वासामपि गाथानामर्थं संक्षिप्य "इह यो यदर्थी न स तन्निमित्तोपादानं प्रत्यनादृतः, यथा घटार्थी मृत्पिण्डोपादानं प्रति, चारित्रार्थिनश्च यतयः, तन्निमित्तं च चीवरमिति, न चास्यासिद्धत्वम्" इत्यादिना सूत्र-वस्त्र-पात्रपारिग्रहाविषयं वादस्थानकं वृद्धैर्विरचितमास्ते, तच्चोत्तराध्ययनेषु द्वितीये परीषदाध्ययने आचेलक्यपरीषहे बृहद्दीकायां तदर्थिनान्वेषणीयम् । तथा, इह खलु यस्य यत्रासंभवो न तस्य तत्र कारणवैकल्यम्, यथा शुद्धशिलायां शाल्यङ्कुरस्य, अस्ति च तथाविधस्त्रीषु मुक्तेः

कारणावैकल्यम्, न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः” इत्यादिना विरचितं स्त्रीनिर्वाणविषय-
मपि वादस्थानकं तत्रैव षड्विंशत्तमाध्ययने द्रष्टव्यमिति ॥२६०६॥२६०७॥
॥२६०८॥२६०९॥

D. C. Śivabhūti went out of the *upāśraya* in the naked condition. He was followed by his sister in the same condition. A whore gave her a garment to cover her body but she did not bear the same. The whore again covered her breasts with a garment, which, too, was being rejected by her. But at last Śivabhūti asked her to put on a garment and she did so.

Śivabhūti had initiated two pupils named Kauṇḍinya and Koṭṭavīra, who in their turn initiated others, and thus a chain of Boṭikas was continued till the whole of the sect (of Digambaras) was produced.

Concluding the explanation of all the verses in connection with the discussion with Boṭika, the author says “Iha yo yadārthī na sa tannimittopādānam pratyanādrītaḥ yathā ghaṭārthī nritpiṇḍopādānam prati, cāritrārthīnaśca yatayaḥ tannimittam ca cīvaramitī, na cāsyāsiddhatvam” etc.

[He who is desirous of any particular object, is not indifferent towards the employment of cause of production, just as any one desirous of a ghaṭa is not (indifferent) to the employment of a lump of clay, and also just as ascetics desirous of right conduct are not indifferent to clothes which are instruments (in the careful observance of vows.) It is not that this has not been proved (beyond doubt)].

A discussion on the subject of *sutra-vastra-pātra-parigraha* composed etc. by, old eminent, experienced Ācāryas can be found in the *Parīṣaha Adhyāyana of Uttarādhyāyana Sutra*.

Besides “Iha khalu yasya yatrā-sambhavo na tasya tatra kāranāvaikalyam, yathā śuddhaśīlāyām śalyaṅkurasya, asti ca tathāvidhastrīṣu mukteḥ kāranāvaikalyam, na cāyamasiddho hetuḥ” etc.

[Whatever is really impossible here, has not lack of absence of cause of production, just as there is absence of cause of budding of rice-grains on a clean slab of stone. But there is an existence of cause of production in case of *mukti* to females. This *hetu* is also not unproved.

A discussion on the subject of Nirvāṇa for females can be seen in the thirty-sixth Adhyāyana of Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra.



Chapter X



Summary of
Claims and interallegations of Nihnavas.

एवं एए भणिया उसप्पिणीए उ निण्हगा सत्त ।
वीरवरस्स पवयणे सेसाणं पवयणे न त्थि ॥१॥२६१०॥

1. *Evam èè bhaṇiyā Usappiṇīe u niṇhagā satta ।*
Viravarassa pavayaṇe sesāṇam pavayaṇe na tthi. (2610)

[एवमेते भणिता अवसर्पिण्यां तु निह्वाः सप्त ।
वीरवरस्य प्रवचने शेषाणां प्रवचने न सन्ति ॥१॥२६१०॥

1. *Evamète bhaṇitā Avasarpīṇyām tu niṇhāvāḥ sapta ।*
Viravarasya pravacanè śeṣāṇam pravacanè na santi. (2610)]

Trans. 1 In this way, Seven Nihnavas are said to have existed in the Avasarpīṇī age, during the regime of Vira Tīrthaṅkara (Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira). No more (Nihnavas) are said to have existed during the regime of other Tīrthaṅkaras. 2610.

टीका-१ एवमुक्तेन प्रकारेणैतेऽनन्तरोक्ताः कथिताः प्रतिपादिता अवसर्पिण्यामेव निह्वाः सप्त, अष्टमस्तु बोटिकश्चशब्दसमुच्चितादिकारणाद् न विवक्षितः । वीरवरस्य प्रवचने तीर्थे । शेषाणामर्हतां प्रवचने “न त्थि ति” न सन्ति, यद्वा नास्ति, “निह्वसत्ता” इति शेषः ॥२६१०॥

D. C. As mentioned in the foregoing pages, there have existed Seven Nihnavas in the Avasarpīṇī age, during the regime

of Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvīra. Still however, the word ca¹ expressed in the verse which enumerated their names is interpreted by the author, as well as, commentator to include another type of Nihnavas, known as Boṭikas or Digambaras. Excepting these types, there has never been a single type more. 1. (2610)

मोत्तूणेत्तो एक्कं सेसाणं जावजीविया दिट्ठी ।

एक्केक्कस्स व एत्तो दो दो दोसा मुणेयव्वा ॥२॥२६११॥

2. Mottaṇetto ÷kkam sēsāṇaṃ jāvajiviyā diṭṭhī ।
Ekkēkkassa ya etto do do dosā muṇeyavvā. (2611)

[मुक्त्वेत एकं शेषाणां यावज्जीविका दृष्टिः ।

एकैकस्य चैतस्माद् द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ ज्ञातव्यौ ॥२॥२६११॥

2. Muktvēta ÷kam śeṣāṇāṃ yāvajjivikā dṛṣṭiḥ ।
Ekaikasya caitasmād dvau dvau doṣau jñātavyau. (2611).

Trains. 2. Of them, barring one, all the rest believed in (observing austerities) till the end of (their) life, each one of whom has been recognized as susceptible to two faults. 2611.

टीका—२ मुक्त्वैषामेकं गोष्ठामाहिलं निह्वाधमं शेषाणां जमालिप्रभृतीनां प्रत्याख्यानमङ्गीकृत्य यावज्जीविका दृष्टिः, नापरिमाणं प्रत्याख्यानं ते मन्यन्ते इति भावना ।

आह—ननु पूर्वोक्तानुसारत एवेदमवसीयते, किमर्थमस्योपन्यासः ? इति । उच्यते—प्रत्यहमवश्यंकरणीयत्वेन प्रत्याख्यानस्योपयोगित्वाद् मा कश्चित् तथैव प्रतिपद्येत, ततो ज्ञाप्यते—निह्वानामपि प्रत्याख्याने यावज्जीविकैव दृष्टिः, अतो नापरिमाणं प्रत्याख्यानं विधेयमिति । “एत्तो ति” अतोऽमीषां मध्य एकैकस्य निह्वस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ मुणितव्यौ ज्ञातव्यौ, सदोषस्यापि स्वमतस्याभ्युपगमः, परमतस्य पुनरनभ्युपगम इति । इह च भावार्थं भाष्यकार एव वक्ष्यति । इति निर्युक्तिगाथाद्वयार्थः ॥२६११॥

D. C. Excepting Goṣṭhā Māhila (who believed in unlimited practice of *pratyākhyāna*) all the Nihnavas have accepted the principle of observing *pratyākhyāna* or vow till the end of his life. This is clearly understood from the original Nirukti, but in order to prevent people from following the wrong theory of Goṣṭhā Māhila, we beg to draw their attention to the fact that *pratyākhyāna* should be always limited to this life, and it never extends to the next life.

There is mutual allegation of faults to each one of them in this way. One blames the other firstly because he sticks to his own misbelief, and secondly, because he does not accept the right belief of the other. 2. (2611)

This is explained in details as follows :—

मोत्तूण गोष्ठमाहिलमन्नेसिं जावजीवसंवरणं ।
 कम्मं च बद्धपुट्टं खीरोदवदत्तणा समयं ॥३॥२६१२॥
 मोत्तुं जमालिमन्ने बेति कडं कज्जमाणमेवं तु ।
 एकैको एकैकं नेच्छइ अबद्धिओ दोन्नि ॥४॥२६१३॥
 अवरोप्परं समेया दो दोसे देतिं एकमेक्कस्स ।
 परमयसंपडिवत्तिं विपडिवत्तिं च समयम्मि ॥५॥२६१४॥

3. Mottuṇa Goṣṭha Māhilaṁmannēsīm jāvajīvasaṁvarṇaṁ ।
 Kammam ca baddhapuṭṭhaṁ khīrodavadattaṇā samayaṁ. (2612)
4. Mottum Jamalimannè bēti kaḍam kajjamāṇamēvaṁ tu ।
 Ekkēkko ēkkēkkam nēcchai abaddhiō donni. (2613)
5. Avaropparam samēyā do dosē dētim ēkkamēkkassa ।
 Paramayasampadivattim vipadivattim ca samayammi. (2614)

[मुक्त्वा गोष्ठामाहिलमन्येषां यावज्जीवसंवरणम् ।
 कर्म च बद्धस्पृष्टं क्षीरोदकवदात्मना समकम् ॥३॥२६१२॥
 मुक्त्वा जमालिमन्ये ब्रुवन्ति कृतं क्रियमाणमेवं तु ।
 एकैकं एकैकं नेच्छत्यबद्धिको द्वौ ॥४॥२६१३॥

परस्परं समेता द्वौ दोषौ ददति एकैकस्य ।

परमतसंप्रतिपत्तिं विप्रतिपत्तिं च स्वमते ॥५॥२६१४॥

3. Muktvā Goṣṭhā Māhila manyeṣām yāvajjīva saṃvaraṇam ।
Karma ca baddhaspriṣṭam kṣīrodakavadātmanā samakam. (2612)
4. Muktvā Jāmalimanye bruvanti kritam kriyamāṇamēvam tu ।
Ekaika ēkaikam nēcchatyabaddhiko dvau. (2613)
5. Parasparam sametā dvau doṣau dadati ēkaikasya ।
Paramatasampratipattim vipratipattim ca svamatē. (2614)]

Trans. 3-4-5. All the Nihnavas excepting Goṣṭhā Māhila hold the observance of vow (to be) limited till the end of this life, and (believe that) Karma is intimately united with Soul, like milk and water. Excepting Jāmalī, all believed that what is being done, has already been done (and so on). Each one of them disbelieves the other's principle, while the *abaddhika* misbelieves two (principles). So, when they meet, each one attributes two faults to the other by way of his disbelief of the other, and by way of his misbelief in his own principle. (2612-2614).

टीका-३-४-५ व्याख्या-एतेषां मध्ये गोष्ठामाहिलं मुक्त्वा शेषाणां याव-
ज्जीवं संवरणं यावज्जीवं प्रत्याख्यानं विधेयमित्यभ्युपगम इत्यर्थः । तथा,
गोष्ठामाहिलादन्येषां कर्म च संमतम् । कथंभूतम् ? आत्मना समकं जीवेन सह-
बद्धस्पृष्टम् । किंवत् ? क्षीरोदकवदिति । गोष्ठामाहिलस्त्वेतद् द्वितयमपि न मन्यत
इति । जमालिप्रभृतयस्तर्हि किं मन्यन्ते ? किं वा न मन्यन्ते ? इत्याह-“मोक्षं
जमालिमित्यादि” जमालिं मुक्त्वाऽन्ये तिष्यगुप्तादयः क्रियमाणं कृतं मन्यन्ते,
जमालिस्त्वेतद् न मन्यते, किन्तु कृतमेव कृतमभ्युपगच्छति । एवं तिष्यगुप्तं
मुक्त्वा शेषाः परिपूर्णं जीवमिच्छन्ति, तिष्यगुप्तस्तु चरमेव प्रदेशं जीवं मन्यन्त
इत्याद्यप्रेतनेष्वपि सुधियाऽभ्युह्य वाच्यम् । एवं “तु त्ति” तुशब्दस्य चशब्दार्थ-
त्वादेवं च सति किं सिद्धम् ? इत्याह-“एकैको इत्यादि” एकैको निहवः
श्रीमज्जिनोक्तपदार्थानां मध्ये दक्षितन्यायेनैकैकं पदार्थं नेच्छति । अबद्विकरतु

गोष्ठामाहिलः पूर्वदर्शितौ द्वौ पदार्थौ नेच्छति, उक्तशेषांस्तु पदार्थान् सर्वानपीच्छ-
तीति । ततः किम् ? इत्याह—“अवरोप्परमित्यादि” एवं च सत्येकत्रसमेता
मिलिताः सर्वेऽपि निह्नुवा विवदन्तः परस्परमेकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ ददति
प्रयच्छन्ति । तत्र बहुरतादेः प्रादेशिकादिः परस्तस्य परस्य यद् मतं निजोऽभि-
प्रायस्तदभ्युपगमरूपा या संग्रतिपत्तिः सा परमतसंग्रतिपत्तिस्तां परस्परं दूषयन्ति ।
तथा, बहुरतादेः स्वस्यात्मनो यद् मतं तत्र या तदनभ्युपगमरूपा परस्य प्रादेशि-
कादेर्विप्रतिपत्तिस्तां दूषयन्ति । एवं च सत्येकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ संबध्येते ।

अयमत्र भावार्थः—बहुरतः प्रादेशिकं वक्ति, तत्र द्वौ दोषौ—एकं तावत्
“कृतमेव कृतम्” इति मदीयमतं निर्दोषमपि न मन्यसे, “चरम एव प्रदेशो
जीवः” इत्यात्मीयमतं तु सदोषमपि मन्यसे इति । एवं प्रादेशिकोऽपि बहुरतस्य
व्यत्ययेन द्वौ दोषौ ददाति । तथा, अयमेव प्रादेशिकोऽव्यक्तवादिनं वदति, तत्र
द्वौ दोषौ—सदोषस्वमताभ्युपगमः, निर्दोषमदीयमतानभ्युपगमश्चेति । एवमव्य-
क्तोऽपि प्रादेशिकस्य व्यत्ययेन द्वौ दोषौ ददाति । एवं तावद् नेयं यावत् त्रैराशि-
कोऽबद्धिकं वक्ति द्वौ दोषौ—सदोषस्वमताभ्युपगमः, निर्दोषमदीयमतानभ्युपगम-
श्चेति एवमबद्धिकोऽपि त्रैराशिकं व्यत्ययेन द्वौ दोषौ ददातीति । एवं एवं बहुरता-
दयोऽव्यक्तादिभिरपि सह द्विक्योगेन क्रमशश्चारणीयाः, सर्वत्र च द्विक्योगे यथो-
क्तदोषद्वयप्रदानं परस्परतो वक्तव्यम् ।

आह—नन्वबद्धिकः स्पृष्टाबद्धं कर्म, परिमाणरहितं च प्रत्याख्यानमिति द्वौ
पदार्थौ नेच्छतीति प्रागुक्तम् । ततश्चासौ प्रतियोगिनो निह्नुवस्य त्रीन् दोषान्
ददाति, प्रतियोग्यप्यस्य त्रीनेव दोषान् प्रयच्छतीति प्राप्नोति । तथाहि—अबद्धिको
बहुरतं वक्ति—तव त्रयो दोषाः एकं तावद् निर्दोषमपि मदभ्युपगतपदार्थद्वयं
नेच्छसि, अपरं च स्वयं सदोषमपि स्वाभिमतं पदार्थं कल्पयसीति । एवं बहुरतोऽ-
प्यबद्धिकस्य व्यत्ययेन दोषत्रयं ददातीति । एवमबद्धिकेन सह प्रतियोगिनां
विचारे सर्वत्र दोषत्रयं प्राप्नोति, तत् कथं एकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ दोषौ इति व्याप्त्या
प्रोच्यते ?—सत्यम्, यद्यबद्धिकस्य व्यक्तिविवक्षया पदार्थद्वयभेदेन भिन्नं मतं
विवक्ष्यते, तदा यत् त्वं वदसि तत् तथैव मन्यामहे । यदा तु पदार्थद्वयभेदेन
भिन्नमपि तस्य सामान्येनैकं मतमात्रं विवक्ष्यते तदा दर्शितन्यायेनैकैकस्य द्वौ द्वौ
दोषाविति सर्वत्र न विरुध्यत इत्यलं विस्तरेणेति ॥२६१२॥२६१३॥२६१४॥

D. C. All the *Nihnavas* excepting *Gosṭhā Māhila* have accep-

pted the doctrine of *sa-parimāṇa* pratyākhyāna. They also admit the relation of Karma and Soul as intimate as that of water and milk. Goṣṭhā Māhila tries to refute both these theories.

All the *Nihnava*s except Jamāli hold the view that “*kriya-māṇa* is *kṛita*” while Jamāli believes that *kṛita* alone could be recognized as *kṛita*.

Those excepting Tisya-gupta rightly believe that the whole region of Jīva is *Jīva*, while according to Tisya-gupta, the last portion alone is *Jīva*.

In this manner, when Goṣṭhā Māhila disbelieves two doctrines of the Tīrthaṅkara, each one of the rest disbelieves one. Since, each one of them holds a belief different from another, he attributes two faults to the other. For example, Jamāli the Bahurata *Nihnava*, accuses Tisya-gupta first of disbelieving his own doctrine of “*kṛita* is *kṛita*” and secondly of holding a wrong theory of “no-jīva”. The *pradeśika nihnava* (Tisya-gupta) on the other hand, makes counter-allegations on Jamāli on the same grounds. Tisya-gupta further attributes two faults of accepting a wrong belief and rejecting the right one to *Avyaktavādin*, who in his turn, accuses *pradeśika* of similar faults. The same is the case with Trairāśikas and others.

It should be noted here that since the *abaddhika Nihnava* believes in *sprīṣṭa-baddha* karman and *a-parimāṇa pratyākhyāna* he has to preach two doctrines. If these two doctrines are taken separately, he attributes three faults to the opponent who also in turn makes three allegations on him.

On the other hand, if the two doctrines are taken together as one, the allegation and counter-allegation will be based on two faults only. This is explained by the author clearly on the consideration that the *abaddhika* blames the opponent in as much as he (i. e., the opponent) disbelieves the two doctrines laid down by *abaddhika* and wrongly asserts his own theory which is not acceptable to anyone else. The opponent, too, blames the *abaddhika* on the same grounds. 3-5 (2612-2614).

Also,

अबद्धिस्स दोसे दिंति तओ सो वि तिन्नि अन्नस्स ।
तिप्पभिइ तु समेया दोसे तिप्पभिइए दिंति ॥६॥२६१५॥

6. Abaddhiyassa dosè dinti taö so vi tinni annassa ।
Tippabhii tu samèya dosè tippabhiè dinti. (2615)

[अबद्धिकस्य दोषान् ददति ततः सोऽपि त्रीनन्यस्य ।
त्रिप्रभृतयस्तु समेता दोषांस्त्रिप्रभृतीन् ददति ॥६॥२६१५॥

6. Abaddhikasya doṣān dadati tātaḥ so'pi trīnanyasya ।
Triprabhritayastu sametā doṣānstriprabhratīn dadati. (2615)]

Trans. 6. (The opponents) blame abaddhika. Therefore, he, too, attributes three faults to each one (of them). When three or more *Nihnavas* meet (together), each one of them tries to attribute three or more faults to the other. (2615)

टीका—६ ‘तउ चि’ व्यक्तिविवक्षारूपेण पूर्वदर्शितविधिना त्रीन् दोषानबद्धिकस्य बहुरतादयः प्रत्येकं ददाति, सोऽप्यबद्धिकस्त्रीन् दोषानन्यस्य बहुरतादेः प्रत्येकं ददाति । तदेवं द्वयोः समुदितयोरेष विधिर्दर्शितः । यदा तु त्रिप्रभृतयः समुदिता भवन्ति तदा को विधिः ? इत्याह—“तिप्पभिइत्यादि” त्रिप्रभृतयस्तु समुदितास्त्रिप्रभृतीन् दोषान् ददाति । इदमत्र हृदयम्—बहुरतादिषु त्रिषु समुदितेषु बहुरतः शेषान् वक्ति—ननु भवतस्त्रयो दोषाः—कुत्सितनिजनिजमतप्ररूपणाकृतौ द्वौ, निर्दोषमदीयमतविप्रतिपत्तिकृतस्त्वेक इति । एवं सर्वत्र त्रिक्योगे उपयुज्य वक्तव्यम् । केवलमबद्धिकेन सह यस्त्रिक्योगस्तत्र व्यक्तिविवक्षायामेकदोषवृद्धेस्त्वत्वारो दोषा वक्तव्याः । तथा प्रभृतिग्रहणाच्चतुष्क—पञ्चक—षष्ठक—सप्तकयोगेष्वपि यथासंख्यं चतु—पञ्च—षट्—सप्तदोषा उक्तानुसारतो भवनीयाः । केवलमबद्धिकेन सह चतुष्कादियोगे व्यक्तिविवक्षायामेकदोषवृद्ध्या पञ्चादयो दोषा वाच्याः । इति गाथा चतुष्टयार्थः ॥२६१५॥

D. C. When the first three *Nihnavas* meet together, each one of them alleges the other of three faults. Say, when Bahu-rata and the other two (excepting the *abaddhikas*) meet, each one of them attributes three faults to the other, because each

one preaches wrong ideals (according to the other) and rejects the right belief (held by him). Thus, all these *Nihnavas*, barring *abaddhikas*, become susceptible to three faults,

Now, when *abaddhika* joins the other two *Nihnavas*, he attributes four faults to either of the two, and becomes susceptible to four faults. In a group of four, five, six, and seven *Nihnavas*, each *Nihnava* attributes four, five, six, and seven faults respectively on the other. But whenever there is *abaddhika* in the above-mentioned group, one more fault is added. So, in case of four, five, six, and seven *Nihnavas* (including the *abaddhika*) each one alleges the other of five, six, seven, and eight faults respectively. 6. (2615).

Explaining the purpose of *Nihnavas'* theories, the author proceeds—

सत्तेया दिट्ठीओ जाइ-जरा-मरण-गम्भवसहीणं ।

मूलं संसारस्स उ हवन्ति निगगन्थरूपेण ॥७॥२६१६॥

7. Sattēyā diṭṭhīō jāi-jarā-maraṇa gabbhavasahīṇam ।
Mālam saṃsārassa u havanti niggantharūpeṇa. (2616)

[सप्तैता दृष्टयो जाति-जरा-मरण-गर्भवसतीनाम् ।

मूलं संसारस्य तु भवन्ति निर्ग्रन्थरूपेण ॥७॥२६१६॥

7. Saptaitā dṛṣṭayo jāti-jarā-maraṇa-garbhavasatīnām ।
Mūlam saṃsārasya tu bhavanti nirgrantharūpeṇa. (2616)]

Trans. 7. (Theories of) all the seven *Nihnavas* happen to be the root-cause of birth, old age, death, and rebirth, and also of mundane world, even with an attire of an ascetic. 2616.

टीका-७. सप्तैता दृष्टयः सप्तनिहवदर्शनानि, बोटिकास्तु पूर्वोक्तकारणाद् न विवक्षिताः, मूलं कारणं भवतीति संबन्धः । कासाम् ? इत्याह-जाति-जरा-मरण-गर्भवसतीनाम् । जाति नारकादिषु यत् प्रसूतिमात्रं तद्रूपा गृह्यते, गर्भवसतिस्तु पञ्चेन्द्रिय-तिर्यग्-मनुष्येषु गर्भावास इति न पौनरुक्त्यम् । तथा, संसरणं

चारकादिषु पुनः पुनर्भ्रमणं संसारस्तस्य च मूलमेताः सप्तनिह्ववदृष्टयो निर्ग्रन्थरूपमात्रेण । इतिनिर्युक्तिगाथार्थः ॥२६१६॥

D. C. Theories of all the Seven *Nihnavas* do not, in any way, lead to the attainment of Mokṣa, but they become the root-cause of the saṃsāra and its cycle of birth, old age, death, and re-birth. They happen to be mendicants only outwardly.

Then the question arises as to whether *Nihnavas* should be considered as mendicants, or as followers of some other religion, or as householders. The author explains that they are real mendicants. Really speaking, food meant for a mendicant is not acceptable to another mendicant. *Nihnavas* do not follow this rule.

And,

पवयणनिह्वयाणं जं तेसिं कारियं जहिं जत्थ ।

भाजं परिहरणाए मूले तह उत्तरगुणे य ॥८॥२६१७॥

8. Pavayaṇanihvaṇāṇaṃ jaṃ tesaṃ kārīyaṃ jahim jattha ।
Bhajjaṃ pariharaṇāḍe malā taha uttaraguṇe ya. (2617)

[प्रवचनाकिञ्चित्करणं यत् तेषां कारितं यदा यत्र ।

भाज्यं परिहरणेन मूले तथोत्तरगुणे च ॥८॥२६१७॥

8. Pravacanākincitkarāṇaṃ yat teṣāṃ kārītaṃ yadā yatra ।
Bhājyaṃ pariharaṇeṇa malā tathottaraguṇe ca. (2617).]

Trans. 8. Whenever and wherever whatever is prepared for the (*Nihnavas*) who transgress the prescribed rules, should be alternatively given up, (as they affect) the original, as well as, the subsidiary predicaments. 2617.

टीका—८ ‘निह्वयं चि’ देशीवचनमकिञ्चित्कार्थे, प्रवचने यथा भणितं क्रियाकलापं प्रत्यकिञ्चित्कराणां यदशनादि तेषां निह्ववानां कारितं यस्मिन् काले यस्मिन् क्षेत्रे, तद् भाज्यं विकल्पनीयम् । कया ? । परिहरणया वर्जनया । कदाचित् परिह्रियते वर्ज्यते, कदाचिद् नेति । यदि लोको न जानाति यथैते निह्ववाः साधुभ्यो भिन्नास्तदा परिह्रियते । अथ तु जानाति तदा न परिह्रियत इति । अथवा,

परिहरणा परिभोगोऽभिधीयते । यत उक्तम्—“ धारणया उवभोगो परिहरणा तस्स होइ परिभोगो ” इति । ततश्च कदाचिद् परिह्रियते परिभुज्यते, कदाचिद् न, इत्येवं परिहरणा । किं पुनरित्थं भाज्यम् ? इत्याह—मूले मूलगुणविषयमाधाकर्मादि, तथा उत्तरगुणे चोत्तरविषयं क्रीत-कृतादि । ततो नेते निह्णवाः साधवः, तदर्थार्थकृतस्यासाधूनामेकान्तेन कल्प्यत्वात् । नापि गृहस्थाः न वा तीर्थान्तरीयाः, तदर्थार्थकृतस्यासाधूनामेकान्तेन कल्प्यत्वात् । तस्मादव्यक्ता एवैति ॥ इति निर्युतिगार्थः ॥२६१७॥

D. C. It has already been said above that *Nihnavas* are not real mendicants, because they do not satisfy the rule as regards food etc. prescribed for the mendicants. Food etc. meant for mendicants should never, as a rule, be accepted by others. While in case of *Nihnavas*, the same may or may not be accepted by others. When people do not know that these *Nihnavas* are different from real mendicants, food etc. prepared for them, must not be accepted by other mendicants, but when they happen to realize the fact that *Nihnavas* are not real mendicants, food etc. meant for them should be abandoned. Right from the original predicament like that of taking pledge etc. to the minor predicament like that of *kritākṛita* etc. alternative acceptance (of food etc. meant for *Nihnavas*) is prescribed.

In such a case, the *Nihnavas* are neither called *sādhus* nor *grihasthas* (house-holders), nor the followers of some other religion, because their food etc. happen to be neither wholly acceptable nor wholly unacceptable, but somewhat acceptable to some other mendicants. So, they are known as *avyaktas* or indistinct. 8. (2617).

The reason of placing them under this new category is repeated, when the author again states that—

जत्थ विसेसं जाणइ लोगो तेसिं च कुणइ भत्ताइ ।
तं कप्पइ साहूणं सामन्नकयं पुनरकप्पं ॥९॥२६१८॥

9. Jattha visēsam jāṇai logo tēsīm ca kuṇai bhattaīm ।

Tam kappai sāhūṇam sāmānnayam punarakappam. (2618).

[यत्र विशेषं जानाति लोकस्तेषां च करोति भक्तादि ।

तत् कल्पते साधूनां सामान्यकृतं पुनरकल्प्यम् ॥९॥२६१८॥

9. Yatra viśeṣam jānāti lokastēṣāṃ ca karoti bhaktādi ।

Tat kalpatē sādhanām sāmānyakṛitam punarakalpyam. (2618)]

Trans. 9. Wherever people know in particular (that they are not real mendicants), their food etc. become acceptable to other mendicants. But ordinarily that is not acceptable. 2618.

टीका-९. गतार्था, नवरं “सामन्नकयं ति” निह्वरूपतां विशेषेण तेषाम-
ज्ञात्वा सामान्येन यत् कृतं तदकल्प्यमित्यर्थः ॥२६१८॥

Lastly, with regard to food etc., prepared for *Boṭikas* the author says—

मिच्छादिद्विधाणं जं तेसिं कारियं जहिं जत्थ ।

सव्वं पि तयं सुद्धं मूले तह उत्तरगुणे य ॥१०॥२६१९॥

भिन्नमय-लिंग-चरिया मिच्छदिट्ठि त्ति बोडियाऽभिमया ।

जं ते कयमुद्दिसिउं तं कप्पइ जं च जइजोग्गं ॥११॥२६२०॥

10. Micchāddiṭṭhiyāṇam jam tesim kāriyam jahim jattha ।

Savvam pi tayam suddham mule taha uttaraguṇe ya. (2619)

11. Bhinnamaya-līṅga-cariyā-micchaddiṭṭhi tti boḍiyā’bhimayā ।

Jam te kayamuddisium tam kappai jam ca jai joggam. (2620)

[मिथ्यादृष्टिकानां यत् तेषां कारितं यदा यत्र ।

सर्वमपि तत् शुद्धं मूलं तथोत्तरगुणे च ॥१०॥२६१९॥

भिन्नमत्त-लिंग-चर्या-मिथ्यादृष्टय इति बोटिका अभिमताः ।

यत् तान् कृतमुद्दिश्य तत् कल्पते यच्च यतियोग्यम् ॥११॥२६२०॥

10. Mithyādrīṣṭikānām yat teṣāṃ kārītam yadā yatra ।

Sarvamapi tat śuddham mūlam tathottara guṇe ca. (2619)

11. Bhinnamata-līṅga-caryā-mithyādrīṣṭaya iti Boṭikā abhi-
matāḥ ।

Yat tān kṛitamuddiśya tat kalpatē yacca yatiyogyam. (2620)]

Trans. 10-11. Whenever and where, whatever is prepared for mendicants preaching false doctrines, (should) entirely (be taken) as pure according to original, as well as, accessory predicaments. Boṭikās are known as mithyādrīṣṭikas^a on account of their doctrine, dress, and character being different. (Hence), whatever is meant for them becomes acceptable to other mendicants. (2619-2620)

टीका-१० मिथ्यादृष्टीनां बोटिकानां यदशनादि तेषां कारितं यस्मिन्काले यत्रक्षेत्रे तद् मूलगुणविषयम्, उत्तरगुणविषयं च सर्वमपि शुद्धं साधूनां कल्पनीयम् ॥ इतिनिर्युक्ति गाथार्थः

टीका-११ मतं च लिङ्गं च भिक्षाग्रहणादिविषया चर्या च मत-लिङ्ग-चर्याः, भिन्ना मत-लिङ्ग-चर्या येषां ते तथाभूताः सन्तो बोटिका मिथ्यादृष्ट-योऽभिमतः, भिन्नमतत्वादिकारणात् ते निर्युक्तिकृता मिथ्यादृष्टित्वेन निर्दिष्टा इत्यर्थः। यच्चाशनादि तानुद्दिश्य कृतं तत् साधूनां कल्पते। आह-ननु बोटिका-नुद्दिश्य सचितं कर्कटिका-दाडिमाद्यपि क्रियते, अचितं चानन्तकाय-वृन्ताका-द्यपि संस्कृत्य विधीयते, तत् किं सर्वमपि साधूनां कल्पते?। न, इत्याह-“जं च जज्जोगं ति” तानुद्दिश्य कृतमपि यदेव यतीनां साधूनां योग्यमुक्तं प्राशुकमेष-णीयं, समये चानुज्ञातं, तदेव कल्पते नान्यत् ॥ इति गाथार्थः ॥२६१९॥॥२६२०॥

D. C. Everything prepared for *mithyā-drīṣṭikas* is *śuddha*. Boṭikas with their doctrine, dress, and behaviour in asking for alms etc., different from the real mendicants are, known as *mithyā-drīṣṭikas* or false preachers. Hence whatever (food etc.) is prepared for them, becomes acceptable to other mendicants. Still however, it should be noted carefully that if the food happened to be raw vegetable like karkatika or cooked cucumber-pomegranate etc. or ananta kāya like vrintāka (brinjal) the same would not be acceptable to other mendicants. Only that which is acceptable to ascetics according to the prescribed rules, should be accepted by other mendicants and not anything else. 10-11. (2619-2620).



2. False preachers.

CORRECTIONS

Page	Line	Incorrect	Correct
3	23	describeces -	describes
6	29	अव्य	अव्यक्ताः
11	23	मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयो दयतो	मिथ्यात्वमोहनीयोदयतो
12	15	मध्ये	मध्ये
15	9	. o	to
20	8	ef	of
29	21	khdira	khadira
52	5	prrdèśa	pradèśa

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- Abaddhikas- 5, 9, 332, 334, 335, 336.
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 Acèlakatva- 307, 311, 318, 319, 321.
 Acèlaka Pariṣaha- 317, 318.
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